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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of the structure and function of deft constructions in 
discourse. Drawing on a corpus of naturally-occurring spoken and written data, we 
present a multi-layered explanation of how it-clefts, wh-clefts, and reverse wh-clefts are 
different from non-clefts, and from one another. After a review of previous research on 
clefts in discourse, we explore the aspects of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics relevant 
to the structure and function of all three types of deft. The discussion falls into three 
main parts: 
" An analysis of the three deft types, within the framework of Generalized Phrase 
Structure Grammar (cf. Gazdar et aL [19851), in which particular attention is 
paid to the variety of constituents that can appear in particular positions in each 
type. The output of the grammar rules is compared to the examples that occur 
in the corpus of data. 
"A treatment of deft presupposition in terms of an analogy (suggested by van der 
Sandt [1988)) between presupposition and the treatment of pronominal anaphora 
in Kamp's [19811 Discourse Representation Theory. 
" An examination of the range of accentual patterns, presuppositional relations, 
and information structures typically appearing in clefts of all three kinds. We 
show that marked distinctions exist between the three cleft types in terms of all 
these factors, and suggest ways in which this helps to differentiate the range of 
discourse contexts in which clefts in general, and each cleft type in particular, are 
appropriate. 
At the end of the thesis we point to an analogy between the formal model for clefts 
presented and a psychological model of sentence processing. We also suggest how the 
conclusions regarding both the structure and function of clefts as a class of construction 
and the distinction between the three types of cleft could be synthesised in a deci- 
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This thesis is about CLEFT CONSTRUCTIONS, particularly the factors that might deter- 
n-dne a speaker's or writer's decision to use such a construction in a particular discourse 
context. The types of cleft- construction that will be considered are IT-CLEFTS (some- 
times termed CLEFTS), WH-CLEFTS (sometimes termed PSEUDO-CLEFTS), and REVERSE 
WII-CLEFTS (or INVERTED PSEUDO-CLEFTS). Examples of each respectively appear be- 
low: 
a It was Karen who was doing the typing. 
b What I'm interested in is aeroplane modelling. 
c That's what I meant. 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine a range of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic- 
contextual factors that are relevant in differentiating clefts from other sentence types and 
from one another, and to present an account of their functions in connected discourse 
in terms of a synthesis of these factors. 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Cleft constructions of all three types first began to attract attention in the 1970's (cf. Ak- 
majian (1970], Harries [19721, Hankamer [1975], Gundel [1975,19771, Halvorsen [19781, 
Higgins [1979] inter alia) where the majority of research was couched in the terms 
of Transformational Grammar. For this reason, the discussion centered upon theory- 
internal debates concerning which kinds of cleft were base-generated, and which were 
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transform ati on ally driven, and whether the transformations involved were pre- or post- 
cyclic. 
Although it is possible to extract some concrete observations with respect to cleft syntax 
from this literature, the transformational tradition left two particular legacies with 
respect to the study of clefts. One, perhaps appropriate given the syntactic nature 
of the research involved, was a methodology almost entirely based on the study of 
decontextualised examples, judgements regarding the grammaticality or acceptability 
of the data involved being left to the discretion of the researcher. This had long-term 
effects on research on clefts in general, not just in the field of syntax, in that the 
assumptions made about the syntactic, p rosodic and functional variety that existed 
in the data seemed to underestimate, often drastically, what corpus-based study can 
actually reveal to be the case. 
The second legacy, which stems from the first, is the assumption that it-clefts and wh- 
clefts, as tru th-functi on ally equivalent constructions, are interchangeable in context. 0 
Akmajian states tids explicitly: 
There is a great deal of similarity between cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences. 
For example, the following two sentences: 
(1-2) a The one who Nixon chose was Agnew. 
b It was Agnew who Nixon chose. 
are synonymous, share the same presuppositions, answer the same questions, 
and in general they can be used interchangeably. 
[Akmajian 1970: 149] 
Eight years after Akmajian's claim, Prince (1978] produced an important rejoinder: she 
argued in her paper A comparison of wh-clefts and it-clefts in discourse that the two 
construction types were distinct in structure, and in discourse function, supporting her 
arguments with naturally-occurring, contextualised examples. Prince was able to show 
not only distinct functions for it-clefts and, wh-clefts, but the existence of a heterogeneity 
within the two cleft types that was an entirely new observation. In many ways, the 
research reported in this thesis takes this important paper of Prince's as a starting 
point. 
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As with all research, Prince's work left many questions unanswered. At what level 
of description could the distinctions between cleft constructions be differentiated from 
non-clefts? NVas it really the case that it-clefts and wh-clefts served to convey entirely 
distinct types of information, in all cases? What was the true extent of the heterogeneity 
Prince claimed regarding it-clefts in particular, and had she even underestimated it? 
In particular, what could be said for reverse wh-clefts, which had rarely received any 
attention, either in Prince's work or in the work that led up to it? 
Apart from the important stimulus of Prince's paper, a second influence in this research 
has been the parallel work on cleft semantics that has been going on often independently 
of research into their syntax and discourse function. Many researchers (notable among 
them being Chomsky [1971], Keenan [19711, StaInaker [1974], and Gazdar [1979]) have 
suggested a role for clefts as PRESUPPOSITIONAL constructions, on a variety of defini- 
tions of presupposition. Although it was generally agreed that clefts do convey presup- 
positions, very little research had been done into how presupposition might relate to 
discourse notions such as information structure and focus. For example, how could a 
syntax-based view of presupposition-where a presupposed proposition was postulated 
on the basis of the syntactic structure of the sentence-be related to accounts of cleft 
constructions that appeal to notions of what is 'Given' or 'New' in context? What (lid 
it mean for 'New' information to be 'presented as part of the presupposition? 
Both kinds of account clearly have their advantages for the description of clefts. The 
accounts based on information structure have their strength in the fact that they address 
how an utterance relates to the current state of the discourse context, and the shared 
knowledge aýnd assumptions of speaker and hearer. The weakness of such accounts, 
however, is that they have no power to explain the existence of clefts as a particular 
syntactic structure: on the basis of information structure alone, clefts of various types 
are often equivalent to other structures. The strength of syntax-based accounts of cleft 
presupposition, on the other hand, is that they point to the syntactic form of the cleft 
having a recognisable function that distinguishes it from many other sentence types: 
the fact that it signals presupposition. The problem with such accounts, however, lies 
in the problem of relating presupposition to what is currently going on in the discourse 
in which such presupposing constructions appear, ana what function the presupposition 
serves. If no such relationship can be found, the notion of presupposition, however 
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neatly derived from the surface form, is merely a sterile artefact. 
Much of this thesis centres around reconciling these two accounts, and synthesising the 
valuable parts of each into an account of clefts that has a formal basis but is able to 
describe and account for the wide range of types and functions of cleft that appear in 
a corpus of data. Some of the work described here is consolidatory, formalising aspects 
of deft structure particularly information structure about which observations have 
been made before. Other parts of the thesis are analytical, exploring and exposing the 
range of data to be described. Perhaps the most important part of the thesis consists 
of a synthesis of the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic facts about clefts into a multi- 
layered account of the distinctions between the cleft types, and the distinctions between 
deft andnon-deft sentences. 
1.2 Preliminaries 
1.2.1 The Aims of the Research 
On the basis of the discussion above, the aims of the research reported here can be 
summarised in the following points. 
e To expose the syntactic, prosodic and pragmatic heterogeneity of the cleft data 
on the basis of a corpus of naturafly-occurring written and spoken data. 
* To provide a formally-based but largely theory-independent means of describing 
the data. 
* To motivate the distinctions between cleft and non-cleft sentences, and between 
the three types of cleft, at a variety of levels of description. 
* To show how factors identified at these various levels can be synthesised into an 
account of the structure and function of clefts in discourse. 
1.2.2 Starting Points 
In the research to be reported, we begin with a number of background assumptions. 
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The Principles of Utterance Design 
We assume that in order to convey a message in a particular context, speakers and 
writers have at their disposal a range of message- carrying devices, i. e., different types 
of sentence. Many of these sentence types are truth-functionally equivalent, and the 
choice between them has to be made on the basis of a variety of syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic factors. It is assumed here that sentence type is chosen on the basis of the 
following aims on the part of the speaker or writer: 
a to mark the message being conveyed with particular information regarding its 
relationship with the discourse context; and 
* to observe as far as possible co-operative principles ensuring the comprehensibility 
of the message. 
While the research reported is not couched in procedural terms-it does not constitute 
an algorithm for choosing cleft constructions, for example it is assumed here that a 
complete explanation of clefts in discourse is one that contains sufficient descriptive 
detail to discriminate between clefts and non-clefts and between the three cleft types, 
in the majority of cases. 
A Corpus-Based Study 
In the description of early work on cleft syntax given above, it was noted that much -un- 
derestimation of the heterogeneity of the clefts data resulted from the study of idealised, 
decontextuallsed examples. The research reported here is predominantly corpus-based, 
drawing on a sizeable corpus of data in the description of the syntactic and pragmatic 
variety of clefts in particular. 
The data used throughout this study are included in the Appendix to this thesis, and 
are as follows: 
eA corpus of spoken data, taken from the Survey of English Usage corpus (Svartvik 
[19801), consisting of 54 it-clefts, 63 wh-clefts and 106 reverse wh-clefts. 
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eA corpus of written data, taken from the Lancaster- 0 slo-Begen (LOB) on-line 
corpus, consisting of 165 it-clefts, 72 wh-clefts and 38 reverse wh-clefts. 
a My own collection of casual conversational data, consisting of 37 it-clefts, 36 wh- 
clefts and 16 reverse wh-clefts. 
The total tokens amount to 256 it-clefts, 171 wh-clefts and 160 reverse wh-clefts. 
In one case, the corpora studied for the purposes of more detailed discussion were cut 
down in size: in the discussion of prosody and pragmatic aspects of the cleft, two sub- 
corpora of 150 examples each, drawn from the spoken data, were used in the analysis. 
This is made cleax where it occurs, and the particular examples chosen are identified in 
the appendix. 
On occasion, wher6 conclusions are to be drawn on the basis of the frequency of a 
particular phenomenon appearing in the data, Chi-squared tests are performed to verify 
the reliability of distribution in the sample. This is made clear where relevant, and the 
degree of significance of the test pointed out in each caýe. 0 
Constructed data appear in cases where particular points of grammaticality or accept- 
ability are at issue, particularly for the purposes of the discussion of cleft syntax in 
chapter 3. 
A Multi-Layer Approach 
As we noted above, the motivation for the use of clefts in discourse is shown in the thesis 
not to reside at a single level of description. Instead, it is demonstrated that aspects of 
syntax, semantics and pragmatics are all involved in carving out a functional niche for 
deft constructions as a group, and for the three individual cleft types in particular. In 
the discussion of previous research given in chapter 2, we point out that accounts that 
attempt to explain deft function at a single level- in terms of information ordering, 
for example can never be sufficiently general, and in almost all cases fail to capture 
crucial factors determining the function of clefts that reside at other levels. Accordingly, 
the core of the thesis consists of a discussion of cleft syntax, semantics and pragmatics 
respectively. In addition, in the conclusion to the discussion of pragmatic aspects, we 
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suggest a model of the relative roles of presupposition and information structure in 
determining the function of clefts, and in the concluding chapter of the thesis we make 
some suggestions regarding how the conclusions reached could interact in a decision 
procedure for choosing clefts in context. 
Terms of Reference 
At the beginning of this chapter, we identified the three cleft types using the terms 
IT-CLEFT, WH-CLEFT and REVERSE %VH-CLEFT. These are the terms used throughout 
the thesis. They are adopted in preference to CLEFT, PSEUDO-CLEFT and INVERTED 
PSEUDO-CLEFT, partly because the latter terms carry transformational overtones not 
in keeping with the approach adopted here, and partly because people seem to have a 
certain amount of difficulty remembering which term applies to which cleft type. Often 
in the thesis we refer to all three kinds of construction as CLEFT CONSTRUCTIONS, 
or sometimes Simply as CLEFTS. As far as the discussion of the various parts of cleft 
constructions is concerned, we will avoid the terms FOCUS and PRESUPPOSITION as often 
used to describe particular syntactic constituents. This is because such terms seem to 
indicate a blurring of the distinction between syntactic form and pragmatic function, 
and to adopt them would therefore pre-empt a great deal of the discussion contained 
in this thesis. The terms we will adopt instead are therefore as follows. For clefts of 
all three types, the immediate complement of the copula-for example, the box in the 
examples in (1-3)-will be termed the clefts HEAD. The embedded clausal constituent 
in it-clefts will be termed the it-cleft COMPLEMENT, while in the case of wh-clefts and 
reverse wh-clefts the corresponding constituent is termed the WH-CLAUSE: 
(1-3) a It is the box that I'm standing on. 
b What I'm standing on is the box. 
c The box is what I'm standing on. 




In talking about syntactic constructions that seem to be a departure from some 'canoni- 
cal form, it is often easy to lapse into terminology that suggests that such constructions 
have undergone some transformational process in order to reach their current form. In 
this thesis, while we have tried to avoid the use of such terms, they may creep in from 
time to time simply because the transformationalists left behind them such a wealth of 
useful terms that at times it seems obtuse not to use them. However, the view taken 
here of 'marked' syntactic constructions such as clefts is not that they are transformed 
from some other surface form. Instead, clefts, canonical declaratives, and any other sen- 
tence types are seen as a range of possible realisations for a given propositional content. 
Declaratives are seen as distinct from 'marked' syntactic structures only in that they 
appear to be more neutral in terms of the markings that they convey in addition to 
their propositional content, which makes them a possible choice for speakers in a wider 
variety of contexts. 
1.3 The Object of Study 
There exist several categories of sentence type that are similar to the sentences which 
are the object of study in this thesis, some of which are also classed as cleft construc- 
tions. Before continuing, we should make clear which types fall within the scope of this 
research. As far as it-defts are concerned, there is one other, rather rare construction 
that appears to be cleft-like, but is not studied here. The construction in question is 
exemplified in (1-4): 
(1-4) a It's a wise boy who knows his own father. 
b It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good. 
This sentence type is poorly understood, but appears to be distinct semantically at least 
from the it-cleft proper. 
The wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts studied here might be termed a subset of the class 
of pseudo-clefts, since we will not be concerned with some particular cases. Sentence 
types we will not address are: 
S 
a Wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts whose clausal constituent modifies the onelthe 
ones, such as the one Im looking for is John and my sister is the one that minds. 
9 Wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts with all in place of the wh-initiator of the clausal 
constituent, such as all I want is a good night's sleep and a bran muffin was all I 
asked for. 
The exclusion of the first type above is simply due to the fact that cleft sentences with 
the one are one step further along a continuum of equative copular sentences, and seem 
to be the thin end of the wedge as far as the inclusion of all equatives of this type is 
concerned. To appreciate this, consider the progression from the wh-cleft in (1-5a) to 
the copular equative in (1-5d): 
a What I want is a new hoover. 
b The one I'm looking for is John. 
c The thing that annoys me is their lack of charity. 
d The girl that spoke to you just now is his daughter. 
Prince [19781 notes semantic distinctions between wh-clefts such as (1-5a) and (1-5b), 
and on this basis, confining the study to the 'headless' wh-cleft such as (1-5a) seems a 
coherent position to take. Semantic distinctions also exist between the wh-clefts proper 
and sentences with all as initiator of the clausal constituent, and we shall also rule these 
out of the current study. 
1.4 The Structure of the Rest of the Thesis 
The structure of the rest of this thesis is as foHows. 
Chapter 2 takes a look at previous research on the functions of cleft constructions in 
discourse. We review a variety of claims to the effect that cleft constructions serve to 
mark particular kinds of information, notably FOCUS, GIVEN and NE%V, in particular 
syntactic positions. For most of these claims, it is possible to draw counterexamples 
from the data, and we demonstrate the problems of a single-layer approach to the 
description of the function of clefts with these as evidence. 
Chapter 3 contains a syntactic analysis of each of the three cleft types in turn, couched in 
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the terms of Generative Phrase Structure Grammar (cf. Gazdar et al. [19851). We pay 
particular attention in this chapter to syntactic factors that may serve to differentiate 
between the three cleft types in terms of their possible discourse functions. In addition, 
we compare the variety of clefts that are judged in general to be grammatical, and that 
can be generated by the rules we give in the chapter, to the range of strings actually 
occu rring in the corpus of data. 
In chapter 4 we turn to the analysis of the aspect of clefts that is most important in 
differentiating them from non-cleft constructions: their semantics. We demonstrate 
that cleft constructions are presupposition-bearing on a fairly conventional description 
of presupposition, and assess the relative merits of three particular theories of presup- 
position for describing clefts. The account we adopt is that of van der Sandt [1988 and 
forthcoming], who suggests that a fruitful way to look at a presupposition is in terms of 
an analogy with the treatment of pronominal anaphora within the framework of Kamp's 
[1981] Discourse Representation Theory. Accordingly, we work out the details of how 
van der Sandt's proposal for presupposition in general might work for clefts in particu- 
lar. In this chapter, we also touch on the important issues of the referentiality of all or 
parts of clefts, and examine the claim that cleft heads in particular specify semantic ob- 
jects that are UNIQUE with respect to their ability to satisfy the existentially-quantified 
variable in the deft presupposition. 
In chapter 5 we move on to an account of some separate but related issues concerning the 
use of clefts in discourse. We examine first of all the range of accentual Patterns available 
to clefts, further substantiating claims we made in chapter 2. We then look at the range 
of relationships it is possible for cleft presuppositions to have with the discourse context, 
following our observations in chapter 4 to the effect that the presupposed information 
need not always be currently available to the hearer prior to the time of encountering 
the presupposition. We identify three types of presuppositional relation, and examine 
the profile of each cleft type in a corpus of 150 examples with respect to the frequency 
with which particular presuppositional relations appear. On this basis, we are able to 
establish distinct presuppositional profiles for each type of cleft. 
We move on to an analysis of the information structure of the cleft as a whole, using the 
framework developed for the discussion on presupposition types as a basis. We establish 
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both general features of deft information structure, and some further factors by which 
clefts are differentiated. In the final section of the chapter, we point out the distinct 
and complementary roles of information structure and cleft presupposition, showing 
how they combine to detern-dne a range of functions unique to clefts. We also discuss 
parallels with the model for human sentence processing suggested by Clark and Haviland 
[1977], indicating the potential of that model for explaining some factors observed in 
the corpus with respect to the information structure and presuppositional behaviour of 
the data. 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of the conclusions reached in the thesis, and discusses 
how they might be applied in a decision procedure for choosing whether to cleft, and 
which cleft to use. Finally, some suggestions are made with respect to further relevant 
research. 
Having outlined the aims and content of the thesis, we can move on to the first part of 
the research: a review of previous work on the discourse functions of clefts. 
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Chapter 2 
An Overview of Previous 
Research 
In this thesis, we are particularly interested in why people use clefts-that is, with 
the reasons behind the choice of a cleft construction given a particular context and 
a particular message to convey. In chapter 1, we explicitly adopted the assumption 
that cleft constructions belong to a class of syntactic structures whose use bestows 
particular pragmatic markings on the message being carried, these markings being a 
powerful determinant of syntactic choice. This chapter examines claims that have been 
made in the literature regarding the nature of those markings. 
An examination of the literature reveals that claims regarding clefts fall into two broad 
categories. Those in the first category have in common the view that the use of a cleft 
construction, either of itself or in conjunction with a particular accent pattern, indicates 
that the speaker or writer considers or intends certain elements within the construction 
to be interpreted aS FOCAL. Unfortunately, although intuitive characterisations of the 
meaning of the term FOCUS are many and varied, definitions are few and far between. 
We will assess the various claims regarding the focusing functions of clefts in section 2.1: 
as we will see, the major thing these accounts have in common is the use of the term 
FOCUS, rather than a common understanding of what the term means. 
The second category of claim, addressed in section 2.2, consists of accounts taJdng the 
view that information types other than focus are marked by cleft constructions. The 
information types invoked include the notions GIVEN, NEW and KNOWN information. 
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Some of these accounts discuss the function of only parts of the cleft; others go further 
in trying to account for the function of the construction as a whole. The latter is 
generally done in one of two ways, the claim being either that clefts are a means of 
presenting information in a particular serial order, or that they indicate a distinction 
between two different types of information, Usually GIVEN and NEW. 
2.1 Accounts Based on Focus-Marking 
In this section, we examine claims to the effect that clefts can be explained by some 
formulation of the notion Of FOCUS. Many things are meant by this term: in particular, 
the term 'focus' can either denote a syntactic or prosodic INDICATOR of information 
status, or it can be a term predicated of the information itself, independently of how 
focal status came to be associated with it. In one case, Quirk et al. 's [1985] account, 
sentence ACCENT is itself termed 'focus'. In Geluykens' [1984] account, accent is taken 
to be the indicator of focal information; Sidner [19791, Reichman [1981] and Taglicht 
[1984] take syntax to be the indicator of the focal information; and Creider [1979] and 
Chafe [1976] take the view that accent and syntax together indicate focus. 
Taglicht's claim that the cleft head is focus will not be examined here, since he makes 
no predictions as to what will result from his analysis: his syntactic focus can only be 
taken as an alternative label for the syntactic constituent concerned. Reichman and 
Sidner, on the other hand, in their computational accounts of the relationship between 
focusing and anaphora, offer a testable hypothesis-that is, one that provides both a 
definition of the notion concerned, and a claim regarding its purpose. 
It is not my intention here to discuss the relative merits of different notions of focus 
per se; we will be concerned only with the applicability and usefulness of particular 
notions for describing the functions of clefts in discourse, including the accuracy of 
any predictions they make with respect to the surrounding discourse. Throughout the 
discussion, since there are so many different notions of focus being dealt with, it should 
be assumed that where the term 'focus'is used, the notion intended is that of the author 
being discussed at the time. 
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Chafe 
Focus of Contrast 
Chafe (19761 distinguishes a class of sentence types he Calls CONTRASTIVE SENTENCES; 
these, he argues, mark a distinction between BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE and FOCUS OF 
CONTRAST. Background knowledge is 'that knowledge which the speaker assumes to 
be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance' [Chafe 1976: 30], 
and is 'pronounced with lower pitch and weaker stress than new' [Chafe 1976: 31]; focus 
of contrast, on the other hand, is expressed through 'higher pitch and stronger stress' 
than the other material in the sentence. This focus (there is by obligation one, but may 
be more, in a contrastive sentence) is described as the ASSERTED ALTERNATIVE to some 
other element that a hearer may have in mind, where both the alternatives are potential 
candidates for satisfying the predicate in the background knowledge of the sentence. 
For example, in the following short discourse (taken from Chafe [1976: 25]), Sally and 
Ronald are contrastive alternatives: 
(2-1) a Sally made the hamburgers. 
b RONald made the hamburgers. 
Clefts as Contrastive Sentences 
Chafe makes two related claims for the discourse function of clefts. First, he suggests 
that they can be used to mark focus of contrast, where the focus of contrast appears on 
the cleft head. Chafe's own position is a reiteration of Jespersen's: 
A cleaving of a sentence by means of it is (often followed by a relative 
pronoun or connective) serves to single out one particular element of the 
sentence and very often, by directing attention to it and bringing it, as it 
were, into focus, to mark a contrast. 
[Jespersen 1961: 147-1481 
Chafe's examples of this use of clefts are as follows: 
(2-2) It was RONald who made the hamburgers. 
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(2-3) The one who made the hamburgers was RONald. 
Chafe's second claim is that 
... cleft sentences provide a way of moving focus to the the right, so that it 
does not appear as the initial item in the sentence. There may, then, be a 
tendency to place not only new information, but also the focus of contrast 
later in the sentence. Pseudo-cleft sentences, of course, allow this tendency 
full rein. 
[Chafe 1976: 371 
In the cases shown in (2-2) and (2-3) above, focus of contrast is, as Chafe describes, 
further to the right than it might have been in the corresponding declarative, shown in 
(2-4): 
(2-4) RONald made the hamburgers. 
Of course, this account, and other accounts based on the 'movement' of particular types 
of information to particular places in the cleft, presuppose that a corresponding declar- 
ative is available for the deft in question. This is not always the case, however, since 
what we might take to be the corresponding 'unclefted' constructions are sometimes 
syntactically unacceptable. It can be very difficult to deterrrflne exactly what the un- 
marked declarative correlate of a particular cleft should be (perhaps this is evidence in 
itself that there is something suspicious about accounts based on movement), but in 
many cases all the alternatives that present themselves are equally unacceptable. For 
example, the declarative corresponding to the reverse wh-cleft: 
(2-5) That's who it is. 
is presumably one of the following unacceptable sentences: 
(2-6) a It is that. 
b It is that person. 
Halvorsen (1978: 6] comments on a number of other cases where cleft sentences have 
no declarative correlate. This is evidence for a model of the choice to cleft that takes 
into account not only pragmatic considerations but syntactic constraints on possible 
linguistic realisations as well. 
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Some Problems 
Apart from the point just mentioned, Chafe's account also runs into problems when 
confronted with other clefts data. 
First of all, examples in which there does not appear to be anything corresponding 
to focus of contrast on the cleft head appear with regularity: (2-7) is one such exam- 
ple, where the cleft head is unaccented, and does not seem to represent the asserted 
alternative that Chafe's account requires: 
(2-7) a Joe Wright you mean. 
b Yes yes. 
cI thought it was Joe Wright who'd walked in at FIRST. 
As a corollary of this, it is clear that elements that fit the definition of focus of contrast 
may appear in parts of the cleft other than the head. Such examples are not a problem 
for Chafe's account provided these foci appear in addition to a focus in the head, since 
he states that there may be multiple foci of contrast in a single sentence. ' However, 
note that, in (2-7), the sole focus of contrast, as defined in prosodic terms, appears to 
be in the complement. 
As a second problem, we might note that Chafe makes no comment about the occurrence 
or function of accents which do not appear to indicate contrast: these often appear in 
it-deft complements. (2-8b) is one example where such an accent appears (secondary 
accent is indicated here by means of italics): 
(2-8) a I've done the shopping. 
b Was it your turn? I thought it Was MIKE who took the list. 
The information in the complement of (2-8b) cannot be described as either an asserted 
alternative or as Chafe's background knowledge. In fact, it is quite simply new but 
non-contrastive information, which does not figure in Chafe's division of information in 
clefts. 
Third, difficulties also arise with Chafe's claim that clefts serve to move the focus of 
contrast to the right in an utterance. Even if it is assumed that focus of contrast occurs 
'In fact, it is not clear whether Chafe intends that this claim be taken to extend to clefts. 
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where he predicts, his claim does not account for clefts with heads that would be the 
grammatical object of the corresponding declarative. For example, it cannot be claimed 
that the function of (2-9b) is to postpone the contrast, since the cleft places the focus 
considerably further to the left than would be the case were the declarative (2-9c) to be 
used instead: 
(2-9) a I've bought Martha's rabbit. You'll have to wrap it up. 
b But it was a Guinea pig I wanted you to buy! 
c But I wanted you to buy a Guinea pig! 
Summary 
It is clear from the evidence above that Chafe's suggestions are not sufficiently general 
to account for the kinds of deft he sets out to explain. The difficulties encountered 
show first of all that Chafe's account of clefts as 'contrastive sentences' in the sense he 
intends cannot be supported. In addition, the data we have seen so far are sufficiently 
heterogeneous in accentual pattern to suggest that a motivation of clefts in terms of the 
placement of any kind of accentu ally- marked information, contrastive or otherwise, is 
unlikely to suffice as an account of clefts in general. 
In chapter 5, we show that there are no less than five predominant accentual patterns 
for clefts, and that a large proportion of the data serve as counterexamples to Chafe's 
claims. 
2.1.2 Creider 
Creider's [19791 proposal is based on the argument that many languages clearly dif- 
ferentiate FOCUS from TOPic. He argues that some syntactic structures are focusing 
constructions, and that others are topicalizing constructions; it-clefts are said to fall 
into the category of focusing constructions. 
Creider's notion of focus is essentially based on sentence accent, although he establishes 
the notions of topic and focus on the basis of three tests, as foUows. 
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The Assertability Test for Focus 
First, a constituent in a given utterance is said to be the focus if it can be construed 
as being ASSERTED in that utterance [Crelder 1979: 91. Although, as Ward [1985: 31) has 
observed, the notion of 'asserting a constituent' is somewhat difficult to conceptualise, 
Creider's test is that a constituent is being asserted in an utterance, and is therefore 
the focus, if the utterance provides an answer to a wh-question by identifying that con- 
stituent as the instantiation of the wh-word in the question. Creider's [1979: 4] examples, 
repeated in (2-10) below, show that a declarative, such as (2-10b), can be focusing in 
this sense, while a topicalisation, such as (2-10c), cannot: 
(2-10) a What kind of breakfast food can you eat every morning? 
bI can eat English muffins every morning. 
c# English muffins I can eat every morning. 
The about-Test for T6pic 
The second test delineates Creider'S Topics as elements that can be introduced in an 
about phrase, and then referred to subsequently. Creider's [1979: 51 example appears in 
(2-11); it shows that the appropriate topicalisations, such as (2-11b), provide a topic, 
while (2-11c) and (2-11d) do not: 
(2-11) a What do you find exciting about Griselda? 
b Griselda, I hope to meet her husband someday. 
c #1 hope to meet Griselda's husband someday. 
d# Griselda's husband, I hope to meet him someday. 
The Non-negatability Test for Topic 
Creider's third test for differentiating between his notions of topic and focus is that 
when the topic is sentence-initial, it cannot occur within the scope of negation, as he 
demonstrates using the following examples: 
(2-12) a# It is not the case that the play, John saw it yesterday. 
b 41t is not the case that as for the play, John saw it yesterday. 
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On the other hand, sentence-initial focus (in the following example, Raymond) can 
appear within the scope of negation: 
(2-13) It is not the case that Raymond made the hamburgers. 
Clefts as Focusing Constructions 
Creider claims that, in English, transformations that effect movement to the left are 
TOPICALISING, and those that move constituents to the right are FOCUSING. 
On Creider's account, however, although it-clefts belong to the class of structures involv- 
ing leftward movement (presumably because the interposing of the cleft complementiser 
could be seen as causing the deft head to move to the left), they are an exception to 
the rule that correlates movement with focusing or topicalising, since they appear to be 
focusing in spite of belonging to the leftward- movement category. 
Creider states that in it-clefts the 'stressed constituentis the focus. It might therefore be 
assumed that any stressed constituent anywhere in a cleft construction should perform 
appropriately on the basis of the tests for focus and topic given above. However, Creider 
goes on to equate 'stressed constituent' with the cleft head in all but what he considers 
to be a limited number of exceptional cases. He states: 
Note that cleft sentences ... are type cases where the stressed constituent is 
focused. It is impossible to read (i) below without stressing the underlined 
constituent: 
(i) It is John who likes 'An Goirtin Eornan'. 
The only situation in which John would not be stressed would be one where 
a correction was being made with respect to John, as in (ii) (with focusing 
stress on the portion in boldface ... 
): 
(ii) It is John who likes 'An Goirtin Eornan'. 
It is inherent to metacontexts such as these that normal values be reversed. 
[Creider 1979: 15] 
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Problems 
As we saNv above in relation the Chafe's explanation of clefting, the heterogeneity of 
clefts with respect to accentual patterns is clearly greater than Creider's characterisation 
suggests (we go on in chapter 5, moreover, to show that the accent pattern Chafe claims 
to be 'normal' for it-clefts is in fact the least usual of the patterns that occur). As a 
result of this, two of Creider's tests for focus and topic do not support his conclusion 
that it-clefts in general are 'focusing', as follows. 
In support of his claim that clefts are 'focusing', Creider gives an example where a cleft 
with the 'normal' accentual pattern does not pass the about-test for topic: 
(2-14) A: What is it about John that makes him easy to work with? 
B: # IVS JOHN that writes all the lines. 
However, it is possible to construct examples with the same accentual pattern where 
the cleft does pass the test for topic: 
(2-15) a What is it about Mike and Sandy that you Eke? 
b ItS Only SANdy that I like. 
It is also possible to construct examples with different accentual patterns which pass 
the about-test. (2-16), for example, has two nuclei: 
(2-16) a You'd better tell me about this guy Pete. 
b It7S HIM who's CAUSED all this trouble, after all. 
Clefts with weakly accented or unaccented heads can pass, too, thereby qualifying these 
elements as topics. This is demonstrated in (2-17): 
(2-17) a What is it about John that makes him easy to work with? 
b It's John who writes all the LINES, and so he can give us a lot of help 
with interpretation. 
The about-test shows, therefore, that some cleft heads are apparently topics, on Creider's 
definition. 
A second problem arises with Creider's prediction that clefts with the 'normal' accentual 
pattern will pass the wh-question test for focus. As we noted above, the focus is that 
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element which can instantiate the wh-word in a wh-question: 
(2-18) a Who did the washing? 
b It Was JOHN who did the washing. 
Clefts with accentual patterns other than that exhibited by (2-18b), however, fail this 
test for focusing constructions. This is because clefts with unaccented or weakly ac- 
cented heads cannot be used as direct answers to wh-questions at all: the resulting 
discourse is incoherent. To demonstrate how such patterns occur in contexts, consider 
(2-19b), which is an it-cleft with an unaccented head and accented complement: 
a You should complain to John. 
b But it's John that's CAusing this! 
When the cleft in (2-19b) is placed in a question context such as the focus test would 
require, where the head of the cleft would act as the instantiation of the wh-word in the 
question, the result is unacceptable: 
(2-20) a Who's causing this? 
b# It's John that's CAUsing this! 
These clefts, therefore, do not 'focus' in the way Chafe suggests. 
Ultimately, Creider's assumption that clefts are 'focusing' on his definition results from 
too narrow a sample of data. His tests for focus seem to capture clefts with heads 
that carry new information, and the topic tests capture clefts with contrastive, or given 
heads. 2 Creider's account founders, like Chafe's, chiefly as a result of the assumption 
that an accented constituent necessarily appears in the cleft head. For this reason, 
Crieder's tests do not show that clefts in general are focusing constructions, contrary to 
21t might at this point be tempting to conjecture that the clefts that pass Creider's test for topic 
are those which fall into Prince's [1978] class of inform ative-presu pposition (IP) clefts, and those that 
pass the focus test her stressed-focus (SF) clefts (this distinction is discussed in section 2.2.1). This 
conclusion would, however, fall foul of Creider's final test for topic and focus, which states that initial 
focus cart fall within the scope of external negation, but that initial topic cannot. This test does not 
discriminate between it-clefts of the IP type, such as (2-21), and those of the SF type, such as (2-22): 
(2-21) The railwaymen saw the incident, admittedly, but it is not the case that it was they 
who rePORTed it. 
(2-22) Someone must have done it, admittedly, but it is not the case that it was PAULine. 
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Ms claims. 
2.1.3 Quirk et al 
There are two strands to Quirk et al. 's [1985] argument about clefts. The first concerns 
the relationship between focus and accentual pattern, and is discussed below. The 
second relates to the role of the cleft as a syntactic indicator of the boundaries of given 
and new information in the structure, which we discuss in section 2.2.4 below. 
Focus and Intonation 
Quirk et al. [1985: 1353ffj subscribe to a notion of focus akin to that of Haffiday [1967, 
1973,19851, where focus is a linguistic notion defined on the basis of prosody. 
Human speech is naturally segmented into brief stretches which, in general, correspond 
to units of information. Each such INFORMATION UNIT is realized as a pitch contour 
called a TONE UNIT (or TONE GROUP, in Halliday's [1985] terms), so that informa- 
tion units and tone units are co-extensive. Each tone unit contains one INTONATION 
NUCLEUS, this being the peak of greatest prominence in that unit. 3 
On this account, FOCUS indicates "where the new information lies'[Quirk et aL 1985: 13631 
in an information unit, and is signalled by the intonation nucleus. In Halliday's [1985: 2751 
terms, the element of the utterance which has this TONIC PROMINENCE is said to be 
carrying INFORMATION FOCUS. The new information in question can be as little as a 
single syllable, or as much as a whole clause. 
Focus in Clefts 
In the case of cleft constructions, Quirk et A argue that the traditional correspondence 
between information unit, new information, and nucleus is fundamentally altered, as 
follows. The claim is that a deft consists of a single information unit, but that the 
function of the cleft is to 'divide' the one focus into two, resulting in a single unit with 
3 For an elaboration of these concepts, see, for example, chapter IV in Couper-Ruhlen [19861. 
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two foci. Quirk et al. therefore account for wh-clefts and it-clefts as devices for achieving 
DIVIDED FOCUS [1985: 1372]. This division is claimed to fall at the syntactic boundary 
between the head and the complement of the clause, and Quirk et al. predict that a 
nuclear accent will fall at the end of each constituent, as in (2-23): 
(2-23) It was JOHN that had him %VORRied. 
In spite of there being two nuclei, both of which on the standard assumption would be 
associated with new information, on Quirk et aL's account only one of these two nuclei 
is expected to indicate new information. In such cases (for the cleft is not the only con- 
struction which allows divided focus) the nucleus associated with the new information 
is termed the DOMINANT NUCLEUS, and the constituent bearing that nucleus will be the 
dominant constituent. In the case of the it-cleft, the context determines which of the 
two nuclei appears on new information, and so either can be the dominant one [Quirk 
et aL 1985: 1384]. In the case of the wh-cleft, on the other hand, the dominant focus is 
assumed always to occur on the head. 
Discussion 
Quirk et al. 's account is interesting in that, in its claims for accentual structure, it comes 
a great deal closer to accounting for the range of clefts data than the other accounts 
expressed in terms of focusing that we examine here. In chapter 5, we will see that clefts 
containing two nuclei are very common, particularly in the case of the wh-cleft. Quirk 
et al. also avoid the common pitfall of taking an accent-based view of focus and then 
supposing that this will correlate reliably with syntactic structure, as has been the case 
in other accounts examined in this section. Their account, however, runs into several 
problems, as follows. 
First, the analysis Quirk et al. suggest implies a revision of the established notions of 
information unit and tone group of the most fundamental kind. In the standard accounts 
(as found, for example, in Crystal [1969]), it is axiomatic that a single tone group has 
a single nucleus, and the suggestion that two nuclei are possible suggests that the unit 0 
Quirk et al. postulate is something very different from the traditional notion. However, 
they provide no definition that would make clear what their new notion consists of. 
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Moreover, Quirk et at. fail to argue convincingly for the controversial claim that nuclei 
can correlate with non-new information. In addition, the analysis of clefts as consisting 0 
of a single information unit, and therefore as a single tone group, is hard to reconcile with 
the phonological evidence: for example, Geluykens [1984] reports wh-clefts consisting of 
up to 17 conventional tone groups, and much of the data on tone groups presented in 
chapter 5 of this thesis suggests that 'single group' clefts are in a minority. 
Second, even if Quirk et al. were able to show that their new analysis is justified, their 
account again falls short in terms of coverage of the data, since the explanation of clefts 
requires that all clefts have a double nucleus. This means first of all that clefts with 
more than two nuclei cannot be accounted for. In addition, clefts with fewer than two 
nuclei are also ruled out, which, interestingly, disallows the kinds of it-cleft that many 
researchers (including some discussed in this section, namely Chafe [1976] and Creider 
[1979]) consider to be the only common types. As we noted above in relation to Creider's 
claim, single nucleus accent patterns are not the most normal, but they certainly occur. 
Examples of each appear in (2-24): 
(2-24) a It was the WIND that knocked off her hat. 
b What knocked off her hat Was the WIND. 
Although Quirk et aL's description of the function of clefts does come closer to coverage 
of the data than the others discussed so far in this section, the evidence above shows 
that their account still falls short of a complete description. In addition, their view 
implies unprincipled revisions of basic notions in phonology and information structure 
that require a great deal more support if they are to be convincing. 
2.1.4 Two Theories of Focus in Computational Linguistics 
In this section, we consider two computational approaches to the track-Ing of focus in 
discourse that have something to say about clefts: Sidner's [1979] theory of focusing for 
anaphora resolution, and Reichman's [1981,1985] model for the generation and inter- 
pretation of conversational discourse. The two theories are unique among the research 
involving focus being dealt with in this chapter in that, while the other accounts provide 
definitions of focus, no predictions are made with respect to what focus as defined in 
each case actually does in discourse-that is, what effects, linguistic or otherwise, are 
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meant to result from an element being in focus. Sidner's and Reichman's theories, on 
the other hand, both contain notions of focus that were evolved as a means of capturing 
the behaviour of discourse phenomena, and can be tested by assessment of how well 
they account for that behaviour. 
Although the two theories differ in how focus is defined and exploited, in both cases 
focus is a status that is predicated of information in a model of the ongoing discourse, 
and is related directly to the use of anaphoric referring expressions, the hypothesis being 
that focal elements are the most likely antecedents for subsequent anaphoric expressions. 
Reichman 
In Reichman's [1981,1985] model, a discourse is represented by a collection of CONTEXT 
SPACES, each of which corresponds to a particular segment of the discourse; that context 
space which corresponds to the current part of the discourse is referred to as the ACTIVE 
space. Each context space contains, amongst other things, the entities mentioned in 
the part of the discourse corresponding to that context space; and each-entity has a 
corresponding FOCUS LEVEL which indicates its salience within that context space. For 
the speaker, the focus level assigned to an entity determines the form of referring phrases 
to be generated; for the hearer, the focus level assists in the interpretation of anaphoric 
expressions. 
Focus levels are established by means of a set of 14 FOCUS RULES. These predict the 
changes that will take place in the focus registers of the currently active space either after 0 
generating or interpreting an utterance with particular characteristics. For example, a 
semantic rule exists that stipulates the assignation of a HIGH focus level to the agent 
of an action. The syntactic rules concern the use of particular kinds of constituent or 
sentence construction, and include the following rule for clefts [Reichman 1985: 751: ZD 
F3 The subject of a pseudo-cleft, cleft, or topicalised clause is assigned a high focus 
assignment. 
In Reichman's model, only high focus elements in the currently active context space 
may be referenced by a pronoun [Reichman 1981: 1191. Her model therefore predicts 
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that when an it-cleft or reverse wh-cleft occurs, its head is a likely source of antecedents 
for subsequently-occurring pronominal anaphora; when a wh-cleft occurs, the likely 
source is the wh-clause. 
S idner 
Before examining the accuracy of Reichman's prediction, we will look briefly at a similar 
assumption made by Sidner [19791, and implemented in her program for the resolution 
of anaphora. Sidner claims that clefts are in a class of syntactic constructions 'which 
make the recognition of focus easy, since these sentence types are claimed to have the 
purpose of singling out one element from others' [Sidner 1979: 601. Sidner's notion of 
focus is similar to Reichman's, in that it is a dynamically- updated assignment of salience 
to entities that responds to linguistic aspects of the input. The model as a whole differs 
in that Sidner takes that input to indicate POTENTIAL foci-that is, likely antecedents 
for pronouns-but does not decide on actual focus until this has been indicated by the 
resolution of an anaphor. Sidner's potential foci are therefore arranged in a list according 
to rules based on her theory of the likelihood of their being successful candidates for 
actual focus. The heads of clefts of all three syntactic types are claimed to have the 
function of placing the element referred to by the cleft head at the top of the list, 
with the result that this element-the EXPECTED FOCUS in Sidner's terms-is the first 
candidate to consider when attempting to resolve a subsequent anaphor. 
Discussion 
It is not our purpose here to criticise the status of Reichman's and Sidner's notions 
of focus either in terms of their 'correctness' or in terms of the deree to which they 
approximate what is intuitively meant by 'focus'. Both are formally defined notions 
with an explicit function in a computational theory, and to this extent other uses of the 
term, and intuitions about what it should mean, are irrelevant. 
What is of interest is the value of the inclusion of clefts as focusing constructions in 
theories of anaphora resolution. In each case, we are interested in exploring whether 
the rule for clefts can really enhance the efficiency of the algorithm in question. Sidner's 
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Cleft Type Antecedent 
Head Non-head 
Total 
it-cleft 10(43%) 13 (57%) 23 
wh-cleft 32 (78%) 9 (22%) 41 
reverse wh-cleft 3(11%) 25 (89%) 28 
Total 45 (49%) 47(51%) 92 
Figure 2.1: Clefts as providers of antecedents 
claim can be tested in the form of the hypothesis that the heads of cleft constructions 
provide antecedents for subsequent pronominal anaphors at a rate that is better than 
other parts of the cleft construction; Reichman's claim can be tested on the same hy- 
pothesis for it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts, and on the hypothesis that wh-cleft wh-clauses 
provide antecedents more frequently than wh-cleft heads. 
To test these hypotheses, I took a sample of 150 sentences, 50 each of it-clefts, wh-clefts, 
and reverse wh-clefts, from my corpus of naturally-occurring spoken data. 92 of these 
had one or more subsequent pronominal anaphors within three sentences of the cleft 
itself. 
The antecedents of these anaphors were categorised as being either HEAD-that is, oc- 
curringin the head of the cleft-or NON-IfEAD-occurring eitherin the cleft complement, 
or being composed of the entire content of the sentence, as sometimes occurs with the 
anaphoric elements this and that. The results of the analysis appear in figure 2.1. 
The distribution of pronoun resolutions shown in figure 2.1 is significant to . 001 by 
the Chi-Square test. Taking Sidner's hypothesis first, the table shows that for two out 
of three of the cleft types-it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts-there is unlikely to be any 
advantage in taking the deft head as a favoured antecedent for subsequently-occurring 
pronouns; in the case of the reverse wh-cleft, it is likely to be a distinct disadvantage. 
In Reichman's case, again, it-cleft heads offer a roughly equal chance of providing an 
antecedent and not doing so; and reverse wh-cleft heads provide a much worse likelihood. 
Wh-cleft wh-clauses also provide a much smaller number of antecedents than wh-cleft 
heads. Reichman's theory therefore fares slightly worse than Sidner's, although neither 
fares particularly well. 
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While it is not in question that Sidner's and Reichman's algorithms do resolve anaphors, 
on the basis of the evidence above we would question whether the view of pragmatically- 
marked syntactic constructions that is built into them is actually of assistance in the 
task. 
Of course, the view of the function of marked syntactic structures adopted in Sidner's 
and Reichman's work is necessarily drawn from the linguistics literature, and is likely 
therefore to give currency to views originating there, some of which are criticised in this 
chapter. Undoubtedly, though, on the basis of work such as Sidner's and Reichman's, the 
view of clefts as focusing structures as the term is meant here has become widespread in 
the natural language processing community and its literature (see, for example, Carter 
[1987: 104]). The data above suggest that a review of this assumption is in order. 
2.1.5 Geluykens 
Focus as New or Contrastive Information 
Geluykens' [1984) notion of focus is similar to Halliday's definition of new information. 
Geluykens'describes focus as 'information which is New and/or Contrastive' [Geluykens 
1984: 271; New information is 
... information which the speaker does not assume to be in the hearer's 
consciousness, and which he also cannot assume to be recoverable by the 
hearer from the discourse context. 
Geluykens [1984: 231 explains the functions of it-clefts, wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts in 
terms of the view that all three are special devices for the marking of focal material as 
he describes. Focus is not only marked by syntactic constructions, however: 
Focus will be expressed through Prosody, Linear Order, or Special Devices, 
or through any combination of these three phenomena. 
[Geluykens 1984: 281 
Geluykens' study is intended to determine the relative importance of cleft constructions, 
prosody, and linear order in mark-ing his notion of focus. Ile proceeds first of all by 
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dividing his corpus of clefts, which consists of examples of all three syntactic types, into 
subcategories depending on where the focal material occurs. Since it is clear that this 
focal material is not always present in the head of the cleft, Geluykens examines the 
data with the aim of explaining its placement elsewhere in the sentence. He does this 
using a set of seven separate hypotheses, his purpose being to find out how successful 
each of them is in accounting for the data. The seven hypotheses are as follows: 
1. Given information should appear before New information. 
2. Focus (as defined above) should appear near the end of the sentence. 
3. There should be more New information than Given in any sentence 
4. Information may need to be moved into, or out of, 'Topic Position'. 
5. svo order should be preserved. 
6. Canonical order may need to be disrupted for special effects. 
7. Contrast may be required, or may need to be avoided. 
Geluykens observes that these principles are able to account for the position of focus in 
the data to varying degrees, as summarised below. 4 
The Given-before-New Hypothesis 
The Given before New principle is as follows: 
Given information tends to precede New information in the linear order of 
the sentence. 
[Geluykens 1984: 221 
We noted Geluykens' definition of New information above; Given, for Geluykens, is 
... information which may be assumed, by the co-operative speaker, to 
be 
appropriately in the hearer's consciousness and/or which may be assumed to 
'It should be obvious, of course, that these principles are not mutually exclusive: some subsume 
others. 
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be recoverable by the co-operative hearer from the discourse context (either 
textual or situational), either more or less directly, or via inferential linking. 
[Geluykens 1984: 20] 
Under these definitions, the claim that Given information generally precedes New in- 
formation accounts for many wh-clefts and most reverse wh-clefts; but Geluykens notes 
that it cannot account for it-clefts that present new information first, such as (2-25): 
(2-25) A: Who did this? 
B: It was JOHN who did it. 
Of this New-before- Given ordering, Geluykens observes that there are quite severe re- 
strictions on the length of the New information. He suggests that the shortness of the 
head in cases such as (2-25) is due to the reluctance of the speaker to postpone the 
Given information for too long. 
The End-Focus Constraint 
Since Geluykens takes the view that Focus and New information frequently coincide 
[1984: 27], this constraint is almost the corollary of the Given-before-New hypothesis: it 
is simply that the Focus tends to come near the end of the sentence. 
The End-focus hypothesis is seen to be supported by the wh-cleft, because of the position 
of the head, commonly accented, at the end of the sentence, as in (2-26a). 
(2-26) a What I found in the barn waS THIS. 
bI found THIS in the barn. 
In addition, 40% of the wh-defts in Geluykens' corpus have direct objects as head, 
which the wh-cleft is able to postpone to the end of the sentence without this effect 
being diluted by succeeding indirect objects, complements, etc. as it might be in a 
declarative such as (2-26b). 
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More New Information than Given 
The More-New-than- Given hypothesis states, predictably, that an utterance will contain 
more New than Given information. Geluykens observes: 
If the Focus is indeed the most important part of the message, we might 
reasonably expect that the Focus consists of more words than the Given 
information. 
[Geluykens 1984: 35] 
Geluykens establishes this on the basis of counting the words that are deemed to carry 
each kind of information. He does not find, however, that in clefts on average the 
principle is supported, and so the principle is ruled out by Geluykens. 
The Preservation of SVO Order 
In the description of several of his cleft types, Geluykens maintains that the type of cleft 
chosen depends to some extent on whether or not the speaker wishes to preserve the 
sVO order of the sentence, while at the same time achieving some sort of prominence on 
the desired element by means of some other principle such as end-focus. 
The it-cleft has a high proportion of subject heads, and so Geluykens concludes that 
in general it supports the svo ordering hypothesis. Wh-clefts appear to support the 
svo hypothesis, since many of the heads are objects-, however, in the case of subject 
heads (14.17% of Geluykens' corpus) and some adverbials (6.67%) the svo hypothesis 
falls. Finally, in the case of the reverse wh-cleft, the svo hypothesis is not in general 
supported, as many of the heads (sentence-initial in these sentences) are grammatical 
objects. 
Moving Into or Out of Topic Position 
The terrn TOPIC is used here to indicate 
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... what the message is about, the pragmatic point of departure of the mes- 
sage ... Topic is not equated with 'Given', nor with 'first element of the 
clause', although these factors often coincide. 
[Geluykens 1984: 21] 
In Geluykens' descriptions of particular types of cleft, however, he refers to elements 
being topicalised or de-topicalised by movement to the left and right respectively. This 
suggests that, for Geluykens, the relevant definition of topic is 'first element of the 
clause'. 
Geluykens concludes that, for the it-cleft, detopicalising is an important consideration, 
since subject heads are moved further to the right than would be the case in the corre- 
sponding declarative. Reverse wh-clefts, on the other hand, support topicalising, since 
the head element is in leftmost position in the sentence. For some types of reverse 
wh-defts, the principle would allow topic and focus (on Geluykens' terms) to coincide: 
Geluykens suggests this might provide a reason for the speaker to choose a reverse wh- 
cleft rather than the comparable it-cleft, as in the latter case the topic and focus are on 
distinct elements. 
Movement from Canonical Position 
The point here is simply that a 'marked' reading will occur if an element is moved out 
of its canonical position in the sentence--for instance, a rightward movement of the 
cleft head in the case of subject-headed it-clefts. Such markedness would presumably 
be used to achieve prominence for a particular element or for the message as a whole. 
Geluykens concludes that this principle does not fare sufficiently well in the explanation 
of the data to feature in the final analysis, however, and in any case it seems that at 
least part of its function is subsumed by the 'End Focus' and 'Topic Position' principles 
described above. 
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Avoidance of Contrast 
Geluykens (1984: 371 puts forward the hypothesis that in some cases a nuclear accent 
on a particular element in a declarative (for example, on a subject) would result in a 
contrastive reading for that element where none was required. A cleft might therefore be 
used to mark prominence without contrast. However, Geluykens notes that the heads 
of at least one kind of it-cleft are contrastive anyway; on this basis, he discounts this 
particular hypothesis. 
Discussion 
Of the seven hypotheses Geluykens suggests as explanations for the arrangement of 
information in clefts, he discounts three himself. Those remaining are the ones con- 
cerned with the linear ordering of elements in the sentence: the Given-before-New and 
End-Focus hypotheses, and the explanations concerning svo ordering and topicalising. 
Geluykens notes that the Given-before-New hypothesis is fairly well supported, although 
as we saw above some it-clefts have New-before- Given structure. This is similarly the 
case with the End-Focus hypothesis, with the same set of counterexamples. 
In addition, neither principle explains wh-cleft cases with 'focal' heads that are indirect 
objects, prepositional phrases, or intransitive verb heads, since these elements would be 
at the end of the sentence in the corresponding declarative in any case: the principles 
would. suggest that clefting is unnecessary in such cases. 
For the svo hypothesis, Celuykens seems to overestimate the support. First, he claims 
that the high proportion of subject-headed it-clefts support the hypothesis. However, 
it-clefts with subject heads preserve svo ordering precisely as much as canonical declar- 
atives, and so the fact that a cleft is used is not explained. In addition, he fails to 
observe that it-clefts with other head types, which make up 47.1% of his it-cleft corpus, 
feature heads that on the model he suggests would have been fronted from a post- 
verbal position, including adverbials, direct objects, and prepositional complements. 
These systematically go against the svo hypothesis. 
A similar problem arises with the Topicalising hypothesis: again, the conclusion does not 
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apply to nearly half the data, whose head elements would be described on Geluykens' 
terms as having been moved not to the right, as Geluykens' topicalising argument 
requires, but to the left. 
It is not dear which of the remaining four hypotheses is the strongest, but it is obvi- 
ous that none individually constitutes an explanation of clefting. From the discussion 
Geluykens presents, which it should be recalled is intended to investigate how deft con- 
structions, as special devices for marking focus, achieve the focus marking function, it 
is not dear that any picture of the cleft as a syntactic focusing device emerges at all. 
In fact, Geluykens eventually places most emphasis on the function of accent as the 
principal means of focus marking. He states 
We even think that prosody might be the most important focus marker in 
spoken English. 
[Geluykens 1984: 25] 
and later 
In more than 99% of our corpus, Focus is marked by tonality and tonicity 
... tonicity is a powerful focus marker, more powerful than linear order. 
[Geluykens 1984: 691 
Prosody, therefore-the accentual marking of focus-emerges as a stronger marking of 
Geluykens' notion of focus than any of the linear order principles he tests, including the 
four remaining ones mentioned above. However, Geluykens presents no argument upon 
which to base the view that the prosody of clefts is any different from that of declaratives. 
This leaves entirely unsupported the claim that clefts are focusing constructions, since 
Geluykens does not demonstrate that there is anything special about the syntax of clefts 
that justifies his enduring view that clefts are special devices for indicating his notion 
of focus. 
Although Geluykens' account fails to demonstrate the 'focusing' function of clefts, his 
work is useful in suggesting the success rate of various principles in explaining the data. 
In particular, what is interesting about Geluykens' work is that it does show that several 
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different principles may combine in accounting for the function of a group of clefts. 
Which principles operate in any given instance, however, may depend on context, and 
on what the speaker is trying to achieve. On this assumption, a more plausible account 
of the function of clefts in discourse would be one in which contextual factors could be 
formulated to explain which principles would be relevant in which contexts. 
It is not necessarily the case that the principles Geluykens has chosen will be all and only 
the ones that are required: it is likely that the three he discards himself, for example, 
will not be of use; and he falls to consider the presuppositional nature of clefts, which 
must be fundamental in the choice of whether or not to use a cleft. 
2.1.6 Clefts and Focus-Marking: Conclusion 
It is clear that none of the accounts of clefts as 'focusing constructions' that we have 
examined are satisfactory, all of them failing to demonstrate that cleft constructions 
are 'focusing' on any of the definitions of focus supplied. In the majority of cases, the 
claim has been that the focus of the cleft is the cleft head, or the information borne by 
that constituent. However, we saw above that this part of the cleft does not show any 
uniformity of function sufficient to satisfy any of the definitions of focus that have been 
examined in this section. In particular: 
e The head element does not always carry sentence accent. 
* The head element does not always carry new or contrastive information. 
e The head element does not provide antecedents for subsequent pronominal anaphora 
at a rate significantly better than elements occurring elsewhere in the cleft. 
It is interesting to look into the reasons for the failure of the accounts we have discussed: 
these are surprisingly general. First of all, with tile single exception of Geluykens' 
account, the research discussed falls to take sufficient account of the range of data 
involved, particularly with respect to the variety of information structures and accentual 
patterns clefts display. The temptation to assume that there is a single 'normal', or 
even possible, accentual pattern for clefts undoubtedly begins in the transformational 
tradition, where data is drawn from decontextualised examples. The accentual pattern 
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assumed to be unique for clefts is the default one assumed on uttering examples out of 
context; such examples, however, are not fit data for conclusions regarding the functions 
of clefts in discourse. 
As a result of this underestimation of the data, Quirk et al. 's account, which looks 
exclusively at accent, fails to predict the range of accentual patterns that would be 
required for a general account. Similarly, Creider and Chafe, supposing an accentual 
peak to coincide with the head of the cleft-a syntactic position-could not deal with 
cases where the accentual pattern differed. 
The view that the focal element in a deft is the syntactic head, shared also by Sidner and 
in part by Reichman, appears to be based upon an influential paper by Chomsky [1970] 
in which he makes a distinction between FOCUS and PRESUPPOSITION in relation to the 
deft. The examples Chomsky gives in the main text show the predictable analysis: the 
cleft head is Chomsky's focus, while the complement is his presupposition. However, 
a close reading reveals that Chomsky's analysis is based on sentence accent [1970: 701, 
and not on syntax: it is simply that in the examples he chooses to use, what he calls 
the INTONATION CENTER occurs on the cleft head. He does suggest, in a footnote, that 
other accentual patterns are available, which (although he does not make this explicit) 
would require a different analysis of the sentences into focused and presupposing parts. 
Of the accounts we have examined, the most successful at dealing with the range of 
data was that of Quirk et al. [1985], which postulated a relationship between a notion 
of focus and sentence accent, but did not then assume that this two-way correlation 
would extend to the popular correspondence with syntactic structure. 
We conclude, then, that in spite of the popular assumption that clefts are special focus- 
marking constructions, no account we have examined here has been able to substantiate 
the claim. 
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2.2 Accounts Based on the Marking of Other Informa- 
tion Types 
In this section, we address accounts of the cleft's function in discourse that are based 
on the view that clefts mark kinds of information other than focus. The claims made 
refer to the marking of GIVEN, NEW and KNOWN information, and the view that clefts 
divide given from new information or enable the presentation of material in a particular 
serial order. 
2.2.1 Prince 
Prince [1978] makes a distinction between it-clefts and wh-clefts in discourse on the 
basis of the kinds of information each carries in its complement, arguing that this factor 
plays a major role in determining their distinct functions in discourse. She claims that 
wh-cleft wh-clauses carry GIVEN information, characterised as follows: 
Information which the co-operative speaker may assume is appropriately in 
the hearer's consciousness. 
[Prince 1978: 9031 
Information in the complement of it-clefts, on the other hand, is claimed to be 
not marked as assumed to be in the hearer's mind ... often, though not 
always, known from the context -information which the speaker represents 
as being factual and as already known to certain persons (often not including 
the hearer). 
[Prince 1978: 896] 
Below, we examine each of these claims in detail. 
Wh-clefts 
Prince suggests that, although the content of the wh-clause in a wh-cleft need not have 
been explicitly included in the previous discourse, if it has not then it is necessary 
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for the hearer to be able to construct an inferential BRIDGE (Cf. Haviland and Clark 
[1974]) between the information contained in the clause and the preceding discourse. For 
such bridges to be constructed, Prince claims that it is sufficient that the information 
is 'appropriate to the situation' [Prince 1978: 8991. Prince's characterisation of GIVEN 
therefore consists of an adaptation of the following formulation due to Chafe, itself based 
on that of Halliday [19671: 
Given material [is that] which the speaker assumes is already in the ad- 
dressee's consciousness. 
[Chafe 1974: 111-2] 
Thus, Prince has added to her definition of given (which we sa%v earlier) the word 
appropriately in order to accommodate the observation that information in the wh-clause 
need not be currently in the hearer's consciousness; it would simply be appropriate to 
the discourse if it were. 
The data on wh-clefts Prince presents shows this adaptation to be necessary, since, 
as we noted above, it cannot be assumed that the content of the wh-dause has been 
made explicit in previous discourse. For example, the following wh-cleft conveys what 
Prince characterises as CONTrtAST (Prince 1978: 8901, where the contrastive relation holds 
between issues described as dynamic and those that are constant: 
(2-27) Our position is a dynamic one. It will be more and more refined as 
conditions change during the course of the struggle. What is constant is 
our commitment to a revolutionary emancipation of Ethiopia. 
The contrasting information in the wh-clause cannot be assumed to be already in the 
hearer's consciousness, and so does not conform to Chafe's notion of Given. Prince 
herself notes that her formulation of GIVEN is too weak to predict which information 
would be acceptable in wh Clauses and which would not, but goes into some detail 
in characterising kinds of relationship, like that of CONTRAST, that represent major 
classes of link-and therefore major kinds of bridge-that users of wh-clefts seem to be 
expecting their hearers and readers to be able to make. We will return in chapter 5 to 
the kinds of coherence link that the wh-cleft regularly exploits. 
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It-clefts 
Prince's claim that it-clefts carry KNOWN rather than GIVEN information rests on impor- 
tant observations she makes about the nature of the data. Prince divides it-clefts into 
two types, which she differentiates mainly by their information structure but also by 
their prosody and by certain aspects of their syntax. These are termed the STRESSED- 
FOCUS (sF) deft and the INFO RINIATIVE-PRESUPPOSITION (ip) deft. 's 
The STRESSED-FOCUS it-cleft has a nucleus on the head element (focus, in Prince's. 
terms), indicated in the following example by small capitals: 6 
(2-28) Its HERE I look like Mina Davis. 
It should be noted that the SF category subsumes both it-clefts with unaccented com- 
plements and those with subsidiary accents; examples of each type appear below, re- 
spectively: 
(2-29) a Who ate the beans? 
b It was JOHN who ate the beans. 
(2-30) a How come you're still hungry after all that food? 
b This is the first thing I've had all day. It was JOHN who ate the 
beans. 
The INFORNIATIVE-PRESUPPOSITION cleft has a quite different accentual pattern and 
information structure. Prince's example [1978: 9011 is as follows: 
(2-31) It was 10 years ago this month that young Irwin Vamplew was bopped 
on the head by a nightstick while smashing windows in Berkeley in order 
to end the war in Vietnam. 
In this type of cleft, a nucleus appears in the complement, accompanying the bulk of 
the new information in the sentence. As for the discourse effect of this kind of it-cleft, 
Prince claims: 
With these sentences, not only is the hearer not expected to be thinking 
'Perhaps based on a misconstrual of Chomsky's [1970] conclusions in the manner described in sec- 
tion 2.1 above, Prince uses the terms 'focus' and 'presupposition' as syntactic labels. Although this 
is somewhat misleading, we will preserve the terms 'stressed focus' and 'informative presupposition' 
during the course of the discussion for the sake of simplicity. 
'This example is from Prince [1978: 899]. 
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about the information in the that-clause, but s/he is not even expected to 
know it. In fact, the whole point of these sentences is to inform the hearer 
of that very information. 
[Prince 1978: 8981 
Prince concludes that the function of this type of cleft is to mark a particular piece 
of information as a KNOWN FACT [Prince 1978: 8991, leading to the frequent use of the 
device in situations where the speaker does not want to claim responsibility for the fact 
conveyed by the cleft, implying that it is already well-known to persons other than the 
hearer. The status KNOWN is 
a choice on the part of the speaker of a particular validity-level s/he wishes 
to ascribe to the utterance. 
[Prince 1978: 9031 
The distinction between GIVEN and KNOWN is therefore intended at least in part to 
differentiate the functions of it-clefts and wh-clefts. There are several points to be made 
in relation to this, however, which show that the distinction is not so clear. 
Some Problems 
First of all, some of the types of 'given' Prince describes as characteristic of the wh-deft, 
and therefore types of given information, can appear quite happily in the complements 
of it-defts: in fact, in some contexts the two are interchangeable. 7 The category pf given 
that Prince [1978: 889] describes as EXPLICIT INFORMATION is one example. The wh-cleft 
below qualifies as explicit information on Prince's terms: the it-cleft is an adaptation 
with identical content in the complement: 
(2-32) a When they say that focus is important, what they are really talking 
about is accent. 
b When they say that focus is important, it is accent that they are 
really talking about. 
71t will be recalled from the introduction that it-clefts and wh-clefts have been claimed to be in- 
terchangeable in general (see, for example, Akmajian [1970]). In cases where other contextual factors 
cannot decide between them this is indeed the case. Since many of the factors deciding between cleft 
types are contextual rather than internal to the clefts themselves (as will be demonstrated later in 
this thesis), the prevalence of claims to their interchangeability can be at least partly explained by the 
widespread use of de-contextualised examples, where, obviously, such factors are obscured. 
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Similarly, wh-clefts can carry information implicit in the discourse, as shown in Prince's 
example repeated here as (2-33a). However, (2-33b) shows that it-clefts can also perform 
this function: 
(2-33) a When talk goes on of 'the national purpose', 'the national life', 'the 
mainstream of the nation', what is being advanced is the erection of 
these bourgeois dictatorships. 
b When talk goes on of 'the national purpose', 'the national life', 'the 
mainstream of the nation, it is the erection of these bourgeois dic- 
tatorships that is being advanced. 
We would suggest that there is in fact an overlap in the kinds of information that 
wh-clefts and it-clefts can carry as complement, which casts doubt on the hard and 
fast distinction between GIVEN and KNOWN. In fact, if we look more closely at the 
category KNOWN, the heterogeneity of this information type makes it highly likely that 
it subsumes the content of the category GIVEN-Simply because KNOWN spans all the 
information types there are. 
The kinds of information appearing in the KNOWN category include, for example, both 
information completely unknown to hearers and readers, such as that appearing in (2- 
31), and information already shared and salient, such as that in (2-29). There are also 
shades in between, in the shape of information that is available to hearers by inference, 
such as that in (2-27) and (2-30). It seems, therefore, that it-clefts are capable of 
carrying a range of information types spanning a continuum from 'shared and highly 
salient' to 'known only to speaker. The interchangeability of the examples in (2-32) and 
8 (2-33), however, suggests that part of this continuum at least is shared by the wh-cleft. 
It does not confirm Prince's view that the two information types GIVEN and KNOWN 
are qualitatively different. 
Instead, it would appear that the KNOWN label for it-cleft complements represents an 
attempt on Prince's part to generalise across the wide range of information types that 
she observed appearing in it-deft complements. However, this does not appear to be a 
particularly valid or useful generalisation. There are two points to note in this respect. 
"Note that I do not claim that, because wh-clefts inhabit a part of the information continuum con- 
tained within that of the itcIeft, an it-cleft can be used in any situation where a wh-cleft is appropriate. 
This is of course not the case, since there are many other factors that determine appropriateness, as we 
demonstrate throughout this thesis. 
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In fact, the 'known fact' effect Prince alludes to, appearing especially in the case of ip 
clefts, is a result of presenting new information as a presupposition in order that it be 
ACCOMMODATED by the hearer or ieader, a phenomenon well known in the semantics 
literature (cf. Karttunen (19741, Lewis [1979]). We discuss this in detail in chapter 4. 
We can re-interpret the 'known fact' effect as a side-effect of conveying one particular 
kind of information in a cleft complement, rather than as the motivation behind it- 
clefts as a whole. The interaction between information type and presupposition will be 
discussed fully in chapter 5. 
In addition, the use of the terM KNOWN to describe it-clefts in which the presupposed 
information is shared and salient in the discourse, such as is arguably the case in (2-34), 
serves no apparent purpose: 
(2-34) a Who ate the beans? 
b It was JOHN who ate the beans. 
Such information is, as we have seen, no different from kinds of information that can 
appear in wh-clefts, and, in addition, it is not intuitively apparent that (2-34) represents 
a speaker's attempt to avoid responsibility for the fact conveyed, as Prince claims is 
characteristic of KNOWN information. 
2.2.2 Lapolla 
Building Discourse Models 
Lapolla [1986] gives an account of the function of wh-clefts in discourse in terms of 
an analogy Nvith another pragmatically-marked construction, namely INVERSION. An 
example of inversion appears in (2-35): 
(2-35) Outside stood a little angel. 
Lapolla. is principally interested in the function of the part of the construction that is 
first encountered by the hearer in each case: the inverted element of inversions, such as 
outside in (2-35), and the wh-clause of the wh-cleft. For inversions, Lapolla claims that 
the function of the inverted element is to draw the hearer's attention to, or to instruct 
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the hearer to create, a 'location' in their model of the discourse to which the incoming 
new information can be related [Lapolla 1986: 11]. He states: 
The claim of this theory is not that the inverted element is old information, 
though in most cases it is, but that it is the important element with respect 
to embedding of information. When it is new information it sets up a context 
to which new information can be related, including the information in its 
own predicate. When it is old information, "it serves to find the correct 
context in which to embed the information in the predicate. 
[LapoNa 1986: 10] 
When the information used to set 'up a context is new, this constitutes, on Lapolla's 
terms, the construction of a new discourse space in the model of the discourse. The 
wh-cleft, he claims, serves a similar, but more restricted function than inversion in this 
respect, as follows: 
the information contained in the wh-clause of wh-clefts can be equated with 
old information. 9 ... It seems that the main difference between inversion and 
wh-clefting is that inversion can create a completely new discourse space and 
wh-clefting cannot. 
[Lapofla 1986: 13] 
Ile condudes that 
one need not propose any new mechanisms for a linguistic, psychological or 
computational theory to handle clefting but only adopt, or restrict, those 
proposed for inversion. 
[Lapofla 1986: 14] 
Some Problems 
It should be noted first of all that the treatment of wh-clefts in general suggested by 
Lapolla is unlikely to suffice, for two particular reasons. 
9He claims that this conclusion follows Prince (1978]. In fact, as wiU be recalled from our discussion 
of her research, this is rather a rough approximation of her actual claims: Prince equates the information 
in the wh-cleftwh-clause with a slight emendation to Chafe's Given, her phrase being 'information which 
the co-operative speaker may assume is appropriately in the hearer's consciousness'. 
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First, Lapolla's claim that wh-clefts cannot introduce a new discourse space is hard to 
assess, since he does not define what a discourse space is, or what having a new or 
an old one might predict in the way of linguistic behaviour. We do know, however, 
that the wh-cleft can be used to present information that is not currently available to 
the hearer, and can be associated only by inference-not quite the classical use of the 
term 'old' information. In addition, it is well known that the wh-cleft can be used 
discourse-ini ti ally, as in (2-36): 
(2-36) What I'm going to talk about today is inversions in discourse. 
A discourse space would have to be already open in such cases for Lapolla's claim to be 
true for the wh-cleft. We do not know, however, whether this is possible or not. 
Second, his account reveals a serious underestimation of the distinctions between wh- 
clefts and inversion. In particular, simple differences in the syntactic categories of what 
can be fronted in inversions, and used as head in the wh-cleft, indicate that the two are 
unlikely to be equivalent. In inversions, Pps, locative and temporal adverbials, vps and 
prepositional complements can be fronted, although not simple subjects and objects. In 
the wh-cleft, as we will see in chapter 3, simple objects are among the most common, 
with non-finite Vps, and subjects next, adverbials and Pps being comparatively rare. 
This means that not all inversions can be replaced by wh-clefts, as is shown in the 
following example: 
(2-37) a In a large forest stood a house. 
b *Where a house stood was in a large forest. 
The true test of Lapolla's claim as to the equivalence of the two constructions, however, 
is to replace the wh-cleft with an inversion: if the wh-cleft performs a subset of the 
functions of the inversion, the result should be acceptable. We can see straight away that 
even in cases where both the head (in the case of the cleft) and the fronted constituent 
(in the case of the inversion both feature) are syntactically permissible, unacceptability 
often results: 
(2-38) a What Mike is doing is combing his hair. 
b ? Combing his hair is Mike. 
This type of inversion might succeed when Mike was being identified as the person comb- 
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ing his hair; it appears to be an example of the type of inversion Green [1980] identifies 
with the speech of sportscasters (such as Bringing the ball up is Marty Mestemacher). It 
is odd here because hair-combing is not a very noticeable activity by which to pick out 
somebody, and it is hard to imagine a situation where it might be where sportscaster- 
type locutions. would also be appropriate (in the changing-room after the game, per- 
haps? ). But the serious point is that, in the cleft, the same proposition is being used 
to very different effect: to point out what Mike (a known person) is doing, rather than 
to identify him. We therefore conclude that the situations in which both the inversion 
and the wh-cleft would be acceptable are rather more restricted than Lapolla supposes, 
suggesting a greater distinction in their discourse functions than he suggests. 
Even though it may be the case that for Lapolla's purposes his mechanism produces 
the types of wh-cleft he wants (although lie does not demonstrate this) it cannot be 
advanced as a general claim that a theory that can handle inversions will necessarily 
cope with wh-clefts satisfactorily. 
However, some of Lapolla's intuitions regarding the use of the wh-cleft wh-clause as 'the ZD 
important element for the embedding of information' in some model of the discourse 
are very much in the spirit of Clark and Haviland's [19741 and Clark and Clark's [19771 
proposals on the integration of information into discourse models, which we suggest in 
chapter 5 is itself a plausible model for the processing of clefts. 
2.2.3 Werth 
Werth [19841 explains clefts in terms of a view of the information structure of sentences 
due to research in the Prague School tradition, namely the requirement to place the 
TOPIC of the sentence before the COMMENT, a similar hypothesis to the Given-before- 
New principle tested by Geluykens. Informally, the topic is the information that is 
used to connect to what is already shared between the speakers, and is responsible for 
expressing coherence with preceding discourse. Topic therefore tends to appear at the 
beginning of a sentence. Comment, on the other hand, is usually new information, and 
tends to come near the end of the sentence. 
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The Topic-Comment Articulation Constraint 
Werth expresses the requirement that Topic should come before Comment in terms of a 
global constraint on the arrangement of information, the Topic-Comment Articulation 
or TCA constraint. Rather than investigating the information structure of sentences 
directly to see if the constraint is observed, however, Werth postulates a correspondence 
between Topic and Comment and sentence accent. On Werth's account, Topic is often 
realised in speech as either unaccented (REDUCED or rL in Werth's terminology) or 
with CONTRASTIVE (c) accent. The Comment, on the other hand, is ACCENTED (A) 
information. The constraint as a whole is phrased as follows [Werth 1984: 220]: 
The TCA Constraint: Semantic material is deployed in a discourse so as to respect 
the order: Anaphoric-Non-Anaphoric. This corresponds to the emphatic struc- 
ture 
R or C 
Corollary: to maintain this order in surface structure, syntactic elements may be 
moved, or a variant allowing the order may be preferred to one which loses it. 
Werth's contention is that clefts of all kinds represent speakers' attempts to achieve an 
arrangement of information that satisfies the constraint. 
Inits strongest form, theTCA constraint makes the following predictions [Werth 1984: 218ffl: 
@R and C elements occur to the left 
eA elements occur to the right 
A sentence adhering to the TCA constraint (for example, one that can be analysed as 
following the schema R, C, A) has what Werth terms a STABLE structure; that is, a 
structure that is less likely to invite movement. If the pattern of the sentence is contrary 
to the TCA (e. g., if it follows the schema A, R, C), it is not stable and should encourage. 
movement to a more stable arrangement. An intermediate pattern (which, presumably, 
may or may not be transformed) is one where the order of stresses are not actually 
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reversed (e. g. R, R, C). An example of each might be as follows: (2-39a) is a stable 
structure, (2-39b) is unstable, and (2-39c) is intermediate. 
(2-39) a What does John Eke? 
Well, he Ekes BEANS. 
RA 
b Who likes carrots? 
JOHN Ekes BEANS. 
ARC 
c And John Ekes beans? 
No, John likes CARROTS. 
RRC 
The TCA Constraint and It-Clefts 
The predictions the theory makes for clefts [Werth 1984: 241] are the same as those for 
other sentences: we should expect to find an anaphoric leftward element (R or C) and 
an Accented rightward one. The constraint can therefore account for examples such 
as (2-40), which conforms more closely to the TCA constraint than the corresponding 
declarative in (2-41): 
(2-40) 1 know I should tell the vicar, but it's him that I'M aFRAID of. 
RRA 
(2-41) I'm aFRAID of him. 
RAR 
Applying the Principle to Other Clefts 
As Werth observes, the TCA principle does not account so well for clefts with other 
accentual structures. The cleft in (2-42), for example (Werth's 26a), has a Contrastive 
head and a Reduced complement, on Werth's analysis. 
(2-42) Though Johnson stepped up the war in Vietnam, it was KENNedy who 
c 
first drew America into the conflict. 
R 
This sentence is not in direct conflict with the TCA constraint, but neither does it 
conform to it directly. Werth terms such sentences INTERIMEDIATE structures. 
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This in itself is not a problem, but Werth notes that the declarative whose content would 
be equivalent to that of the cleft would itself have identical constituent and emphasis 
order: in effect, the movement has been from one intermediate structure to an identical 
one. In fact, then, clefts with this contrastive/ red u ced structure constitute 
... prima facie evidence against the TCA cons trai nt-evi dently their function 
is different from the rearrangement of anaphoric material that TCA accounts 
for. 
[IiVerth 1984: 2421 
Werth's constraint also runs into difficulties with wh-clefts. In a wh-cleft such as (2- 
5), where the wh-clause contains a constrastive element, both the wh-cleft and the 
corresponding declarative are intermediate structures. Example (2-43) (Werth's 34b) 
shows the TCA structure of the relevant portion of a declarative: 
(2-43) He doesn't realise that 
RCR... A 
which, appearing as a wh-cleft, would receive the following analysis: 
(2-44) What he doesn't realise is that ... R (R) RC 
The comparison of the two examples shows a stable arrangement moving to another 
stable one. Although some of the examples Werth tests in each case move in a way 
predicted by the TCA constraint, many move between equivalent states. He notes that 
even this is often because the wh-element introducing the wh-cleft has been marked as 
anaphoric and therefore R; if this were not the case, the movement would appear to be 
from a more to a less stable arrangement-a situation as contradictory to the TCA as 
that of the it-deft. 
Werth therefore concludes: 
These [examples] seem to suggest that, given an appropriate context, the 
TCA constraint cuts across whatever motivates the emphatic constructions, 
i. e. the two impulses are separate and perhaps independent. 
[Werth 1984: 242-2431 
48 
Werth goes on to argue that the emphatic constructions, clefts among them, 
... are essentially RHETORICAL in nature, in that they are used to highhght 
semantic material, rather than simply redeploy it. 
[Werth 1984: 253] 
Werth then attempts an alternative formulation to explain the behaviour of it-clefts, 
suggesting the function of the cleft to be that of demonstrating contrast on that head 
element. He notes, however, that in some cases there may be an extra contrastive em- 
phasis in the complement. Werth interprets examples where two such points of contrast 
exist as demonstrating another motivation for clefting, akin to that suggested by Quirk 
et al. [1985], as we saw above: namely that of separating the two points of Contrast. 
The Contrastive element in the head 'often carries with it new Accented material', he 
claims, 'while the secondary contrast will usually be accompanied by repeated and Re- 
duced material' [Werth 1984: 254]. Note that this gives us an ordering exactly opposite 
to that predicted by the TCA; for example, (2-45) (ýVerth's example 31f [1984: 2451) has 
the ordering AACCR, rather than the predicted RCA: 
(2-45) It's the academic structure of the UNIVERSITY that WE're concerned 
about. 
AACCR 
Werth concludes that, for the it-cleft, 
It is this reversal of the TCA order, we may assume, that gives the cleft its 
rhetorical effect. 
[Werth 1984: 254] 
Discussion 
Werth's attempt to salvage the TCA constraint by hypothesising that clefts serve to 
reverse it is not without its own problems. As we saw above, Werth was able to show 
that some clefts did conform to the TCA constraint, namely those which have anaphoric 
and/or unaccented head elements and new information in the complement. The reversal 
of TCA cannot explain these examples. It-clefts as a class, therefore, can neither be 
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described wholly in terms of an observation of TCA nor wholly in terms of a violation 
of it. 
Werth's analysis, however, fares rather better for reverse wh-clefts. As we will see in 
chapter 5, the reverse wh-cleft head carries almost exclusively old information, and is 
either Reduced (i. e., unaccented) or Contrastive. New information, with corresponding 
accents, appears in the reverse wh-cleft complement. The common pattern for this kind 
of cleft under Werth's analysis would therefore be R (or C) followed by A, which is the 
pattern predicted by the TCA constraint. 
However, because the declarative corresponding to any cleft may, as we have seen, be 
just as stable as the deft, cleft constructions cannot be motivated solely on the basis 
of the requirement that Werth's TCA constraint-or any similar ordering principle-be 
satisfied. While we go on to show in chapter 5 that information-ordering principles are 
relevant in making the choice between clefts of various types, many other factors need 
to be considered (for example, presupposition, and the syntactic possibilities a sentence 
type offers). As it stands, Werth's account is unable to differentiate between clefts and 
any other construction that departs from canonical sentence order. 
2.2.4 Dividing Given from New Information 
In this section, we examine a claim that has a long history in the clefts literature, 
namely that deft constructions serve the function of dividing given from new informa- 
tion, on some (explicitly or implicitly) Hallidayan notion of given and new. The earliest 
statement of this kind known to me is due to Prince: 
although the it-cleft presents information (old vs. new) in aberrant order, it 
clearly marks which is which. 
[Prince 1978: 897]' 
A similar claim also appears in Geluykens [1984: 681, Quirk et al. (1985: 1387], and 
Cruttenden (1986: 95]. Geluykens' version is as follows: 
Clefted sentences are an ideal device to signal the Given-New distinction: 
they put the Given and New information in structurally very different parts 
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of the sentence. 
The claim-or more commonly, the assumption-that -given information appears ex- 
cl usively in cleft complements, and new in cleft heads appears either implicitly or ex- 
plicitly in Hornby [1972], Haviland and Clark [1974], Clark and Clark [1977: 89], Glatt 
[1982: 89], and Fletcher [1984]. However, it is contradicted by the data Prince [1978] 
and Geluykens [1984] present and by examples given already in this chapter, where new 
appears in complements and given in heads (for example, in Prince's Ip it-cleft). As 
we have seen, Prince and Geluykens realise that given information can appear in cleft 
heads and new in cleft complements, but also that the complete opposite is possible. 
Their claim therefore relates to the separation of given and new information being the 
function of the cleft. 
However, even this more general hypothesis is not supported by the evidence. First of 
all, it has been pointed out by Taglicht [1984] and others that the new information in 
the denotation of an accented constituent need not exhaust the information conveyed 
by that constituent. For example, in the it-cleft in (2-46), accent appears to indicate 
the new status of only part of the head constituent, namely Bill- 
(2-46) It wasn't just John who was kicked out. It was John and BILL. 
In cases such as this, the cleft head is composed of both new and given information. 
In fact, as Taglicht points out, it is possible to confine the scope of new information 
(described as 'focus'in Taglicht's terms) to a single semantic feature in the denotation of 
the constituent, resulting in a higher ratio of given to new information in the denotation 
of that constituent. In (2-47), new information is arguably confined to the feature [+ 
FEMALE]: 
(2-47) A: And then Billy Connolly came on? 
B: No, next it was a comediENNE that was on. 
In (2-47), it is not at issue whether Billy Connolly is a comedian; that is, the contrast 
is not between Billy Connolly and a comedy act (this would require B to say COMEDian 
rather than comediENNE). Instead, B makes a contrast between male and female come- 
dians, the fact that both are comedy acts being given. 
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Not only is it possible to combine given and new information within the same syntactic 
part of the cleft, as (2-46) and (2-47) show, it is clearly the case that given or new 
can appear in both parts of the cleft at once. This appears to have been a conclusion 
that Quirk et aL [1985] in particular tried to avoid by their suggestion that, of the two 
nuclei they claim to be obligatory in cleft constructions, one-uncharacteristically for 
nuclei-had to mark given information. However, contrary to their claim, it is quite 
common for some new information to appear in both head and complement. IM-clefts, 
for example, can have contrastive information (which falls under Halliday's definition 
of new) in the complement, and new information in the head, as in (2-48): 
(2-48) I'd rather they came later. What I DON'T want is for them to come while 
I'm at VINa's. 
The problem of deciding on the scope of new information-that is, how much is new 
when the presence of new information is indicated by means of an accent-was first 
noted by Halliday [1967], and has appeared more recently in phonological approaches 
to focus (cf. Selkirk [19801, Cussenhoven [19831, Taglicht [19841). It is generally held 
that the problem is not resolvable on an entirely syntactic basis, yet this is the force of 
what Prince, Geluykens, Quirk et al. and Cruttenden claim with their view of the cleft 
as providing a syntactic boundary between the two information types. While there may 
well be a correlation between syntactic structure and information structure, as we go 
on to examine in chapter five, the claim that a hard and fast syntactic division can be 
made between given and new information in clefts cannot be sustained. 
2.2.5 Clefts and the Marking of Other Information Types: Conclusion 
In this section, we have reviewed some claims regarding the kinds of information, other 
than focus, that clefts have been claimed to mark. We have also examined research that 
claims the function of clefts to be that of presenting information in particular ways, in 
terms of serial ordering and in terms of separating out different kinds of information. 
Some problems that have occurred with the accounts discussed, in common with those 
occurring in relation to some of the focusing accounts discussed in the previous section, 
are based on too slender an acquaintance with the variety present in the data: this is true 
of Werth's suggestions regarding clefts as devices for presenting information according 
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to his definition of Topic-Comment ordering. In addition, our exan-dnation of accounts 
claiming that clefts divide new from given information revealed an underestimation of 
the varying scope of new information that is possible within constituents. 
Prince's account, the only one that attempts to distinguish between wh-clefts and it- 
clefts, was found not to be correct as it stands, although her observations regarding the 
existence of different categories of it-clefts are important. In particular, the distinction 
she makes between GIVEN and KNOWN information was shown not to capture the fact 
that some it-clefts and wh-clefts carry the same kinds of information in their comple- 
ments. In relation to this, we suggested that the label KNOWN represents a confusion 
of levels, being itself a side-effect arising in particular contexts, namely when new in- 
formation is presented as a presupposition. We proposed as an alternative to Prince's 
distinction that it-clefts and wh-clefts should be seen as overlapping in the kinds of infor- 
mation they are able to convey as presupposition along some continuum of information 
types. This will be demonstrated and explained further in chapter 5. 
2.3 An Overview of Previous Research: Summary 
In spite of the variety of arguments put forward to explain the function of clefts and 
to characterise the kinds of information they appear to be able to convey, difficulties 
arising with the accounts suggested to date are often very similar. 
The conclusions reached in this chapter can be summarised in the following five points: 
1. On no definition of focus proposed so far in relation to clefts can the view of clefts 
as focusing constructions be substantiated. 
2. Too little attention is paid to the variety Of ACCENTUAL PATTERNs and INFOR- 
NIATION STRUCTURES Occurring in the data. The range available to clefts in both C) 
respects requires an extensive corpus-based study if general conclusions are to be 
drawn. 
3. Possibly resulting from the above point, there is a tendency to incorrectly gen- 
eralise about the correspondences that exist between accent and syntactic form, 
between information structure and syntactic form, and, where accent is taken into 
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account at aU, between accent, information structure, and syntactic form. 
4. In cases where an attempt is made to distinguish the different syntactic types of 
deft, there is a tendency to assume a one-to-one mapping between the different 
syntactic structures and the kinds of information carried in each type. 
5. Most strikingly, all the research examined attempts to explain the existence of 
cleft constructions in terms of a single level of description (information structure 
or focus, for example), neglecting important differences between clefts and other 
syntactic constructions that can be described at other levels. For example, al- 
most all the accounts we have examined fall to mention the role of the cleft as a 
presuppositional construction, which differentiates it from other sentence types. 
Because of this last point in particular, we advocate here a multi-level approach to the 
description of the function of clefts in discourse, where the distinctions between clefts 
and other syntactic constructions, and between the three types of cleft, can be explained 
in terms of their syntax, their semantics and their pragmatic function. 
In the next chapter, we make the first step towards a multi-level model for the use of 
clefts in discourse: a study of the syntax of the three kinds of cleft construction. 
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Chapter 3 
The Syntax of Cleft 
Constructions 
While the nature of cleft constructions may seem intuitively clear, a full understanding 
of the range of data that fall within the definitions of the three cleft types, and the 
distinctions between them, cannot be reached without a detailed examination of the 
syntax of each of the structures involved. The particular concerns of this chapter are 
first of all to identify the structural distinctions between it-clefts, wh-clefts, and reverse 
wh-clefts that may be relevant considerations from the point of view of the speaker's 
choice of construction, and secondly to differentiate the clefts, or parts of them, from 
other kinds of construction that may be superficially similar. 
Taking each cleft type in turn, we suggest an appropriate syntactic analysis, and look 
at how the analysis predicts the range of possible data. In the case of the it-cleft, the 
phrase-structure rules given by Gazdar et al. [19851 within the framework of Gener- 
alized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) are adopted. This treatment is extended to 
wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts, further GPSG rules being suggested to cope with each 
construction. For wh-clefts in particular, several competing analyses have been sug- 
gested: the distinctions between the analysis proposed here and these other analyses 
are pointed out and explained where appropriate. For all three cleft types, we are par- 
ticularly interested in the kinds of constituent that can appear as heads, since these 
syntactic facts have effects with respect to the kinds of semantic object that cleft heads 
are able to specify. It seems that differing constraints operate on the instantiation of 
the head constituent in each type of cleft: we summarise the range of head constituent 
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types available to each cleft type at the end of the section in which that cleft type is 
discussed, and this aspect of the three cleft types is compared at the end of the chapter. 
While the chapter concentrates on the formation of phrase-structure rules which, as 
is traditionally the aim of grammar, generate all and only the grammatical strings 
involved, it is also instructive to compare what is generated by the grammar with 
the frequency of occurrence of these strings in the corpora upon which much of this 
study is based. Some of the strings that the rules generate, and which are judged by 
informants to be grammatical, occur frequently in the data; others occur rarely or not at 
all. Some of the reasons for the scarcity of particular surface forms may be pragmatic, 
or connected with the content of what people decide to talk about. The approach 
we take to the problem is to construct phrase structure rules that generate the strin s 
judged to be grammatical, but we also present the frequency data for comparison. In the 
suggestions for generating appropriate cleft constructions given in chapter 6, we propose 
that the tendencies towards particular surface strings can be captured at levels other 
than the syntactic level, either falling out of decisions made at the level of semantics or 
pragmatics, or adjusted for in terms of preference weightings. 0 
The structure of the present chapter is as follows. In sections 3.1,3.2, and 3.3, we 
discuss the syntax of the it-cleft, the wh-cleft, and the reverse wh-cleft respectively. 
Section 3.4 contains a discussion of the relevant features of the corpus data, while 
section 3.5 presents a summary of the findings of the chapter, paying particular attention 
to a comparison of the three types of cleft in terms of what syntactic constituents can 
appear as cleft head (defined below) in each case. 
3.1 The li-Cleft 
An example of the construction known as the IT-CLEFT appears in (3-1): 
(3-1) It was William who was voted Greatest Cat. 
As we noted in chapter 1, the practice throughout this thesis will be to refer to the 
immediate complement of the copula in each kind of cleft-in this case the NP William- 
as the HEAD of the cleft. The clausal constituent that comprises the remainder of the 
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cleft, in this case who was voted Greatest Cat, will be termed the cleft COMPLEMENT 
(or, as we observed for wh-clefts, the %VII-CLAUSE). 
3.1.1 Phrase-Structure Rules for it-clefts 
In our description of it-clefts, we will be adopting the phrase-structure rules developed in 
Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (henceforward GPSG; Cf. Gazdar et al. [1985]). 
Gazdar et al. (1985: 159ffl give two rules which in combination are intended to cover the 
range of the clefts data. The rules are as follows: 
(3-2) VP[+ it] ---+ H[44], NP, S [+ R] 
(3-3) Vf[+ it] ----* H[44], X2, S [FIN]/X2 
In each rule, the category H[441 stands for the main verb be; the category x2 in rule (3- 
3) can be characterised as representing any major phrasal constituent (such as NP, AP, 
PP), while the constituent S[FlN]/x2 stands for a finite sentential constituent containing 
a gap of category X2. That is, it corresponds to an s which, in transformational terms, 
has had a constituent of category x2 extracted from it. However, in the framework of 
GPSG, there are no 'extractions' or 'movements' as such. Rather, there is a systematic 
use of features for encoding UNBOUNDED DEPENDENciEs between fillers and gaps. For 
the sake of convenience, the term 'extraction' will be used from time to time during 
the discussion to follow. This is not, however, intended to imply a transformational 
analysis. 
We will discuss the range of data covered by each of the two rules in turn. An examPle 
of the tree structure associated with rule (3-2) appears in figure 3.1. 
The Relative-Clause Rule 
The first point to note regarding rule (3-2) is that it generates only NP-headed it-clefts, 
rather than the full range of it-cleft head types. Secondly, the rule generates a normal 
restrictive relative clause as the complement of the deft. On this analysis, the relativiser 
involved plays the role of a subject or object NP argument in the embedded sentential 
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S 
NP [it] VPE+it] 
V[44, +it] NP S [+Rl 
NP [+Rl VP 
v I pp I 
Pi 
p NP 
it is Kim who relies on Sandy 
Figure 3.1: Phrase-marker for an it-cleft generated by rule (3-2) 
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constituent. Two important features fall out of this view of the role of the relativiser: 
one is a correct account of person agreement, and we discuss this later in this section. 
The second is that, as is common to the analysis of both it-deft complements and relative 
clauses in GPSG, the relativiser cannot be omitted when it plays the role of subject in 
the embedded clause. The fact that this feature appears in both types of construction 
is also noted by Sornicola [1988] and Quirk et al. [1985]. In basing the (3-2) analysis of 
it-defts on that of restrictive relative clauses, Gazdar et al. 's rules correctly predict that 
it-cleft complement relativisers that are covered by this rule can only be omitted when 
they act as object in the embedded clause. Relative clause examples are given in (3-4); 
it-deft examples in (3-5). In the (a) example in each case, the relativiser is object; in 
the (b) cases, it is subject: 
(3-4) a The man I saw has come back. 
b *The man saw me has come back. 
(3-5) a It was the man I saw first. 
b *It was the man saw me first. 
The rule also predicts that it-clefts with NP heads can be generated with the full range of 
appropriate relative-clause relativisers, such as that, which, who, whom and compounds 
of these items with prepositions such as on whom and with which. 
Note that this prediction is incompatible with a conclusion of Quirk et at. [1985], who 
argue that 'whom and which are only marginally possible [in it-clefts], and it is virtually 
impossible to use whom or which preceded by a preposition' [Quirk et al. 1985: 1397). 
Th. is position seems to be difficult to substantiate, since their example, given here in 
(3-6), which they claim only admits a non-cleft reading, seems to be equally appropriate 
in the context given in (3-7), in which a cleft reading is induced: 
(3-6) It was the dog to which I gave the water. 
(3-7) It was the dog to which I gave the water, not the cat. 0 
Examples generated by rule (3-2) include the following (cf. Gazdar cf A (1985: 158]): 
(3-8) a It is Kim on whom Sandy relies. 
b It is Kim who Sandy relies on. 
c It is Kim that relies on Sandy. 
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The analogy between the Complements of NP-headed it-clefts and the relative clause is 
further supported by the fact that PIED-PIPING (cf. Ross [19671) occurs in these it-clefts 
just as it does in relative clauses. The term developed from the view that relativisation, 
seen in some abstract sense, involves the FRONTING of a wh-constituent, a progression 
that is represented schematically in (3-9). The argument runs that when such fronting 
has taken place, there is a choice between leaving associated prepositions STRANDED at 
the end of the clause, as in (3-10), or pied-piping them, like the piper of Hamelin, along 
to a position accompanying the relativiser, as in (3-11): 
(3-9) aI spoke to the man. 
b The man I spoke to who. 
c The man who I spoke to. 
(3-10) The man who I spoke to. 
(3-11) The man to whom I spoke. 
The acceptability of both stranded and pied-piped prepositions in relative clauses is 
identical in the case of it-clefts, as follows: 
(3-12) It was the man who I spoke to. 
(3-13) It was the man to whom I spoke. 
It will be noted that the phrase structure given by rule (3-2) does not presuppose that 
the head and relative clause form a cons ti tuent-su ch as Kim who relies on Sandy 
that can be analysed as NP. Although the NP analysis is a common one for relative 
clauses and their heads, it is clear that the relative clause of the it-cleft does not form 
a constituent with the deft head. This is demonstrated by examples such as (3-14), 
where an attempt is made to extract the resulting 'constituent': 
(3-14) *He said it was John that's an interesting guy, and John that's an inter- 
esting guy it is. 
The structure given by rule (3-2) predicts that the extraction will be unacceptable. 
Rule (3-2), although capturing a range of if-cleft behaviour, does not cater for all the 
data, however. For example, Sornicola [19881 notes that restrictive relative clauses 
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cannot normally modify proper nouns: 
(3-15) a Which company are you going to ring? 
b *I'll ring Momma's who make the best pizzas. 
In addition, rule (3-2) does not cover the many cases where it-clefts have heads that are 
not NPS. In these cases, as Quirk et al. [1985: 1387] have observed, the relativiser that 
does not function strictly as a pronoun, as rule (3-2) requires, since it can also occur in 
sentences where it serves as a pro-form for the non-norninal constituent. For example, 
in (3-16), that substitutes for the reason adverbial because he was ill: 
(3-16) It was because he was ill that we decided to return. 
Quirk et al. note that while that is adaptable to such non-pronorninal use, which is not 
so adaptable, since it cannot be used in contexts in which the non-pronorninal function 
is required: 
(3-17) *It was because he was ill which we decided to return. 
We would therefore expect which to appear only with NP-headed clefts, and this is borne 
out by the data. Gazdar et al. 's rule (3-3) deals with these non-pronominal cases. 
The Complementised Sentence Rule 
Rule (3-3) allows any constituent that can be extracted from s to be cleft head, leaving 
the cleft complement as a. sentential constituent containing a dependent gap, rather than 
a relative clause. The phrase-marker given by Gazdar et al. [1985: 159] for an example 
that the rule would generate appears in figure 3.2. 
First of all, as we noted above, only the sentential complementiser that appears in exam- 
ples covered by rule (3-3). The rule therefore excludes examples such as the following: 
(3-18) *It was on Kim on whom Sandy relied. 
(3-19) *It was to Kim who John gave a book. 
The range of constituents that can act as xp, i. e. that can be extracted from s are, 
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S 
NP [it] VP[+it] 





NP [+NULL] /NP 
it is Kim Sandy relies on e 
Figure 3.2: Phrase-marker for it-cleft generated by rule (3-3) 
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in GPSG as elsewhere, taken to be any major phrasal constituent, such as PP, AP, VP 
or NP. XP cannot, however, be instantiated by a particle, NP with possessive marking, 
non-finite VP, V, or A. In fact, the constituents predicted to be acceptable as xP are the 
same as those that, on similar rules, can be extracted in sentential constructions other 
than it-clefts, such as topicalisation and wh-fronting. We shall see below, however, that 
the possible instantiations of xP in it-clefts are not identical either to the constituents 
possible in topicalisation and wh-fronting, or to those possible for other types of cleft. 
It is not to the purpose here to attempt to adduce rules for the instantiation of xP in 
each case, and so in what follows, we will simply draw attention to the unacceptable 
cases, leaving the particular constraints that operate in each case as a topic for further 
research. 
Rule (3-3) predicts that clefts with heads that are not major phrasal constituents will 
not be acceptable. It therefore makes the correct predictions for examples such as the 
following. In (3-20a), a possessive NP has been extracted; in (3-20b), a particle, and in 
(3-20c), a non-finite vp (in this particular case, a bare infinitive): 
(3-20) a *It was Kim's I read a book of. 
b *It was up he called John. 
c *It is be beaten by a six-year-old that I couldn't bear. 
The rules also predict that cases in which the head is a non-extracted constituent will noi 
be acceptable. This appHes to the case of sentential adverbs, which, although they can 
appear at the in various positions throughout the sentence, do not create dependencies 
in the normal sense since it is never clear whether extraction has taken place at all. The 
explanation of such constituents as non-extracted would account for the unacceptability 
of (3-21): 
(3-21) *It is frankly that I think lie's a nuisance. 
While vp is predicted to be one of the major constituents that can be extracted from 
s, not all kinds of VP can be cleft head. First of all, in all three kinds of cleft, finite VPs 
cannot be deft head: 
(3-22) a John bit me. 
b *It was bit me that John. 
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Extraction of a range of non-finite vps is possible, however. Purposive to-infinitive 
clauses, such as that forming cleft head in (3-23a), non-finite vps in -ing acting as 
subject, as in (3-23b), and passive participle clauses, such as (3-23c), are all possible: 
(3-23) a It was to get some shaving cream that Bill set out for the store. 
b It was making all those beds that was the worst thing. 
c It was jammed under the sofa that I found your wallet. 
Non-purposive to-infinitive clauses such as that appearing as head of (3-24a), -ing clauses 
acting as complement of an embedded VP such as that in (3-24b), and bare infinitives 
such as that in (3-24c), are all ungrammatical, however: 
(3-24) a *It's to go out that I'd prefer. 
b *It's making the beds that John is [doing]. 
c *It's make the beds that I'll have to. 
Note that in (3-24b), do-insertion appears unable to support the vp in the cleft head. 
While do-insertion in wh-clefts allows a range of non-finite vps in head position as we 
shall see in section 3.2, neither progressive non-finite Vps, such as that in (3-24b), nor 
non-progressive non-finite vps such as that in (3-25), appear to be supported by do in 
the case of the it-deft: 
(3-25) *It is make the beds that John does. 
Unlike reverse wh-clefts, it-clefts are able to take phrases with not only and not just as 
head. In addition, uniquely among the cleft constructions, they are able to take phrases 
with not untiL 
(3-26) a It is not only/not just the wind that makes the noise. 
b What makes the noise is not ordy/not just the wind. 
c *Not only/not just the wind is what makes the noise. 
(3-27) a It was not until three that she left. 
b *When she left was not until three. 
c *Not until three was when she left. 
Two final constraints on the instantiation of xP are as follows. First, it appears that 
XP for it-clefts cannot be either a universally quantified phrase such as (3-28): 
(3-28) *It is every boy that Mary likes. 
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Nor, as Halvorsen [19781 points out, can it be an NP with a negative polarity item, such 
as (3-29): 
(3-29) *It is any marbles that John doesn't want. 
Second, although this is strictly a pragmatic issue, it is worth noting here that certain 
anaphoriC NPs, namely that and it, are less than acceptable as head of an it-cleft. It is 
completely unacceptable, while that is merely marginal: 
(3-30) *It was it that I was talking about. 
(3-31) ? It was that that I was talking about. 
Interestingly, it cannot appear as head of a topicalised clause either, while that can: 
(3-32) *1 looked for the spanner. It I could carry. 
(3-33) 1 looked for the spanner. That I could carry. 
This pragmatic constraint on the instantiation of xP is discussed further in chapter 5. 
3.1.2 It-clefts and Topicalisation 
The most interesting cases are those where the behaviour of the it-cleft appears to 
diverge from that of the putatively analogous topicalised and wh-fronted constructions. 
In some cases, pragmatic principles can be brought to bear to explain the distinctions 
involved; in others, the reasons for the divergence are not so clear. We will note three 
particular cases where it-cleft behaviour does differ, only the third of which appears to 
have a pragmatic explanation. The cases are as follows: 
0 AP cannot always act as head of an it-cleft, although it can in topicalised clauses. 
a As the rules for it-clefts predict, ADV cannot appear as a cleft head; it can, however, 
appear as the fronted constituent of a topicalised clause. 
* Sentential complements of non-factive verbs cannot be it-cleft heads, although this 
does not appear to be a restriction on topicalised clauses 
65 
Taking the AP issue first, Gazdar et aL [1985: 159] note that only in some dialects can 
AP be extracted, their example being as follows: 
(3-34) % It is very enthusiastic that Sean is. 
In it-clefts, AP appears in fact to be acceptable when it appears in an adjunctive role 
modifying the main verb, as in (3-35). In this example, the action of the main verb 
could be described as painting green: 
(3-35) It was lurid green that he painted his boat 
However, AP is either marginal or unacceptable when it appears as complement of an 
intensive verb: 
(3-36) a ? It was absolutely deficious that your pie was. 
b ? It was morose that he became. 
c *It was furry that it felt. 
d *It is cacophonous that this sounds. 
Interestingly, extraction of the same kind as that shown in (3-36) is acceptable in topi- 
calised dauses: 
(3-37) a He said your pie would be absolutely delicious, and absolutely deli- 
cious it was. 
b They said John was morose, and morose he is. 
A related construction is though fronting, which permits AP in cases where it-clefts do 
not: 
(3-38) a Short though lie is, he made it into the basketball team. 
b *It is short that lie is. 
It has been suggested that only nounlike APS can be clefted, which might explain the 
acceptability of (3-34). However, why this constraint should operate on it-clefts and not 
on the corresponding topicalised clauses is not immediately clear. 
A second divergence from the case of topicalisation occurs in the case of ADV as cleft 
head. It-clefts appear to be unable to take -1y adverbs in particular as cleft head, as 
is demonstrated in (3-39). If the adverb is analysed as simply A, rather than as a 
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reatisation Of ADVP, tbiS unacceptability is predicted by rule (3-3): 
(3-39) a *It was tenderly he sang. 
b Tenderly he sang. 
ADVP, on the other hand, is acceptable, again as the rules predict: 
(3-40) It was with great tenderness that he sang. 
The third and final case in which topicalisation and it-clefts differ is in the acceptability 
of sentential complements of factive and non-factive verbs. As Delahunty (1984: 821 
notes, the complements of non-factives such as think-, write and say cannot appear as 
the heads of it-clefts, while those of factives such as forget, remember and regret can be. 
The following example demonstrates: 
(3-41) a *It was that he was coming home that he wrote. 
b It was that he was coming home that he regretted. 
Sentential complements of both non-factive and factive verbs can be topicallsed, how- 
ever: 
(3-42) a That he was coming home he regretted, but his decision was final. 
b That he was coming home he wrote a week ago; why he has not 
appeared is a mystery. 
The constraint on the sentential complements of non-factives appearing as the heads 
of it-clefts is not necessarily exclusive to clefts, since a plausible and more general 
explanation is available on the basis of pragmatic principles concerning the use of such 
complements. Factive verbs are so called because their complements have the status 
of fact: the complement is presupposed. This makes them particularly well-suited to 
appearing as deft heads, since, as we show in chapter four of this thesis, cleft heads 
act in a manner very similar to that of definite referring expressions in discourse. Their 
similarity lies in the fact that an antecedent seems to be required for them both in the 
discourse, in each case because of an existential presupposition that arises from syntactic 
structure. In the case of definite referring expressions the presupposition arises from 
the determiner the; in the case of clefts, it arises from the presence of an existentially- 
quantified variable that appears in the presupposition conveyed by the cleft complement. 
This is discussed fully in chapter four: for the moment, it is sufficient to note that the 
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complements of factive verbs have the required quasi-definite status in the discourse to 
appear appropriately as cleft heads, while those of non-factives do not. 
While the reasons behind the three points of divergence between it-clefts and other 
constructions where similar extraction takes place are not always clear-cut, the above 
evidence demonstrates that slightly different constraints operate on what constituent 
type xP can be for the purposes of cleft rule (3-3) than might operate on a similar topi- 
calisation or wh-fronting rule of the same type. We will summarise what the constraints 
on XP seem to be at the end of the section. 
3.1.3 Agreement in It-clefts 
Before we go on to look at the constraints operating on the extraction of constituents 
from s in wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts, we should look at the behaviour of it-clefts with 
respect to agreement, in particular, agreement between the main verb embedded in the 
complement and the cleft copula. First of all, as Halvorsen [19781 and Sornicola [1988] 
point out (following Jespersen [1949]), the it-cleft copula no longer agrees with the cleft 
head, as it did in Middle English. An oft-quoted example from Chaucer demonstrates 
this agreement: 
(3-43) It am I that loveth so hote Emilye the brighte. 
Copular agreement of this nature is generally judged to be ungrammatical in Modern 
English: 
(3-44) *It am I that is going to the pictures tonight. 
(3-45) *It were you lot that had the Radio Times last. 
The agreement patterns between the verb embedded in the cleft complement and the 
copula are rather less simple. When the head of the cleft is object of the embedded verb, 
agreement is straightforwardly between the embedded verb and grammatical subject of 
the embedded sentence, as might be expected: 
(3-46) It is me that Mary talks to most. 
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Agreement of the verb in the complement clause is not so straightforward when the 
subject of that verb appears as cleft head. Halvorsen (1978: 511 notes that, in examples 
such as (3-47), the verb in the it-cleft complement agrees with the subject cleft head in 
number, but not in person: 
(3-47) It's me who is/*am responsible. 
Akmajian [1970: 153] and Iluddleston [1984: 4621, however, give examples where both 
person and number agreement seem to be taking place between the verb and the it-cleft 
head. Akmajian [19701 points out that, in dialects where such examples are acceptable, 
when the head of the cleft is a nominative pronoun, person and number agreement both 
occur: ' 
(3-48) a It is I who am/*is responsible. 
b It is the boys who are responsible. 
Sornicola [19881 proposes that, while number agreement is always controlled by the cleft 
head, person agreement only appears if the head takes the nomi native case. The contrast 
between (3-48a), where the cleft head is nominative, and (3-46), where it is not, shows 
tMs to be the case. Note first of all that the examples we are discussing are those that 
would be generated by rule (3-2) given above, in which the cleft complement is analysed 
as a relative clause. Rule (3-2), in the cases we are concerned with 2, casts the relative 
pronoun as grammatical subject of the complement. On the GPSG analysis, we could 
postulate that the verb agrees by default with the relative pronoun. We can therefore 
describe this default agreement simply as agreement with the subject. Because the 
element agreed with-the subject relative pronoun-exists only in third person form, 
default agreement is thýird person. In cases where the cleft head is deliberately marked 
as subject by the use of the nominative case, however, as occurs in (3-48a), we can say 
that this element is being marked as the dominant subject element. Agreement in these 
cases defaults to that element, and not to the relative pronoun 3 
'In Italian, agreement with the head NP is unvarying; in French, the cleft shows variations in the 
extent of this agreement, particularly in older rural varieties. For a full discussion, see Sornicola [1988]. 
2 Nominative marking cannot appear in the cleft head when the relative pronoun is not acting as 
subject: consider, for example, *It is I that Mark hatei. 
'3Note, however, that in the Middle English example in (3-42) agreement does not default to this 
element even though the cleft head is marked as nominative. Agreement instead appears to be between 
the embedded verb (e. g. loveth) and the third-person relative pronoun in all cases. 
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3.1.4 Summary 
In this section, two GPSG rules for generating it-clefts were adopted. Rule (3-2) describes 
NP-headed it-clefts with relative clause complements; rule (3-3) caters for it-clefts with 
heads of constituent type XP, whose complement is a sentential constituent contain- 
ing a gap of category xP. The constraints on what constituent types could instantiate 
xP were examined, and it was demonstrated that all major phrasal constituents could 
appear except for finite vp, non-purposive to-infinitive, non-finite -ing vp as comple- 
ment of embedded vp, universally quantified or negative polarity NP, some APS, -1Y 
adverbs, sentential complements of non-factive verbs, sentential adverbs, and bare in- 
finitive clauses. It was also shown that it-clefts cannot have it as head, while that is 
marginal, but possible. 
As far as agreement of the main verb of the complement clause is concerned, we con- 
cluded that number agreement is always with the cleft head, while person agreement 
seems to default to the relative pronoun unless the cleft head is marked as nominative. 
In these cases, person agreement is with the head element. 
3.2 The Wh-Cleft 
The copular construction known as the wh-cleft (sometimes referred to as the PSEUDO- 
CLEFT) construction is exemplified in (3-49): 
(3-49) What Andrew wants most is to find a nice cover for his book. 
As is the practice throughout this thesis, in the discussion to follow, the relative-Eke 
clause that introduces the wh-cleft will be termed the %VH-CLAUSE (in (3-49), what 
Andrew wants most) and the immediate complement of the copular main verb will be 
termed the HEAD of the cleft (in (3-49), to find a nice cover for his book). 
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3.2.1 Phrase-Structure Rules for Wh-clefts 
It is easy to see that the wh-clause of the wh-cleft contains a gap, and that this may be 
embedded arbitrarily deeply. For example: 
(3-50) What Andrew seems to have persuaded Sue to want to get 
Alex to do ... 
What is less clear is what constitutes the filler corresponding to the gap. One hypothesis 
is that the initial wh-element, such as what in the examples in (3-51), and where in the 
examples in (3-52), plays tMs role: 
(3-51) a WhatNp Andrew wants most eNp. 
b *What Andrew wants to put the car e. 
(3-52) a Wherepp Andrew wants to put the car epp. 
b *Where Andrew wants most e. 
In (3-52a), the where is presumably a wh-filler of category PP which enters into a depen- 
dency with the PP gap after the car. In cases where category of the wh-filler and that of 
the gap do not match, such as in (3-50b) and (3-52b), the sentence is ungrammatical. 
Although there is clearly a dependency of some sort between the wh-filler of the wh- 
clause and the head of the whole wh-cleft, it is difficult to subsume it under the general 
mechanisms of filler-gap dependencies using GPSG-style slash features, unlike the depen- 
dency within the wh-clause just discussed. If such a gap-filler dependency did exist, the 
analysis of the wh-cleft might be represented by a rule such as (3-53b): 
(3-53) a What John wants is beans. 
bs, s/xp v xp 
However, on this analysis, we would expect it to be possible to topicalise the filler 
constituent XP, as follows: 
(3-54) a *Beans, what John wants is 
s- xp[Top] s/xp v 
The lack of acceptability of this topicalisation sugOrests that the relationship between CDO 
the cleft head constituent and the wh-clause is something other than a straightforward 
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gap-filler dependency. One alternative possibility is that the dependency is purely se- 
mantic. A second, and perhaps more appealing, suggestion is that we could capture it 
syntactically by postulating a category-valued foot feature, say CL, which is analogous 
to SLASH, but appears only in wh-clefts. ' That is, consider the following rule: Jacobson 
discontinuous 1987 .] 
(3-55) S- S[CL XP] V[106] XP 
We discuss later in this section the reasons behind this flat structure; for the moment 
note that the specification [CL xP] is intended to encode the dependency between the 
xP category of the head and the xP category of the wh-element in the wh-clause. 
In order to get this to work, it seems that a second rule of the foHowing kind might be 
necessary: 
(3-56) S(CL XP] - XP[%VH XP] S/XP 
However, let us suppose that lexical entries of the following sort are available: 
(3-57) a what NP(CL NPI 
b where PP[CL PP] 
c who NP[CL NP] 
We could now replace (3-56) by (3-58), which draws upon lexical entries such as those 
in (3-57): 
(3-58) S[CL XP] - XP[CL XP] S/XP 
The conventions which govern foot features in GPSG can be used to ensure that the (CL 
XPI on the mother of (3-58) will also occur on one of the daughters. If we assume, in 
addition, that [CL xP] is prevented from co-occurring with [SLASH XP] by a Feature 
Co-occurrence Restriction (FCR), then (3-58) does not need to be separately written in 
the grammar, but will follow from the Foot Feature Principle (FFP; cf. Gazdar et al. 
[1985]) and appropriate FCRS. 
'Similar proposals for a slash-type feature which is not unbounded have been made in the GPSG 
literature, though for somewhat different purposes: see, for example, Jacobson (1987]. 
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It is not our intention to look for detailed arguments in favour of one approach or 
another, since we are not primarily concerned with this aspect of the syntax-semantics 
interaction in this thesis. For convenience, we shall just adopt the (CL XPI analysis in 
the following discussion. Later in this section, we use this analysis as the basis of a 
comparison between the wh-cleft and and other kinds of wh-construction. 
As in the discussion of it-clefts, we are interested in examining what constituent types 
can instantiate xP, as well as in demonstrating that the analysis given in the rule is 
appropriate for the construction in question. We will make some remarks concerning 
the comparison of wh-clefts with it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts during the course of the 
following section, but will provide a thorough comparison of the three construction types 
in section 3.5. 
3.2.2 The Instantiation of XP 
In the case of the wh-cleft, a broader range of constituents can act as XP-Le. as the 
head of the cleft-than can appear as head of it-clefts. However, the constraint that xP 
has to be a major phrasal constituent still holds, predicting that the examples below will 
not be grammatical wh-clefts. In (3-59), the cleft head is a preposition extracted from 
a phrasal vp; in (3-60) the head is a possessive noun extracted from a possessive NP, 
and in (3-61), the head is formed from a concatenation of two unrelated constituents: 
(3-59) *What/how he called John was up. 
(3-60) *Who he read a book of was Kim's. 
(3-61) *Who/What they are making is Mike captain. 
Several constraints on xP do arise, and these are as follows. First of all, we saw in 
the case of it-clefts that AP heads were only marginally acceptable. Difficulties also 
arise with this category of head in wh-clefts, but the problems are somewhat different 
in nature. Often, when an AP is placed as head of a wh-cleft, instead of the result 
being ungrammatical, a non-cleft reading arises. This reading results from a different 
semantic and syntactic analysis of the same string. In the non-cleft case, the wh-clause 
is interpreted as a referential free relative clause, while the complement of the copula is 
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interpreted as predicating some property of the object referred to by the free relative 
clause. Following Higgins (19791, we term this a PREWCATIONAL reading. For example, 
in (3-62), the wh-clause what Lisa is chasing refers to an entity, and the predicative 
complement covered in scales predicates a property of that entity: 
(3-62) What Lisa is chasing is covered in scales. 
Although ungrammaticality is also an issue in certain cases, the main issue to take note 
of in the discussion Of AP heads-as in predicative heads in general-is to make sure 
that non-cleft, predicative readings do not occur. Broadly speaking, AP heads do not 
result in a predicative reading in wh-clefts as long as the main verb of the wh-clause is 
INTENSIVE: that is, if it is a copula or a member of the class of verbs (such as look and 
appear) in which the complement predicates a property of the entity referred to by the 
subject phrase. A cleft reading can therefore be preserved in examples such as (3-63), 
where the main verb of the wh-clause is a copula: 
(3-63) What John is is interesting. 
Where the wh-clause main verb is non-intensive, an unambiguously predicational reading 
occurs: 
(3-64) What John does is interesting. 
Examples of other intensive verbs which allow the cleft reading to be preserved in the 
presence of an AP or A head are become, feel, and sound, exemplified as follows. As we 
noted in the previous section, the corresponding it-cleft is not acceptable in any of these 
cases: 
(3-65) a What he became was morose. 
b *It was morose that he became. 
(3-66) -a How it felt was furry. 
b *It was furry that it felt. 
(3-67) a How this sounds is cacophonous. 
b *It is cacophonous that this sounds. 
74 
There are intensive verbs, however, which do not permit either a cleft or a predicational 
reading of the sentence: 
(3-68) ? What John seems is unhappy. 
(3-69) ? What he remained was morose. 
Turning to the acceptability of non-finite vp as cleft head, we saw in the case of the 
it-cleft that three types of phrase were possible: purposive to-infinitives, -ing participle 
phrases when used as subject, and passive participle phrases. AU three are also possible 
for wh-clefts, examples of each type of head appearing as follows: 
(3-70) What Bill set out for the store for was to get shaving cream. 
(3-71) What was the worst was making all those beds. 
(3-72) Where I found your wallet was jammed under the settee. 
However, in addition to these types, a further range is also possible for wh-clefts. Non- 
purposive to-infinitives are possible: 
(3-73) a What I'd prefer is to get a more appley green. 
b *It's to get a more appley green that I'd prefer. 
More possibilities are opened up by the ability of the wh-cleft to allow -do-insertion in 
the wh-clause. This allows bare infinitives to appear as cleft head: 
(3-74) a What she would like to do is leave straight away. 
b *It's leave straight away that she would like to do. 
We saw in the previous section that participle phrases with -ing, while acceptable as 
subject, are not acceptable as predicative complements of be in the it-cleft. They are, 
however, acceptable as wh-cleft heads, again because do c an appear in the wh-clause. 
Examples of both it-cleft and wh-cleft appear in (3-75): 
(3-75) a *It is making the beds that John is [doing]. 
b What John is doing is making the beds. 
Do does not, however, allow non-finite vps of all kinds to appear as wh-cleft head. In 
particular, it cannot allow stative, non-volitional verbs such as suffer, exist and non- 
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volitional meanings of see to appear as cleft head, because binding with do requires 
volition on the part of the agent of the action. We can see this through the contrast of 
volitional and non-volitional uses of see, in the following example: see a psychiatrist is 
volitional, while see a stone is not: 
(3-76) a What Mary does is see a psychiatrist. 
b *What Mary does is see a stone. 
As we noted earher, support of non-finite vps through the use of do is not possible for 
it-clefts. 
A final point to note on non-finite vps as heads is that non-finite -ing clauses may be 
extracted out of PP to form the head of the cleft, but only if the PP has an adjectival 
function, as in (3-77), rather than an adverbial one, as in (3-78): 
(3-77) What he was hopeless at was writing letters. 
(3-78) *What Mary disposed of the car by was driving it over a cliff. 
We saw in the case of it-clefts that there are restrictions on the appearance Of ADVP 
as head, in particular that -ly adverbs were only marginally acceptable. Restrictions 
on the appearance of various kinds Of ADVP in head position of a wh-cleft or reverse 
wh-cleft are of rather a different sort. The constraints can be couched in terms of a 
distinction among different kinds Of PROCEss adverbials made by Quirk et al. [1985]. 
The three subtypes of these adverbials that interest us are what Quirk et al. term 
MANNER adverbials, such as casually, with deference and carefully, MEANs adverbials, 
such as by bus and through insight, and INSTRUMENT adverbials, such as with a crowbar. 
The key to the constraint on the appearance of these adverbials as wh-cleft head is that, 
of the three categories, only means and instrument adverbials can be bound by the 
wh-word how, while the appearance of how with manner adverbials is only marginally 
acceptable: 
(3-79) a ? How he did it was with deference. 
b How he got there wa-s by bus. 
c How he broke it open was with a crowbar. 
The reason behind this unacceptability seems to be that how can bind only adverbials 
that can be characterised as VOLITIONAL. The less volitional the adverb, the less ac- 
76 
ceptable the wh-cleft with how. Volitional adverbials such as the means and instrument 
examples above are perfectly acceptable; manner adverbials such as the head of (3- 
79a) could be described as semi- volitional, resulting in a marginally acceptable reading, 
while the definitively non-volitional manner adverbials, many of them (but not all) -1y 
adverbs, are definitely unacceptable. Examples of this latter kind appear in (3-80): 
(3-80) a *How he did it was luckily. 
b *How he won was by chance. 
c *How he smiled was happily. 
A second restriction on the appearance of certain types of ADVP also seems to be based 
on the lack of appropriate wh-words to bind them in a wh-cleft construction. As in 
the case of non-volitional manner adverbials, indexical adverbials expressing time (such 
as immediately, first, etc. ) appear not to be correctly bound by any of the available 
wh-words. Examples are as follows: 
(3-81) *How/*When she came in was immediately. 
(3-82) *How/*When she came in was first. 
We noted in the case of it-clefts with sentential complements as heads that only the 
complements of factive verbs such as regret could appear as cleft head. For wh-clefts, 
the complements of both factive and non-factive verbs can appear, as follows: 
(3-83) a What he regretted was that he was coming home. 
b It was that he was coming home that he regretted. 
(3-84) a What he wrote was that he was coming home. 
b *It was that he was coming home that he wrote. 
We saw in the case of the it-cleft that quantifier phrases are unacceptable as head, as was 
NP with a negative polarity item. This is the case for the reverse wh-cleft also, as we will 0 
see in the next section. Wh-clefts, however, are the exception: as Halvorsen [1978] points 
out, wh-clefts are able to take both kinds of expression as head. (3-85a) demonstrates 
a universally quantified phrase, (3-85b) an NP with negative polarity determiner: 
(3-85) a What John has seen is every film of Coppola's 
-b What John doesn't want are any marbles. 
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A final point to note regarding the heads of wh-clefts is that the head constituent cannot 
be anaphorics: 
(3-87) *What I want is it. 
(3-88) *What I want is that. 
(3-89) *What I want is this. 
(3-90) *Where I want to go is there. 
Since this constraint is related to pragmatic considerations, it will be discussed further 
in chapter 5. % 
3.2.3 The Analysis of K-clefts 
The key points of the analysis of wh-clefts argued for here are as follows: 
a the wh-clause is not analysed as NP, but as s; and 
a the copula and its complement-the cleft head-are not analysed as vp, but as 
two constituents, V and xp. 
We wish also to argue for a syntactic distinction between the wh-cleft and the wh- 
relative construction, in contrast to the conclusions of Halvorsen [1978), Huddleston 
[1984], and Quirk et aL [1985], who analyse the wh-cleft as containing a free relative 
clause. In addition, we wish to point out distinctions between both clause types and 
wh-interrogatives, since it has been claimed (cf. Faraci [19711 and Nakada [1973]) that 
the wh-cleft wh-dause is an interrogative. In the discussion to follow, we will refer to 
wh-cleft wh-clauses as %VHC, wh-relative clauses as MIREL, and wh-interrogative clauses 
as wHi. 
'It has been suggested to me that the unacceptability of these examples is not due to the presence 
of an anaphoric item but to lack of 'heaviness' on the head constituent. This seems unlikely, since the 
available deictic readings of the same lexical items are acceptable. For example: 
(3-86) Headache? What you need is THIS! (holds up packet of aspirin) 
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what John stole was William's chickpea 
Figure 3.3: Phrase-marker for wh-cleft generated by rule (3-55) 
The syntactic anaJysis we suggest for the wh-deft what John stole was lVilliam's chick-pea 0 
on the basis, of rule (3-55) above appears in figure 3.3. 
The first thing to note about the construction is that wHc has not been analysed as NP, 
as is sometimes done. The analysis of wHc as a sentential constituent is supported by the 
fact that the constituent cannot undergo movement such as subject-auxiliary inversion 
or subj ect-ral sing, both of which require the subject in question to be NP. (3-91a) is 
an example of a wh-cleft, while (3-91b) and (3-91c) are examples of the corresponding 
inverted and subject-raised sentences, respectively: 
(3-91) a What John is is a dancer. 
b *Is what John is a dancer? 
c *1 believe what John is to be a dancer. 
Halvorsen [1978: 101 observes that 'vPs that both select a specificational [wh-cleft] reading 
cannot be conjoined', while vps of wh-relative constructions can be. His examples are 
as follows: 
(3-92) a What John is doing is dangerous and is damaging to his health. 
b *What John is doing is buying tickets and is seHing cars. 
Halvorsen motivates this dis Unction on semantic grounds, arguing that examples such 
(3-92b) are unacceptable because 'is is repeated in both conjuncts, and conjoined 
vps with identical main verbs are in general ungrammatical' [11alvorsen 1978: 111. A 
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simpler explanation, however, falls out of our analysis of wh-clefts; as we noted above, 
is buying tickets and is selling cars are not VPs: they are not even constituents. This 
renders the ungrammaticality of (3-92) explicable in terms of the traditional constraints 
on constituent conjunction. 
This analysis also explains behaviour noted by Higgins [19791 with respect to vp ellipsis: 
the copula of the cleft cannot be elided in conjoined constructions. In simple NP VP 
conjoined constructions, as in (3-93a), the main v of the second conjunct can be deleted 
under identity. In cases of conjoined wh-clefts such as (3-93b), however, the ellipsis is 
not possible, since no vp is present: 
(3-93) a John is stupid and BiH proud. 
b *What John is is stupid and what Bill is proud. 
Finally, the analysis of the copula itself as v, rather than vp, seems to be justified on 
the grounds that a non-cleft reading results in examples when the copula is modified 
in a way that suggests that it is not acting as an equative verb. Loss of the equative 
reading causes the cleft to be read as a wh-relative. Higgins notes that this may occur 
when a modal auxiliary precedes an embedded copula (as in (3-94a)), that copula is 
negated, as in (3-94b), or the copula is modified by a sentential adverb, as in (3-94c): 
(3-94) a What John is may be important. 
b What John is isn't important. 
c What John is is probably important. 
Despite the attractions of using a flat structure for wh-defts, we should point out that 
it is incompatible with the treatment of English word order proposed in Gazdar et at. 
[1985]. This is not a problem we will deal with here, but a solution is clearly required. 
Having explained the motivation behind the analysis of the wh-cleft, we can turn to the 
business of differentiating the wh-cleft from other kinds of construction with which it 
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is a reptile 
Figure 3.4: Phrase-marker for wh-relative construction 
3.2.4 M-clefts and other Wh- Constructions 
It is important to point out the syntactic differences between the wh-cleft and the wh- 
relative construction that gives rise to the predicational reading we described above. 
To recap briefly, a predicational reading results if the wh-clause of the wh-cleft is inter- 
preted as a referring expression, and the complement of the copula is construed as an 
expression that predicates some property of the entity referred to. Sentences such as 
(3-95) have unambiguously predicational (wh-relative) readings; others, such as (3-96), 
are ambiguous between the wh-relative reading and the wh-cleft reading: 
(3-95) What John likes is interesting. 
(3-96) What John is is interesting. 
The analysis we suggest for wh-relative constructions appears in figure 3.4, and can be 
motivated on the basis of many of the diagnostics we used as evidence for our analysis 
of wh-clefts. The example analysed in the figure is the wh-relative what Lisa is chasing 
is a reptile. 
First of all, we argued that certain types of movement, such as subject-auxiliary inver- 
sion, and subject-raising, could not take place in wh-clefts because the %VHC could not 
be analysed as NP. Our analysis of the wh-relative construction, however, where WIIREL 
is NP, predicts that these kinds of movement will be acceptable. That this is the case is 
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demonstrated in (3-97) and (3-98). For clarity, we base these examples on the content 
of the unambiguous wh-relative in (3-95): 
(3-97) Is what John likes important? 
(3-98) 1 believe what John likes to be important. 
We also argued against an analysis of the copula and head of the cleft as a vp constituent, 
demonstrating in support of this that operations such as vp conjunction could not be 
performed. Our analysis of the entire complement of the wh-relative as vp predicts that 
such conjunction should be possible in wh-relative sentences. As Halvorsen [1978] notes, 
this is indeed the case: 
(3-99) What John likes is dangerous and is damaging to his health. 
Further evidence for the vp analysis in the case of the wh-relative construction comes 
from Higgins, who notes that vp ellipsis can take place in a predicational sentence, such 
as (3-100). As we saw above, this is not possible in the wh-cleft: 
(3-100) What Mary likes is important and what John likes trivial in comparison. 
(3-101) *What John is is stupid and what Bill is proud. 
Finally, we noted Higgins' observation to the effect that wh-cleft modification of wh-cleft 
copulas could result in the loss of the wh-cleft reading. We captured this in the wh-cleft 
rule by describing the copula as an isolated v constituent. The VP analysis of the wh- 
relative copula and complement is supported by the fact that comparable examples of 
wh-relative modification are commonplace, and result in only the predictable changes 
of meaning: 
(3-102) a What John likes may be important. 
b What John likes isn't important. 
c What John likes is probably important. 
We noted earlier that the wh-clause of the wh-cleft, here termed %vllc, has often been 
confused with the wh-relative clause (%VIIREL) and the wh-interro. ative (%VHI). In this 
final part of the section on wh-clefts, we will turn our attention to a brief but conclusive 
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analysis that demonstrates that mic can be analysed as neither WHREL nor %V111.6 
There are three main parameters along which the clause types differ, as follows: 
9 The initial wh-words required by mic, %VHREL and wm are distinct. 
* Placement of prepositions in wnc and %VHREL differs from that in %VHI. 
a Agreement in wHc patterns differently from that of WHREL and %vHi. 
We will address each of these areas in turn. 
Distinctions in Initial lVh-Words 
Accounts of wh-cleft syntax differ in their predictions regarding the kinds of wh-element 
that are acceptable as the initial item in the wh-cleft construction. Of the wh-elements 
that have been put forward as candidates, namely who, what, where, when, why, how, 
and which, Akmajian [1970] accepts all except which; Gundel [1977] includes when and 
where as well as what, while Higgins [1979] considers only wh-clefts with initial what to 
be grammatical. Of this set of possible wh-elements, only which appears to be positively 
ungrammatical: 
(3-103) *Which I wanted was the green-coloured cut-out one. 
(3-104) Who's in charge is Neil Kinnock. 
(3-105) What they meant, of course, was that Conroy did not belong to the 
school that bash on regardless and hope for the best. 
(3-106) Where Cheryl is going to wait is by the squash courts. 
(3-107) When I was thinking of leaving was at about four. 
(3-108) Why we're unhappy about this scheme is that we don't believe it will 
work. 
(3-109) How I got to the tree was simply by adding one on each time. 
6%Ve do not intend to provide an exhaustive analysis of these clause types, since several authoritative 
works exist on the subject. See, for example, Bresnan and Grimshaw [1978]. 
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Higgins [1979] notes that the suffix -ever cannot appear on the wh-element of %VHC. For 
example: 
(3-110) *Whatever John likes is sauerkraut. 
Although WHC can (and usually does) begin with what, which is permitted both by the 
both %VHREL and %VHI, WHc differs from %VHI in that WHC cannot begin with whom, 
whose or which: 
*Whom I am looking for is the manager. 
(3-112) *Whose that car is is mine. 
(3-113) *Which I asked for was the tinned one. 
Quirk et A [1985] claim that the following kinds of wh-words are acceptable initially 
in WHREL: what, whatever, whichever, wherever. In addition, where, who, whoever, 
when, whenever, how, however, why, whom and whomever seem to be possible, while 
whyeveris unacceptable, as it is in all except wm. Finally, whose seems to be marginally 
acceptable, and completely unacceptable with the suffix -ever. These cases can be seen 
in the following examples: 
(3-114) a III do what/whatever you do. 
b III choose *which/whichever you choose. 
c I'll go where/wherever you go. 
d Just ask who/whoever you know to come. 
e Come when/whenever you're ready. 
f Do it how/however you can. 
g lie did it why/*whyever you did it. 
h I'll talk to whom/whomever you are to see. 
i MI buy whose/*whosever I want. 
wHi, on the other hand, can begin with what, which, where, who, when, how, why, and 
whose. All of these except whom and whose can take the suffix ever. Whose does not 
in general seem to be acceptable with -ever even outside the context of the cleft. The 
unacceptability of whomever, though, appears to be a constraint particular to mu: 
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(3-115) a What/Whatever is she doing? 
b Which/Whichever will he choose? 
c Where/Wherever will she go? 
d Who/Whoever is going to come? 
e When/Whenever will they be ready? 
f How/However will she manage? 
g Why/Whyever did they do it? 
h Whom/*Whomever are you going to see? 
i Whose/* Whosever is that? 
Finally, only in win can whose, which and what appear with NP. In examples (3-116)- 
(3-118), the WHi appears in the (a) examples, %VHREL in the (b) examples, and %VHC in 
the (c) examples: 
(3-116) aI wonder whose cat that is. 
b *I'll love whose cat you love. 
c *Whose cat John wanted was Bill's. 
(3-117) aI wonder which cat that is. 
b '*I'll love which cat you love. 
c *Which cat John wanted was the grey one. 
(3-118) aI wonder what cat that is. 
b *I'll love what cat you love. 
c What cat John wanted was the grey one. 
Therefore, although the wh-word what is acceptable in all three classes of clause, the 
sets of acceptable wh-initiators are otherwise distinct to a large extent. A table showing 
the differing ranges of acceptable wh-elements Of %VHREL, WHc and WHi appears in 
figure 3.5. In this table, unacceptable wh-elements are indicated by asterisks, while 
acceptable ones are ticked. 
Differences in Placement of Prepositions 
Quirk et aL [1985: 1060] note differences in the acceptahility of prepositions in certain 
positions in wHi and WHREL. Prepositions occurring in %VHREL have to appear after 
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of acceptable wh-elements in MIREL, WHc and wHi 
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(3-119) a They ate what they paid for. 
b *They ate for what they paid. 
wHi, on the other hand, allows prepositions to be fronted, as in (3-120): 
(3-120) aI don't know who they lent the money to. 
bI don't know to whom they lent the money. 
In this respect, WHc and wHi display different behaviour, mic in fact approximating 
more closely the pattern of wiirtEL: like %VHREL, %VHC doesn't tolerate the appearance 
of the preposition prior to the wh-word. This is e., cemplifled in (3-121): 
(3-121) a What he was driven to was suicide. 
b *To what he was driven was suicide. 
In case it appears that the restriction is on prepositions such as this appearing sentence- 
initially, the WHI example in (3-122 )7 allows prepositions to be fronted: 
(3-122) To what he owes allegiance is a mystery. 
It seems that the unacceptability of these examples is due to the fact that the clause 
from which the preposition is extracted is headless. A clefted copular sentence with the 
one as head, such as (3-123), does pern-Lit this extraction: 
(3-123) a The one I was complaining to was him. 
b The one to whom I was complaining was him. 
In this respect, therefore, WHC resembles %VHREL more closely than %viu. 
Differences in Agreement 
Halvorsen [19781, in his discussion of Faraci's [1971] claim that the %vIjC is in fact inter- 
rogative, argues that both embedded interrogatives and wh-clefts always have singular 
marking on the copula, while copulas in wh-relative constructions can have either sin- 
gular or plural marking. First of all, it is quite clear that Halvorsen's claim regarding 
obligatory singular marking on wh-cleft copulas is incorrect. Wh-clefts permit plural 
'I am grateful to Graeme Ritchie for suggesting this example to me. 
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marking too, as shown in (3-124), apparently indicating agreement with either the wh- 
clause or with the cardinality of the head element: 
(3-124) What we were looking at was/were some old photos of Mum. 
Secondly, the interrogative, too, may condition plural marking on a succeeding copula 0 
if two interrogatives are conjoined. This suggests that agreement is not with the cardi- 43 
nality of the NP within the wh-clause, but with the wh-clause itself-that is, with the 
number of questions that are being asked in the sentence: 
(3-125) a Which boys are ahead in the race is/*are unclear. 
b Which boys are ahead in the race and what time it's going to end 
are both unclear. 
As Halvorsen shows, however, plural agreement is obligatory in wh-relative construc- 
tions, if a plural NP appears in the wh-clause complement. This indicates that the 
cardinality of that complement controls agreement: 
(3-126) What John just stepped on *is/are living beings. 
In fact, the agreement behaviour of the wh-cleft is identical to neither the pattern shown 
by WHI, nor that Of MIREL. As we saw above, when a plural element appears in the 
complement of a wh-cleft, plural agreement is optional. This behaviour, shown in (3- 
127), is in marked contrast to that Of WHREL, demonstrated in (3-126): 
(3-127) What John just stepped on was/were living beings. 
Number agreement behaviour in wh-clefts is therefore different from that occurring in 
either WHREL or %vHi clauses. 
In summary, then, we have observed several differences between MIC and two other 
kinds of clause with whichit has been equated, namely %VHREL and %VH1. Our conclusions 
were as follows: 
" WIIC, %VHREL and win take overlapping but different sets of wh-elements. 
" Prepositions may appear prior to the wh-clement in vin, but not in mic and 
WHREL. 
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e Agreement in IVIIREL iS with the complement of the copula, in mic with either 
that element or with the wh-clause, and in will with the number of wh-clauses 
that appear. 
We conclude, therefore, that an analysis of %vHc in terms of either %V11REL or %vill is 
not supported by the data. In fact, the wh-cleft wh-clause seems to occupy a unique 
position in the range of wh-clauses, in the following way. It seems plausible to posit 
a continuum-on an intuitive semantic level at least-from interrogative, through wh- 
deft, to free relative, in terms of the referential behaviour of the three kinds of clause. 
(3-128) shows each type respectively: 
(3-128) 1 asked what he wanted. 
(3-129) He said that what he wanted was a bag of crisps. 
(3-130) 1 gave him what he wanted. 
It seems that what differentiates between the three examples-which all belong to dif- 
ferent classes of clause, as far as we have been able to establish-is that wHi is asking 
for a referent, the wh-cleft sentence structure assigns a referent to %vHc, while %VHREL 
is being used as a referring expression. Referentiality-or at least capability of carrying 
the features that pick out a referent-seem to be behind part of the distinction between 
the predicational and wh-cleft sentences: number agreement and ability to take the 
suffix -ever at least. 
3.2.5 Agreement in K-clefts 
Although we touched briefly on matters of agreement in the discussion of wh-cleft wh- 
clauses above, some aspects of agreement in wh-clefts remain to be summarised. 
A clue to the syntax of wh-clefts lies in how agreement of the copula in person, number 
and tense is controlled. Sornicola [1988: 348] claims that agreement is controlled by the 
head of the wh-clause in cases where items like the onelthe ones are present, or by the 
relative pronoun itself (the wh-word) when there is no nominal head in the wh-clause. 
Sornicola's claim certainly seems to be true of wh-clauses that have heads, since person 
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and number agrees with that of the head in each case: 
(3-131) The ones I want *is/are the blue ones. 
(3-132) The one I want is/*are the blue one. 
The claim that the wh-word in the headless %V11REL clause can also control agreement, 
however, is more problematic. First of all, the wh-clause is morphologically unmarked 
for number. It may carry number agreement information lexically, on the other hand, 
but this is almost impossible to evaluate. 
Gundel [1977] takes the view that the wh-cleft copula agrees with the head of the wh- 
cleft. This appears to be the case in (3-133), where there is no number information 
morphologically marked on the wh-clause, and none is available from any semantic 
antecedent. Plural agreement, however, still occurs on the copula: 
(3-133) What we were looking at were some old pictures of Mum. 
In cases where the deft head is plural, singular marking of the copula (such as in (3-134)) 
is also possible: 
(3-134) What we were looking at was some old pictures of Mum. 
On the basis of (3-134), it seems that the one option for agreement is with the wh- 
clause, which, as it is not marked for number, will result in a neutral singular. To 
accommodate examples such as (3-133), we can add the second option of agreement 
with the cleft head. The way this agreement alternates, and the features that control 
it, are as yet poorly understood. 
However, it seems that things are more complex than simple alternation of agreement 
control between head and wh-clause. There are also examples where agreement on the 
copula doesn't seem to occur at all, in spite of the relevant information being available. 
This is the case in (3-135a). (3-135b), which does display agreement, is also acceptable: 
(3-135) a Who those people are is N/like's friends from Sheffield. 
b Who those people are are Mike's friends from Sheffield. 
This lends weight to an analysis such as that suggested for the wh-interrogative, in 
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which agreement appears to be with the physical number of wh-clauses that appear, 
regardless of their cardinality. We could say for the wh-cleft that, when the copula does 
not agree with the head, it agrees with fact that there is onlY a single wh-clause. 
Agreement in tense is more clear-cut than agreement in number. In wh-clefts, the copula 
is required to agree in tense with the wh-clause. In (3-136a) and (3-136b), this 'tense 
harmony' (cL Higgins [19791) is observed: 
(3-136) a What John has got is a tree. 
b What John had was a tree. 
In (3-138), however, the copula and the wh-clause do not agree in tense, and as Higgins 
[1979] predicts, a wh-relative reading results: 
(3-137) a What John has got will be a tree. 
b What John will get has been a tree. 
3.2.6 Summary 
In this section, a rule for wh-clefts was suggested, and its predictions explored. It 
was concluded that a superficially similar construction to the wh-cleft, the wh-relative 
construction, required a syntactic analysis distinct from that of the wh-cleft, and the 
distinction was motivated on the basis of several diagnostics for constituency. The wh- 
clause of the wh-cleft was examined in some detail, and differentiated from two other 
clause types with which it has been identified, the wh-relative and the wh-interrogative 
clause, on the basis of three factors: distinctions in the initial wh-elements available for 
each, distinctions in terms of the placement of prepositions, and differences in agreement 
behaviour. 
As in the case of the it-cleft, it was proposed that the head of the wh-cleft could be 
analysed as XP, and we examined the constraints on what constituent types could in- 
stantiate XP. The range of possible constituent types was in general broader than that 
of the it-deft, although the following were ruled out, some of them on the basis that 
they induced the wh-relative reading for the wh-cleft: AP when the main verb of the 
wh-clause was not an intensive verb, non-volitional manner adverbials, finite VP, and all 
anaphoric items. 
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3.3 The Reverse Wh-Cleft 
We turn now to the least studied of the three kinds of cleft construction that are the 
subject of this thesis: the reverse wh-cleft (also termed INVERTED PSEUDO-CLEFT). An 
example of this cleft type appears in (3-138): 
(3-138) This is what annoys me most. 
As in the discussion of the wh-cleft, the relative-clause-like part of this construction will 
be termed the WH-CLAUSE, while the pre-copular part will be referred to as the cleft's 
HEAD. 
3.3.1 Phrase-Structure Rules for Reverse Wh-clefts 
For reverse wh-clefts, we suggest the following rules: 
(3-139) s XP VP[AGR XP] 
(3-140) VP[AGR XP] V S[CL XP] 
These rules give rise to a phrase-marker such as that in figure 3.6, which analyses the 
example that is what I want. 
The motivation behind this analysis is as follows. There are important similarities 
between this analysis and that of the wh-cleft, presented above. As in the case of the 
wh-cleft, there are two dependencies to be taken care of. The first is a straightforward 
syntactic dependency between the wh-filler in the wh-clause and the corresponding gap. 
The second requires the agreement of the xP head of the cleft with the xP value in the 
wh-clause. Since the xP constituent in (3-139) controls the VP, the Control Agreement 
Principle [Gazdar' et al. 19851 will ensure that any further instantiation of xP will be 
identical to the eventual specification of AGR on vp. 
We have shown in the case of the wh-cleft that if the specification [CL xPI appears 
on the mother category, it wiU ensure a wh-filler of category xp. To take care of the 0 
corresponding match between the value Of [AGRJ on the VP node and the value of the 
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s 
NP VPCAGR MPI 
v S[CL NPI 




that is what I want e 
Figure 3.6: Phrase-marker for reverse wh-cleft 
feature (CL] on the daughter of that VP, we will assume that this too can be handled 
by the appropriate FCR. How this is worked out in detail is not something we will 
investigate here, however. 
An important distinction exists between the analysis for the reverse wh-cleft proposed 
here and that of the wh-cleft, however: the reverse wh-cleft copula and its complement 
are analysed as vp. Evidence for this analysis is that, while in the case. of the wh-cleft 
the cop ula and its complement cannot be conjoined as vp, in the reverse wh-cleft it is 
possible to do this. Examples of wh-cleft and reverse wh-cleft respectively appear in 
(3-141): 
(3-141) a *What John is doing is buying tickets and is selling cars. 
b This hat is ývhat I wanted and is what I still want. 
Further support for the simple xP vp analysis comes from subject-auxiliary inversion 
and subject raising of appropriate examples. As we noted in previous sections, for either 
kind of movement to take place the copula and its complement have to form a vp, while 
the initial constituent of the cleft has to be a sister of that vp acting as subject. Both 
kinds of movement are possible in reverse wh-clefts. In (3-142), (a) is a canonical reverse 
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wh-cleft, (b) is the corresponding sentence with subject- auxi li ary inversion, and (c) is a 
subject-raised version: 
(3-142) a This is what you wanted. 
b Is this what you wanted? 
cI believe this to be what you wanted. 
In the discussion of wh-clefts, we observed that copula deletion in conjoined structures 
was not possible, since the copula was not part of VP: 
(3-143) *What John is stupid and what Bill is proud. 
Our analysis predicts that copula deletion in the second conjunct will be acceptable in 
reverse wh-clefts, since the copula is an ordinary v within vp. This turns out to be the 
case: 
(3-144) That is what I wanted and this what I got. 
A further point in support of the vp analysis for the copular constituent is the fact 
that the copula can, unlike that of the wh-cleft, take the kinds of modification that 
are expected in ordinary vps. Examples are as follows: the starred examples, while 
grammatical, are unambiguously wh-relative readings of the sentences involved: 
(3-145) a *What John is doing is maybe working. 
b Working is maybe what John is doing. 
c *What John is doing isn't working. 
d Working isn't what John is doing. 
e *What John is doing is probably working. 
f Working is probably what John is doing. 
Finally, the agreement behaviour of the reverse wh-cleft su-Crests that the xP vp analysis tRD 
is the correct one, since it is simply the case that, as in canonical declaratives, the copula 
agrees with the subject in all cases: 
(3-146) Some photos of INIum *was/were what we were looking at. 
(3-147) A photo of Mum was/*were what we were looking at. 
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As a final point before we turn to the examination of reverse wh-cleft heads, it should be 
noted that the wh-clause of the reverse wh-cleft (rnvlic, for simplicity) is not comparable 
to either the wh-relative (WHREL) nor the wh-cleft wh-clause (%V11C) in terms of the initial 
wh-elements possible. TtIlIvC behaves Eke %vuc and unlike MIREL in that both whom 
and the suffix -ever are unacceptable: 
(3-148) a *That's whom I'm looking for. 
b *That's whatever I want. 
Urflike either of the other two clause types, however, whose with NP seems to be accept- 
able: 
(3-149) That's whose car I borrowed. 
Having examined the syntactic structure of the reverse wh-cleft, we can look more closely 
at the constituents that can appear as xP: the cleft head. 
3.3.2 The Instantiation of XP 
Looking first at the grammaticality Of AP as cleft head, we find the case of the reverse 
wh-cleft similar to that of the it-cleft. While AP is acceptable as head in manY wh-clefts, 
in reverse wh-cleftS AP is often marginal or unacceptable: - 
(3-150) a What your pie was was absolutely delicious. 
b ? It was absolutely delicious that your pie was. 
c ? Absolutely delicious was what your pie was. 
(3-151) a What he became was morose. 
b *It was morose that he became. 
c ? Morose was what lie became. 
(3-152) a How it felt was furry. 
b *It was furry that it felt. 
c ? Furry was how it felt. 
In cases where AP is marginal in the wh-cleft, it is unacceptable in the corresponding 
reverse wh-cleft: 
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(3-153) a ? What John seems is unhappy. 
b *Unhappy is what John seems. 
(3-154) a ? What John remained was morose. 
b *Morose was what John remained. 
ADVP as head of the reverse wh-cleft is subject to similar constraints to those that apply 
in the case of the wh-cleft. As we saw earlier, only volitional adverbials that fall into 
Quirk et aL's (1985: 4821 categories of MEANs and INSTRUMENT adverbials, and that can 
therefore be bound by how, can form the head of a reverse wh-cleft. Means adverbials 
refer to the means by which an action is done, including phrases such as by bus and 
through insight . 
Instrument adverbials include phrases such as with a fork and using 
a dictionary: Examples of reverse wh-clefts with means adverbials as head appear in 
(3-155), while the clefts in (3-156) have instrument adverbials as head: 
(3-155) a By bus was how we got here. 
b Through insight was how he reached a solution. 
(3-156) a With a fork is how you turn over the topsoil at first. 
b Using a dictionary was how she solved most of the clues. 
At first glance, -1y adverbs seem to be marginal or unacceptable in general: 
(3-157) ? Carefully was how he rowed. 
(3-158) *Luckily was how he won. 
However, as we discussed in the case of the wh-cleft, the appropriate generalisation is 
that -ly adverbs fall Quirk el al. 's non-volitional class Of NIANNEP, adverbials, and cannot 
therefore be bound by how. The constraint also applies to PP as manner adverbial: 
(3-159) ? With great aplomb was how he got there. 
The constraints on ADVP, therefore, are equivalent to those of the wh-cleft. 
In the case of the wh-cleft, we saiv that sentential complements of both factive verbs such 
as regret and those of non-factive verbs such as write made acceptable heads. Reverse 
wh-defts behave more Eke it-clefts in this respect, as in the it-cleft the complements of 
non-factives are unacceptable, and in reverse wh-clefts they are marginal: 
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(3-160) ? That he was coming home was what John wrote. 
(3-161) That he was corning home was what John regretted. 
Like the case of it-clefts, negative polarity items make bad reverse wh-cleft heads. As 
we saw above, these are acceptable in wh-cleft: , 
(3-162) a *It is any marbles that John doesn't want. 
b *Any marbles are what John doesn't want 
c What John doesn't want are any marbles. 
Quantifier phrases are sirnilarly unacceptable: 
(3-163) *Every film of Coppola's is what I've seen. 
Finally in this discussion of head types, the behaviour of reverse wh-clefts with respect 
to non-finite Vps is as follows. As in the case of it-clefts and wh-clefts, purposive 
to-infinitives, -ing participle phrases as subject, and passive participle phrases are all 
acceptable. Examples of each respectively appear in (3-164): 
(3-164) a To get shaving cream was what he went out for. 
b Making all those beds was what was the worst. 
c Jammed under the settee was where I found your wallet. 
The reverse wh-cleft and the wh-cleft can both take non-purposive to-infinitives, while 
we saw in section 1 that this was not possible for it-clefts: 
(3-165) a What Id prefer is to get a more appley green. 
b To get a more appley green is what I'd prefer. 
c *It's to get a more appley green that I'd prefer. 
Bare infinitives, on the other hand, while acceptable in wh-clefts, are only marginally 
acceptable in reverse wh-clefts: 
(3-166) a What she'd Eke to do is leave straight away. 
b ? Leave straight away is what she'd like to do 
Finally, while vps with progressive aspect seem to be as acceptable in wh-defts as non- 
progressive vps, only the former seem to be acceptable in reverse wh-defts. (3-167) 
shows the progressive examples, (3-168) the non-progressive: 
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(3-167) a What John is doing is. making the beds. 
b Making the beds is what John is doing. 
(3-168) a What Mary does is see a psychiatrist. 
b ? See a psychiatrist is what Mary does. 
The range of heads possible for the reverse wh-cleft might seem on the evidence above 
to be more restricted than that of the wh-cleft. However, the anaphoric heads available 
to the reverse wh-cleft render this construction rather more flemble than it first appears. 
As we show in the tables given in section 3.5, the vast majority of reverse wh-cleft heads 
are in fact composed of the pro-forms this and that, which, as we noted in section 3.2, 
are not available to the wh-cleft. In practice, while the constraints on the appearance of 
certain kinds of constituent as head still operate, the same content can often be specified, 
if suitable discourse conditions exist, by this or that. For example, (3-169) specifies the 
content of a bare infinitive, which we saw above to be an unacceptable reverse wh-cleft 
head in itself: 
(3-169) a *Leave straight away was what she did. 
b What she wanted to do was leave straight away, so that's what she 
did. 
(3-170) shows a similar treatment of the content of an -ly adverb: 
(3-170) a *Energetically was how he ran. 
bI thought he would run energetically, and that's how he ran. 
Although the complements of non-factive verbs were themselves unacceptable as reverse 
wh-cleft heads, that can be used to specify the same content: 
(3-171) 1 told them he'd write that he was coming home, and that's what he 
wrote. 
Anaphoric respecification can be used to create a new grammatical role for the specified 
information. For example, (3-172) respecifies previously occurring content and uses 
it adjunctively within the reverse wh-cleft, even when the original specification of the 
information would not have been acceptable as an adjunct (cf. (3-173)): 
(3-172) The cat came in and the dog went out. That was why I couldn't shut 
the kitchen door. 
(3-173) *The cat came in and the dog went out was why I couldn't shut the 
kitchen door. 
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Note that the reverse wh-cleft can take pronon-ýinal it and which as cleft head, which, as 
we saw in the previous sections, neither of the other two cleft types can: 
(3-174) a He announced-and it is what I cannot forgive him for-that he had 
spiked Annabel's Perrier. 
b *He announced-and it is it that I cannot forgive him for-that he 
had spiked Annabel's Perrier. 
C *He announced-what I cannot forgive him for is it-that he had 
spiked Annabel's Perrier. 
(3-175) a The most frightening part, which of course is what concerns me, is 
that nobody knows this apart from Deeping. 
b *The most frightening part, it is which of course that concerns me, 
is that nobody knows this apart from Deeping. 
C *The most frightening part, what of course concerns me is which, is 
that nobody knows this apart from Deeping. 
This constraint is related to consideration of what constitutes acceptable serial ordering 
of information. We address this issue in detail in chapter 5. 
Finally, note that uniquely among the clefts the reverse wh-cleft is unable to accept 
negated head constituents of any kind: 
(3-176) a* Not John was who did it 
b *Not only the wind was what made the noise 
c *Not until three was when she came 
The distinctions between all three types of cleft in terms of what can instantiate the 
head xP constituent will be summarised at the end of the chapter. 
3.3.3 Summary 
The analysis given for the reverse wh-cleft has been the simplest of all, namely XP VP. 
As far as the instantiation of XP is concerned, we found the range of constituents pos- 
sible closer to that of the it-cleft than to the wh-cleft. As well as the usual prohibitions 
on constituents that were not major phrasal types, the following constituent types were 
unacceptable as XP: AP, non-volitional manner ADv and ADVP, negative polarity NP, 
quantifier phrases, non-finite Vps with non-progressive aspect, finite Vps, and bare in- 
finitives. Sentential complements of non-factive verbs were marginal as xP. As in all 
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three cleft types, sentential adverbs were not acceptable. The range of anaphoric ele- 
ments that could appear as head of the reverse wh-cleft was the broadest of all three 
types of cleft, and included, uniquely among the clefts, pronominal which. 
In section 3.5, a comparative summary of the syntax of the three cleft types is presented. 
First, however, we will take a brief look at the frequency of the main variants appearing 
in the corpus data. 
3.4 A Note on the Corpus Data 
In this section, the data taken from the joint corpora are presented, taken from a total of 
245 it-clefts, 162 wh-clefts, and 160 reverse wh-clefts. Two frequency counts were carried 
out, the most important being a count of the frequencies of various cleft head types. 
The second count gives the frequency and range of wh-elements that could appear as 
relativisers or complementisers in the three types of cleft. 
It might be expected that the examples from a corpus of naturally-occurring data would 
yield many strange and quasi-grammatical strings. In fact, the data found in the corpora 
were quite ordinary in this respect. The interesting points to note, however, are the 
narrowness of the range of data that appeared, compared to the broad range of possible 
grammatical strings that could have occurred, and the marked differences between the 
cleft types with respect to the appearance of particular syntactic variants. 
Constituents appearing as Head 
In the frequencies below we omit clefts that have more than one constituent, such as 
two conjoined NPs, as head. We distinguish between human and non-human NPs, and 
between various types of NP in the case of reverse wh-clefts. For each cate'-ory, three 
figures are given: the frequency from the spoken corpus, the frequency from the written 
corpus, and the total frequency from the corpus as a whole. 
The interesting points to note here are the distinctions between the three cleft types. 
All three cleft types, as n-dght be expected, have a high proportion of NP heads. The 
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spoken [911 written [1541 total[2451 
NP [+HUNIAN] 34 39 74 
NP (-HUNIAN] 44 41 85 
Total NP 78 80 158 
pp 4 46 50 
ADVP 9 27 36 
s 0 1 1 
Figure 3.7: Constituent types appearing as heads of It-clefts 
spoken (991 written [631 total [162] 
NP [+HUNIAN] 2 1 3 
NP [-HUNIAN] 38 30 68 
Total NP 40 31 71 
pp 0 0 0 
ADVP 2 0 2 
s 29 23 52 
VP [-FIN] 29 9 38 
Figure 3.8: Constituent types appearing as heads of Wh-clefts 
reverse wh-deft, however, in spite of the wide range of possible head constituents, has 
NP heads in all but one case. Notable in it-clefts is the very low frequency of s heads, 
and the complete non-appearance of non-finite vps of any kind. Wh-clefts, on the other 
hand, have a very high proportion of s heads and non-finite VPs, but, surprisingly, no 
Pps at all. In none of the cleft types do -1y adverbs or APs appear as head. 
spoken [122] written [381 total [160] 
that 89 13 102 
this 27 16 43 
other NP 5 7 12 
which 0 2 2 
pp 1 0 1 
Figure 3.9: Constituent types appearing as heads of Reverse lVh-clefts 
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spoken [91] written [1651 total[256] 
that 44 102 146 
who 18 33 51 
0 24 6 30 
when 2 2 4 





which + PREP 0 3 3 
Figure 3.10: Constituent types appearing as it-cleft wh-elements 
Relativisers/Complementisers Appearing 
The total occurrences of various relativisers/complementisers found in the corpora ap- 
pear below. The notation is that of the previous section. The sizes of the corpora 
are slightly different from those shown above since the entire corpus, including those 
clefts with conjoined heads, has been included in this count. Wh-elements that are 
ungrammatical for the cleft type in question are indicated by asterisks. 
In spite of the wide range of wh-elements predicted to be possible for the wh-cleft, 
the range appearing is in fact very narrow: almost exclusively what, with a very few 
instances of how, who and why. The spread of reverse wh-clefts is more broad, but 
again with the vast majority of examples featuring what. For it-clefts, that is the most 
common, followed by who and complementiser deletion. 
3.5 The Syntax of Cleft Constructions: Summary 
In this chapter, we conducted an analysis of each of the three cleft types in turn, 
suggesting appropriate phrase-structure rules for the generation of each. In the case of 
the it-deft, we adopted an existing pair of rules suggested by Gazdar et at. [1985), which 
capture in particular the fact that the complement of the it-cleft seems to behave Hke 
a relative clause when the cleft head is NP, but like a complementised sentence when 
the cleft head is any other category. For wh-clefts, we suggested an analysis in which 
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spoken [991 written [721 total [171] 
that 
who 1 0 1 
0 
when 0 0 0 
which 
why 2 0 2 
how 1 0 1 
where 0 0 0 
what 95 72 167 
which + PREP 
Figure 3.11: Constituent types appearing as wh-cleft wh-elements 
spoken [122] written [381 total [1601 
that 
who 3 0 3 
0 
when 2 0 2 
which 0 0 0 
why 14 6 20 
how 7 3 10 
where 13 1 14 
what 83 28 
which + PREP 
Figure 3.12: Constituent types appearing as reverse wh-cleft wh-elements 
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the wh-clause was treated as a special clause type, on the basis of its lack of similarity 
with other superficially similar types of clause. A syntactic dependency existed within 
the wh-clause between the wh-filler and a gap of the same category. In addition, a 
dependency existed between the wh-filler in the wh-clause and the head of the wh-cleft. 
We took care of this by specifying a category-valued feature [CL XP] on the wh-clause, 
inherited by the wh-filler, which matches the current value of xP on the cleft head. 
The analysis of the reverse wh-cleft was conducted in a similar way, except in this case 
agreement between the xP category of the wh-filler in the wh-clause, and the cleft head, 
was ensured by means of the specification AGR[XP] on the vp. This vp itself is worthy 
of note, since we argued that, unlike the case of the wh-cleft, the reverse wh-cleft copula 
and its complement could be analysed as a single VP constituent, rather than as V xP 
as in the case of the wh-cleft. 
In each section, we devoted some time to examining what kinds of constituent could 
appear as xP-that is, as head of the cleft. We noted that the range of constituents it 
was possible to have as XP was different for each cleft type. Some of the reasons behind 
the distinctions may be pragmatic; others may be the result of syntactic constraints that 
remain for further research. The possible head constituents of each cleft type, however, 
may be important determinants of their relative functions in discourse, in terms of the 
choice of a cleft type to convey a particular message. The range of possible head types 
are compared in figure 3.13. 
Having filled in the syntactic background to our study of clefts we can turn to perhaps 
the most powerful factor determining the function of these constructions in discourse: 
their semantics. 
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-ing as vp complement _V/ Subject ing participle V V 
Passive participle V V V 
Bare infinitive %/ ? 
NP +not until 
XP +not only1just V V 
Universally-quantified NP V 
Negative polarity NP N/ 
AP ? V (most) ? 
-1y ADV 
ADVP V some some 
Sentential ADV 
S complement of factive V V V 
S complement of non-factive v V ? 
PP V V V 
Figure 3.13: Possible Head Constituents by Cleft Type 
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Chapter 4 
Aspects of Cleft Semantics 
In this chapter, we explore how the cleft itself, and its interaction with context, can 
be characterised in semantic terms. In what follows, we will argue for a view of clefts 
as differentiated from declaratives on the basis of several features that can be captured 
semantically. The first, and most crucial, is that the cleft is a PRESUPPOSITIONAL Con- 
struction in a way that simple declaratives are not. We can characterise the content 
of the part of the cleft that conveys the presupposition, the wh-clause or cleft comple- 
ment, quite simply. For example, for the three cleft constructions in (4-1), we would 
expect a presupposition that we can gloss as (4-2). The presupposition contains an 
exi stenti ally- quantified VARIABLE, which is indicated in the example by something: 
a It was the bell that rang. 
b What rang was the bell. 
c The bell was what rang. 
(4-2) Something rang. 
(4-3) 3x rang(x) 
We adopt a view of clefts in wl-dch a proposition such as (4-3) is both ENTAILED and 
PRESUPPOSED by Positive clefts, and merely presupposed by negative ones. 
However, the content of the cleft is not exhausted by the statement of its presupposition. 
We take the view that clefts also contain an ASSERTION, to the effect that the element 
or elements named by the cleft head serve to INSTANTIATE the variable contained in the 
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presupposition. We can therefore represent the remainder of the content of the clefts in 
(4-1) as follows: 
(4-4) be(s, x, y) A bell(y) 
where x stands for the variable in the presupposition. 
Finally, a third aspect of the meaning of the cleft is that the elements specified by the 
deft head-which we will argue in section 4.3 are always a (possibly singleton) set- are 
UNIQUE or MAXIMAL with respect to the variable in the presupposition. That is, the 
members of the set specified must be the only elements in the discourse context that 
can provide a true instantiation of this variable. 
In this chapter, we propose a treatment of cleft semantics in general, and presupposition 
in particular, based on the view that presuppositions can be treated as ANAPHORS 
within the framework of Kamp's [19811 Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). This 
proposal, due to van der Sandt [1988,1989], is explored in some depth, and we develop 
a general account of cleft semantics in DRT with it as a basis. In the course of the 
chapter, we examine a range of data in detail, and expose aspects of the cleft's meaning, 
several of them related to presupposition, that need to be accounted for within the final 
framework. In the course of the discussion, we also address several attempts to account 
for cleft meaning within a variety of semantic and pragmatic frameworks, evolving in 
the course of the discussion a view of what a representation for clefts should be Hke. The 
treatment we suggest at the end of the chapter takes these recommendations into account 
in providing a unified formal account of clefts in context that combines the advantages 
of semantic and pragmatic approaches to the meaning of sentences in discourse. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 4.1, we provide the first part 
of the formal underpinning for the DRT model, providing an account of tile REFEREN- 
TIAL aspects of cleft constructions. In this section, we show that there are important 
problems with one prominent account of the referential behaviour of wh-clefts, that of 
Higgins [19791. We show that, while there is a great deal of surface diversity within and 
between the three types of cleft in terms of referential behaviour, a single underlying 
characterisation, based on an observation of Williams' [1983] with respect to copular 
sentences, will suffice to cater formally for the range appearing in the clefts data. We 
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accordingly adopt this in section 4.4 in the representation for clefts in DRT. 
We move on in section 4.2 to address what is the central concern of the chapter, reflect- 
ing its crucial role in the choice and use of clefts in discourse: the nature and treatment 
of cleft presupposition. Having established that clefts do convey presuppositions in a 
fairly conventional sense, we go on to argue that the function of cleft presuppositions in 
discourse is to establish the content of the presupposition as information that requires 
an ANTECEDENT in the discourse context. If no such antecedent is available, the in- 
terpretation of the cleft requires that one be constructed. The construction of missing 
antecedent material is equated with the strategy of the ACCOMMODATION of presuppo- 
sitions (cf. Lewis [1979]). We look through the literature in search of an account of 
presupposition that is able to support this view, as well as meeting other requirements 
for the treatment of clefts that emerge during the course of the discussion. The acount 
we arrive at is that of van der Sandt [1988,1989], who proposes a treatment of presuppo- 
sition within the framework of Kamp's [19811 Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). 
Van der Sandt proposes that presuppositions can usefully be viewed as ANAPHOrtS, 
adapting the existing treatment of anaphora in DRT to cater for them. At the end of 
the section, we provide a general characterisation of the model van der Sandt proposes. 
A final aspect of the meaning of cleft constructions remains to be dealt with, however, 
before we explore these proposals in detail: the description and treatment of the so- 
called UNIQUENEss reading of clefts. In section 4.3, therefore, we go on to exan-dne the 
evidence surrounding the claim that the head of the cleft specifies a discourse object 
or set of objects that is unique with respect to the rest of the discourse context. We 
suggest an analogy between this 'uniqueness' and the notion of TOTALITY described by 
Hawkins [1978] in relation to definite referring expressions. 
Finally, in section 4.4, we examine van der. Sandt's proposal within the framework of 
DP. T, developing a treatment of cleft presupposition that draws on the treatment of 
pronominal anaphors. We incorporate our conclusions concerning referentiality and 
uniqueness into the treatment, and show how an elegant formulation of both can be 
arrived at. We also examine how DRT offers a framework in which some long-standing 
problems in presupposition can be remedied, showing in particular the relevance of the 
solutions it offers for the treatment of clefts. 
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Before we begin our development of a framework for clefts, we first have to establish 
some necessary terms and definitions. The largest semantic unit that we will refer to is 
the PROPOSITION, and each sentence that appears in a discourse realises one or more 
of these. Following Bach [1986], each proposition, or rather the verbal predicate it 
contains, is taken to describe a single EVENTUALITY, of which there are three types: 
STATE, PRoCESs and EVENT. ' Examples of each of these respectively (taken from Bach 
[19861) are as follows: 
States: sit, stand, be drunk-, be in New York-, own x, love x, resemble x 
Processes: walk-, push a cart, be mean (agentive) 
Events: build x, recognize, notice, flash once, reach the top 
In cases where more than one verbal predicate appears in a. proposition, each will be 
considered to introduce a separate eventuality INDEX. Following the traditional David- 
sonian approach to verbal predicates, the eventuality index is included as an extra 
argument of the predicate. 
On this approach, the representation of (4-5) would be (4-6), where the index el is the 
event index associated with the verbal predicate eats: 
(4-5) Someone eats. 
(4-6) 3ej3. T2eats(ej, x2) 
4.1 Cleft Constructions and Referentiality 
For the purposes of the DRT model of presupposition, we need to work out a coherent 
view of the referential behaviour of cleft constructions. In this section, we first of all draw 
attention to an influential, but we believe erroneous, description of referring and wh- 
clefts, due to Higgins [1979). Higgins claims that wh-clefts have no referential function, 
in that neither the head element nor the wh-clause can be a referring expression. We 
present a range of data to show this claim cannot be supported for wh-cleft heads, 
'We do not use the full detail of Bach's taxonomy here, these three general categories being sufficiently 
fine for our immediate purposes. 
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and that his view confuses the issue of characterising the relationship between the cleft 
head and the cleft complement with independent considerations regarding the referential 
behaviour of the expressions that the cleft contains. We go on to show that, with respect 
to the expressions that appear in various positions throughout the three syntactic types 
of cleft, few general predictions regarding referential behaviour can be made. We argue 
that, on the surface, no more uniformity can be expected in cleft sentences than in 
other sentence types, since the presentation of a proposition in cleft form does nothing 
to determine the referential behaviour of the expressions within it. A generalisation can 
be made, however, in terms of a single underlying representation for clefts as copular 
sentences, based on Williams' [19831 work on the copula. The representation we propose 
is adopted in section 4.4 in the DRT model of clefts in context. 
4.1.1 Higgins' View of 14"h-clefts 
HIggins [19791 claims that wh-clefts are instances of what he terms SPECIFICATIONAL 
copular sentences. He groups together under this heading examples such as the follow- 
ing: 
(4-7) His height is two metres. 
(4-8) His daim. was that Stapleford is a great place to live. 
(4-9) What I don't like about John is his tie. 
Higgins argues that specificational sentences have two arguments. One, which he terms 
the SUPERSCRIPTIONAL argument, acts as an abstract specification, such as his height, 
his claim and what I don't like about John. The other argument, termed the SPECIFICA- 
TIONAL argument (after which the sentence type as a whole is named) acts as a further 
specification of the superscriptional. argument, an intensive complement which in effect 
provides a value for the other expression. Two metres, that Stapleford is a great place to 
live and his tie are all examples of such specificational expressions. Higgins explains the 
operation of specificational sentences in terms of two analogies: in one, the superscrip- 
tional expression acts as a variable, as we described above, the specificational expression 
providing a value; in the second, the superscriptional expression acts as the header of a 
list, with the complement supplying the list itself. With respect to the second analogy, 
110 
Higgins notes: 
The heading of a list does not refer to any item at all, nor does the set of 
items in the Est itself say anything about the heading of the list, or indeed 
about anything ... just as a list is neither 'about' the heading of the list or 
'about' the items on the fist, so, I would maintain, a Specificational sentence 
is neither about the Subject nor the Predicate, and therefore neither Subject 
nor Predicate is referential. 
[Higgins 1979: 2131 
As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, the value/variable analogy does seem to 
be a good characterisation of what is taking place in cleft sentences in general. However, 
while such a characterisation might satisfactorily serve as a basis for a representation 
of the sentences concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that this value/variable 
behaviour has any connection with referentiality in the way Higgins suggests. For ex- 
ample, Higgins' view would predict that the expression his tie in the cleft in (4-10) is 
non-referential. This view requires that the expression has a different referential status 
from the same expression as it occurs in the declarative (4-11). The difference, however, 
is not at all clear: 
(4-10) What I don't Eke about John is his tie. 
(4-11) His tie is about a foot wide. 
In fact, we can provide examples that show wh-cleft heads in particular performing a 
fairly normal range of referring and non-referring functions, similar to those we might 
expect to appear in declaratives. As diagnostics for referentiality, we can draw on tests 
suggested by Doron [1988] in her work on predicative copular sentences. One diagnostic 
provided by Doron [1988: 31 is simply that if an expression has successfully referred to 
an element, a subsequent anaphoric reference to that same element should be possible. 
(4-12) shows that subsequent anaphora is possible in the case of the referent of the 
wh-cleft head in (4-8): 
(4-12) What I don't Eke about John is his tiej. Iti looks like a floral kipper. 
A second diagnostic described by Doron states that referring expressions permit modifi- 
cation by non-restrictive relative clauses, while non-referring expressions do not. Recall 
ill 
from chapter 2 that one of the ways in which wh-cleft sentences such as (4-13) can 
be differentiated from wh-relatives such as (4-14) is on the basis that the wh-clause of 
the former is non-referring, while that of the latter is not. Doron's test supports tl6s 
view, demonstrating that Higgins' 'non-referential' predication is correct at least for 
wh-cleft wh-clauses, when taken as a constituent. The following example show that the 
wh-relative's subject clause accepts non-restrictive relative modification, while that of 
the wh-cleft does not: 
(4-13) a *What Karen ordered, which was burnt black, was a Welsh rarebit. 
b What Karen ordered, which was burnt black-, gave her an upset stom- 
ach. 
However, the same test demonstrates that Higgin's specificational group do not behave 
consistently with respect to the referential behaviour of the 'superscriptional', subject 
clause. While (4-13) demonstrated that the wh-cleft clause was non-referential, (4-14) 
and (4-15) show that the subject clauses of the two declarative specificational sentences 
do refer: 
(4-14) His height, which is what we're concerned with, is two metres. 
(4-15) His claim, which made all the papers, was that Stapleford is a great place 
to five. 
According to the independent diagnostics suggested by Doron, therefore, we can show 
that referring expressions do occur among Higgins' class of specificational sentences, 0 
which he claims to be non-referential, both in head position in wh-clefts, and in subject 
position in the declarative examples. 
We would claim, contrary to Higgins' conclusions, that the use of a cleft construction 
of any kind does not determine the referential or non-referential status of either the 
arguments embedded in the wh-clause or complement or the arguments appearing in 
deft head position. We can demonstrate this as follows, using comparisons between 
declarative and cleft examples. In each case, the expression embedded in the cleft 
wh-clause or complement, and the expression that appears as cleft head, appear to 
be playing exactly the same referential role as the corresponding expressions in the 
declarative examples. In fact, the range of functions that the expressions concerned 
can perform seem to be identical between the clefts and the declaratives. For example, 
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in both (4-16) and (4-17), John is referential, while the baker and nice respectively are 
predicative: 
(4-16) a John is the baker. 
b It is John who is the baker. 
(4-17) a John is nice. 
b What John is is nice. 
The complement of the declarative, and the head of the cleft, in (4-18) are both generic 
expressions: 
(4-18) a We are interested in the brine shrimp. 
b What we are interested in is the brine shrimp. 
A similar pattern emerges in (4-19), where the declarative complement and cleft head 
are definitions: 
a This is bauxite. 
b Bauxite is what this is. 
As a final example, clefts can carry as head both de dicto and de re elements, which can 
also appear as the complement of an ordinary declarative: 
(4-20) a John wants to marry a Norwegian. She has/should have long hair. 
b It is a Norwegian that John wants to marry. She has/should have 
long hair. 
The effect of the above data is to show that the range of expressions that can appear 
both as deft head and embedded elsewhere in cleft constructions is apparently the same 
as the range that can appear in ordinary declaratives. We would claim, therefore, that 
the reallsation of a proposition in cleft form has no effect on the referential status of the 
arguments in that proposition, contrary to Higgins' claim. 
4.1.2 The Referential Relations of Clefts 
In spite of the variety that appears in terms of referring expressions on the surface of 
clefts, we can postulate a single underlying representation of the referential relations 
in clefts. In order to do this, we abstract away from the behaviour of the surface 
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expressions occurring in the cleft as such, concentrating instead in what we can term 
the MAIN IDENTIFICATION of the sentence-that is, the identification of value with 
variable that we argued in the introduction of tl-ds chapter to be part of the function of 
the cleft. We can do this as follows. 
For a cleft such as (4-21a), which yields the presupposition (4-21b), we can paraphrase 
the propositional content-the presupposition combined with the assertion-as (4-21c): 
(4-21) a It was John who left. 
b Someone left. 
c Someonei left and iti was John. 
We can see the assertion that is part of the content of the cleft, glossed above as the 
second conjunct of (4-21c), as the part that identifies the variable in the presupposition 
with an underlying anaphoric expression of the same type. The element denoted by 
the cleft head, i. e., John, acts as the value of both that anaphoric expression and the 
initial variable, the copula be acting as the link between it and the variable expressions. 
The relationship between this state of affairs and referentiality is as follows. We can 
assume with Williams [19831 that copulas take two arguments, one referential and one 
predicative. It can be assumed in the majority of cases that the argument to the left of 
the copula is the referential argument, while the argument to the right is the predicative 
argument. Applying this generality to the representation in (4-21c), we can see that 
the anaphoric variable expression in the second conjunct is in the leftmost, referential 
position with respect to the copula, while the element denoted by the cleft head, John, 
is in rightmost, predicative position. We will adopt this as the appropriate general 
representation for clefts of all kinds, regardless of the referential status of their surface 
expressions. This treatment is important for the DrtT model we present in section 4.4, 
since on the view of presupposition we present there, the existentially-quantified variable 
in the presupposition requires an antecedent in the context. In Dn: T, this antecedent 
has to be a discourse marker, and discourse markers are always referential in the DRT 
framework. Aside from notational convenience, however, the representation in (4-21c) 
allows us to capture a generalisation in the underlying function of the cleft which, as 
we have seen in the data above, has a variety of surface realisations. 
Having presented our proposed treatment of cleft referentiality, we can move on to our 
114 
central concern: the nature and treatment of presupposition in clefts. 
4.2 Cleft Constructions and Presupposition 
Cleft constructions have for some time been considered to belong to the class of con- 
struction that induces, conveys, or requires PRESUPPOSITIONS (see, for example, Keenan 
[1971], Chomsky [1971], Gazdar [19791, inter alia). 
The definition of presupposition being adopted here is broadly a Strawsonian one, in 
terms of the survival of entailments of the carrier sentence in negative, modal, and other 
contexts. There are four fairly well-known tests for presupposition: embedding under 
negation, embedding under modality, the so-called antecedent test, and the test 
for constancy under illocutionary force. According to the most traditional of the 
four tests, the negation test, the presuppositions of a sentence are just those entailments 
that are preserved under negation. Negating a sentence and comparing it with its 
positive counterpart should therefore reveal presuppositions as those propositions that 
are true in both cases. The next two tests, the modality and antecedent tests, are 
attributable to Karttunen [1971]; the modality test is similar to the negation test, except 
it uses a possibility operator rather than negation, and the antecedent test involves 
making the sentence under analysis into the antecedent of a conditional. In both cases, 
the entailments are lost, while what remains are the presuppositions. The test involving 
speech acts, originated by van der Sandt [1988], uses presuppositional constructions to 
perform a variety of speech acts; if propositional meanings are preserved across these 
contexts, it is assumed that these are the presuppositions of the carrier sentence. For 
the purposes of this discussion, success in the four tests, explained in detail below, will 
be taken to be the criterion for presupposition as intended here. Where other definitions 
of presupposition are discussed, the distinction between them and our notion will be 
made dear. 
The Negation Test 
As we noted above, the negation test shows that the proposition conveyed by the cleft 0 
complement or wh-clause appears to be preserved under ne,,, ation. In examples (4-22)- 
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(4-24), the positive and negative sentences (a) and (b) both preserve the truth of (c): 
(4-22) a It is a hot-dog that she wants. 
b It isn't a hot-dog that she wants. 
c She wants something. 
(4-23) a What she wants is a hot-dog. 
b What she wants isn't a hot-dog. 
c She wants something. 
(4-24) aA hot-dog is what she wants. 
bA hot-dog isn't what she wants. 
c She wants something. 
On the negation test, therefore, positive and negative clefts both appear to presuppose 
the existentially quantified version of the complement/ wh-clause proposition. The read- 
ing of negation has to be narrow scope or internal in order for the presupposition to 
be preserved. Contexts which condition the broad-scope or external negation reading 
cause presuppositions of negative sentences to be lost. In (4-25), the embedding of the 
deft causes the negative in the cleft construction to be read as broad scope within its 
clause, providing a reading equivalent to (4-26): 
(4-25) A hot-dog isn't what she wants, because she doesn't want anything. 
(4-26) It is not the case that she wants a hot-dog. 
Since they do not rely on negation, the other three tests are not open to this ambiguity, tD 
and are therefore more reliable as tests for presupposition. 
The Modality Test 
The modality test involves the creation of a context in which a modal operator such as 
possibly has scope over the potentially presupposing sentence. Again, if any entailment 
is preserved in this context, this entailment is said to be presupposed. The complements 
of all three syntactic types of cleft sentence pass this test. In the following examples, 
the (a) sentences imply the truth of the (b) sentences: 
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(4-27) a It is possible that it is a hot-dog that she wants. 
b She wants something. 
(4-28) a It is possible that what she wants is a hot-dog. 
b She wants something. 
(4-29) a It is possible that a hot-dog is what she wants. 
b She wants something. 
Antecedents of Conditionals 
In this third test, as in the one before, propositions are considered to be presupposed 
if they are preserved in a particular context. In this case, the appropriate context is 
constructed by making the carrier sentence the antecedent of a conditional construction. 
An example of this test at work appears in van der Sandt [1988: 39], using sentences with 
manage to and be glad that. Manage is an example of an implicative verb, which entails 
its complement. Be glad that, on the other hand, presupposes its complement. On this 
test, therefore, we would expect the truth of the complement of manage to be cancelled 
or suspended in the conditional, while the proposition carried by the complement of be 
glad that is preserved. Van der Sandt's examples show this to be the case: (4-30) does 
not require that (4-32) be true, while (4-31) does: 
(4-30) If Charles managed to leave the country, he will never come back. 
(4-31) If Charles was glad that he left the country, he will never come back. 
(4-32) Charles left the country. 
When the antecedent test is applied to clefts, a similar pattern emerges. It appears 
that the cleft construction (the (a) sentence in each of the examples below) requires the 
complement proposition (c) to be true; the declarative (b) does not: 
(4-33) a If it is a hot-dog that she wants, Bill will be cross. 
b If she wants a hot-dog, Bill will be cross. 
c She wants something. 
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(4-34) a If what she wants is a hot-dog, Bill will be cross. 
b If she wants a hot-dog, Bill will be cross. 
c She wants something. 
(4-35) a If a hot-dog is what she wants, Bill will be cross. 
b If she wants a hot-do-, Bill will be cross. 0 
c She wants something. 
Constancy under Elocutionary Force 
The final test for presuppositions, suggested in van der Sandt [1988: 1931, is that they are 00 
constant under illocutionary force. Briefly, if a proposition is conveyed by a particular 
sentence regardless of whether that sentence is used as a question, an assertion, or any 
other kind bf speech act, then that proposition is an elementary presupposition of the 
carrier sentence. It was clear from the discussion above that clefts serving as assertions 
(such as (4-22a), for example) pass this test. The following examples demonstrate that 
clefts appearing in the form of questions (the (a) examples) preserve the truth of the 
(b) sentences below: 
(4-36) a Is it a hot-dog that she wants? 
b She wants something. 
(4-37) a Is what she wants a hot-dog? 
b She wants something. 
(4-38) a Is a hot-dog what she wants? 
b She wants something. 
A simple declarative sentence, however, shows that entailments are not constant under 
illocutionary force. (4-39a) entails both she wants a hot-dog and (4-39c), while (4-39b) 
does not: 
(4-39) a She wants a hot-dog. 
b Does she want a hot-doa? 
c She wants something. 
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Summary 
On the basis of the four tests set out above, we can adopt the traditional view that cleft 
constructions are presupposition-carrying in some fairly conventional sense. We will 
assume that the content of the presupposition can be determined by taking the content 
of the cleft complement or wh-clause and supplementing it with a suitable existentially- 
quantified variable. (In the examples above, we represented this informally by someone 
and something. ) Throughout the discussion to follow, presuppositions as defined accord- 
ing to the four tests above will be termed the ELEMENTARY PRESUPPOSITIONS of the 
cleft, and the utterances which convey such presuppositions in context will be regarded 
aS PRESUPPOSING. It is not always the case that these presuppositions remain when 
clefts appear in context, however: see, for example, (4-4) above. Contexts in which cleft 
presuppositions are lost are demonstrated at various points in the discussion to follow. 
4.2.1 Characterising Presupposed Information 
Having established that the cleft is a presupposition-conveying construction in a specific 
sense, we can turn to the examination of the kind of information that is presupposed 
by clefts. In particular, what is the relationship between presupposed information and 
the discourse context? 
As we shall see in subsequent sections, presupposition can be defined according to many 
criteria different from our own, including what speakers believe and know, and whether 
this is currently shared and/or salient knowledge in the discourse (cf. Chomsky [19711, 
Prince [1986]); whether the context entails presupposed information (as is suggested 
in Karttunen [1974]); or whether it is part of the common ground of the discourse 
[Karttunen and Peters 1979]. In this thesis, we will be arguing for a view of cleft 
presupposition that is syntax-based, although pragmatically interpreted. The notion 
of presupposition argued for here does not require that at the time of utterance the 
presupposed proposition itself stand in any particular logical relation to the current 
context, nor in any single relation to hearer belief, nor that it be shared information, 
nor even information entailed by such information. 
But why is it necessary to make these departures from the intuitive notion of 'pre- 
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supposition', that of information that is presumed to be the shared background of the 
discourse? We take this step because it is possible to presuppose information that is 
not in any sense shared, known, or entailed by the context preceding the presupposing 
element or construction. Prince [1978] was the first to point this out in relation to 
it-clefts in the case of her INFORINIATIVE-PRESUPPOSITION it-cleft, discussed in chapter 
2. An examPle of this kind of cleft is as follows: 
(4-40) It was just about 50 years ago today that Henry Ford gave us the week- 
end. 
Her observation was simply that 
... with 
[informative-presupposition it-clefts], not only is the hearer not ex- 
pected to be thinking about the information in the that-clause, but s/he is 
not expected even to KNOW it. In fact, the whole point of these sentences is 
to INFORM the hearer of that very information. 
[Prince 1978: 898] 
In fact, the phenomenon is not confined to it-clefts: in wh-clefts, as will be shown in 
chapter 5, a more limited range of 'informativeness' is permitted, allowing examples 
such as the following: 
(4-41) I'm going to concentrate on dissemination and evaluation. What I 
haven't been able to do yet is get all the figures in. 
In (4-41), the presupposition I haven't been able to do something is arguably not shared 
knowledge. Similar observations can be made for the reverse wh-cleft. Examples of the 
kinds of information that regularly appear in the presuppositions of all three kinds of 
deft appear in chapter 5. 
The presupposition of information that is not currently shared, salient, or standing in 
an entailment relation to the information currently in the discourse model is actually an 
instance of something that is quite general to presupposing constructions of all kinds, 
as has been noted by Karttunen [1974], Halliday (1985] and van der Sandt [1988,1989], 
among others. On an analogy suggested by van der Sandt [1988], presuppositions are 
like anaphors, in that they require some ANTECEDENT in previous discourse. We would 
claim that a large part of the function of cleft sentences is to mark that such an an- 
tecedent is required for the presupposed information. In the frequent cases in which 
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the presupposed information is in fact new to the discourse, one of the effects of the 
cleft is to mark information as intended to be ACCOMMODATED by the hearer. That is, 
an antecedent for the presupposed information is intended to be incorporated into the 
discourse context, if it is not already available. Although the term used here is due to 
Lewis [1979], the phenomenon was first observed to my knowledge by Karttunen [1974] 
and StaInaker (1974]. Karttunen explains it as follows: 
People do make leaps and shortcuts by using sentences whose presupposi- 
tions are not satisfied in the conversational context ... I think we can main- 
tain that a sentence is always taken to be an increment to a context that 
satisfies its presupposition. If the current conversational context does not 
suffice, the listener is entitled and expected to extend it as required. He must 
determine for himself what context he is supposed to be in on the basis of 
what was said and, if he is willing to go along with it, make the same tacit 
extension that his interlocutor appears to have made. 
[Karttunen 1974: 191] 
StaInaker makes a similar point: 
A speaker may act as if certain propositions are part of the common back- 
ground when he knows that they are not. lie may want to communicate a 
proposition indirectly, and do this by presupposing it in such a way that the 
auditor will be able to infer that it is presupposed. In such a case, a speaker 
tells his auditor something in part by pretending that his auditor already 
knows it. The pretence need not be an attempt at deception. It might be 
tacitly recognised by everyone concerned that this is what is going on, and 
recognised that everyone else recognises it. . .. I shall say that one actually 
does make the presuppositions that one seems to make even when one is 
only pretending to have the beliefs that one normally has when one makes 
presuppositions. 
[19"14: 202-203] 
Lewis, in his introduction to the notion of accommodation, explains as follows: 
Presupposition evolves according to a rule of accommodation specifying that 
any presuppositions that are required by what is said straightway come into 
existence, provided that nobody objects. 
[Lewis 1979] 
121 
The phenomenon has come to be known by several other names: van der Sandt's CON- 
TEXTUALISATION [1982]; Seurell'S BACKWARD SUPPLETION [1985]; and Reichgelt'S RET- 
ROSPECTIVE UPDATING OF THE DATABASE [1986]. 
We would claim, then, that clefts mark the fact that antecedents have to be found 
or created for particular information they convey. Information marked in this way is 
set apart from the information that is ASSERTED by the cleft sentence, namely the 
information in the cleft head. On this view, the syntactic signalling of presupposition 
is a seen as a signpost to hearers to treat information in a particular way, rather than 
as a signal of assumptions about the current state of the discourse. 
Of course, not all information can be marked as intended to be contextualised. As 
Stalnaker points out: 
I 
The presumed background information-the set of presuppositions which in 
part define a linguistic context-naturally imposes constraints on what can 
reasonably or appropriately be said in that context. 
[StaInaker 1974) 
Some of these constraints appear to be genuinely semantic, and are accordingly dealt 
with later in this chapter. Others, especially those that appear to be specific to the 
three kinds of cleft, are discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
In this section, we have claimed that the function of presuppositions in general, and of 
deft presuppositions in particular, is to communicate a requirement for ANTECEDENCE 
in a model of discourse. We would argue that such signalling is a direct consequence 
of the syntax of the cleft construction. In addition, because it is common to presup- 
pose not only information that is New, but information that is currently in the context, 
and information that is a mixture of the two, it is plausible to postulate a notion of 
presupposition that is independent of any consideration of whether the information is 
currently present in the discourse context or not. It is therefore clear that a theory of 
presupposition that is going to account for this behaviour will need to distinguish clearly 
between information structure-what speakers share, know, believe, etc. -and the syn- 
tactic/semantic fact that a presupposition is taking place. In the following sections, we 
will see that few of the accounts of clefts proposed so far fulfil this requirement. 
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4.2.2 Accounts of Cleft Presupposition 
In this section, we will discuss the major treatments of cleft presupposition that have 
been suggested to date. These fall into three major groups, as follows: 
* accounts based on the position of sentence accent; 
9 accounts based on Gricean or pseudo-Gricean principles, which reduce presuppo- 
sition to various kinds of implicature; and 
e accounts based on the semantic interpretation of sentences augmented by a prag- 
matic component. 
We will argue below that, accounts of the third kind are the most appropriate for our 
purposes, and one of these in particular, that of van der Sandt [1988], suits our needs 
particularly well. 
Accounts based on Sentence Accent 
On a sentence-accent based approach, cleft presupposition is defined either wholly or 
partly according to the position of prosodic NUCLEI. The major proponents of this 
approach as applied to cleft constructions are Chomsky [1971] and Prince (19861. 
Chornsky, following Halliday [19671, divides sentences into FOCUS and PRESUPPOSITION 
as follows: 
The focus is the phrase containing the intonation center, and the presuppo- 
sition is determined by the replacement of the focus with a variable. 
[Chomsky 1971] 
Presuppositions on this basis will be all the non-focal material in the sentence, which 
need not amount to a recognisable syntactic constituent. Chomsky notes that 'there 
may be no actual sentence expressing just this proposition, for grammatical reasons'. 
Chomsky's definition of presupposition therefore does not take the syntactic structure of 
123 
the cleft into account. Unless it can be demonstrated that this affects accentual pattern, 
presumably, on Chomsky's account, the cleft will be treated equivalently to any other 
syntactic structure. 
As we will summarise in chapter 5, clefts have several distinctive accentual patterns. 
For the it-cleft in (4-42), for example, Chomsky's analysis would be (4-43): 
(4-42) It Was JOHN who ate the beans. 
(4-43) [Focus: John] [Presupposition: x ate the beans. ]
For clefts such as (4-44), however, Chomsky's definition of presupposition might produce 
an analysis such as (4-45): 
(4-44) It was John who ate the BEANS. 
(4-45) [Focus: the beans] [Presupposition: John ate x] 
We would argue that Chomsky's approach takes an over-simple view of the prosodic 
features of sentences. First of all, as we show in chapter 5, if focus and presupposition 
are to be defined on sentences, many sentences contain more than one nucleus. On 
this basis, it is not clear how the nucleus that represents 'intonation center' is to be 
decided upon. Secondly, however, it seems that taking account of one principal 'center' 
will not capture the phenomena as Chomsky would require. Not only additional nuclei, 
but the appearance of subsidiary accents, are a case in point, since both appear to 
mark information that is arguably different in discourse status from the 'presupposed' 
material that Chomsky intends to isolate. As a brief example of this, we can give pairs 
of sentences both of which contain a presupposition on Chomsky's definition, but which 
in fact seem to differ in the contexts in which they are appropriate. We would claim 
that they differ because in the examples where a subsidiary accent appears (the (b) 
examples below), New information (which Chomsky might also call Focus) is present 
in the ostensible 'presupposition'. In (4-46) and (4-47), subsidiary accents are shown in 
italics, and nuclei in small capitals: 
(4-46) A: Who did this? 
a B: It was JOHN that did it. 
b B: # It was JOHN that did it. 
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(4-47) A: I'm really quite cross with you about breaking my vase. 
a B: #It WaS JOHN that did it. 
b B: It Was JOHN that did it. 
In addition, Chomsky's account assumes that focus can be reliably associated with 
surface lexical material. More recent approaches to capturing the notion of focus, such 
as that of Gussenhoven [1983), suggest that it is desirable to base focus on semantic 
material. This is because there otherwise seems to be no principled way to account 
for cases in which the focal item is apparently a single semantic feature, rather than a 
whole lexical item. For example, in (4-48), the negation, rather than the lexical material 
involved, might arguably be termed the focus: 
(4-48) A: They should clean up after themselves occasionally. 
B: But they DON'T! 
Even on an intuitive basis, the cases where subsidiary accents occur seem to be closer 
to Chomsky's 'focus' than his 'presupposition', yet his account does not capture them. 
Chomsky's account, as is common to accounts based on sentence accent, takes the view 
that presupposition is a phenomenon of the same order as what is sometimes termed 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE-the oldness, newness, or retrievability of information in the 
discourse from the hearer's point of view, rather than a syntactic/semantic phenomenon. 
On the account being developed here, these levels are separated out, sentence accent 
being associated with the latter, and syntax with the former. Sentence accent accounts 
of presupposition do not allow for the observation that presuppositions appear to be 
systematically related to syntactic structure. 
While at this point to adopt a syntax-based account of presupposition may seem to be a 
matter of simple preference, we will see shortly that the accentual treatment of presup- 
position is unable to deal with any of the problematic cases for presuppositional theory, 
in particular those in which presuppositions are lost while sentence accent remains un- 
altered. In fact, this difficulty is common to both Chomsky's account and another 
prominent account of presuppositional phenomena in p ragm ati cally- marked syntactic 
structures, that of Prince [19861. Before going on to examine the problems in the ap- 
proach, therefore, we will first of all outline Prince's claims. 
Prince's [1986] view of cleft presupposition, although still based on sentence accent, 
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does allow the syntax of the cleft to play a role in determining presupposition. She 
argues that it-clefts and wh-clefts fall within a class of sentence types that can mark 
vari able- containing or OPEN PrtoPOSITIONS (ops) as information presupposed by the 
speaker; i. e., information taken to be salient shared knowledge in the discourse. ops are 
of course equivalent to the kind of standard existentially quantified proposition we have 
already isolated as the elementary presupposition of clefts. 
On Prince's account of it-clefts and wh-clefts, presupposition is suspended or cancelled 
just in case the prosodic nucleus of the sentence appears in the part of the sentence 
that contains the putative presupposition, namely the cleft complement or wh-clause. 
A presuppositional reading octurs when the gap-binding constituent (in the deft's case, 
2 the cleft head) carries the nucleus, but presupposition is cancelled in cases where new 
material-and hence the nucleus-appears in the potentially presupposing part of the 
construction. 
It is interesting to note, too, that on Prince's account, wh-clefts are always op-marking, 
while it-clefts need not be. This view of wh-clefts requires the assumption that nuclear 
accents do not occur in wh-cleft wh-clauses. As our study of the Survey of English 
Usage data presented in chapter 5 shows, nuclei frequently appear in this position (in 
the sample of 50 wh-clefts used in the study, 41 had nuclei in both the head and the 
complement). An example of such a wh-cleft is as follows: 
(4-50) What they KNo%v about is experimentai RESEARCH. 
Approaches such as Prince's and Chomsky's seem to capture some intuitive notion 
of what speakers are assuming to be shared knowledge at the time of the utterance. 
However, in their neglect of syntactic structure, they cannot explain the additional 
and complementary marking system that is based on syntax. For example, Chomsky's 
'Prince does, however, comment that OP-marking still takes place even when the gapAinding con- 
stituent isn't the one bearing the nucleus in cases where the gap is of category VP or dominated by VP. 
This would predict that reverse wh-clefts with VP heads, such as 
(4-49) Making jigsaws was what he was doing 
would be categorised as OP-marking, regardless of accentual pattern. This does not seem to be quite 
correct, since, as we shall see in chapter 5, the information structure of these clefts is as free as that 
of the it-cleft-that is, they are able to carry new information in the complement, which cannot be 
described as 'shared' and 'salient. 
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sentence accent account would analyse the presupposition of both (4-51) and (4-52) to 
be (4-53): 
(4-51) At four I'm going to SLEEP. 
(4-52) It's at four I'm going to SLEEP. 
(4-53) I'm going to do x at four. 
However, the analysis cannot account for the differences in meaning between of the two 
sentences in a context such as the one that appears in (4-54): 
(4-54) A: Have you got anything planned for this afternoon? 
a B: At four I'm going to SLEEP. 
b B: It's at four I'm going to SLEEP. 
The cleft example, (4-54b), suggests that speaker B is reminding speaker A of her plans 
for the afternoon, giving what we might informally term an as you know reading. If this 
interpretation is not available (for instance, if A is a person from the electricity board 
that B has never seen before), (4-54b) is unacceptable as a response. The declarative 
simply informs A of B's plans, and does not suggest a previous acquaintance with the 
knowledge. ' 
As we saw, Chomsky's sentence accent account gives an identical analysis for both, while 
Prince's would simply cancel the presupposition in the cleft example. Neither account 
captures the extra meaning attached to the syntax of the cleft, which we have claimed is 
due to the requirement of a contextual antecedent for the syntactically-defined presup- 
position for the cleft. The notion of presupposing new information is on both accounts 
highly problematic, since such information would have to be unaccented in order to 
pass as presupposed. This would mean that any algorithm developed to differentiate 
focal from presupposed information would have to distinguish new information that falls 
within the scope of an accent yet is not itself accented" from new information that is 
deliberately unaccented in order to pass as presupposed. 
3 As we will see in chapter 5 in our discussion of presupposition in context, prior acquaintance with 
the information carried by the cleft presupposition is by no means a requirement for the cleft to be 
acceptable in discourse. On this occasion, the 'as you know' reading can be accounted for by the high 
degree of intersection that exists between the information that is signalled to be genuinely available to 
the hearer by an accent pattern such as that in (4-54b), and the information marked syntactically as 
requiring an antecedent. 
"Not every syllable of 'New' information can be accented, as noted by Halliday [1967). It is a well- 
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Most importantly, however, theories such as these cannot accurately predict circum- 
stances in which presuppositions will fail to survive. It is well known that presup- 
positions can be cancelled or suspended in certain situations, depending on context. 
This problem, known as the PROJECTION PROBLEM for presupposition, resides in the 
fact that presuppositions of simple sentences be suspended or cancelled under complex 
embeddings, for example in conditional contexts. This is true even of sentences that 
presuppose on Chomsky's and Prince's definitions. (4-55a), for example, fulfils their 
criteria, and as a result presupposes (4-55b): 
(4-55) a It Was JOHN who ate the beans. 
b Someone ate the beans 
In (4-56), the same example appears as appears as the consequent of a conditional. The 
presupposition in this case can only be said to survive if the antecedent clause of the 
conditional is true: 
(4-56) If anyone ate the beans, it was JOHN who ate them. 
On Chomsky's and Prince's accounts, however, the presupposition would remain, since 
the sentence has the appropriate accentual structure. This leads to an incorrect analysis 
of (4-56) as presupposing, and would do the same for any sentence which appears 
in a context in which presuppositions fall to project. The situation is the same for 
examples such as (4-57), where a broad-scope negation suspends the presupposition 
without affecting accentual pattern: 
(4-57) It wasn't John who ate the beans, because nobody did. 
This demonstrates the necessity for separating the level of the actual status of infor- 
mation with respect to a hearer's model of the discourse, which is what accounts such 
as Chomsky's and Prince's capture, from the pragmatic interpretation of sentences in 
contexts. It is our view that the notion of shared knowledge is suitably captured at the 
level of INFORMATION STRUCTURE, that is, by describing the relationships that exist 
between the content of the cleft and the discourse context at the time of the cleft's 
known difficulty both for research in pragmatics and in phonological accounts of sentence accent that 
a single accent -appears to mark a larger stretch of the discourse than the accented syllable itself. For 
approaches to how to deal with the scope of accents, see in particular Selkirk [1980], Gussenhoven [1983], 
and Taglicht [1984). 
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interpretation. Considerations such as this are often relevant in the pragmatic interpre- 
tation of presupposition, but on our view, the generation of presuppositions resides at 
the level of syntax. 
Accounts based on Implicature 
Several attempts have been made to account for presuppositional phenomena in terms 
of Gricean implicatures, both conventional and conversational. 5 The major account of 
clefts that falls within this category is that of Atlas and Levinson [1981], who argue 
that conversational implicature is central to the description of it-clefts. 
Atlas and Levinson argue that an important part of the 'meaning' of clefts is non- 
truth-conditional, a view that is compatible with the position we argue for later in this 
chapter. However, their account differs from ours with respect to the explanation they 
give regarding the source of this non- tru th-condi tional meaning. Most phenomena that 
are currently attributed to presupposition, they argue, can in fact be explained equally 
as well by a combination of entailment and conversational implicature. Their argument 
is that, instead of clefts carryin, presuppositions, positive clefts (which can also be 
termed affirmative clefts) carry entailments, while negative clefts carry implicatures in 
addition to entailments. For example, the positive cleft in (4-58) is claimed to entail 
(4-59) and (4-60), but (4-59) does not entail (4-58): 
(4-58) It was John that Mary kissed 
(4-59) Mary kissed John 
(4-60) Mary kissed someone 
The notion of impEcature is relevant in the description of negative clefts such as (4-61). 
Atlas and Levinson claim that this example would entail (4-62) (although (4-62) does 
not entail (4-61)), and implicate (4-63): 
(4-61) Jt wasn't John that Nlary kissed 
'A full critique of accounts of this nature appears in van der Sandt (1988: 50ff]; in this study, we 
concentrate on accounts which have addressed cleft constructions specifically. 
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(4-62) Mary didn't kiss John 
(4-63) Mary kissed someone 
The argument Atlas and Levinson present in support of the analysis of (4-63) as an 
implicature rather than a presupposition is as follows. In order for (4-63) to be inter- 
preted as part of the meaning of (4-61) at all, regardless of whether it is presupposed or 
implicated, the negation in the example has to be interpreted as INTERNAL or NARROW 
scoPE. This much is uncontroversial. Along with Allwood [1972], Gazdar [1976,19791 
and others, Atlas and Levinson claim, however, that the narrow scope reading is not 
the natural or 'default' interpretation of negation. Atlas and Levinson argue that, for 
a proposition such as (4-63) to be part of the meaning of the cleft, some principle has 
to operate to guide the reader or hearer to choose the non-default, internal, negation. 
The natural reading is the external negation, which, for (4-61), would produce a reading 
that can be glossed as (4-64): 
(4-64) It is not the case that Mary kissed John. 
To ensure that the internal negation reading is assumed where appropriate, Atlas and 
Levinson posit a pragmatic principle to condition the selection of internal negation on 
the grounds that it yields the most INFORMATIVE interpretation of the sentence. They 
term this principle the PRINCIPLE OF INFO RIMATIV ENESS. Atlas and Levinson argue that 
this inference to the 'best interpretation', that is, from external to internal negation, 
is a generalized conversational implicature. The fact that the process is mediated by a 
(quasi-Gricean) principle, rather than performed on the basis of context or the structure 
of the sentence, is what leads Atlas and Levinson to maintain that the proposition in 
question is implicated rather than presupposed. 
Several difficulties are apparent in Atlas and Levinson's account, however. Firstly, it will 
be recalled that their analysis states that the proposition conveyed by the complement 
of a positive cleft is simply an entailment, while that of the negative is implicated. The 
first of these two claims seems to be beyond doubt. Evidence for this is the fact that the 
behaviour of this proposition when cancellation is attempted is typical of entailments. 
(4-65) demonstrates that, like entallments, the proposition cannot be cancelled: if the 
sentence in (4-65) is true as a whole, then the proposition in (4-66) cannot be false: 
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(4-65) *It was John who ate the beans, although nobody did. 
(4-66) Someone ate the beans. 
However, the tests presented at the beginning of this section demonstrated that propo- 
sitions like (4-66) are also presupposed. Further evidence for their presupposed status 
is given by van der Sandt [1988: 77], who points out that the 'entailment-only' analy- 
sis does not explain why readers and hearers would continue to infer the truth of the 
proposition concerned even in non-entailing environments. Non-entaifing environments 
include, once again, conditional contexts. In such contexts, no explicit negation occurs, 
but entailments of other entailing constructions (such as declaratives) fall to be pre- 
served. In (4-67a), the declarative antecedent of the conditional, John ate the beans, 
loses its entailment; but in (4-67b), which is a cleft in a similar context, preserves the 
proposition someone ate the beans, carried by its complement: 
(4-67) a If John ate the beans, Bill will be cross. 
b If it was John who ate the beans, Bill will be cross. 
To account for these facts, the only interpretation open is one to the effect that the 
proposition conveyed by the cleft complement is presupposed as well as entailed. The 
analysis of the positive cleft as simply entailing, therefore, obviously will not do. In fact, 
as we will see in section 4.3, Atlas and Levinson ultimately find it necessary to appeal 
to the notion of presupposition in positive clefts even though they discount it here, in 
order to account for a related aspect of cleft meaning. 
For negative clefts, Atlas and Levinson's claim is that the proposition conveyed by the 
deft complement is implicated, rather than entailed or presupposed. It is quite clear 
that no entailment is involved in this case, since cancellation is possible: 
(4-68) It wasn't John who ate the beans, because nobody did. 
At the beginning of this section, we showed that negative cleft complements, too, con- 
veyed a presupposition. However, it is also possible to show-and this is the substance 
of Atlas and Levinson's claim-that negative cleft complement propositions also satisfy 
the standard Gricean definition of implicature; that is, the implicated proposition is 
non-detachable and cancellable. 
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We can demonstrate this as follows. First of all, detachability requires that the implicature- 
generating sentence in question can be replaced by another expression in the same con- 
text with the same broad meaning, and still generate the implicature. (4-69) demon- 
strates that, in context (a), if the negative cleft (b) is replaced by another sentence (c) 
(a declarative, in this case), the resulting discourse will cease to convey proposition (d): 
(4-69) aI thought I'd explain about the state of the plates. 
b It wasn't John who washed up. 
c John didn't wash up. 
d Someone washed up. 
The two readings are quite distinct: (4-69b) preserves the implication that someone 
had washed up (presumably badly); (4-69c) loses any such implication, resulting in the 
interpretation that no-one had washed up at all. The example as a whole demonstrates 
that (4-69d) is a NON-DETACHABLE part of the meaning of (4-69b). 
Cancellability requires that, when the sentence carrying the putative implicature is 
placed in a different context, the implicature disappears. Such cancellability appears in 
clefts, as can be demonstrated by a context which forces an EXTERNAL or WIDE-SCOPE 
reading for the negation, such as that in (4-70): 
(4-70) It wasn't John who washed up, because nobody did. 
It appears, then, that the proposition conveyed by the cleft complement conforms both 
to the definition of implicature, and, as we showed above, to our definition of presup- 
position. It might then appear that the two analyses of negative clefts do not appear 
to differ in any crucial sense. We might, however, question the basis for Atlas and 
Levinson's claim that implicature, rather than presupposition, is the relevant term to 
apply because of the explanation they give for the source of the 'implicated' proposition, 
namely the Principle of Informativeness. It will be recalled that the Principle is required 
to license the inference from the external ne, -ation that Atlas and Levinson see as the 
default, to the implicature-bearing internal negation. However, as Givon observes, the 
assumption that the default negation in natural language is external may not bear close 
inspection: 
In general, while linguists and philosophers find it easy to recognise the ex- 
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ternal sense of negation, most speakers of human languages do not. In other 
words, they tend to view negative constructions almost always as internal 
operations. 
[Givon 1978: 88] 
If Givon's claim is true, the basis for Atlas and Levinson's argument that implicature is 
taking place-the inference from the 'default' external negation to the required internal 0 
negation via the Principle of Inform ati veness-i s flawed. 
In what follows, we will continue to use the term PRESUPPOSITION to describe the 
prop6sitions conveyed by the complements of negative clefts. This is partly because of 
the objection raised above, and partly because, as van der Sandt points out, there seems 
little point in invoking specialised pragmatic principles to explain a notion that is more 
simply and generally captured at the level of semantics. For positive clefts, however, 
our conclusions differ from Atlas and Levinson's in more than a cosmetic sense, since 
we have shown that both entailment and presupposition are taking place. The evidence 
from non-entailing contexts shows that the propositions in question do more than merely 
entail. 
Semantic/Pragmatic Accounts 
In this last broad category of treatments of presupposition reside theories that, in gen- 
eral, separate out the level of semantic interpretation of sentence types from the process 
of interpreting the resulting intermediate structures pragmatically, in order to produce 0 
the final representation of the sentence in context. Into this category falls the final 0 
theory of presupposition to be discussed, namely that of Gazdar [1979]. 
Gazdar's proposed solution to the projection problem is to build up an initial repre- 
sentation of the component simple clauses of sentences to be processed. From this 
representation, 0 the potential presuppositions and implicatures for each clause are 
generated. The potential presuppositions (PRE-SUPPOSITIONS, in Gazdar's terminol- 
ogy) and potential implicatures (1110-PLICATURES) need to be filtered in some way to 
see which are to survive in order to represent the sentence meaning correctly. This is 
achieved by a mechanism that causes all the propositions in the sentence to be integrated 
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into a discourse context, itself a set of propositions, in a certain order, the unwanted 
ones being discarded under conditions of inconsistency. The order for integration is as 
follows: 
@ entailments 
9 clausal im-plicatures 
* scalar im-plicatures 
e pre-suppositions 
The condition for the integration of the representation of any clause is simply that it 
should be consistent with the context. On Gazdar's account, both it-clefts and wh-clefts 
fall into the group of sentence types for which a function can be defined to yield a pre- 
supposition. While this function is not given explicitly, Gazdar comments that it would 
fit the following general pattern : 
... clefts, pseudo-clefts and wh-questions ... share a pre-supposition that is 
arrived at, more or less, by extracting the wh-clause and substituting the 
appropriate exi stenti ally- qu anti fied phrase for the wh-phrase within it. 
[Gazdar 1979: 1281 
The pre-suppositional analysis of an it-cleft such as (4-71) would therefore be (4-72), 
that of the wh-cleft (4-73), (4-74), and by analogy (although Gazdar does not mention 
these explicitly) that of a reverse wh-cleft such as (4-75), (4-1-6) (the speaker knows gloss 
follows Gazdar's analysis): 
(4-71) It was Duane who owned all those halter tops. 
(4-72) Speaker knows that someone owned all those lialter tops. 
(4-73) What finished it was the black patent pumps under the bed. 
(4-74) Speaker knows that something finished it. 
(4-75) That was what made Pandora give all his clothes to the PDSA. 
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(4-76) Speaker knows that something made Pandora give all his clothes to the 
PDSA. 
The presuppositions of a sentence are those pre-suppositions that survive the process 
of integration. Assuming that no propositions already exist in the knowledge base that 
will cause the pre-suppositions not to survive on the grounds of inconsistency, it can be 
assumed that they will appear as presuppositions in the final analysis of the sentence 
typ es. 
Gazdar's [1979: 123] approach to the initial analysis of cleft sentences is similar to the 
one we argued for in the previous section, in that he supposes positive clefts to entail as 
well as presuppose the proposition conveyed by the complement, while negative clefts 
only presuppose. His analysis of the positive cleft in (4-77), and the corresponding 
negative cleft in (4-81), would therefore be as follows. (4-77) would be considered to 
entail (4-78) and (4-79), and presuppose (4-80): 
(4-77) It was the woodlice that ate the nasturtiums. 
(4-78) The woodlice ate the nasturtiums. 
(4-79) Something ate the nasturtiums. 
(4-80) Speaker knows that something ate the nasturtiums. 
(4-81) would entail (4-82, ) and presuppose (4-83): 
(4-81) It was not the woodlice that ate the nasturtiums. 
(4-82) The woodlice did not eat the nasturtiums. 
(4-83) Speaker knows that something ate the nasturtiums. 
Although we would agree with this analysis, difficulties arise with Gazdar's model for 
clefts with respect to the mechanism lie proposes for integrating propositions into con- 0 
text. Before striking this negative note, however, we should observe the positive ad- 
vantages of the mechanism, which does allow Gazdar to avoid some of the anomalies 
that would otherwise arise in the case of clefts. For example, Keenan [1971: 521 gives an 
example in which clefts are iterated (cited in Gazdar, [1979: 1491) to demonstrate the 
falsity of the pre-supposition of the cleft: 
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(4-84) You say that someone in this room loves Mary. Well, maybe so. But it 
certainly isn't Fred who loves Mary. And it certainly isn't John ... 
(Nve 
continue in this way until we have enumerated all the people in the 
room). Therefore no one in this room loves Mary. 
Although each cleft in itself pre-supposes the proposition Someone in this room loves 
Alary, Gazdar's model would allow the initial sentence You say that someone in this room 
loves Mary to impficate that it is possibly not the case that someone in the room loves 
Mary, therefore (since im-plicatures are integrated before pre-suppositions) preventing 
the pre-suppositions of the clefts that c7ome after from being integrated. 
The ordering of integration also allows Gazdar's model to deal with a situation pointed 
out by Wilson ([1975: 123], given in Gazdar [1979: 141]) in which a wh-cleft yields an 
entailment and a pre-supposition that are contradictory. Wilson shows that (4-85) 
yields the inconsistent propositions (4-86) (the entailment) and (4-87), a presupposition 
(pre-supposition, in Gazdar's terms): 
(4-85) What your generalization captures is precisely nothing. 
(4-86) Your generalization captures nothing. 
(4-87) Your generalization captures something. 
Again, Gazdar's approach would cause (4-87) to be discarded, since it is incompatible 
with the proposition integrated before it. 
The difficulties with the integration mechanism referred to above arise precisely because 
the preferred analysis for positive clefts is to have the same proposition presupposed as 
well as entailed. While there is no doubt that this is the correct analysis, Gazdar's model 
loses the distinction between this and an entail ments-only analysis (such as might arise 
in the case of a declarative), since entailments are integrated before presuppositions. 
The identical presupposed proposition is therefore redundant by the time it is processed. 
Since this is equivalent to treating the presupposition as an entailment, the model falls to 
capture any notion of what it means to presuppose with respect to a model of discourse. 
In addition, it means that the integration of 'bad' presu pposi ti ons-t hose that are 
anomalous for pragmatic reasons, for example-cannot be constrained. As Prince [19781 
has shown, and as we examine further in chapter 5, what is acceptable as an entailment 
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of a declarative is not always acceptable when presented in a presuppositional construc- 
tion: 
(4-88) a Hi! Aly name is Ellen. 
b *Ili! What my name is is Ellen. 
Since presuppositions and assertions cannot be distinguished, and the sole criterion 
for the acceptability of a proposition is its consistency with that context, pragmatic 
anomaly such that occurring in (4-88b) cannot be prevented-the reason for its lack of 
acceptability is presumably not inconsistency. 
Finally, if we are interested in the treatment of discourse in a broad sense, we should note 
that because the integration mechanism Gazdar proposes fails to integrate inconsistent 
propositions, it cannot cope with the processing of contradictory statements that we 
might expect to appear in dialogues. 
A general criticism of models in which presuppositions are cancelled or suspended in 
case of inconsistency (or, on models such as Prince's, in case new information appears 
in the presupposed part of the utterance) is that it is not possible on these accounts 
to support the claim that presupposition al constructions have a pragmatic function in 
discourse even in cases where presuppositions would traditionally be suspended, such as 
the conditional contexts that we have discussed above. We have claimed above, and 
will discuss further in chapter 5, that presuppositional constructions convey processing 
signals to hearers and readers, requiring that antecedents be found for the presupposed 
material. In cases where presupposition is suspended, it is not the case that these sig- 
nals disappear and cease to be processed: in other words, the rhetorical force of the 
cleft is not lost. On the account of cleft presupposition that we adopt in this thesis, 
allowance is made for these situations by the postulation of LEVELS OF EMBEDDING 
in the discourse model in which the antecedents are to be constructed which are used 
for the interpretation of presuppositional structures whose presuppositions do not ul- 
timately survive. This will be discussed in some detail below: for the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that models that cancel presuppositions in these cases, or fail to differ- 
entiate between presupposed and entailed presuppositions even when presuppositions 
do survive, lose vital information concerning how the content of the sentences concerned 
are to be integrated into context. While Gazdar's analysis of the cleft is in our view 
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correct, therefore, the mechanism lie proposes for the integration of the cleft's content 
into context is not sufficiently sensitive to allow pragmatic considerations to play a part 
in the interpretation. This sensitivity-to allow factors such as appropriateness to come 
into play, for example-is a vital feature of any model that is to capture the discourse 
meaning of presuppositional constructions in general, and clefts in particular. 
4.2.3 Requirements for a Theory of Cleft Presupposition 
On the basis of the discussion above, what features does a good theory of presupposition 
for clefts need to have? In this section, we summarise conclusions from our discussion of 
the three types of presuppositional. theory, and augment the summary with comments 
on additional features that the clefts data demonstrate to be important. 
How Presuppositions should be Generated 
In the preceding sections, it was argued that a suitable view of presupposition should 
take the syntax of the construction in question into account, since it is clear that 
presuppositional behaviour in the cleft is due in no small part to its syntactic structure. 
A theory would therefore be required that allowed at least potential presuppositions 
to be generated in a manner based on syntactic structure. Accent-based accounts of 
presupposition, it was argued, neglect the important fact that the syntactic structure 
of the cleft is itself presuppositional, in addition to confusing the semantic level of 
description at which presupposition operates with the pragmatic issues surrounding 
how presuppositions cohere with the discourse contexts in which they are used. 
It is also important that the means of generating potential presuppositions should be 0 
based on a well-grounded view of how negation works. It appears that for the cleft at 
least that the unmarked case for negation is internal, rather than the default external 
negation posited by approaches based on the Gricean pragmatic view. 
Finally, an adequate theory needs to generate presuppositions for both positive and 
negative clefts, at the same time capturing the asymmetry between them revealed by 00 
cases of presupposition 'cancellation'. As Nve argued above, positive clefts entail and 
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presuppose the existentially-quantified content of the cleft complement, while negative 
clefts only presuppose. 
What Context Should be Like 
What kinds of propositions can make up the context is vitally important. We argued 
in the discussion of notions of presupposition based on sentence accent that the propo- 
sitions that the discourse context would be likely to contain need to be considered 
separately from the knowledge and beliefs of the speakers. The discourse context might 
contain information from such diverse sources as the following: 
" Propositions that have been introduced explicitly in the conversation. 
" Background information shared by both speakers. 
" Propositions adopted by speakers for the sake of argument. 
" Propositions inferred or otherwise indirectly derived from others explicitly intro- 
duced. 
Propositions in the context need not be shared knowledge, or believed to be true by 
either speaker (and in fact can be believed to be false by either or both). 
Finally, it may be obvious that the context will need to change dynamically, to take 
account of propositions being integrated and, on occasion, retracted. 
How Propositions Should be Integrated into Context 0 
It was argued above that a mechanism that allows propositions to be integrated into the 
context under the sole constraint that they are consistent with what is already there 
is too simple for our purposes. Consistency is naturally important, but other, more 
subtle constraints are involved if discourse constraints on the presentation of informa- 
tion are to be observed in addition to logical ones. The mechanism should separate 
out presuppositions, assertions, entailments and implicatures as distinct cases so that 
pragmatic constraints on the presentation of information in each of these forms can be 
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implemented. Moreover, any component of the integration mechanism that evaluates 
or constrains integration on the basis of information structure (i. e., 'old' versus 'new' 
information) should make a sharp distinction between this information structure and 
the asserted, presupposed, entailed or implicated status of the proposition that carries 
it. On this basis, assessments of 'conversational contribution', if provided, can cope 
with new information being presented as presuppositions, for example. Most impor- 
tantly for our purposes, this provision also enables the distinctive discourse effects of 
presupposing new information to be captured. The integration mechanism should be 
able to assess the acceptability of repeated information, and redundancy in the presen- 
tation of information, in a variety of situations, to ensure that utterances that violate 
Gricean maxims are not accepted automatically. This latter stipulation is particularly 
important if the mechanism is ever to be extended to deal with implicatures that result 
from such violations. 
As we noted above, in models where presupposition can be cancelled or suspended (as 
might happen, for example, when the presupposition occurs in the consequent clause of a 
conditional construction), the information that a presupposition has taken place should 
not be lost. This reflects the fact that presupposition-signalling constructions are used 
deliberately and systematically, whether the presupposition itself projects or not. A 
model for processing presuppositions would be able to capture this most appropriately 
by reflecting the signall. ing role of presuppositions in the way in which it integrates them 
into the discourse context. If possible, the model for integration should be compatible 
with extensions to deal with dialo-ue. 0 
General Requirements 
It is to be hoped that a framework appropriate for clefts is generalisable to other pre- 
supposing constructions, as well as being elegant and, hopefully, simple. 00 
In the following section, we will introduce a model, due to van der Sandt [1988,1989], 
that displays most of the desirable characteristics which we argued above were necessary 
for an adequate account of cleft presupposition. 
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4.2.4 A Model for Presupposition 
Van der Sandt's [1988,19891 model for presupposition centres upon the following points: 
9 Presupposition is not a binary relation between sentences and propositions; it is a 
ternary relation between sentences, contexts and presuppositions. On this view, 
the presuppositions of sentences are context-sensitive, and cannot therefore be 
determined out of context. 
a The presuppositions of a syntactic structure or lexical item act as functions that 
select from a set of possible contexts those contexts in which they are appropriate. 
Presuppositions require, as a condition for interpretability, a context in which the 
presupposed proposition has already been asserted or is assumed to be true. If 
the appropriate context is not given, the hearer can postulate it for the purposes 
of interpreting the sentence [van der Sandt 1988: 163]. 
41 Contexts change as a result of the utterance of new sentences. 
0 With most speech act theorists, we assume that the objects of speech acts are 
propositions, and that with each context is associated a set of propositions taken 
to be true in that context. 
0A discourse or conversation must be seen as a sequence of speech acts and a text 
as a representation thereof. 
0 Acceptability does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence; the rules deter- 
mining acceptability fall within the scope of pragmatics. 
0 Presuppositions are viewed as ANAPHORS, in that they require satisfaction in the 
context 
e Drawing on insights from Discourse Representation Theory (henceforth DPT), the 
context permits separate LEVELS OF EMBEDDING which constrain the accessibility 
of antecedents depending on the depth of embedding of the 'anaphor' (i. e., the 
presupposition). This enables presuppositions that do not survive in a particular 
context to be represented, thus preserving parallels between the processing of both 
non-projecting and projecting presuppositions 
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In this section, these principles will be amplified in sufficient detail to demonstrate the 
usefulness of van der Sandt's model for clefts. We then go on to pursue van der Sandt's 
suggestions in the form of a DRT model of cleft presupposition, which we present in 
section 4.4. 
The Cont ext- Sensitivity of Presuppositions 
Although we have established that clefts are presuppositional constructions, suspension 
of these presuppositions can take place in a variety of contexts, some of which we have 
already noted in this chapter. Suspension may occur in conditionals, under verbs of 
propositional attitude and verbs of reported speech, and in sentences containing tem- 
poral clauses. Van der Sandt notes, however, that suspension of presupposition not 
only depends on the linguistic context, but on the assumptions made by the interlocu- 
tors. He points out in support of this claim [1988: 1581 that not all conditional contexts 
cause presuppositions in the postcedent clause to be cancelled, depending on what is 
tacitly assumed by the speakers to be part of the context. For example, (4-89) allows 
both a presuppositional and a non-presuppositional reading depending systematically 
on the contextual information selected-that is, depending on what information is in 
the context at the time of utterance. 
(4-89) If someone at the conference solved the Prtoi3lem, it was Julius who 
solved it. 
In the antecedent clause of (4-89), what is at issue is whether or not the problem was 
solved. In this case, what is in question matches the content of the presupposition of 
the cleft in the consequent clause, and the example as a whole acts as a conventional 
conditional context. In this case, therefore, as in ordinary conditional contexts, a non- 
presuppositional reading is available for the cleft depending on whether or not the 
antecedent clause is decided to be true or not. In the antecedent clause of (4-90), 
however, things are somewhat difference. Here, what is at issue is only where the 
problem was solved. In this case, what is in question does not affect the truth value 
of the cleft in the consequent clause in the same way: whether or not the antecedent 
clause is true, the cleft presupposition will still be true. That is, the problem appears 
to be solved whether or not Julius solved it: 
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(4-90) If someone at the CONference solved the problem, it was Jul-ius who 
solved it. 
These phenomena suggest that the computation of the elementary presuppositions of 
sentences have to take into account not only the syntactic form of the sentence in which 
they appear, but more sophisticated features of context such as shared knowledge. As 
van der Sandt points out, this evidence points towards a definition of presupposition as 
A THREE-PLACE RELATION between sentences, propositions, and contexts. 
The Nature of the Context Set 
We have already said something about the nature of the ideal discourse for our purposes. 
The discourse context as conceived of by van der Sandt [1988: 164] has the following 
features: 
e It contains background information that is shared by the interlocutors 
e It contains information that has been introduced in the course of the conversation, 
provided that it is accepted and not refuted or withdrawn 
a It can be extended by non-linguistic events that are open to perception by all 
participants 
e It continually changes throughout the discourse, due to the constant addition (or 
retraction) of information 
Propositions in the context set do not need to belong to common knowledge, or be 
believed by the interlocutors. Neither do the interlocutors' views about which of the 
propositions in context is background knowledge and which has been asserted have 
to coincide with one another: on this model, it is possible for different speakers to 
have different perspectives on the content of the context set. It will be noted that 
Gazdar's [19791 theory only caters for explicitly introduced information: that is, only 
that information finds its way into the common ground. It is therefore not possible 
to use such a notion of context to cater for sentences that presuppose tacitly assumed 
information. 
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Sentence Interpretation Depends on Contextualisation 
In this and the following section, we embark upon topics that are particularly useful for 
an understanding of the rationale behind the DRT model of presupposition we present 
in section 4.4. 
Van der Sandt describes the role of presupposition in contextualising information as 
follows: 
The interpretation of sentences ... often requires that we construct contexts 
in which those sentences are acceptable and interpretable. Furthermore 
presuppositions are normally supposed to belong to those contexts. Given 
these two facts we can understand the role of elementary presuppositions 
in determining the presuppositions of sentences in isolation; they can be 
conceived of as syntactic or lexical indicators for the selection or construction 
of contexts. A presupposition theory can then be conceived of as a set of 
principles for selecting or constructing partial contexts. 
[van der Sandt 1988: 181] 
Each presupposed proposition therefore selects a set of contexts in which it is appropri- 
ate, each of which contain the proposition itself. Each time the presupposing sentence 
is used, it has to be in one of these contexts. 
The constraints on what is acceptable in the context will be discussed shortly: in the 
meantime, it is important to understand the contribution of discourse representations 
to van der Sandt's model. Several versions of Discourse Representation Theory ex- 
ist (see, for example, Kamp [1981], Heim [19821); it is sufficient for our purposes to 
communicate a common feature which makes DRT particularly suitable for an account 
of presupposition as van der Sandt describes, namely the hierarchical ordering of the 
discourse representation structures that are built up during processing of a sentence or 
sentences. A representation is bu ilt incrementally for simple sentences, but when logical 
connectives, conditionals, etc. are encountered, more complex embedded structures re- 
sult. Conditionals, for example, induce two structures, where the one which represents 
the consequent is subordinated to that representing the antecedent. Each representa- 
tion, whether subordinated or not, consists of the objects that have been introduced as 
the cliscourse is processed (usually termed DISCOURSE MARKERS) and predicates and 
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relations of those objects. We will show how clefts can be represented in this framework 
shortly. For the moment, we should note the features that make it particularly suitable 
for our purposes. 
What is important for this account is the way the hi erarchi cally- cons t ru cted discourse 
representation is able to constrain anaphoric relations between entities existing in its 
member structures. A discourse marker can act as an antecedent to an anaphor only 
if it is contained in the same structure as the marker of the anaphor or if it is on 
a superordinate level of structure. Van der Sandt [1989: 21] suggests that presupposi- 
tions work similarly to anaphors, meaning that the presupposing material has to be in 
a well-formed anaphor-antecedent relation with appropriate material elsewhere in the 
structure. How this works for cases of presupposition projection is explained in van 
der Sandt (1989: 12ffj; particularly relevant for our purposes here is to see how cases 
of accommodation are dealt with in the model. When no antecedent can be found for 
a presupposition, a discourse marker is created in the structure to act as antecedent, 
taking advantage of the fact that presuppositions of this nature have sufficient descrip- 
tive content to allow such antecedents to be formed. The marker will be placed at the 
highest level in the structure possible without violating the well-formedness conditions 
on structures internal to DRT. When discourse markers created in this way are able to 
appear at the top level of the representation, these are presuppositions of the sentence. 
The important thing to note about the model is that antecedents are created for all 
presuppositions, regardless of whether or not they belong to the final set of presupposi- 
tions of the sentence. Instead of suspension or cancellation, the DRT model reflects the 
fact that presupposition has occurred, capturing the circumstances in which presuppo- 
sitions fail to project by using constraints on the structure of the model being built. If 
pragmatic effects arise from both projecting and non-projecting presuppositions, as we 
have claimed they do, the ability of the model to capture both makes it a particularly 
useful basis for a pragmatically-conditioned model of for discourse processing. 
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Constraints on Contextual Acceptability 
Van der Sandt's model, as described above, treats propositions as instructions to con- 
struct appropriate contexts for their own interpretation. In order to constrain the 
incorporation of sentences into contexts, as well as the formation of antecedents for 
presuppositions, van der Sandt [1988: 199] suggests four principles, which can be para- 
phrased as follows: 
Consistency: As is common in models where new propositions have to be integrated, 
propositions that are included in the context have to be consistent with it. 
Informativeness: The information contributed by a sentence must not be a subset of 
that already in the context. 
Efficiency: This is a variant of the previous principle, ensuring, for example, that the 
antecedents of conditionals do not already exist in the discourse context. It too 
helps to prevent redundancy. - 
Sequential Interpretation: Sentences are to be processed left to right. 
The principle of consistency prevents inconsistent sets of propositions arising, since such 
sets entail everything. The principle of informativeness ensures that propositions cannot 
simply be re-iterated, and incorporated into context ad infinilum. This will be partic- 
ularly important in the next chapter, where we will look at the constraints imposed 
by the context on what information can be presented in cleft form. The principle of 
efficiency prevents unnecessarily complex utterances that may give rise to implicatures 
that less complex structures would not. Finally, the principle of sequential interpreta- 
tion ensures that the correct DR structures can be built up. This allows conjunctions, 
disjunctions, and conditionals to be processed correctly, with the appropriate subordi- 
nation relationships between the representatimis of their parts, and between their parts 
and the existing structures in the context. 
In section 4.4, we show how this general description relates to a treatment of cleft 
presupposition in particular. Before we turn to this, however, there is a final aspect of 
the meaning of clefts to be examined: the 'uniqueness' reading for cleft heads. , 
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4.3 Cleft Constructions and Uniqueness 
In this section, we will examine the claim that clefts implicate, presuppose or otherwise 
convey the meaning that the discourse object or set of objects specified by the cleft 
head is UNIQUE with respect to its ability to satisfy the variable contained in the cleft 
presupposition. Various forms of this claim have been made in the literature. For 
example, Halvorsen [1978: 15] argues that a cleft such as (4-91) creates an vNIPLICATURE 
such as (4-92): 
(4-91) It was Wilham that dug up the onions. 
(4-92) Exactly one individual dug up the onions. 
HaUiday [1985: 43] notes that, in the comparison between a topicalised sentence such as 
(4-93a) and a reverse wh-cleft such as (4-931)) 'the former implies among other things, 
the latter implies 'and nothing else: 
(4-93) aA loaf of bread Nve need. 
bA loaf of bread is what we need. 
Atlas and Levinson [1981] argue that the 'uniqueness' reading is not due to implicature. 
Instead, they claim that clefts such as (4-94) and (4-95) ENTAIL a reading such as (4-96): 
(4-94) It was John that T'vlary kissed. 
(4-95) It was John that Mary didn't kiss. 
(4-96) Mary kissed (exactly) one person. 
In what follows, we will be looking at the evidence for 'uniqueness' in the three types of 
cleft. We will argue that, while Atlas and Levinson's explanation of uniqueness appears 
to deal with the data they present, it is inconsistent with their own account of cleft 
presupposition. In addition, because of their view that negation is by default external, 
the account they give of uniqueness in negative clefts is incorrect. Finally, for the 
same reason, the account in general fails to spot the central role that is played by the 
presupposition of the cleft in the appearance of a uniqueness reading. We will examine 
the nature of this role, arguing that a simple and illuminating analogy is available in 
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the comparison between 'uniqueness' as understood for clefts and a similar effect that 
results from the use of definite referring expressions (discussed at length by Hawkins 
[1978]). Such an approach not only describes the uniqueness behaviour of clefts simply 
but falls out of the view of cleft presuppositions as propositions that are interpreted like 
anaphors, a view which we pursue throughout this chapter. 
4.3.1 The Evidence for Uniqueness 
It is evident from simple examples that some kind of 'uniqueness' reading does exist in 
clefts. First of all, the cleft in the following context is unacceptable, in spite of the fact 
that both the entailment Alary kissed John and the presupposition Mary kissed someone 
are trivially true in the context: 
(4-97) #Mary kissed everyone, and it was John that she kissed. 
Modifications of the cleft head that run counter to the 'unique' interpretation of its 
denotation are also unacceptable. For example, the use of among others to modify the 
cleft head creates a non-unique effect that is incompatible with the unique reading, 
resulting in the unacceptable (4-98): 
(4-98) *It was Wiffiam, among others, who dug up the onions. 
Similar effects can be created using also. In a context where also has scope over the 
cleft complement, as in (4-99a), the cleft is acceptable. Where it has scope only over the 
cleft head, which is the phrase denoting the 'unique' element, however, the uniqueness 0 
reading is violated, resulting in unacceptability. This is shown in (4-99b), below: 
(4-99) Did William dig up the onions? 
a Yes, and it was also William that destroyed the runner BEANS. 
b *Yes, and it was also ZOE that did. 
Even has a similar effect. In (4-100a) below, even has scope over the cleft complement. 
As in the previous case, however, where it has scope over the head only, as in (4-100b), 
it runs counter to the uniqueness reading: 
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(4-100) a A: I suppose John helped out with the party, did lie? 
B: Yes. It was even John who arrANGED it. 
b A: I suppose you had a lot of help clearing up after the party, did 
you? 
B: *Yes. It was even JOHN that helped. 
We can conclude, then, that a uniqueness reading certainly seems to exist. But what is 
uniqueness predicated of? In the introduction to this chapter, we noted that uniqueness 
was apparently not predicated of single elements. Evidence for this is the fact that plural 
terms can appear as cleft heads: 
(4-101) It was some boys that Mary kissed. 
(4-102) It was Mart and Rick that Mary kissed. 
In fact, existentially quantified phrases such as proper names, plural and singular definite 
and indefinite NPs, and generics can all appear freely in cleft head position. Universally 
quantified expressions, however, are not generally acceptable: 6 
(4-103) *It was every boy that Mary kissed. 
How are these facts to be explained? Atlas and Levinson argue that, given an example 
such as (4-104) 
(4-104) It was John that Mary kissed 
the uniqueness reading arises from a combination of two factors: the fact that the it-cleft 
carries a presupposition, in this case, Hary kissed someone, and the fact that the cleft 
lists only one person who Mary kissed, namely John. Atlas and Levinson explain the 
interaction of these two factors as follows: 
The sentence Mary kissed someone follows from the contribution of that 
Mary kissed to It was John that Mary kissed. But the proposition Mary 
kissed (exactly) one person follows because of the CONTINGENT fact that the 
specification in the (surface) main-clause focus constituent of It was John 
'It is a problem for this account that wh-clefts, unlike the other two cleft types, can take universally 
quantified expressions in head position. In the DRT account of presupposition to follow, we will be 
deafing primarily with it-clefts. The distinctive behaviour in wh-clefts in this respect suggests that a 
slightly different treatment would need to be developed for them. We return to this point briefly in 
chapter 6. 
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that Afary kissed lists but one item, namely, John. That 'asserted' fact adds 
Mary kissed (at most) one person to the 'presupposed' Mary kissed someone 
to give Mary kissed (exactly) one person. 
[Atlas and Levinson 1981: 54] 
Because this principle is dependent upon the number of items listed by the cleft head, 
it is possible to extend uniqueness to suggest that iMary kissed more than one person, 
if more than one person is named in the head. 
While Atlas and Levinson's account seems to be compatible with the data we have 
seen so far, it is not internally consistent with their view of clefts. It will be recalled 
from section 4.2 that Atlas and Levinson's account does not appeal to the notion of 
presupposition: on their view, positive clefts only entail the proposition conveyed by the 
complement. There is therefore no 'presupposed Mary kissed someone. If such a view 
were to be based on entailment, which is a way of making their account consistent, the 
uniqueness reading should also be associated with normal declaratives. This, however, 
does not explain the asymmetry between declaratives such as (4-105a) and clefts such 
as (4-105b) with respect to uniqueness: 
(4-105) a William, among others, dug up the onions. 
b *It was William, among others, who dug up the onions. 
While Atlas and Levinson are forced to discover a role for presupposition in the case of 
the positive cleft to explain the appearance of a uniqueness reading, they argue that no 
such reading appears in negative clefts; this is in spite of the fact that their analysis of 0 
negative clefts postulates the appearance of an implicature which is identical in content 
to the presupposition required in the positive case. 
Apart from this inconsistency, we should also point out that the conclusion that no 
uniqueness reading exists for negative clefts cannot account for examples such as (4- 
106): 
(4-106) *Of all the cats I can think- of, it wasn't this cat that dug up the onions. 
The explanation behind this unacceptability is as follows. The negative cleft has a 
uniqueness reading that can be glossed as (4-101 0 
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(4-107) There exists a unique set of indivi duals such that they dug up the onions, 
and this cat is not a member of that set. 
However, the function of (4-106) is to postulate all the cats I can think of as potential 
diggers-up of onions. The referent of this cat is a member of that set, which violates 
the uniqueness requirernent of the negated cleft, i. e., that the head of the cleft is not a 0 
member of the unique set of diggers-up. This suggests that the uniqueness reading is a 
part of the meaning of the negative cleft in (4-106). 
Atlas and Levinson's conclusion that no uniqueness reading exists for negative clefts 
of this kind may well stem from their view, described in section 4.2, that the default 
reading of negation is external. If the external reading is taken, the uniqueness reading 
does indeed disappear. On this reading, we would gloss the meaning of (4-108) as 
(4-109), rather than as (4-107): 
(4-108) It wasn't this cat that dug up the onions. 
(4-109) It is not the case that there exists a unique set of individuals such that 
they dug up the onions, and that the sole member of that set is this cat. 
In fact, the disappearance of the uniqueness reading is merely a side-effect of the dis- 
appearance of the factive presupposition that causes it. In the case of negative clefts 
interpreted with internal negation, therefore, the existenti ally- quantified cleft presuppo- 
sition still serves to assert the existence of a unique set of individuals that can instantiate 
the variable in the proposition, while the cleft as a whole asserts that the set of individ- 
uals currently specified by the cleft head is not a member of that first set. Contrary to 
Atlas and Levinson's conclusion, there is no reason why the cleft presupposition should 
lose its force when the negation has scope only over the cleft head. CD 
Th. is view, of course, requires that presupposition plays a central role in both positive 
and negative clefts, and that the uniqueness reading falls out of the edstence of the 
existentially-quantifted presupposition. In support of this view, we can show that this 
situation is analogous to that occurring in the case of other presupposing constructions, 
using definite referring expressions as an example. 
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4.3.2 The Analogy with Definiteness 
We would claim the presupposing constructions such as the are syntactic signals indicat- 
ing the existence of a unique set of individuals that satisfy the description accompanying 
the syntactic signal. In the case of a definite referring expression such as the bishop, 
therefore, the description to be satisfied might be represented as (4-110): 
(4-110) 3xbishop(x) 
Analogously, in the case of a cleft such as (4-111), the description to be satisfied is 
conveyed by the content of the cleft presupposition, which can be represented as (4- 
112): 
(4-111) It was John who kissed Mary 
(4-112) lxkissed(m, x) 
In both cases, an existential presupposition is communicated, which presupposes the 
existence of a set of elements suitable for satisfying the variable in the expression. 
Why, though, should that set be unique with respect to the current context of the dis- 
course? This can be understood in relation to llawkins' [1978] work on definite referring 
expressions. Hawkins' claim is that, for the use of a definite referring expression to be 
appropriate, the expression must refer to the TOTALITY of of objects currently in the 
discourse context that can satisfy the description contained in the referring expression. 
For example, in the case of the phrase the bishops, there must be no bishops in the dis- 
course context that fall outside the set that the speaker intends to indicate by the use 
of the definite article. If there are, definiteness cannot be used appropriately. We would 
argue that the cleft presupposition such as that indicated in (4-112b) is analogous: in 
this case, there must be no objects such that Mary kissed them that fall outside the 
intended reference of the cleft head-that is, nobody other than John in the current 
universe of discourse must have kissed Mary if the cleft is to be appropriate. This would 
explain the unacceptability of the examples we examined at the beginning of this sec- 
tion, such as (4-113). In this example, the element named in the deft head is only one 
element of the set of people who Mary kissed, instead of naming the totality of that set: 
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(4-113) *Mary kissed everyone, and it was John that she kissed. 
Finally, we noted in our review of the evidence for uniqueness that both singular and 
plural expressions could appear as cleft heads-that is, that the cleft head seems to 
specify SETS of individuals, which may consist of one or more elements. Hawkins' sug- 
gestions are compatible with this view, since he proposes that definiteness is predicated 
of sets. In each case, the set specified indicates the TOTAL or mAXIMAL set of elements 
to which the description is currently applicable. 
In the DRT model we give in the next section, we see how the requirement that the 
deft head specifies the MAXIMAL instantiation of the exi ste nti ally- quantified variable in 
the deft's factive presupposition can be implemented as a precondition on well-formed 
discourse representation structures for dealing with clefts. 
4.4 Clefts in Discourse Representation Theory 
As we described above, van der Sandt [1988,1989] has suggested that presuppositions 
can be analysed as a species of propositional anaphor within the framework of Discourse 
Representation Theory (henceforward DRT). In this section,. we explore this proposal in 
detail, concentrating for simplicity on it-cleft examples. We believe, however, that the 
treatment we suggest can straightforwardly be applied to wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts. 
The structure of the section is as follows. We first of all give a brief introduction to DRT. 
Since we are interested in the treatment of presupposition as anaphora, we will use a 
simple sentence featuring a pronoun to show how anaphora is treated in DrtT. We then 
go on to look at a propositional presupposition, using as an example the complement 
of regret. Using this example, we demonstrate how the notion Of ACCOriNiODATION can 
be dealt with in the framework, before going on to show how a cleft example would 
be interpreted. In the treatment of the cleft, we draw not only upon the notion of 
accommodation but also on the discussion Of UNIQUENESS, which on our treatment 
is more appropriately termed MAXINIALITY, and show how these phenomena can be 
elegantly catered for in the DRT framework. Finally, we exarnine how the Dru model 
can account for contexts in which presuppositions. fail to survive, capturing this by 
means of embedded discourse representation structures (DRSS). 
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4.4.1 A Brief Introduction to DRT 
DRT can be described as a formal means of representing discourses and the relation- 
ships of the objects that appear within them. Using a representation of discourse which 
consists of boxes in a variety of relationships, the framework is able to represent con- 
straints on the interpretation of anaphora in terms of the ACCESSIBILITY of potential 
antecedents. What constitutes an acceptable discourse is defined in terms of constraints 
on allowable DRSS, using DRS construction rules based on the syntactic structure of the 
incoming sentences. 
In Kamp's original formulation, a DRS for a text is determined by a set Of DRs-construction 
rules which operate top-down on the parse trees of each sentence in the text, thereby 
using syntactic structure as the basis for the logical representation. Formally defined, 
a DRs K is a pair (UK, ConK) where Uj, ý is the universe of A, consisting of the set of 
elements that appear in the discourse, termed the DISCOURSE MARKERS, and ConK is 
a set Of CONDITIONS consisting of either atomic formulae, or relations on subordinate 
DRSS. -Informally, we can think of the markers as the representations of argument ex- 
pressions, and the conditions as the representation of predicates or relations between 
them. 
To see how an analysis of a simple NP VP sentence might work, we can consider the 
example in (4-114): 
(4-114) Mary ran. 
As we described in the introduction to this chapter, we will be using a notation in 
which an extra argument position is filled by all EVENTUALITY INDEX. We noted there 
that, following Bach [1986], eventualities can be divided into the three main categories 
Of STATES, EVENTS and PROc; EssEs. Examples of each respectively might be the de- 
notations of be drunk-, reach the top and walk. Following the notational conventions 
Of UCG (Cf. Zeevat et al. [19871), we use a, al, a2, ... an to range over eventualities, 
and eel, e2, ... en and S, S1, S2, ... Sn to range over events and states respectively. In 
a conventional notation, the analysis of the content of (4-114) might therefore be as 
follows: 
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(4-115) ran(e, m) 




Figure 4.1: DRS for Alary ran 
To build Up a DRS such as that in figure 4.1, we start by analysing the NP, indexing it 
with a discourse marker m which is inserted into the universe Uj'ý. Since we need to 
encode the fact that m can act as the antecedent for a fen-dnine gender pronoun, we 
also add the condition fem(m). 
Next we analyse the vp. This gives rise to an eventuality marker, e, which is inserted 
into the universe of discourse; it also gives rise to a condition which is added to ConK, 
below the line in the box. In many cases, the NP also yields a condition, as we will see in 
examples below. For reasons internal to the theory, proper names are treated somewhat 
7 differently, and do not in isolation introduce conditions. 
4.4.2 The M-eatment of Pronominal Anaphors 
Having seen how a simple, non-anaphoric example would be represented, we can go on 
to see how pronominal anaphora is dealt with in the theory. The example we will use 
here is (4-116): 
'In fact, the NP and VP, when NP is not a proper name, enter into either an conjunctive or an 
implicative relation, depending on the determiner of the NP. However, we will ignore this issue here, 
and concentrate only on conjunctive structures. 
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(4-116) She feH. 
In this case, because the NP is the personal pronoun she, it gives rise to an instruction- 
to look for a marker that is already present and accessible in the D its. ' In this case, the 
rule for building the DRs has two parts: 9 
9 Find an 'accessible' discourse marker x of feminine gender already present in the 
current DRS. 
a Use x as the argument-filling index associated with the NP. 
Suppose we take the DRS for Alary ran above as our current context; then the result of 




fell(e', - m) 
Figure 4.2: DRS for Mary ran. She fell 
On the basis of this simple example, we will suggest a modification to the representation 
that will make the treatment of presuppositions clearer and more intuitive. We saw 
above that van der Sandt views presuppositions and anaphors alike as mechanisms 
for context selection. That is, both place constraints on the contexts in which they 
are acceptable. We can see these constraints as PRECONDITIONS on what a context-a 
DRs-has to be like in order for the sentence to be interpreted. In the previous example, 
aSee Kamp [19811 for a precise definition of accessibility. Roughly speaking, the markers which are 
accessible for a given box K are those in K itself, those in a box which is the antecedent of a conditional 
where K is the consequent, and those in any boxes which contain K. 
'We should point out that Kamp (19811 uses a slightly different rule, whereby a new marker y is 
introduced for the pronoun, and then linked by an equation of the form y=z to the antecedent. 
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the precondition is exactly the first part of the construction rule: that an accessible 
feminine discourse marker has to be present in the Dns. This can be generalised as 
a precondition for the use of anaphoric pronouns in general: an appropriate accessible 
marker has to exist for a pronoun to be acceptable. In a similar way, the content whereby 
we update a DRS when it is clear that a precondition is met, such as the second part 
of the construction rule above, can be termed a POSTCONDITION on the DRs. Thus, we 
can adopt the general principle that every DRS construction rule R is a pair of PRE(R) 
preconditions and POST(R) postconditions. In order to apply such a rule to a Dru K, we 
first check to see that K satisfies PRE(R), and then produce a new DRs K' by merging 
POST(R) with K. 10 
We shall represent such rules as schematic DRSS, where the preconditions are separated 
from the postconditions by a dashed line. This is illustrated in figure 4.3, using the 
example she felL 
xe 
fem(x) fell (e, x) 
Figure 4.3: Construction rule for She fell 
When we apply this rule to the Drts in figure 4.1 induced by Mary ran, the result is the 
DRS shown in figure 4.2. 
4.4.3 The 'Dreatment of Presuppositions 
Let us now look at van der Sandt's [1988) proposal, using a non-cleft presuppositional 
structure to begin with. We will consider first of all the factive presupposition borne by 
1OIn order to state this merging operation properly, we would need to specify more precisely the part 
of K to which new information is added. Moreover, we have to ensure that the discourse markers in 
POST(K) are renamed, if necessary, to avoid variable clashes. However, we will not attempt to spell 
out the details here. 
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regret. For example, the example in (4-117) presupposes the content of its complement, 
namely John ran: 
(4-117) 'Mary regrets that John ran. 
Processing the sentence left to right, we will first of all need to insert a marker for Alary. 
We can then go on to address the vp. Since it includes a stative verb, regret, we include 
a marker s indicating the state. The vp itself can be represented as condition consist- 
ing of a predicate and three arguments: the first argument, s, being the eventuality 
marker standing for the state introduced by regret, the second, m, being the argument 
representing Mary, and the third representing what is regretted, i. e., the presupposi- 
tion of the sentence. This third argument can be represented as e, since it stands not 
for an atomic element but for another eventuality, the thing being regretted being an 
action of John's. Because this third argument is also presupposed, however, there is a 
requirement for the acceptability of the sentence that its content be present in the DRS 
prior to the interpretation of the sentence-that is, its presence is a precondition on 
the current DRS. We therefore include e not only as an argument in a condition on the 
postcondition side of the construction rule, but as a marker on the precondition side. 
Finally, we need simply to specify what the content of e is. We do this by including 
its content-ran (e, j)-also on the precondition side, since it fills in the content of the 
presupposed information. The construction rule as a whole appears in figure 4.4. 
esm 
ran(e, j) regret(s, m, e) 
Figure 4.4: Construction rule for Mary regrets that John ran 
The analysis just described suggests the following kind of paraphrase for presupposi- 
tional constructions featuring regret: 
158 
(4-118) a Mary regrets that John ran. 
b There was an eventi of John running, and Mary regrets iti. 
Assuming this to be an acceptable paraphrase, it can be observed that an anaphoric 
relation can be said to exist between the eventuality index i in the gloss of the comple- 
ment of regret (the clausal predication John ran), and some antecedent proposition in 
the discourse. In figure 4.4, we represented this as a relationship between the eventu- 
ality e and its antecedent. However, on the paraphrase in (4-118b), we can formulate 
the required precondition for presupposition not as the requirement for the presence of 
the propositional content itself, but as the index of the appropriate eventuality. This 
move allows us to maintain the generalisation, argued for on independent grounds in 
Chierchia and Turner [19881, that anaphora is always to arguments, rather than to 
predicates or relations. It is a standard assumption Of UCG (Cf. Zeevat et al. [19871) 
that verbal Predicates should be allowed to introduce eventuality indices, on the basis 
of their similarity with indefinite terms. 
For presuppositions to be acceptable, therefore, we are stipulating the following precon- 
dition on the DRS into Which the presupposition- bearing sentence is to be incorporated: 
the eventuality index contained in the presupposed clause should already be accessible 
from the DRs as a marker at the time of interpreting the sentence. 
However, as we observed in the discussion of presupposition earlier in this chapter, it is 
perfectly possible to presuppose information that is not already in 
& discourse context. 
As van der Sandt observes, in cases where 'new' information is presupposed, this does 
not lead to an unacceptable discourse. Instead, the presupposition is accommodated, to 
use Lewis's [197991 terminology. That is, the presupposed proposition is added to the 
discourse representation as though it were already there. In the terms we are using 
here, we might say that presuppositions can contain eventuality indices that are not 
part of the precondition of the DRs at the time of encountering the cleft. The strategy 
of distinguishing between preconditions and postconditions is intended to be suggestive 
of the distinction between propositions that are merely entailed, and accommodated 
presuppositions. In both cases, a proposition is added. But a proposition which is only 
entailed by a given sentence S is added to the Drts as an 'effect' of the interpretation 
of S, while a proposition which is an accommodated presupposition of S is added as 
means of satisfying a precondition to the interpretation of S. 
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4.4.4 Cleft Presuppositions as Anaphors 
We can now try to integrate our earlier remarks about clefts with van der Sandt's 
proposal, using the simple it-cleft (4-119), the syntax of which can be glossed as (4- 
120): 
(4-119) It was John who ran. 
(4-120) It was NP S[+R]. 
As described in the previous section, the clausal predication contained in the presuppo- 
sition, in this case S[+R], requires an eventuality index a to act as its antecedent in the 
DRS. The content of the eventuality-in this case, the event of John running-is also 
specified as a condition in the precondition, identifying the nature of the eventuality 
that is required as an antecedent. We also require an additional precondition, because 
the cleft presupposition is existentially quantified: that is, it contains an existential 
presupposition that itself requires an additional marker to appear in the DRS. 
Having represented the presupposition of the cleft complement as a precondition on the 
DRS we need to represent the assertion that links the value specified by the head of 
the cleft to the existentially quantified variable in the presupposition, by means of the 
cleft copula. We can do this in the manner we described in section 4.2, representing the 
asserted proposition as follows. In (4-121), s is the eventuality marker introduced by 
virtue of the stative be, while the marker of the referential argument to the copula, X, is 
anaphoric to the eventuality marker introduced in the context. NP of course represents 
the value provided by the head of the cleft: 
(4-121) be(s, X, NP) 
Th. is appears as a condition in the postcondition of the representation, since it is not part 
of the presupposition. The schematic representation of the cleft appears in figure 4.5, 
while a version with the lexical items filled in is given in figure 4.6. 
Note that in the le. dcally-specified example in figure 4.6, we have been able to specify 
the kind of eventuality that we are talking about: in figure 4.5, we use the generic 
eventuality marker a in the precondition; in figure 4.6, we know we are talking about 
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axs 
S[+RI(a, x) be(s, x, NP) 
Figure 4.5: Construction rule for schematic it-cleft 
Figure 4.6: Construction rule for It was John who ran 
a running event, and can therefore use the event marker e instead. Note further that, 
while in figure 4.5 we are unable to specify the identity of the denotation of the NP (and 
cannot include NP as a marker, since NP is not an admissible discourse object) were are 
able to include in the postcondition that the runner is John; hence the appearance of 
the extra marker, j. 
4.4.5 Clefts and Maximality 
A final aspect of the meaning of cleft constructions still remains to be incorporated into 0 
the representation, however. It will be recalled from section 4.3 that the cleft has a 
reading associated with it to the effect that the set of discourse objects specified by the 
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expression appearing as syntactic head of the cleft has to be UNIQUE or MAXIMAL with 
respect to the existentially-quantified variable in the presupposed proposition. That 
is, the cieft head refers to the unique set of elements in the universe of discourse that 
satisfies the condition expressed by the cleft complement or wh-clause. In order to 
capture the facts we observed, to the effect that the elements specified in this way by 
the cleft could be singular or plural, we will assume for simpficity that the reference 
marker X that stands for the head of the it-cleft is plural, ranging over sets, and that the 
apparently singular NPS in preceding examples can be interpreted as singleton sets. We 
can then account for the exhaustiveness condition along the Hnes indicated in the revised 
schema for it-clefts given in figure 4.7. In this figure, the presupposition appearing in the 
precondition is embedded within a further structure, which expresses the requirement 
that any instantiation of the existentially-quantified variable in the presupposition must 
satisfy the maximality condition. This condition can itself be expressed as (4-122): 
(4-122) max(X, Ayo)-=dfVx[xEX, #>AyO(x)] 
In effect, this just says that X is the set Ix : O(x)}. 
max(X AxC be(s, X MP) 
Figure 4.7: Revised schema for it-cleft featuring the maximality condition 
Finally, we can see how the schema can be applied to our cleft example in figure 4.8. 
Notice that by virtue of (4-122), any DRS which satisfies the precondition of the rule 
in figure 4.7 will entail xEX=::,. run(e, x). Since we have jj} =X (by virtue of the 
postcondition), and therefore iEX, we ensure that run(e, j) holds in the DRS. 
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rnax(X ? ýx[run(e, x]) --:: be(s, X (j» 
Figure 4.8: Revised DRS for it was John who ran 
4.4.6 The Projection Problem and DRT 
We noted in section 4.2 that a useful model of presupposition would be one that could 
deal with what is commonly termed the PROJECTION PROBLEM. That is, it would have 
a way of representing contexts in which presuppositions failed to survive, even though 
the sentence involved might be one that was usually interpreted as a 'presupposing' 
construction. We also stipulated that the solution to this problem would not consist 
of adopting the strategy of cancelling presuppositions in these contexts, since, we ar- 
gued, presuppositions are used intentionally and meaningfully by speakers. A model 
that cancels the presupposition outright is therefore one that loses part of the intended 
meaning of the presupposition-bearing sentence. Van der Sandt suggests a way of treat- 
ing presuppositions in DRT that deals elegantly with the projection problem, by building 
a structured DRS in which the presupposition is treated as normal, but is subordinated. 
or embedded within the DRS. It therefore fails to be preserved at the top level of the 
structure, but can be interpreted at the deeper level of structure in an analogous way 
to that described for presuppositions that do project. 
Because we have treated presupposition as a species of anaphora, we require as in other 
cases of anaphora that an accessible marker exists in the DRS to act as an antecedent for 
the presupposition. These antecedents can either belong to the current DRS or to one 
superordinate to it. This is the case even when the presupposition occurs in a context in 
which presuppositions do not necessarily stirvive: to say otherwise would mean that the 
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presupposition could not be interpreted at all, and would be unacceptable. Following van 
der Sandt [19881, therefore, we will say that when presuppositions are accommodated, 
regardless of the context in which they appear, they are entered into the highest box 
that the rules for constructing DRSS permit; i. e., the topmost box that is accessible at 
the current stage of constructing a DRS. We can say therefore that our preconditions 
all hold of the topmost admissible box. However, in contexts in which presuppositions 
may or may not survive, such as conditionals, the content of the presupposition does 
not appear to be so accessible to subsequent discourse. 
We can show how this might take place using an example of a cleft construction that 
appears as the consequent clause of a conditional. This is represented in figure 4.9. 
p 
eexps 
solved(e, p) solved(e, x, p) 
problem(p) be(s, x, j) 
Figure 4.9: It-cleft appearing as the consequent of a conditional 
Note that in the case of the conditional, an embedded structure is introduced into the 
DRS. The cleft is analysed as normal, except that the topmost box into which markers 
(except for those standing for proper names) can be introduced is the embedded box. 
The presupposition solved(e, x, p) therefore does not hold of the superordinate box of 
the DRS. 
We would claim that the DRT treatment of cleft presupposition proposed is an elegant 
and intuitively' appealing way of dealing with the semantic aspects of clefts we have 
examined in this chapter. Before going on to look at how our conclusions here can 
address the problems presented by a corpus of clefts, however, we will summarise the 
164 
conclusions we have arrived at so far. 
4.5 Aspects of Cleft Semantics: Summary 
In this chapter, we hope to have brought out some important aspects of the meaning 
of clefts. First of all, we have claimed that cleft presupposition is a syntactic means of 
signalling to a hearer or reader that some antecedent should be found in the discourse 
context for the presupposed material. At the same time, the cleft conveys an assertion 
that specifies a the maximal set of individuals in the discourse context that can act as 
a value that can instantiate the existentiafly-quantified variable in the presupposition 
of the cleft. We argued that an appropriate treatment of these aspects of the meaning 
of the cleft, unavailable in other theories of presupposition, could be found in the DRT 
model of presupposition suggested by van der Sandt (1988,1989]. Pursuing van der 
Sandt's suggestions, we developed a model for cleft presupposition, and showed how 
the absence of appropriate antecedents for cleft presuppositions could be dealt with 
through an accommodated eventuality index for the presupposed material. Finally, we 
demonstrated how DRT provides a mechanism that could capture the linguistic behaviour 
of clefts in contexts where presuppositions fail to project, without losing the information 
that a presupposition has meaningfully taken place in the discourse. 
In the next chapter, we will see how the phenomena and processes we describe in this 
chapter can be applied in the description of a corptis of data. While we have explored the 
nature of some major semantic and pragmatic factors that are relevant in the description 
of cleft constructions in general, we concentrate in the next chapter on the examination 




Pragmatic Aspects of Cleft 
Constructions 
In chapter 4, we concentrated on how part of the interaction between clefts and context, 
namely the function of clefts as PRESUPPOSITIONAL constructions, could be captured 
in formal terms. In this chapter, we extend that view in two ways. First, we attempt 
to capture the variety that exists hi the relationship between cleft presuppositions and 
context. Secondly, we examine other aspects of the coherence relations of clefts as a 
whole with the surrounding context, employing some of the same formal machinery. The 
aim of the chapter as a whole is to capture the range of relations that can exist between 
the content of a cleft and the context, specifying which aspects of these relationships 
are obligatory, and which are subject to variation. 
In fulfilling this aim, we examine four separate but related aspects of clefts in discourse, 
as follows: 
the accentual patterns occurring in the data; 0 
* the factors surrounding the serial ordering of information that are relevant to the 
use of clefts; 
a the precise relationships that exist between cleft presuppositions and context 
across a range of data; and 
9 the relationships that exist between the content of clefts as a whole and the con- 
text. 
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Several of these areas have already been touched upon in the discussion of previous 
research in chapter 2: part of the aim here, therefore, is to further substantiate the 
cla. ims we made there, and show in particular how prevalent the counterexamples we 
produced actually are in a corpus of data. Our main aim in the discussion of each area, 
however, will be to point out the distinctions that exist between each of the three cleft 
types, underlining how a choice between them might be made in a given context. 
We deal with the four issues listed above in sections 5.1-5.4 respectively. In section 5.5, 
we present a synthesis of the relative roles of syntactically-signalled presupposition on 
the one hand, and information structure on the other, in the production and interpre- 
tation of clefts. We also relate our conclusions to the psychological model of discourse 
processing suggested by Clark and Haviland [1977]. Finally, in section 5.6, we give a 
summary of the claims made in the chapter with respect to the functions of clefts in 
discourse. 
The Corpora 
Two sub-corpora, which we will refer to as sub-corpus A and sub-corpus B, are used 
in the analysis presented in this chapter. Stib-corpus A consists of 150 examples, 50 of 
each of the three cleft types, and is taken at random from the spoken corpus of clefts 
derived from the Survey of English Usage (cf. Svartvik and Quirk [1980]). 0 
As we noted in chapter 1, the survey provides detailed information concerning the 
prosody of the spoken data, and sub-corpus A is accordingly the one upon which we 
base our discussion of the prosodic features of the clefts. 
Sub-corpus B was chosen from the corpus of spoken data as a whole, including my own 
collection of data. In this corpus, prosodic information was not required: it was simply 
preferable to draw the data from the most comprehensive source available. Sub-corpus 
B is therefore partially overlapping with sub-corpus A. It too contains 150 examples, 50 
of each type of cleft. 
The corpora used throughout this thesis appear in the appendix. Those examples which 
constitute sub-corpora A and B are disti iigiiis lied by the appropriate letter appearing 
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next to the examples in the main corpus. 
The Notation 
In the discussion, we will be using a linearised version of the DRT notation adopted in 
chapter 4. The markers currently in the universe of discourse will be bounded by square 
brackets, while conditions will be represented the same as before, except in linear form. 
For example, the representation corresponding to (5-1) is shown as (5-2): 
(5- 1) John ran. 
(5-2) [e, j] ran(e, j) 
In the discussion of prosodic patterns, lexical items upon which nuclei appear are indi- 
cated in small capitals, while those on which subsidiary accents appear are italicised. 
For example, the cleft in (5-3) features a single nucleus on the head element, and a 
subsidiary accent in the complement: 
(5-3) It's LIBERTY who's making all the noise. 
5.1 The Accentual Patterns of Clefts 
In chapter 2, several claims with respect to the accentual patterns of clefts were exam- 
ined. We saw that several prevalent assumptions about the possible accentual patterns 
rested on too narrow a view of the data, or were based on an ill-founded expectation 
that accentual pattern would correlate reliably with syntactic structure. Some particular 
assumptions discussed were as follows: 
" the assumption that the head constituent of a cleft always bears a nuclear accent 
(cf. Chafe [1976], Creider[19791); 
" the assumption that both the head and the complement of the cleft bear a nuclear 
accent (cf. Quirk et al. [19851); and 
" the assumption that clefts consist of a single tone group (cf. Quirk et al. [1985]). 
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In chapter 4, during the course of the discussion of theories of presupposition based on 
sentence accent, we reviewed the following further assumptions: 
the assumption that clefts contain a single nuclear accent (cf. Chomsky [1971j); 
and 
e the assumption that wh-clefts do not contain nuclei in the wh-clause (cf. Prince 
(19861). 
We examined counterexamples to each of the above at the time, and therefore do not 
intend to review the arguments here. Instead, the purpose of this section is simply to 
describe the five major accentual patterns of clefts, and expose the prevalence of each 
in a small corpus of data. In addition, the composition of clefts of each type in terms 
of the number of tone groups each consists of on average will be discussed briefly. In 
the analysis, we assume that CONTRASTIVE accents can be either subsidiary accents or 
nuclei; they are not considered to be part of a separate systern. ' 
5.1.1 Five Types of Accentual Pattern 
Five kinds of accentual pattern were observed in the data, as follows. 
Head-Nuclear Clefts in which the cleft head has a nuclear accent, and no accent 
appears in the cleft complement; 
Complement-Nuclear Clefts in which the cleft complement or wh-clause has a nu- 
clear accent, and no accent appears in the cleft head; 
Both-Nuclear Clefts in which a nucleus appears in both the head and the comple- 
ment of the sentence; 
Head- N uclea r/Weak Complement Clefts in which a nucleus appears in the cleft 
head, and a subsidiary accent occurs in the cleft complement; and 
Complement-Nuclear/Weak Head Clefts in which a nucleus appears in the cleft 
complement, and a subsidiary accent occurs in the cleft head. 
'This is the position taken by Gussenhoven [1983] in his research into accent placement, which 
considers contrast to be an instance of art accent of any kind having 'narro%v scope' over the information 
conveyed by the utterance. Others taking this view include Ladd (1983]- 
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Examples of each type appear below. 
Head-Nuclear Clefts 
The IIEAD-NUCLEAR pattern appears in (5-4) and (5-5): 
(5-4) it was a very educative PERIOD that I spent there 
(5-5) B: but I have no reason to believe he teaches linguistics 
A: no 
B: you see or that they have any reason for wanting a teacher of linguistics 
what he teaches I think is modern LANGUAGES 
No reverse wh-clefts with this accentual pattern appear in the 150 sentences exan-dned 
in this part of the study, but they do appear in my own collection of spoken data. These 
cases are ones in which a nucleus appears on the cleft head element to indicate contrast, 
but the head is anaphoric, referring to Old information: 
(5-6) JD: That was my friend Mike. 
mr, i: Gosh. THAT'S what he looks like. 
Complement-Nuclear Clefts 
The second pattern is the COM PLEMENT-N U CLEAR pattern, exemplified in (5-7) and 
(5-8): 
(5-7) B: Joe Wright you mean 
A: yes yes 
B: I thought it was Joe Wright who'd walked in at FIRST 
(5-8) B: we're big enough to stand on our own feet now and this is what 
Vincent said No about 
No wh-cleft appeared either in sub-corpus A or in the corpus as a whole with the 
complement-nuclear pattern: in wh-clefts, any nucleus appearing in the wh-clause is 
counterbalanced by at least one nucleus on the head constituent. 
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Both-Nuclear Clefts 
The third pattern, BOTII-NUCLEAR, is as its name suggests one in which a nucleus 0 
appears in both the head and the complement of the cleft. This pattern is compatible 
with all three kinds of cleft, as demonstrated in the examples below: 
(5-9) A: now where did I hear that from 
B: probably me on the phone was it it was the day AFTER when I RANG 
(5-10) A: but have you got a kettle 
B: well what I would USE is one of those little SOLID FUEL jobs-they're 
awfully good and they're quicker than the kettle 
(5-11) A: 'It's perfectly clear from the notes' 
B: THIS is what's SO AWFUL about academics isn't it-this is the worst 
side of them 
80% of wh-clefts and 50% of it-clefts in the sample are of this pattern. 
Head-Nuclear, Weak Complement Clefts 
Examples of the Head- nuclear/ weak complement type are as follows: 
(5-12) B: it's the grammar where the fun is 
A: yes it's the GRAMNIAR which is interesting 
(5-13) A: surely they're all happy 
B: mm 
A: no what they're having is the school PLAY YOU see 
No examples of reverse wh-clefts of this kind appear in sub-corpus A. They do, how- 
ever, appear elsewhere in the corpus: the following example is taken from the segment 
immediately succeeding our sample (reference 2.6.664 in the SEU corpus). 
(5-14) C: He wants to be near the British Museurn to go in for Spenser Variorum 
-do you think THAT'S what it is 
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Type it-cleft wh-cleft Reverse wh-cleft 
Head-nuclear 5 4 0 
Complement-nu clear 13 0 43 
Both-nuclear 25 40 4 
Head- nuclear/ weak complement 4 6 0 
Complement- nu clear/ weak head 3 0 3 
Figure 5.1: Breakdown of the sample into the five accentual patterns 
Complement- Nuclear, Weak Head Clefts 
The complement- nuclear/weak head pattern appears in it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts, 
but not in wh-clefts. It-cleft and reverse wh-cleft examples appear below: 
(5-15) A: Yes but you see it doesn't really make any difference you see what 
they've got it's how much they move it that COUNTS 
(5-16) A: I said I wanted some coaxial cable as what I've been using on the old 
TV thing 'cos I was suspicious - I've still got a hope that that's 
what's WRONG because you know I was in when we got this house that 
television cable 
The absence of wh-clefts of this type is due to the same regularity encountered in the 
case of complement-nu clear wh-clefts: nuclei in the complement do not appear in the 
wh-clefts in the corpus unless balanced by a nucleus in the wh-cleft head. 
Having looked at examples of the five accentual patterns, we can look at their distri- 
bution across sub-corpus A, shown in figure . 5.1. No statistical conclusions should be ZD 
drawn from this distribution, since the population in several of the cells is too small; it 
may be suggestive of tendencies, however. 
Note that the accentual patterns we observed in chapter 2 to be the assumed default 
pattern for clefts of all kinds, namely the HEAD-INUCLEAR pattern with no accents 
elsewhere in the cleft, has the second smallest representation in the data: 10% of it- 
clefts, 8% of wh-clefts, and no reverse wh-clefts. From this data, in addition, we can 
say that reverse wh-clefts are typically complemea-imclear, zvh-clefts are typically both- 
nuclear, and it-clefts are typically either both-miclear or com pl ement- nuclear. 
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5.1.2 Profile of Tone Groups in the Data 
A tone group is an abstract phonological unit which is used to describe the phonological 
characteristics of stretches of speech longer than syllables, having a recognisable internal 
structure and fairly characteristic properties (although definitions differ: for an overview 
of this and similar notions, see Couper-Kuhlen [1986: 73ff]). The data in the SEU corpus 
(and therefore in sub-corpus A, since it is a subset of the sEu data) is analysed into tone 
groups on the basis of the definition proposed by Crystal [1969: 205). Crystal's tone unit 
is defined according to the presence of a peak of prominence in the form of a nuclear 
pitch movement (the nucleus), followed by a. boundary indicated by a perceivable pitch 
change, the direction of which depends upon the direction of movement on the nucleus. 
In addition, boundaries may be indicated by other junctural features such as pause and 
variations of length and aspiration. All this will be of interest mostly to the analyst 
interested in pursuing research on the basis of the results given here; most relevant to 
note in general is simply that, given the definition of tone group as having a nuclear 
accent, and the assumption that nuclei correlate with New information, the number 
of tone groups in utterances permits a crude reckoning of the 'informativeness' of the 
utterances involved. The data on tone groups are therefore interesting in that they 
do give a rough approximation of how relatively informative the cleft types are in use. 
However, for various reasons we will discuss in relation to the study of information 
structure in section 5.4, in this thesis we will not be adopting an approach that relies 
on phonological data for the investigation of information structure. 
A count of the number of tone groups in eacli cleft of the sample appears, according 
to syntactic type, in figures 5.2,5.3, and 5.4, for it-clefts, wh-clefts, and reverse wh- 
clefts respectively. The range of values was as follows: it-clefts were found to consist 
of between 1 and 6 tone groups, wh-clefts of between I and 10, and reverse wh-clefts of 
between I and 3 tone groups. The average number of tone groups for each group was 0 
as follows: it-clefts, 1.68; wh-clefts, 6.48; and reverse wh-clefts, 1.34. 
If this analysis is to be taken as indicative of general tendencies, on the assumptions 
regarding the correlation of tone units with New information the conclusion would be 
that reverse wh-clefts contain the least New information of the three cleft types, whereas 
wh-clefts contain the most. 
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No. of tone units 123456 
Frequency 30 11 5211 
Figure 5.2: It-cleft frequencies across tone group counts 
No. of tone units 123456789 10 
Frequency 5 12 13 9532001 
Figure 5.3: lVh-cleft frequencies across tone group counts 
5.2 Clefts and the Serial Ordering of Information 
In several of the accounts of cleft function discussed in chapter 2, we encountered the 
hypothesis that cleft constructions arise from a need to present a message in some 
particular serial order-be it svo order (cf. Geluykens [1984]), or various versions of the 
'Given Information before New Information' hypothesis (also cf. Geluykens [1984] and 
Werth [1984]). In that chapter, we saw that these claims were not completely supported 
by the data, since several cases could be found in which a cleft had been used, but the 
ordering of the information in the cleft sentence was no better on the salient criteria of 
the theory in question than the corresponding canonical declarative sentence would have 
been. Although these serial ordering hypotheses had to be discounted as explanations 
for the existence of clefts, however, this is not to say that serial ordering principles are 
irrelevant to the discussion of cleft constructions. In particular, they appear to be highly 
relevant when it comes to the decision as to which of the three types of cleft sentence 
will be appropriate in a given context. 
In this section, therefore, we will take a brief look at the evidence for an ordering prin- 
ciple that is more general than the problematic 'Given before New' principle discussed 
No. of tone units 123 
Frequency 41 63 
Figure 5.4: Reverse wh-cleft frequencies across tone group counts 
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in chapter 2, but in some cases makes the same predictions. The principle is based 
on the notion Of REFERENTIAL CONTINUITY culled from the psycholi nguis tics literature 
(cf. Garnham, Oakhill, and Johnson-Laird [1982], Johnson-Laird [1983: 372ffl). Paral- 
lels between this research and work in linguistics in the field of THEMATIC CONTINUITY 
are also relevant, and will be pointed out where appropriate. 
The Notion of Referential Continuity 
The importance of referential continuity for clefts hinges on the issue of the ease of 
comprehension of sentences, and the assumption that arrangements of information that 
are easy for hearers to comprehend will be preferred by speakers over other information 
arrangements. Garnham, Oakhill, and Johnson-Laird [1982] demonstrated experimen- 
tally that randomized stories were much harder to interpret and remember than stories 
where the continuity of devices linking sentences to one another was uninterrupted. This 
effect is perhaps best illustrated in terms of some simple examples along the lines of 
the stimuli constructed by Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird [19821 who conducted a follow-up 
experiment to test Garnham el al. 's conclusions. They found that descriptions of a 
simple scene, a table place-setting in these examples, were much easier to process if the 
description alloived the subject's model of the scene to be built up continuously. (5-17) 
is an example of such a continuous description: 
(5-17) The knife is in front of the spoon. 
The spoon is on the left of the glass. 
The glass is behind the dish. 
In (5-17, ) the order of reference to the objects involved is knife-spoon-spoon-glass- 
glass-dish. The following example, in contrast, exhibits the referentially discontinuous 
progression glass-dish-knife-spoon-spooii-glass, which was predicted to be much harder 
to process: 
(5-18) The glass is behind the dish. 
The knife is in front of the spoon. 
The spoon is on the left of the glass. 
As predicted, subjects took significantly longer to process and integrate the final state- 
ment of discontinuous examples such as (5-18) than was the case for referentially con- 
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tinuous examples, and a mean of a second longer to process the description as a whole. 
As we noted above, the principle that referential continuity should be preserved makes 
the same predictions in some cases as the Gi ven- before- New principle. For example, in 
(5-17), spoon is mentioned before glass in the second statement, which amounts to the 
placement of Given before New information. However, there is more to accounting for 
the coherence of (5-17) than simply this. In the third statement of (5-18), for example, 
both spoon and glass have been mentioned before, and so are both Given. The Given- 
New distinction is therefore unable to predict which of the two NPS should appear first. 
The preservation of referential continuity refers therefore not just to Given-before-New, 
although this may be a side-effect of it. 
Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird's conclusions, however, also suggest a parallel with an area 
that has long been the concern of text linguists, the study Of THEME and THEMATIC 
PROGRESSION. Much research has been directed at this issue, resulting in several well- 
known characterisations of the typical thematic progressions in various languages (see, 
for example, Firbas [1964,1966,1975], Enkvist [1973], and Dand [1974]). While it is not 
to the point here to go into this area in detail, it is useful to point out the parallel between 
this and psychological work on the processing of texts in order to clarify the point 
that work on theme and thematic progression, and work on integrating propositions 
into memory, are in fact different approaches to the same problem. For example, the 
thematic progression in (5-19) is an example of Dane§' [1974] LINEAR PROGRESSION, 
the thematic structure that in Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird's terms observes referential 
continuity most closely: 
(5-19) William has just eaten a cranefly. 
It flew in through the window. 
This example, although less complex than (5-17), demonstrates referential continuity in 
the same way, since the two references to the cranefly-a cranefly and it-are maximally 
close together, uninterrupted by intervening material. In experiments reported by Glatt 
[19821, conducted along similar lines to those reported by Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird, 
the two kinds of linear progressions defined by Daneg [1974] were found to be easier 
to process than the other progressions tested. Note that (5-19), as in many of these 
examples, also features an anaphoric relation: an effect of the preservation of refer- 
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ential continuity is often that anaphoric elements remain near their antecedents. The 
preservation of proximity in anaphoric links also appears to be a priority in discourse: 
Hobbs [1978] and Pinkal [1986: 370) have noted that the vast majority of pronouns, for 
example, relate to an antecedent that is either in the same sentence, or the immediately 
preceding one, which indicates that such proximity is desirable. 2 
Referential Continuity and Cleft Type 
The relevance of these points to the use of clefts in discourse can be illustrated by means 
of a general principle and some examples. The general principle is that, if referentially 
continuous texts and discourses are easier to process, it is likely that the co-operative 
speaker or writer will attempt to construct texts and discourses that preserve referential 
continuity, and the proximity of anaphors to their antecedents, wherever possible. The 
relevant examples to point out are those in which the preservation of referential conti- 
nuity as a principle is able to decide between rival sentence types for a given context. 
One such example, drawn from the corpus of written data, appears below: 
(5-20) Part of Magritte's school holidays was spent with grandmother and an 
aunt at the town of Soignies. It was there, whilst playing one day with 
a small girl in an abandoned cemetery, that he first became aware of 
painting as a special and somehow mysterious activity: 'We used to lift 
up the iron gates and go down into the underground vaults. Regaining 
the light again, I found, in the middle of some broken stone columns and 
heaped-up leaves, a painter who had come from the capital, and who 
seemed to me to be performing magic. ' 
In tMs example, the referential chain is, in outline, the town of Soignies-there- 
painting-the painter. The substitution of a wh-cleft in the same text is much less ac- 
ceptable, since it leads to the chain the town of Soignies-painting-there-the painter, 
where the referential dependencies between the two expressions are crossed: 
2 For a discussion of how anaphors are processed, see for example Sanford and Garrod [1981]- 
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(5-21) Part of Magritte's school holidays was spent with grandmother and an 
aunt at the town of Soignies. Where he first became aware of painting 
as a strange and mysterious activity, while playing one day with a small 
girl in an abandoned churchyard, was there: 'We used to lift up the iron 
gates and go down into the underground vaults. Regaining the light 
again, I found, in the middle of some broken stone columns and heaped- 
up leaves, a painter who had come from the capital, and who seemed to 
me to be performing magic. ' 
Finally, the chain of reference that would be produced by a declarative in this context is 
as discontinuous as that of the wh-cleft in (5-21); the sentence itself is. more acceptable 
than the wh-cleft, although less preferable than the it-cleft. The chain produced by a 
declarative would be the town of Soignies-painting-there-the painter. 
(5-22) Part of Magritte's school holidays was spent with grandmother and an 
aunt at the town of Soinies. He first became aware of painting as a 
strange and mysterious activity while playing one day with a small girl 
in an abandoned churchyard there: 'We used to lift up the iron gates 
and go down into the underground vaults. Regaining the light again, I 
found, in the middle of some broken stone columns and heaped-up leaves, 
a painter who had come from the capital, and who seemed to me to be 
performing magic. ' 
On the basis of this evidence, we caii say diat serial ordering is likely to be important 
in the choice between the three cleft types. However, we do not suggest this as the sole 
motivation for using a cleft, and we do not motivate the notion of serial order in terms 
of Given and New information, or svo order. 
We wiU briefly touch upon this and a related processing constraint in the discussion 
of how cleft types tend to correlate with particular presuppositional. relations, in sec- 
tion 5.3. In addition, suggestions are made in chapter 6 for how a principle of referential 
continuity could be incorporated into a decision procedure for choosing between clefts. 
5.3 Cleft Presuppositions in Discourse 
In chapter 2, we reviewed some claims with respect to the discourse status of the presup- 
positions borne by cleft complements. We noted in particular a claim made by Prince 
[19781 to the effect that wh-clefts presuPI)OSe GIVEN information, while it-clefts pre- 
suppose information that is KNOWN, defined respectively as follows (Prince [1978: 903, 
178 
8961): 
Given information: Information which the co-operative speaker may assume is ap- 
propriately in the hearer's consciousness. 
Known inforniation: [Information that is] not marked as assumed to be in the hearer's 
mind ... often, though not always, known from the context ... information which 
the speaker presents as being factual and as already known to certain persons 
(often not including the hearer). 
It was argued in response to these claims that such a qualitative distinction between the 
presupposed information in each case could not be upheld, on two grounds. Firstly, we 
saw that it-clefts and wh-clefts were interchangeable in certain contexts, which suggested 
that the presupposed information they conveyed could not always be different in the way 
Prince suggests. Secondly, the presuppositions of it-clefts spanned such a wide variety of 
information statuses-from shared, highly salient information, right through to informa- 
tion previously unknown to the hearer, and not mentioned in previous discourse-that 
it'was unlikely that any space on the presuppositional spectrum remained that could be 
called the exclusive domain of wh-clefts. On this basis, it was argued that wh-clefts and 
it-clefts inhabit the same CONTINUUM of presupposition types, the distinctions between 
them arising from their occupying partially distinct, but overlapping, domains. 
In this section, we examine the range of presupposition types that appear regularly in 
clefts. First of all, we look at a particular rhetorical constraint that seems to preclude 
propositions rhetorically related to previous discourse in that way from being presup- C. 
posed at all. Secondly, we go on to look at what presuppositional relations can and do 
occur, and establish a formal means of looking at them, as follows. 
In the DRT model developed in chapter 4, we argued that, for a presupposition to be used 
acceptably in discourse, the presupposed proposition requires an ANTECEDENT in the 
discourse context in the form of a condition representing the presupposed material, and 
a suitable eventuality index. We drew a distinction between presupposed propositions 
whose antecedents were present in the discourse context at the time of processing the 
cleft construction, and those whose antecedent propositions were not already present. 
In the latter case, we argued that the antecedent to the presupposed material had to be 
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constructed in context-ACCOINIM 0 DATED, following Lewis [19791-before the content 
of the cleft sentence as a whole could be interpreted. In this section, we postulate three 
types of relation that can exist between a presupposition and its antecedent in context: 
presuppositions can be OLD, INFERRABLE froin context, an d NE%v. These categories may 
also be divided into various subtypes, some of which have been identified before with 
respect to wh-clefts, by Prince [1978] and Celuykens [19841. The similarities between 
the approach taken here and those of Prince and Geluykens are noted when they occur. 
The categories suggested here apply in general to all three types of cleft, representing a 
broader range of data than that described by Prince and Geluykens. 
After identifying the statuses of the presuppositions involved, we go on to look at the 
distribution of the cleft types found in the data with respect to these statuses. We 
conclude that there are important distinctions between the cleft types with respect to 
the presupposition statuses generally employed, the most categorical of these being that 
wh-clefts cannot carry presuppositions that appear at the NE%v end of the range. Some of 
these regularities are explained at the time; others, being due to more general principles, 
are deferred until the appropriate part of the exposition. The framework we develop in 
this section for looking at presuppositional relations is also used in section 5.4 as part 
of the mechanism for determining the INFORMATION STRUCTURE of clefts. 
Having described the aims and function of this section, we can go on to look at the first 
issue relevant in the description of cleft presuppositions: a rhetorical constraint on the 
kinds of proposition that can be presupposed. 
5.3.1 A Rhetorical Constraint on Presupposition 
Notably absent from the set of relationships observed between cleft presuppositions and 
the preceding discourse context is a rhetorical relationship that can be characterised 
as SIMPLE NARRATIVE SUBSEQUENCE. That is, clefts in general do not seem to be 
used for the simple purpose of relating two subsequent events in a narrative. This 
can be demonstrated by the following set of examples. (5-23) is a constructed discourse 
consisting of two declarative sentences, eacli of w1iicli describe an event. The two events, 
each referred to in the simple past tense, are assumed to be temporally serial: 
iso 
(5-23) Mary left the house. 
She went to the shops. 
When the same content is conveyed with an it-cleft' in place of the second sentence, 
the resulting sentence is unacceptable: 
(5-24) Mary left the house. 
#It was she who went to the shops. 
It is only possible to construct an acceptable discourse where the second sentence is a 
deft, apparently, when the deft presupposition conveys information about Mary that 
can be interpreted as not temporally serial in the discourse-'background' information4 
about her, for example, in the sense that it does not contribute to the main narrative 
sequence of the discourse. Such a discourse can be achieved, for example, by changing 
the tense of the verb in the complement to pluperfect, thereby destroying the relationship 
of narrative subsequence between the two events described: 
(5-25) Mary left the house. 
It was she who had been to the shops once already. 
Narrative subsequence is also destroyed if the eventuality described by the second sen- 
tence is not one which would plausibly be assumed, in the absence of explicit temporal 
indicators, to be a temporal successor to that described in the previous sentence. The 
information that Mary had particular feelings about the shops, for example, would be 
an example of such an eventuality. The resulting sentence, predictably, can be a deft: 
(5-26) Mary left the house. It was she who loved the shops. 
This evidence, combined with the set of relationships that were found to occur between 
cleft presuppositions and the preceding discourse, suggests that narrative subsequence 
is not a link that can be used acceptably by cleft presuppositions. 
It is likely that other rhetorical relationships exist that similarlY' preclude the presup- 
posing of the proposition in question. As we suggest in chapter 6, further research of 00 
'An itcleft is chosen for this example because, as will become clear below, it-clefts are the type 
of cleft able to convey the broadest range of presupposition types. Similar examples can, however, be 
constructed using wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts. 
'It is not intended here that the term 'background' be interpreted as meaning 'less salient in the 
discourse'. As we noted in chapter 2, the information conveyed by cleft complements is equally salient 
in the discourse as information carried elsewhere in the cleft when measured in terms of the frequency 
oýsubsequent references in discourse. 
181 
a comparative nature on a corpus of both cleft and non-cleft sentences would be nec- 
essary to establish the nature of these relationships, and to assess how far any general 
principles can be adduced to explain them. 
Having noted this apparently general constraint on what can be presupposed, we can go 
on to the characterisation of the kinds of presuppositional status observed in the clefts 
in sub-corpus B. 
5.3.2 Three Types of Presuppositional Relation 
Sub-corpus B yielded cleft presuppositions of three statuses, as follows: 
Old: where a proposition that arises directly from an explicit utterance matches the 
presupposed proposition; 
Inferrable: where the cleft presupposition has no antecedent proposition in the dis- 
course context, but one can be created for it by inference; and 
New: where the cleft presupposition has no antecedent proposition in the discourse 
context, and none can be created for it by inference. 
Of the three presupposition types, the latter two require the content of the presupposed 
proposition to be accommodated in the discourse context. These two types can be 
seen as requiring or specifying two separate strategies by which accommodation can be 
performed. The three types are described and exemplified below. 
Old Presuppositions 
As noted above, a cleft presupposition is Old when it is entailed by the discourse context 
at the time of processing the cleft. We can point to two subtypes of Old proposition: 
in the first type, which we will refer to simply as a case Of IDENTITY between the 
presupposed proposition and a proposition in context, the presupposed proposition is 
straightforwardly entailed by the context. ror example, (5-27) contains a constructed 
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context S1 followed by a cleft S2' where the cleft presupposition is entaýiled by the 
context: 
(5-27) Sl: Who cooked the carrots? 
S2: It was Mary who cooked the carrots. 
In the linear DRT notation described in chapter 4, we might represent S1 as the set of 
condition C1, as follows: 
(5-28) Cl: [ei, x, a] cook-ed(ei, x, a) A carrots(a) 
We can represent S2 in a similar notation, as conditions C2 (the presupposition) and 
C3 (the assertion): 
(5-29) C2: [e2, z, b] cooked(e2, z, b) A carrots(b) 
C3: [s, ml be(s, z, m) 
In this case, the presupposition C2 is a DIRECT MATCH with Cl: that is, C1 is currently 
available as a propositional antecedent in context. We can say in these cases that a 
proposition already exists in context that can UNIFY with the cleft presupposition. 
We also come across cases where a proposition that describes an eventuality of the same 
TYPE appears to be acting as an identical propositional antecedent. In this second type 
of Old presupposition, which we will term TYPE IDENTITY, the cleft presupposition does 
not strictly have a direct match in the context, since the eventuality described by the 
proposition that is treated as does not match in every detail. Motivation does exist, 
however, for treating these examples as special cases of Old presupposition, in terms 
of a similar phenomenon that occurs in vp ellipsis. The anaphoric relation to which 
we refer is termed SLOPPY IDENTITY, and occurs when an elhpsis has as antecedent 
content that is non-identical to the elided material, but which is of the same type. This 
is exemplified in (5-30), the elided material being indicated by the symbol 0: 
(5-30) John made a cake, and Mary did 0 too. 
In (5-30), the cake that John made is not the same cake that Mary made. This case is 
exactly analogous to cleft cases such as (5-31): 
'Note that in S2 it would be more natural to omit the complement of the cleft. It is allowed to 
remain in this case in the interests of clarity. 
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(5-31) Sl: On Tuesday, John made a cake. 
S2: On Wednesday, it was Mary who made a cake. 
In (5-31), two non-identical cake-making events are taking place, but they are treated as 
identical for all intents and purposes. Evidence for this is that the it-cleft complement 
can be omitted in these cases: 
(5-32) Sl: On Tuesday, John made a cake. 
S2: On Wednesday, it was Mary 0. 
For a full formal treatment, such cases require a notation that allows generalisation 
over types of events. For simplicity, we can represent these examples as having different 
eventuality indices. In the following example, Cl represents Sl; C2 and C3 represent 
the presupposition and the assertion of the cleft, respectively: 
(5-33) Cl: [el, j, a] cooked(el, j, a) A cake(a) 
C2: [e2, x, b] cooked(e2, x, b) A cake(b) 
C3: [s, m] be(s, x, m) 
In the discussion that appears. later, we will subsume both subtypes of relation under 
the umbrella category OLD. 
Inferrable Presuppositions 
This category of presupposition is designed to capture cases where the presupposition 
is indirectly related to one or more propositions in the context, but has not a directly 
matching antecedent in the context at the time of interpretation. In such cases, the 
presupposition involved would be accommodated, in the manner described in chapter 
4. The inferrable category is intended to represent one of two ways in which such 
accommodation might take place, the second being described in the discussion of NE%V 
presuppositions in the next section. 
There are two ways in which antecedents can be created for presuppositions by means 
of an Inferrable relation. The first way is by means of a LOGICAL RELATION between 
the presupposed proposition and a context proposition. The second is by means of the 
application of some fact or general knowledge schema that licenses an inference to the 
required proposition. We can capture this second type of Inferrable relation in terms of 
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a set of axioms that are available to the interpreter of the cleft. The axioms that are 
relevant in describing inferential relations fall into two groups, as follows: 
World Knowledge axioms where each axiorn is based on speakers' knowledge about 
the state of the world or knowledge about other speakers; and 
Metalinguistic axioms where each axiom is based on speakers' knowledge of dis- 
courses and the situations in which they take place. 
We Nvill describe both kinds of inference, those based on logical relations and those based 
on axioms, in turn. 
Inferences based on Logical Relations 
A particularly common presuppositional relation is one in which an antecedent can be 
formed for the presupposition from what Wilson [1975] terms a BACKGROUND ENTAIL- 
MENT of a proposition currently present in context. Such entailments are more general 
(i. e. less informative) entailments arising from other propositions. ' For example, the 
proposition (5-34a) might have the the background entailments given as (5-34b) to 
(5-34e) (in each case, glosses appear beneath the representation): 
(5-34) a [pl, j, b] runs(pi, j, b) A business(b) 
(John runs a business) 
b [pl, x, b] runs(pi, x, b) A business(b) 
(Someone runs a business) 
c [pi, j, ell does(pi, j, el ) 
(John does something) 
d [pl, x, ell does(pi, x, el ) 
(Someone does something) 
e [e2l occurs(e2) 
(Something occurs) 
We can term each of these more general b-, ickground entailments a SUBSUMPTION of the 
proposition in context, in this case (5-34a). How it relates to clefts can best be seen by 
61Ve do not want to assume that all possible background entailments are generated at the point of 
the initial interpretation of sentences. Instead, they are generated only when required. 
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means of an example, such as (5-35). In this example, we give an utterance S1 from 
which the conditions C1 result, by entailment (although it is only really relevant that 
C1 occurs in the context, not how it arrived there). C1 describes a process of running 
that holds between John and a business: 
(5-35) Sl: John runs a business. 
Cl: [pl, j, b] runs(pl, j, b) A business(b) 
Given this context, it is possible to use a cleft S2, shown in (5-36). The presupposition 
of this cleft can be given as C2: 
(5-36) S2: What he does is write adverts. 
C2: [P2v j, e2] does(P21 j, C2) 
At the time of interpretation, there is not a proposition in the context that can act as 
a directly- matching antecedent for C2. However, by going back into the discourse con- 
text, a proposition may be located from which a proposition that can act as antecedent 
can be derived. In this case, Cl is located as a proposition from which the appropriate 
proposition can be inferred by subsumption, as described above. The resulting proposi- 
tion, a background entailment of Cl, will provide a direct match for the presupposition 
C2. In this case, the appropriate back-ground entailment will be C1', below: 
(5-37) Cl: [pl, j, bl runs(pl, j, b) A business(b) 





We can say that the presupposition of the wh-cleft in (5-36) relates to the propositions 
in context by means of the inferrable relation of subsumption. As we will see later in this 
section, the subsumption relation is particul arly relevant in the description of wh-clefts. 
While do is a common subsuming predicate, it is only able to subsume previous propo- 
sitions that describe processes, not those describing events or states. For example, in 
(5-38), a wh-cleft attempts to use do to subsume a description of a state, that of John 
liking Duvel beer: 7 
(5-38) Sl: John likes Duvel beer. 
S2: #What he does is drink a lot of it. 
7 For the purposes of the examples to follow, we will give the surface forms of the sentences from which 
the propositions arise, rather titan the representations of the propositions concerned. It should be re- 
membered, however, that the subsumption relation referred to in each case relates to the presupposition 
conveyed by the cleft, and the proposition (in each case, an entailment) of the context sentence. 
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(5-39) shows a similar situation where a wh-cleft with do tries to subsume an event 
description, the event concerned bein, that of the door slamming: 
(5-39) Sl: The door slammed. 
S2: #What it did was shut with a bang. 
If do cannot be used for events, another subsuming predicate, happen, can. The use of 
this predicate is possible because the less informative entailment of event descriptions 
upon which it relies can be given as (5-40): 
(5-40) [e, x) happen(e, x) 
Happen can therefore be used in context Sl given in (5-39), as (5-41) demonstrates: 
(5-41) Sl: The door slammed. 
S2: What happened was it shut with a bang. 
We pointed out in chapter 3 that the do-insertion was not syntactically acceptable when 
the verb in the head of the cleft was a stative. For example, (5-42) was unacceptable: 
(5-42) *What Mary does is love ice cream. 
As we noted in chapter 3, neither can happen appear with a sentential head that is the 
complement of a stative verb: 
(5-43) *What happens is that Mary loves ice cream. 
This places obvious restrictions on the subsuinption relation as far as statives are con- 
cerned: if the target proposition entailed by the context is a state description, it cannot 
be subsumed. We saw that this was the case for do in (5-40); (5-44) shows a similar 
lack of acceptability when happen is used for stative subsumption: 
(5-44) sl: John likes Duvel beer. 
s2: #What happens is that fie drinks a lot of it. 
As far as the appearance of cleft presuppositions falling into this INFERRABLE cate- 
gory has been noted in previous research on clefts in discourse, Prince (1978: 8891 and 
Geluykens [1984: 48] observe the appearance of what they term EXPLICIT information in 
wh-cleft wh-clauses, information which we have characterised here as being ENTAILED by 
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the discourse context. In addition, both remark upon the appearance of happen in wh- 
clefts, and Geluykens observes do to appear in these -contexts, too. However, rather than 
providing a general explanation on the basis of entailment relations, as we do above, 
both Prince and Geluykens resort to independent pragmatic principles to explain these 
relationships. With respect to happen in wh-clefts, for example, Prince concludes 
The antecedents 'something happened/seems to be happening' are not re- 
trievable from anything in the preceding contexts; yet the discourses are a 
coherent. There seems to be a pragmatic principle that says that events 
keep occurring-and that in our culture, at least, they are our proper and 
constant concern. 
[Prince 1978: 893] 
Geluykens suggests a similar explanation for do: 0 
It seems reasonable to assume that, just as the knowledge that events keep 
occurring is a pragmatic principle, it is also a pragmatic principle that 'peo- 
ple do things'. The fact that people perform all kinds of actions is probably 
always in our consciousness. 
[Geluykens 1984: 52] 
On the approach advocated here, independent principles do not need to be invoked to 
explain the relationships described. 
Inferences based on World Knowledge Axioms 
Turning to world knowledge relations first, we can demonstrate the use of an axiom 
to license the accommodation of a presupposition using a simplified version of one of 
the corpus examples. In (5-45), S1 represents the current context, S2 a wh-cleft whose 
presupposition is inferentially related to that context: 
(5-45) Sl: John has a gadget., 
S2: What it does is remove fluff. 
The content of Si can be represented as the condition C1, as follows: 
(5-46) Cl: [s, j, a] owns(s, j, a) A gadget(a) 
188 
The content of the cleft can be represented a-s C2 and C3 in (5-47), where C2 represents a 
presupposition that can be glossed as it has some function, C3 representing the assertion 
which we can gloss that function is removing fluff. In C3, the eventuality index e 
represents the process of fluff-removing, following the practice we introduced in chapter 
4, of alloiving predicative vps to introduce eventuality indices. In a full representation, 
e would be decomposed further, but the partial representation below makes the point 
more clearly: 
(5-47) C2: [s, x] has-function(s, a, x) 
C3: (e] be(s, x, e) 
On the approach we developed in chapter 4, the cleft presupposition in C2 has to be 
accommodated in the context C1. In the DRT model, we represented this by simply 
asserting the proposition into context, making it a precondition on the DRS. Here, 
however, we want to go more deeply into how such assertion can legitimately take 
place. In this case, in order to license the accommodation of C2, we can postulate a 
world-knowledge axiom known to the cleft interpreter which contains information to the 
effect that things have functions, unless it is specified otherwise. Such an axiom might 
be written as (5-48): 
- (5-48) Function: Vy gadget(y) D lias-functioii(s, y, e) 
Th. is axiom can be used to create an antecedent for the presupposition C2 if it can be 
instantiated to the values present in C2. In this case, y in (5-48) will be instantiated 
to a of the cleft presupposition C2, and e will be left uninstantiated, matching the 
uninstantiated x in C2. Because this match is successful-we can say it is possible 
to unify the two propositions, as observed above-we can license the accommodation 
of C2 as a precondition on a DRS; that is, we can assert it into context C1. The 
location and instantiation of axioms in this way can be seen as one way of licensing the 
accommodation of presuppositions such as C2, the instantiation process being the part 
of the procedure which we would describe aS INFERENTIAL. 
While we have postulated a quite specific axiom related to the function of gadgets, 
we can also suggest general axioms which reflect presuppositional relations that occur 
repeatedly in the corpus of data. Below, we give an informal rendering of each of these 
axioms, and give an example that belongs to the class covered by each. 
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Nine general axioms appear to cover the examples in sub-corpus B: 
Means: For any state of affaIrs, there is a means of arriving at that state. 
Result: For any process, there is a result. 
Origin: For any entity or set of entities, there is an origin. 
Source: If a speaker knows a fact, that fact has a source. 
Need: For any two state of affairs, there exists something that is needed if it is to be 
possible to move from the first state to the second. 
Cause: For any state of affairs, there is a cause. 
Reason: For any state of affairs that has come about throu, -h deliberate human agency, 0 
there is a reason. 
Affect: For any state of affairs, or any entity, about which they speak or in which they 
are involved, speakers and protagonists have feelings and opinions about that state 
of affairs or entity. 
Opposition For any eventuality that holds or occurs, there exists a state of affairs in 
which an eventuality of the same type does not hold or occur. 
Note that for an axiorn to be selected, the state of affairs, entity, or eventuality quantified 
over in the initial clause of the axiom has to be present in the discourse context. 
Examples exploiting each of the axioms in turn are as follows. (5-49) demonstrates a 
cleft S2 whose presupposition relates to the preceding context S1 by the relationship of 
MEANS: 
(5-49) Sl: And here we have the tree. 
S2: How I got to the tree was simply by adding one on each time. 
(5-50) shows the relation Of RESULT: 
(5-50) Sl: If you just want to say look, these two descriptions simply aren't 
related to one another 
S2: what you would get would be this (points to diagram) 
The relation of ORIGIN is shown by (5-51): 
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(5-51) Sl: Every transformation word I've heard is in at the moment is in the 
course for mathematics. 
S2: That's where it all comes from. 
(5-52) demonstrates the relation of SOURCE: 
(5-52) Sl: (speakers are discussing the marriage of an acquaintance) 
S2: It was Serena who discovered she'd got married. 
(5-53) shows a cleft whose presupposition is inferrable by virtue of the aXiOM of NEED. 
The context of this example is a meeting in which the speakers are discussing ways of 
improving some pro. ramming documentation: 
(5-53) Sl: I mean there's already some of that in the low-level programming 
documentation. 
S2: What we actually need is a specification of what these things do. 
The next relationship in the group is one Of CAUSE, demonstrated in (5-54). In this 
example, the speaker refers to a state of affairs in which the expression Caucasian has 
come to mean white-skinned. The speaker goes on to name the cause of this state of 
affairs as the Americans, using the following cleft: 
(5-54) It was the Americans who started that craze, I think. 
In the following example, the speaker uses a cleft to give the REASON for her lateness: 0 
(5-55) Sl: I forgot then I remembered 
S2: so that's why I'm about five minutes late you see 
The relationship Of AFFECT is demonstrated by the reverse wh-cleft in (5-56): 
(5-56)' Sl: And these are people who have got quite a lot of money 
S2: That's what annoys me 
In this case, the cleft presupposition expresses the fact that the speaker has some feeling, 
namely annoyance. Both Prince and Geluyketis observe the presence of relations like 
this category Of AFFECT relations in zvh-clefts. Prince observes: 0 
In ordinary, non-ritualized discourse, it seems that the speaker's relevant 
thoughts, observations, opinions, reactions etc. (often negative) are taken 
to be the constant appropriate concern of the hearer. 
[Prince 1978: 891] 
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However, for none of the cases they observe do Prince or Geluykens suggest that the 
content of the cleft presupposition represents any particular relationship with a formal 
notion of context. Neither do they suggest that the relationships are relevant for any 
deft type other than wh-clefts. 
The relationship Of OPPOSITION can be cliaractensed as the principle that, for any state 
of affairs in which an eventuality (state, event, or process) can be said to hold or take 
place, there exist other states of affairs in which an eventuality of the same type does 
not hold or take place. For example, in (5-57), the context features a state of affairs in 
which an ordering event el (in a restaurant) has taken place. The cleft S2 coheres by 
virtue of the absence of an event of the same type, an ordering event e2 (note that the 
speaker is not saying that the identical event has not taken place): 
(5-57) Sl: I've ordered. 
S2: It's me who hasn't ordered. 
(5-58) is a similar example featuring a wh-cleft: 
(5-58) Sl: You could get to be a general by being an aristocrat 
S2: but what you could not get to be was to be the general's chief 
of staff. 
As (5-57) and (5-58) show, this relationship may be accompanied by the appearance of 
negation in the cleft complement. The opposition need not, however, be expressed by 
explicit negation: it can also be effected by the presence in the cleft of a verb that is 
lexically opposite to one in the previous discourse. This variation in linguistic form does 
not affect the nature of the coherence relation. An example using lexical opposition 
rather than nerration appears as follows: 0 
(5-59) Sh I quite like documentaries in general. 
S2: What I loathe are those interminable heart transplants. 
Inferences based on Metalinguistic Axioms 
The second group of principles upon which relations between cleft presuppositions and 
discourse context are based are drawn from speakers' knowledge of the discourse and 
its situation. Following Prince (19781, we will term these METALINGUISTic relations. It 
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is possible to distinguish four common means by which metalinguistic presuppositions 
are related to context, as follows: 
Topic: If a speaker x, contributes to the discourse an utterance S1, S1 is about some 
tOPi C X2 - 
Importance: If a speaker x, participates in a discourse, there exists some topic X2 
that is important to the speaker. 
Speaker Meaning: If a speaker x, uses a linguistic form S1, x, means something by 
S1 that can be given as an alternative linguistic form S2. 
Significance: A linguistic or semantic element x, has a significance X2- 
The first relation is based on the principle that speakers have an idea of the TOPIC Of 
what they are talking about-we can say that all discourse is about something. Presup- 
positions such as that appearing in (5-60) seem to be based on this principle: 
(5-60) It's people who are still working on their PliDs that we're talking about 
here. 
A second, related type of metalinguistic relation is based on the perception that speakers 
consider particular topics impor tant, and some more so than others. Clefts whose 
presuppositions rely on this principle of IMPORTANCE appear in (5-61) and (5-62): 
(5-61) Sl: I don't like this business of dear old England is full of eccentrics 
-let's encourage people to be funny individuals and things like that 0 S2: I mean what really matters is systematic collective activity 
(5-62) Si: It isn't a business of learning-well yes there are techniques to 
learn but 
S2: it's very much the application or the criticism of the very techniques 
themselves which is the important thing 
The third and fourth types of relationship that beloiig in this metalinguistic category 
both concern kinds of meaning relation. The third relation, which we will term SPEAKER 
MEANING, concerns the assumption that when a speaker says something, lie or she means 
something by saying it. The axiom of speaker meaning describes the fact that a speaker 
can always clarify what lie or she means by some previous utterance by means of an 
alternative linguistic formulation. Aii example based oii this principle appears in (5-63), 
where S1 and S2 are context sentences, S3 the cleft: 
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(5-63) Sl: you turn left and immediately right again in order to go through 
Farnharn 
S2: Farnharn actually you go around-it's got a bypass-you don't go 
into Farnharn 
S3: No what I mean is you cross a major road 
The fourth. and final metalinguistic relationship discovered also tends to be realised by 
the verb mean. This relationship, which we will term SIGNIFICANCE, can be used both 
literally and metaphorically. In the literal case, it relates a linguistic item to its meaning. 
This is distinct from the case described above, where meaning was attributed not to 
linguistic items alone, but to speakers. An example of the literal use of the significance 
relation appears in (5-64): 
(5-64) Sl: I want to be able to talk about elements being prime. 
S2: And what prime means is that anything below this description has 
that primitive in it. 
The metaphorical use of the significance relation occurs when some element-which 
may be an eventuality or an entity-is said to have some other significance of meaning 
in the symbolic sense. An example appears in (5-65): 
(5-65) Of course what this means is that Sellers is for the high-jump 
We can surnmarise the Inferrable relations suggested here as follows: 
Logical relations 
- Subsumption 












e Metalinguistic relations 
- Topic 
- Importance 
- Speaker Thleaning 
Significance 
WMIe we do not want to assert that the list above is exhaustive, it serves to capture 
the Inferrable presuppositional relations encountered in sub-corpus B. 
New Presuppositions 
In cases where presuppositions are NEW, the eventuality described by the cleft presup- 
position has no propositional antecedent currently in the discourse context, and neither 
can one be inferred for it on the basis of any inferential relation such as those described 
above. In these cases, we describe the presupposition as being NEW in the context. 
Of course, it is difficult to give examples of this type, since whatever the quantity of 
context that is included it is possible to suggest that some coherent relation occurs on 
the basis of context prior to that given. While we do not have the space here to provide 
the full context of (5-66), for example, we can explain that nowhere in the previous 
context does a proposition arise that can be glossed as someone is the editor of the 
Tundraland and lVestingham. Although we could postulate the existence of an axiom 
such as for any newspaper x, has-editor(x), newspapers are not present in the discourse 
context-and so, on the stipulation given above that the referent of the antecedent 
clause of the axiom should be present if that axiom was to be selected as the basis of 
an inferential relation, the presupposition cannot be classed as Inferrable, either. The 
cleft presupposition in (5-66), therefore, seems to entirely lack, a relationship %vith the 
preceding context: 
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(5-66) Sl: Simon Crawley ... he's the Gallic person yes yes 
S2: Now is*it Simon Crawley who's the editor of the Tundraland 
and Westingliarn 
A sirnilar example appears in (5-61"), simplified from one that appears in the corpus for 
the sake of the analysis: 
(5-67) Sl: An unpleasant situation has arisen. 
S2: It's this that rnhkes an absolute fool of Mallet. 
Again, although some of the individual entities referred to in S2 may have been already 
mentioned in the discourse (it is likely, for example, that Mallet has already been re- 
ferred to) the coherent relation between the cleft presupposition, which can be glossed 
something makes a fool of Mallet, and the previous context, is entirely absent. That is, 
the presupposition of S2, represented below as C2, is has no propositional antecedent 
in context C1, and no relevant or plausible axiom exists that could be instantiated to 
provide one: 
(5-68) S1. - An unpleasant situation has arisen. . 
Cl: [S17 S21 CXiStS(S1, S2) A situation(S2) A unpleasant (S2) 
S2: It is this that makes a foot of iMallet. 
C2: [S37 Mi X1 makes- a-fool-Of(S3 , M? X) 
The cleft, however, is acceptable. In these cases, we would argue that the content 
of the cleft presupposition is accommodated simply by asserting that content into the 
discourse context. 
Having introduced the statuses of presupposition that can occur, we can turn to the 
range of these presuppositions that appeared in the data. 
5.3.3 The Distribution of Presuppositional Relations 
The basis for the study of presuppositional relations was the 150-example sub-corpus 
B. The frequencies of presuppositional relations across cleft types, significant to 0.05 
according to the chi-square test, were as shown in figure 5.5. In the analysis to follow, 
we will be particularly concerned with the distinctions between clefts in terms of which 
cleft. type is favoured given a particular presuppositional relation. Of the tendencies 









it-clefts wh-clefts reverse wh-clefts 
16 3 2 
0 15 5 
13 17 8 
1 7 1 
4 8 6 
16 0 28 
Figure 5.5: Frequencies of Presuppositional Relations by Cleft Type 
Wh-clefts do not carry presuppositions that are New in relation to context. 
2. Wh-clefts are particularly favoured for relations of Subsumption, and for Metalin- 
guistic relations. 
3. It-clefts are particularly favoured for Identity relations. 
We will address each cleft type in turn. 
The Presuppositions of Illh-clefts 
Sornicola (1988: 3661 observes two distinct presuppositional relations for wh-clefts, one in 
which an antecedent for the presupposed material appears in the context, one in which 
it does not. In fact, slightly more can be said about zvh-clefts than this: we can show 
that the absent antecedent is in fact always inferrable from the context. The first point 
to note in support of this is that there appears to be a real constraint on the appearance 
of propositions unrelated to discourse context as wh-cleft presuppositions. We can show 
that this is not just a quirk of the data by comparing examples of wh-clefts with it- 
clefts, which can carry such presuppositions. An example appears in (5-69). Both the 
it-cleft and wh-cleft convey presuppositions unrelated to context either by entailment 
or inferential relation: 
(5-69) A: Sue, this is Marta. 
a B: Hi! It was your flat I rented when you were in the States. 
b B: # Hi! What I rented when you wt! re in the States was your flat. 
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Additional support for this view comes from data presented by Prince [1978: 8951. She 
draws attention to examples in which the cleft head is part of an idiom. She points out 
that where it-clefts are acceptable in this role, wh-clefts are not. Her examples are as 
follows: 
(5-70) a It's sort of an arbitrary line that you're drawing. 
b #What you're drawing is sort of an arbitrary line. 
(5-71) It's obvious that I'm a woman and that I enjoy being a woman. I'm not 
overly provocative, either. 
a It's the thin, good-nigger line that I have to toe. 
b #What I have to toe is the thin, good-nigger line. 00 
In each case, the wh-cleft conveys a clear impression that the hearer is expected to be 
acquainted with the information in the presupposition prior to the time of utterance of 
the cleft. We would suggest that this demonstrates a constraint on accommodation: an 
unrelated presupposition cannot be accommodated if it is presented in a wh-cleft. ' When 
it comes to why such a constraint should exist, we can only propose that the combination 
of leftmost position in the cleft construction, traditionally the site of information already 
available to the hearer or reader (cf. Halliday [1967]), and the fact that this position 
in the wh-cleft is marked as the site of presupposed information, together represent too 
strong a signal that the information is in some sense contextually available for New 
information to be sited there. 
A second point to note with respect to tvh-clefts is that they are the most frequent 
choice for subsumption relations, stich as those appearing in the clefts in (5-72): 
(5-72) Sl: John's had an accident. 
S2: What happened was lie fell off his skateboard. 
(5-73) Sl: John's made a grand gesture. 
S2: What he's done is join the Foreign Legion. 
Note that in the above cases the cleft head is either a sentential constituent or a non- 
finite vp. From this syntactic fact arises the first constraint on the use of some cleft 
types for this relation, since, as we noted in chapter 3, sentential constituents as subjects 
8Prince [1978: 8921 observes that wh-cleft heads must not present information that is 'more prominent 
in the hearer's consciousness than the information in the IL-h-clause'. This is a relative constraint between 
the roles of head and complement which we discuss in the next section. 
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are not acceptable in it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts. This prevents subsumption relations 
using happen: 
(5-74) a *It was that John fell off his skateboard that happened. 
b *That John fell off his skateboard was what happened. 
While wh-clefts, and to a lesser extent it-clefts, can specify similar content'to that 
specified by a sentential constituent using that or this, this is obviously only appropriate 
in discourse situations where anaphora is possible. This is likely to be only a few cases, 
since the main function of clefts based on subsumption relations is to convey a further 
explanation of a known eventuality, the explanation commonly being new information. 
The notion of new information as it relates to discourse objects other than eventuality 
descriptions can be intuitively appreciated for the purposes of the current discussion as 
'not currently available in the discourse context'. We define the notion more formally 
for the purposes of the discussion of information structure in section 5.4 below. 
A second factor involved in the preference for wh-clefts when presuppositions are re- 
quired to subsume existing propositions in context concerns the opportunities only the 
wh-cleft offers for the serial ordering of the information involved. There are two strands 
to the serial ordering argument, one of which has been discussed in section 5.2, the other 0 
of which appears in more detail in section 5.5. 
First of all, in cases where the presupposed information is a subsumption, the remainder 
of the information is likely to be new, consisting of a further explanation or elaboration 
of the subsumed eventuality. This in turn suggests that the New information will be 
quite lengthy. As Geluykens [1984] has pointed out, and as we will see below in the dis- 
cussion of information structure, both it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts tend to have short 
head constituents. Gelu kens suggests that this is due to speakers' reluctance to post- y0 
pone the 'Given' information that appears in the cleft complement. While we do not 
adopt the assumption that Given information necessarily appears in cleft complements, 
it does seem that there is evidence to support the view that cleft presuppositions are 
processed first by humans, the corollary of this being that a processing load results from 
postponing the presupposed information. We will give the full argument behind this 
view in section 5.5; for the moment, it is sufficient to note that the wh-cleft, being the 
sole cleft type that is able to place information serially after the presupposed informa- 
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tion, will be the best candidate for supplying large quantities of New, non-presupposed 
information while minimising processing load. 
The second strand to the serial ordering argument is one that has already been discussed 
in section 5.2. This is the principle that, if antecedent- requi ring material, such as 
a subsumýing presupposition, exists in one part of the cleft and New information in 
another, then it maxin-ýises ease of processing to place the lexical material that requires 
an antecedent nearest to that antecedent, and the New information that is presumably 
to be enlarged upon later nearer to the subsequent lexical material that constitutes 
that thematic development. Again, the wh-cleft is ideal for this task in the case of 
presuppositional relations of subsumption: presupposed information is nearer to its 
antecedent, and the part of the cleft carrying New information is nearer to the part of 
the discourse that refers to it subsequently. 
The final regularity to discuss is a related one, to the effect that wh-clefts are also 
preferred when the presupposed information is metalinguistically related to discourse 
context. Often, clefts with metalinguistic presuppositions are used to introduce a New 
topic, or to structure the discourse in a way that requires a bulk of New information to 
be provided. An example appears in (5-75): 
(5-75) What I want to talk about is basically a way of creating big Is out of 
smaller ones. 
Compare the choice of wh-cleft to the corresponding it-cleft and reverse wh-deft: 
(5-76) a M's a way of creating big Is out of smaller ones that I want to talk 
about. 
b ?A way of creating big Is out of smaller ones is what I want to talk 
about. 
The it-cleft and reverse wh-cleft are more clumsy in general on the basis of the ordering 00 
principles discussed above. Again, as we saxv in section 5.2, the ordering of the message 
needs to take into account what part of the message is going to be related thematically 0 
to preceding discourse, and what to succeeding discourse, and arrange the information 
accordingly. 
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The- Presuppositions of It-clefts 
It-clefts seem to occupy almost the complete range of presuppositional relations. One 
exception in the data is the non-appearance of it-cleft presuppositions which are sub- 
sumptions of previous context, which were discussed above. Unlike the case of wh-clefts, 
the range of syntactic head type s required-sentential constituents and non-finite vps- 
are often marginal in it-clefts. In addition, the amount of New information that generafly 
has to be conveyed by a cleft with a subsuming presupposition causes problems f6r the 
it-deft in relation to the principles of serial ordering discussed above. If-clefts simply 
present information in the wrong order to be of use for the functions performed using a 
subsuming presupposition. 
New presuppositions, on the other hand, are reasonably popular in it-clefts, but com- 
pared with the other cleft types, the preference for identity relations is the most signif- 
icant. We can explain this tendency in terms of the principle of EFFICIENCY Suggested 
by van der Sandt [1988], one of the set of principles we discussed in chapter 4, which 
together constrain the incorporation of propositions into context. 0 
The Principle of Efficiency is intended to prevent the use of repetition and elaborate 
phrasing that may give rise to implicatures that less complex structures would not. In 
the case of the identity relation, the presupposition is composed of information already 
entailed by the context. This could lead to repetitiveness in the cleft complement, as in 
the following examples of each type of cleft: 
(5-77) A: What caused the earthquake? 
a B: What caused the earthquake was the San Andreas fault. 
b B: The San Andreas fault was what caused the earthquake. 
c B: It was the San Andreas fault that caused the earthquake. 
The it-cleft is unique in that it allows oinissioii of the complement clause in cases of 
redundant repetition, as follows: 
(5-78) A: What caused the earthquake? 
B: It was the San Andreas fault 0. 
The possibility for complement omission would contribute to the preference for it-clefts 
when the presuppositional relation is an identity relation. 
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Complement ornission does not take place, however, when the propositional antecedent 
in the context is not currently active in the discourse context, for reasons of discourse 
structure or the passage of time. In addition, wh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts are some- 
times used when the imPlicatures created by repetition are required. For example, the 
repetition of the part of the wh-cleft that conveys an entailed presuppos ition can create 
a pedantic or emphatic effect. Such repetition conveys a speaker's refusal to adopt ma- 
terial suggested by another speaker, and lience promotes a feeling of social distance or 
even disagreement: 
(5-79) A: What caused the problem? 
a B: It was a glitch in the power supply 
b B: What caused the problem, Jones, was your own stupidity. 
Most notable about it-clefts, however, is the fact that the data split roughly equally 
across all three types of presupposition: New, Inferrable, and Old. This marks the 
it-cleft as the most flexible of all three cleft types in relation to the presuppositional 
relations that appear. 
The Presuppositions of Reverse ll, *h-clefts 
Reverse wh-clefts, like it-clefts, have a broad range of presuppositional relations open 
to them, but differ from it-clefts in that over half the presuppositions fall into a single 
category, namely New. This appears to be due to the fact that, as we shall see in the 
discussion of information structure below, reverse zvh-clefts can only have old informa- 
tion appearing in head position (again, this can be intuitively recognised as 'information 
currently present in the discourse context'; we define it formally in section 5.4). This 
means that any novel contribution is likely to appear in the presupposition. This same 
fact may also account for the low frequency of Old presuppositions: if heads are old, a 
deft with an Old presupposition as well will have a very low level of informativeness. 
Although clefts with this information structure do occur, they are appropriate in only 






tional Relation I it-cleft wh-cleft reverse wh-cleft 
yes yes possible but rare 
subsumption 110 yes possible but rare 
world knowledge yes yes yes 
metalinguistic yes yes yes 
yes no yes 
Figure 5.6: Range of presuppositional relations by cleft type 
5.3.4 Clefts and Presupposition: Summary 
It was claimed at the be-inning of the section that cleft presuppositions inhabit a contin- 
uum of relationships with previous context, and occupy overlapping but distinct ranges 
along that continuum. With respect to discovering where on that continuum the various 
cleft types lie, the examination of the data above revealed two apparently categorical 
constraints, namely that wh-cleft presuppositions could not carry descriptions of New 
eventualities, and it-cleft presuppositions could not act as subsumptions. Other tenden- 
cies were due to the differing possibilities the clefts offer for complement ornission to 
avoid repetition, principles governing the serial ordering of information, and constraints 
on the usefulness of clefts combining a particular presuppositiona-1 relation with a par- 
ticular discourse status of cleft head. This conibination of tendencies and constraints is 
shown in figure 5.6. 
Having examined the relationships that hold specifically between cleft presuppositions 
and the discourse context, we can turn to the related issue of the information structure 
of clefts as a whole, incorporating both the presuppositional relations described in this 
section, and the information asserted by the cleft. 
5.4 The Information Structure of Clefts 
In chapter 2, we examined clairns that have been made in the literature with respect to 
the INFORMATION STRUCTURE Of Clefts, typically interpreted as their arrangement of 
Given and New information, following Halliday [19671. In that chapter, three hypotheses 
related to information structure were reviewed in particular: 
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e Cleft sentences provide a means of arranging Given information before New infor- 
mation. 
Cleft sentences provide a means of plachig New information towards the end of Z3 
the sentence. 
Cleft sentences provide a syntactic means of signalling a division between the sites 
of Given and New information in the sentence. 
In some cases, a: stronger version of the third hypothesis was advanced, as follows: 
* Cleft sentences provide a syntactic means of signalling a division between the 
sites of Given and New information in the sentence, specifically by placing New 
information in head position, and Given in complement position. 
Although examples were available to support all diree hypotheses, it was possible to 
show that counterexamples existed for each one. In particular, we saw examples of cases 
in which: 
" New information appeared before Given in a cleft sentence; 
" New information was not at the end of the sentence; 
"a combination of Given and New information appeared in a single syntactic part 
of the cleft-i. e. head or complement; and 
e New information appeared in the complement, and Given in the head. 
The effect of the discussion in chapter 2 was tlierefore to reveal a certain amount of 
chaos with respect to the information structure of clefts. In particular, two points were 
demonstrated: one, that no single claim regarding information structure could generalise 
across clefts of all three syntactic types, and two. that examples of the same cleft type 
could have different information structures. 
The purpose of this section is to show that, in spite of the perhaps unanticipated variety 
that exists with respect to the information structure of clefts, some important regular- 
ities do exist, although these are not necessarily of the same nature as those suggested 
previously. In particular, we will attempt to answer the following three questions: 
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e Are there any generalisations about information structure that apply across all 
three types of cleft? 
o Are there any characteristic information structures that exist within cleft types? 
a Related to the previous question, what are the distinctions across cleft types with 
respect to these characteristic information structures? 
In what follows, it will be suggested that generalisations of all three kinds can usefully 
be made. First of all, however, we need to establish a simple formal framework for 
talking about information structure, in order to make perfectly clear the meaning of the 
terms appealed to throughout this section, and the status of the conclusions reached. 
5.4.1 Analysing Information Structure 
Although other taxonomies do exist of the kinds of discourse status entities can have 
(cf. Prince [1981], for example), the previous research on the information structure 
of clefts discussed in chapter two adopts almost uniformly the GIVEN-NEw dichotomy, 
originating with Halliday [1967]. 
Halliday's Given/New Dichotomy 
Halliday's description of Given and New inforniation [1985: 27) can be paraphrased as 
follows: 
Given information Information that is presented by the speaker as recoverable to 
the listener. It may have been mentioned before, it may be something that is in 
the situation, or that is not around at all but the speaker wishes to present it as 
Given. The meaning is: this is not news. 
New Information Information that is presented by the speaker as not recoverable to 
the listener. It may be something that has not been mentioned, it may be some- 
thing unexpected, whether previously mentioned or not. One form of Newness is 
contrastive emphasis. The meaning is: attend to this, this is news. 
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The basis of the relationship between Given and New and the sentences they are intended 
to describe is the TONE UNIT, an abstract phonological unit9 usually characterised as 
having one particularly promýinent accent-the NUCLEus-and a recogniseable intona- 
tion contour. On Halhday's account, tone units function as the realisation of an abstract 
unit Of INFORMATION, which he terms the INFORMATION UNIT or iu (Halliday [1976: 202, 
1985: 275]). It is in relation to these units, rather than in relation to the tone unit, that 
information structure is assessed. 
According to Halliday, ius may consist of either a Given and a New element, or be 
composed entirely of New information. New information is marked by the nucleus, and 
in general, Given information precedes New. " Typically, the position of the nucleus 
marks the end of the New information, which is most usually the element at the end 
of the iu. However, in cases where the nucleus does not occur on the final element of 
the iu", any material to the right of the nucleus is taken to be Given, whether that 
material is accented or not. 
Influential though Halliday's account of information structure has been, it will not 
be adopted here for the reason that severd sources of indeterminacy exist within it, 
some of which Halliday himself points out. First of all, Halliday [1985: 2761 notes an 
inherent difficulty in the Given/New framework in terms of deciding on the extent of 
the New information. Although the accented element can usually be understood to be 
the culmination of New information, where that information begins is more problematic. 
Halliday (1985: 2761 indicates this indeterminacy through the following two examples. In 
(5-80), the context suggests that New information extends from the accented item love 
throughout most of the clause, with the exception of it, which is Given (since it repeats 
material from the immediately preceding context): 
(5-80) I'll tell you about silver. It needs to have LOVE. 
'Crystal's notion of tone group discussed above in section 5.1 is similar, if not identical, to Halliday's 
notion. 
"The element carrying the nucleus is said by Halliday to be carrying information focus, which is 
claimed by Halliday to mark the most informative part of the information unit. We will not be making 
use of this notion of focus, since it is the full extent of the New information, rather than the position of 
its most informative peak, that is of interest here. 
"Halhday's terms the appearance of the nucleus on elements other than that appearing finally in the 
IU 'marked information focus'. 
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In (5-81), the identical accentual structure is placed in a context that indicates a Given 
analysis for the entire clause except for the accented item: 
(5-81) I'll tell you what silver needs to have. It needs to have LOVE. 
Although Halliday does not use the term himself, this issue of how the SCOPE of accents 
can be defirnited, addressed at length by Selkirk (19801, Cussenhoven [19831 and Taglicht 
[19841 among others, is still an open research problem in phonological theory. 
A second difficulty comes back to Halliday's definitions of Given and New information '' 
paraphrased above. In both cases, the definition relies to some extent on what speakers 
choose to present as Given or New, and not on the actual status in the discourse context 
of any element of which Given or New status is predicated. The appearance of such 
imponderables as what speakers are intending renders extremely difficult the analysis 
of utterances into Given or New parts. 
Thirdly, Halliday's Given/New distinction is inextricably involved with the accentual 
patterns of utterances. Problems arise for the analyst both from this fact, and from the 
way Halliday's categories relate to accentual pattern. On the first point, it is clear that, 
if written language is to be analysed, some metric other than accentual pattern needs 
to be found. As it happens, the data examined in this chapter is exclusively spoken 
data, but it would be preferable if the account developed for it could be generalised to 
apply to written data and to casual ly- recorded spoken data for which the phonological 
diacritics are perhaps less than reliable. As for the second point, the analysis Halliday 
suggests runs into technical difficulties in that it does not consider sentence accents 
other than nuclei to be indicators of New information. As we saw in chapter 4 in our 
examination of Chomsky's notion of Focus, the role of subsidiary accents seems at least 
in some cases to be comparable to that of nuclei in indicating the status of information. 
The fourth and final problem to note is that it is not clear what kinds of elements the 
status Given and New applies to. In the analyses lie gives, HaHiday appears to apply 
the status Given and New to the surface structure of discourse, indicating information 
status boundaries to be co-extensive with syntactic boundaries. As Gussenhoven [1983] 
has suggested, it appears to be more appropriate to apply such an analysis to the seman- 
tic objects that are realised by surface structure, for two reasons. The first is that the 
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evidence from indicators of information structure such as sentence accent suggests that 
different surface structures realising the same semantic content should be accorded the 
same, and not different, information status. The second is that, as was demonstrated 
in chapter 2, semantic features, such as negation or femaleness, can be legitimate com- 
ponents of the 'New' contribution of an utterance. On this basis, it would seem to be 
preferable to represent information structure at the level of a semantic representation 
of the discourse and context, rather than at the level of syntax or surface realisation. 
The points above can be summarised simply as the objection that Halliday's theory of 
Given/New, although intuitively appealing and undoubtedly influential, is difficult to 
apply to a range of everyday data in a replicable way. In this section, therefore, we will 
adopt an alternative analysis. The analysis suggested may be over-simple, but it suits DO 
immediate purposes and has the advantage of being applicable to the formal model of 
context developed in chapter 4. 
A D-amework for Analysing Information Structure 
In this section, we look at how discourse status can be assessed with respect to the 
objects that populate our DRT model of context, namely discourse MARKERS. Some 
markers stand for entities, others for eventualities, as we saw in chapter 4. The treat- 
ments we propose for each type of object are distinct, but related. 
Entity Markers 
The treatment of entity markers adopted here consists simply of two discourse statuses, 
OLD and NEW, decided on the basis of the linear DRT representation of the content of 
the sentences involved. Which elements have which status is decided on the basis of 
a comparison between the incoming proposition and the previous context. To take a 
simple example, we can assess the sum of New information contributed to context C1, 
which we could gloss as someone walked, by sentence S2, as follows: 
(5-82) CI: (e, x] walked(e, x) 
S2: John walked. 
C2: [e, il walked(e, j) 
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On the basis of the comparison of C2 with C1 we can say that the New element is the 
one that does not appear in prior context, namely j (or John). 
At this point, a brief observation is in order relating to the notion Of CONTRAST. We do 
not in this thesis go into this issue in much detail, so we will simply assume a tenable 
position on the subject. Following Bolinger [19611, Ladd [1983] and others, we take the 
view that heightened contrastive effect is a result of the narrowness of the scope of New 
information in the sentence in question. The more New information that is conveyed by 
the sentence, therefore, the less the contrastive effect. We can Mustrate this by a couple 
of examples. In (5-83), the context sentence S1 appears to require a response, given 
as S2, which is composed entirely of New information. The result is a non-contrastive 
reading of S2: 
(5-83) Sl: What happened? 
S2: A car slid off the road. 
In (5-84), on the other hand, the scope of the New information in the sentence S2 can 
be described as narrow, since only the object referred to by the expression a car is New: 
(5-84) Sl: Did a bus slide off the road? 
S2: No, a car slid off the road. 
The result in (5-84) is a contrastive reading of S2. These observations are relevant 
to clefts in that constituents in which a small amount of New information appears to 
be confined, such as the heads of it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts, tend always to get a 
contrastive reading. The heads of wh-clefts, however, which are composed of longer and 
more complex descriptions, do not receive such readings so frequently (although they 
may, particularly if only part of the information conveyed by the cleft head is New). In 
both cases, however, note that only New information can receive a contrastive reading. 
To return to the discussion of the discourse statuses of cleft heads, it remains to note 
that in some cases, a third discourse status seems to be required in addition to Old and 
New, described above. In these cases, the element specified by the cleft head is strictly 
New on the definition above, but is inferrably related to a marker that is currently 
present in the context. Examples are the relationship between the referents of wall and 
house, or mountain and mountaineer. This type of relationship has been captured by 
Prince (1981] in her INFERRABLE category, and noted by others, such as Hirst [1981: 27], 0 
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in terms of sets of particular semantic relations where the elements involved are judged 
to be inferrably related to one another. It is still an open question what the precise 
relationships in such a taxonomy of inferrable relations should be, but Hirst suggests 
the following might be relevant: 
a part of 
@ subset of 
@ aspect of 
* attribute of 
9 closely associated with 
A conclusive analysis of which elements are inferrable from the context and which are 
not is beyond the scope of this research, and so this third status will be mentioned 
only in cases where it appears particularly relevant to differentiate it from our New 
status. For the most part, however, in the analysis to follow, inferrable elements will 
be equated with New information, on the simple criterion that inferrable elements, like 
New elements, lack identical antecedents in context. 
Eventuality Markers 
One shortcoming of existing taxonomies of information status (cf. in particular Prince's 
otherwise excellent taxonomy [Prince 1981)) is that they are rarely if ever directed 
towards an analysis of discourse objects other than entities, such as eventualities. Our 
practice of introducing markers for such discourse objects means that they can be treated 
similarly to entity markers, using the set of discourse statuses developed in the previous 
section for talking about the status of presuppositions in the context. For example, if an 
eventuality index stands for an eventuality that is unrelated to Previous context, we can 
treat this as a New eventuality in the manner described in section 5.3. The eventuality 
concerned may of course have Old participants, as in the following example: 
(5-85) Sl: Mary walked. 
Cl: [el, m] walked(el, m) 
S2: Mary ran. 
Cl: [e2, m] ran(e2, M) 
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In this case, we can say that an Old participant, nz, is taking part in a New event, e2. If 
a marker stands for an eventuality that is related by axiom to previous context, we say 
it is inferrably related, in the manner described in section 5.3. Finally, markers standing 
for eventualities whose descriptions arise directly from explicit utterances, and are thus 
present in the context without inference, are Old, as before. 
Since the participants involved in the eventuality may be of a different status to the 
eventuality itself, guidelines for compositionality-that is, the status an eventuality can 
be expected to have given the status of its participants-need to be set out for these 
cases. Whether two eventualities can be the same if they have different participants is 
an open philosophical question, and we do not expect to be able to solve it here. Rather, 
a reasonably coherent position needs to be adopted which we can use for the sake of the 
analysis. 
In fact, it appears to be possible for two descriptions to be interpreted as alternative 
views of the same eventuality, even if the descriptions have no participants in com- 
mon, even the identification of the action that has taken place. It is this that licenses 
disagreements such as the following: 
(5-86) A: And then John ate the last marzipan carrot. 
B: No! Mary threw the pizza over INlike. 
Here, we can say that every aspect of the eventuality is under dispute between A and B, 
except that fact that some eventuality actually took place, the eventuality being defined 
by a position in space and time. On this basis, there is no reason to suppose that a 
whole set of New participants in an eventuality description will necessary constitute a 
New eventuality. 
However, in the discussion in section 5.3 we defined Old relations as cases in which 
the presupposed proposition was already ENTAILED by the context. In the case of B's 
utterance in (5-86), it is clear that her contribution is not an entailment of the context, 
even though they may be debating the 'same' eventuality. We will therefore take the 
position that, for an eventuality to be Old, the content of the eventuality description 
has to be entailed by the context. This in turn implies that all the participants in the 
eventuality will also be Old. This appears to be a coherent position to take for the few 
cases where the issue arises in'the analysis. 
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This framework for discourse status just described enables us to capture some important 
regularities about the information structure of clefts. As mentioned in the introduction 
to this section, these fall into three particular types: regularities across clefts in gen- 
eral, characteristic information arrangements within cleft types, and related distinctions 
between cleft types. We will look at each of these kinds of regularity in turn. 
5.4.2 General Features of Cleft Information Structure 
The Correlation between Cleft Syntax and Information Structure 
In chapter 2, we reviewed claims that the standard information structure for clefts of 
all kinds was either Given in the complement and New in the head, or at least some 
syntactic division between the two. As noted above, counterexamples were available for 
each of these claims, and we will briefly note here the prevalence of those counterexam- 
ples according to the data in sub-corpus B. Although Given and New are not the terms 
we use here, the framework for the analysis described above does turn up the required 
data if we concentrate on the appearance of New information. 
The weak version of the claim that the cleft syntax serves to indicate information struc- 
ture is that Given and New information are at least divided from one another. Coun- 
terexamples to this would be cases in which New information appeared in both the head 
and the cleft complement. The evidence against this claim is convincing: 14% of reverse 
wh-clefts, 60% of it-clefts, and 92% of wh-clefts exarnined contained at least one New 
element in both head and complement. 
Among the counterexamples to the strong version of the claim, that New information 
appears in cleft heads and Given in cleft complements, are those clefts in which New 
information appears in complements. Again, the data are resoundingly against this 
conclusion: 90% of it-clefts, 92% of wh-clefts, and 100% of reverse wh-clefts contain 
at least one New element in the complement or wh-clause. Note that this underlines 
the fact that appearance of New information in cleft presuppositions is systematic and 
prevalent, rather than being the exception. We cannot therefore expect either claim to 
be of use in an account of clefts in discourse. 
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Two General Claims 
There are two features observable with respect to the information structure of clefts 
which appear to be general across all three cleft types. It is possible to express these as 
well-formedness requirements on clefts, as follows: 
eA minimum requirement for INFORMATIVENESS exists, namely that the cleft copula 
should introduce a New eventuality description. 
sA minimum requirement for COHERENCE exists, namely that no cleft can carry 
entirely New information. 
We will address each of these two requirements in turn. 
The Informativeness Requirement 
In chapter 4, we listed van der Sandt's four constraints on integrating propositions into 
discourse conteXt. One of them, the principle Of INFO WMATIVENESS, was summarised as 
follows: 
Informativeness: the information contributed by the sentence must not be a subset 
of that already in context. 
The informativeness principle simply ensures that eacli proposition to be integrated into 
context has some New content. It implies, for example, that if the presupposition borne 
ba cleft contains no New information, it will not be re-integrated into current context. y0 
This prevents examples such as the following unacceptable cleft being generated or 
accepted: 
(5-87) #John walked and it was John who walked. 
In order for a cleft to be acceptable, however, it is not necessary that any of its individual 
participants are New to the context. For example, (5-88) is acceptable, even though the 
presupposed information someone walked is Old in the context, as is the entity John: 
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(5-88) 1 knew someone walked, and I saw John a moment ago, but I didn't 
know it was John who walked. 
The difference between the acceptable (5-88) and the unacceptable (5-87) is theMINIMAL 
INFO RIMATIVENESS REQUIREMENT for clefts mentioned above, namely that the relation- 
ship between the referent of the cleft head (in this case John) and the existentially- 
quantified variable in the cleft presupposition must not already be part of the context. 
We can capture tl-ds by stipulating that the state description introduced by the copula, 
which represents this relationship, must be a New element. This ensures that each cleft 
performs at least the function of conveying a novel conjunction of the element specified 
by the head and the proposition specified by the complement. 
The unacceptability of example such as (5-87) suggests something important about the 00 
function of clefts, namely that they serve to convey exactly such novel conjunctions 
between head elements and the presuppositions whose variables the element specified 
by the head instantiates. 
The Coherence Requirement 
A second wel. 1-formedness constraint seems to exist, on clefts at least, to ensure that 
each deft expresses some coherent link with the previous discourse in the form of Old 
information. It is possible to show as evidence for this that clefts composed entirely 
of New information are unacceptable, even in contexts where all-New information is 
acceptable in the case of declaratives. An example of such a context is the traditional 
question what happened? -. 
(5-89) What happened? 
aA cat's stuck up a tree. 
b# It's a cat that's stuck up a tree. 
c#A cat is what's stuck up a tree. 
d #What's stuck up a tree is a cat. 
To look more closely into the nature of the requirement for explicit coherence between 
clefts and previous context, we can examine the following example: 
(5-90) #Hi! It was in Dunfermline I got my gerbil. 
214 
In (5-90), both the eventuality specifled by the presupposed information and the element 
specified by the cleft head are apparently New (even though the participant denoted by 
I in the presupposition is arguably Old, oii the basis that the speaker is conte-Ktuafly 
available). 
As we saw in section 5.3, there is no general constraint on presupposing information 
that is unrelated to the previous context. We can demonstrate this by constructing a 
context for (5-90) in which the head element, but not the presupposed information, is 
related to previous context. The result, shown in (5-91) below, is perfectly acceptable: 
(5-91) A: I've just come back from Dunfermline. 
B: Really? It was in Dunfermline I got my gerbil. 
(5-90) would also be acceptable in a context where the head element was New, and the 
eventuality described by the presupposition Old: 
(5-92) A: Where was it you went to get your gerbil in the end? 
B: It was in Dunfermline [I got my gerbil]. 
What seems to be wrong with the example in (5-90) is not that its head specifies a New 
element, or that the eventuality described by the presupposition is New, but that both 
occur at the same time. The problem is the combination of New information in the 
complement and a New eventuality in the presupposition. We can see this is general 
across all three types of cleft. (5-93a) and (5-93b) are the closest wh-cleft and reverse 
wh-cleft equivalents of the it-cleft in (5-90): 
(5-93) a# IIi! Where I got my gerbil was Dunfermline. 
b# Ili! Dunfermline was where I got my gerbil. t) 
The minimal coherence requirement therefore seems to be that either the cleft head may 
specify a New element, or the cleft presupposition may specify a New eventuality, but 
that no cleft may do both at the same time. 
On the basis of this, we can state a IMININIAL COHERENCE REQUIREMENT 
for clefts, as 
follows: 
Coherence: No cleft can both specify a New head element, and presuppose a New 
eventuality. 
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5.4.3 Features of Information Structure Specific to Cleft Types 
In tMs section, we will look in general at the patterns of Old and New information that 
occur in all three kinds of clefts, and state some constraints on information structure 
specific to individual cleft types. We will examine it-clefts, wh-clefts, and reverse wh- 
clefts respectively in the sections below. 
The Information Structure of It-clefts 
As Prince [19781 has pointed out, the information structure of it-clefts falls into two 
major patterns. Prince's terms STRESSED-FOcus and INFORMATIVE PRESUPPOSITION 
it-deft and their definitions are discussed in chapter 2, and we will not repeat that 
discussion here: suffice to say that the two information structures we note are similar 
to Prince's types, if defined more formally. 
The first major it-cleft information structure is one in which the cleft head specifies a 
New element, and the eventuality specified by the presupposition is Old. In this case, 
the confinement of New information to the cleft head has the effect of producing con- 
trast, which, as Werth [1984] points out, is itself a coherent relationship WIth preceding 
discourse. Clefts such as (5-94) fall into this category, where the head of the second 
speaker's cleft supplies the New element the fourth [survey], while the presupposed 
information identifies the Old eventuality of getting the flat: 
(5-94) JD: Well, we lost three surveys before we got our flat 
PT: And it was on the fourth you got it 0 
A variation on this structure of cleft is the case in which the eventuality described in 
the presupposition is not Old, but inferrably related, to previous context. Such a case 
occurs in (5-95), where the presupposed eventuality is related to previous context by 
the inferrable relation of NEED, described in the previous section: 
(5-95) KV: I don't like going to popmobility. It's too energetic. It's more 
the bendy, flexy stuff I need. 
As Geluykens [1984: 35] points out, it-cleft heads in these cases are usually very short in 
length. In the data in sub-corpus B, the heads of clefts of this type were usually only 
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one word in length, with three words as maximum. 
The second category of it-cleft is one in which the information structure is reversed: in 
tMs case, the cleft head carries Old information, and the presupposition specifies a New 
or Inferrable eventuality. An Old-New case appears in (5-96): 
(5-96) B: You see one has often seen this happen 
A: it's this sort of thing that makes an absolute fool of Mallet 
(5-97) shows a case in which the head is Old, but the presupposition Inferrable by the 
relation Of SOURCE, described above. JD and MM are discussing the regional origins of 
a particular syntactic construction: 
(5-97) JD: All you have to do is go to Leicestershire 
Num: Or Lancashire. It was in Lancashire that I heard it. 
The it-cleft therefore has two distinctive patterns, one in which a small amount of New 
information appears before the presupposed, Old or Inferential information; the other 
in which the cleft head contains Old material apparently acting as a connective, and 
the the New information in the presupposition. The first type is outnumbered in the 
corpus by the second type by 14 instances to 36, even though this structure is the one 
often. considered to the 'default' for it-clefts, as we noted in chapter 2. 
The Information Structure of ll"h-clefts 
Wh-clefts are much more constrained in their information structure than the it-cleft. 
As we saw in the analysis of presupposition in section 5.3, the presupposed information 
in wh-clefts must be Inferrable, or it must be Old. Although the latter case is, as we 0 
noted in chapter 2, that generally expected for zvh-cleft, of the 50 examples examined in 
the data only three Old-presupposi ti on- New- head cases appeared. The remaining cases 
featured Inferrable presuppositional relations. 
The information specified by the wh-cleft head is similarly restricted, since it can only 
be New. We can show this by means of both anaphoric and non-anaphoric examples, 
as in (5-98a) and (5-98b) respectively: 
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(5-98) A: I want to go to the cinema. 
a B: Oh good. #What I want to do is that. 
b B: Oh good. #What I Nvant to do is go to the cinema. 
Compare B's responses, however, with the reverse wh-cleft in (5-99): 
(5-99) B: Oh good. That's what I want to do. 
In addition, it was noted in section 5.3 that the wh-cleft is the only one of the three cleft 
types that allows New, non-presupposed information to be placed in rightmost position 
in the sentence. We will return to this Point in the discussion of clefts and sentence 
processing in section 5.5. 
The wh-cleft as a whole, then, represents the possibility of prefacing large amounts of 
New information with a presupposition that is closely related to previous discourse. 
Note, too, that there is no obligation for the New information to be contrastive, which 
(as we noted in the introduction to this section) appears to be the case for the short 
head elements of it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts Mien they contain New information. 
The Information Structure of Reverse IV/z-clefts 
The discussion of the presuppositional relations of reverse wh-clefts showed that New, 
Inferrably Related, or Old information could be carried in the presupposed part. In the 
entire corpus, however, only one category of head appears, namely Old. Information 
in reverse wh-cleft heads may be contrastive, but even in those cases it is Old on our 
definition, being either anaphoric or consisting of a definite referring expression. Very 
rarely, the head element is inferentially related to previous context, for example by means 
of a set-subset or part-whole relation. Examples of the anaphoric and the inferentially- 
related case appear in (5-100a) and (5-100b) respectively: 
(5-100) a A: I thought you were going to Spain. 
B: Yes, that's what I told Minio. 
b A: How are ou with thin-s like cabbage and cauliflower? y CD 
B: Vegetables are what I should cat most of, so they're fine. 
Ward [1985] has suggested an analysis of topicalised constructions in which an anaphoric 
or inferential relation can always be traced between the fronted element and the pre- 
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ceding context. From the reverse wh-cleft data analysed for this thesis, it appears that 
the analogy between topicalisation and the reverse wh-cleft would be an interesting av- 
enue for further research, since it seems likely that similar constraints exist for reverse 
wh-clefts. For the moment, however, we will be content with the conclusion that the 
information borne by the head element is Old, since this accounts for all but one of the 
examples we have come across, the exception being (5-100b) above. It may be recalled 
from chapter 3, in addition, that reverse wh-clefts featured anaphoriC NPs as head con- 
stituent in 145 out of 160 examples. As was the case in it-clefts, head constituents of 
reverse wh-clefts are very short in length, most usually a single syllable. 
An example of the combination of Old head and New presupposed information appears 
in (5-101): 
(5-101) JD: I've been given a really iiice Habitat holepunch for Christmas. 
It's matt black. 
NuNi: Can't you go and exchange it for a stapler? Because that's what 
I really need. 
Note that the reverse wh-cleft provides the best opportunity for an anaphoric head 
element to appear near to its antecedent, in the manner encouraged by the serial ordering 
principles discussed in section 5.2. The next most suitable cleft type for this purpose, 
the it-cleft, forces the interpolation of it is before an anaphoric head. In addition, 
as we noted in chapter 3, some anaphoric items, notably it and that, are marginal or 
unacceptable as it-cleft heads, reducing still further the suitabilit of it-clefts for carrying y 
anaphoric heads. 
(5-102) and (5-103) contain examples of reverse zvh-clefts with the combinations of Old 
head-Inferrably related presupposition, and Old head-Old presupposition, respectively. 
In the Old-Inferrable case, the inferrable relation is the relation Of ORIGIN defined in sec- 
tion 5.3. Note also that in the Old-Old case, the conjunction of the presupposition and 
the information conveyed by the head are still New, as stipulated by the Informativeness 
requirement, defined above: 
(5-102) JD: They call it a 'Bain Marie', which means 'Mary's bath'. I don't 
know why. Maybe she was who invented it. 
219 
(5-103) JD: Why don't you try a spanner to open it-or do you need something 
else 
RD: A spanner's what I need. 
In the data examined, the cases with New or Inferrable information in the complement 
were by far the most frequent: two examples only appeared with Old information. The 
reverse wh-cleft therefore seems to be a device favoured for placing anaphoric informa- 
tion first (cf. the prevalence of anaphoric heads) and presenting the New or Inferrable 
information in rightmost position, as part of the presupposition. 
A Comparison of Information Structure in the Three Cleft Types 
From the discussion above, a variety of information structure possibilities for the three 
cleft types have emerged. First of all, the it-cleft appeared as the most flexible sentence 
type in terms of information structure, able to feature all three kinds of presuppositional 
relationship in the information contained in the complement, and to present both New 
and contrastive information and Old information in the head. We can represent these 
possibilities diagrammatically as in figure 5.7. In the figure, the head and complement 
of the cleft are indicated by square brackets labelled by head and compL respectively, 
with the information type appearing in each position indicated between the brackets. 
In addition, arrows indicate anaphoric or coherent relations with previous discourse, a 
solid arrow for anaphoric, Inferrable or Old information, a dashed arrow for the typical 
postion of a contrastive relationship. 
head compl. 
Old New or Inferrable 
head compl. 
New Old or Inferrable 
Figure 5.7: Information structures predominant in it-clefts 
lVh-clefts were restricted in both the information status of the head and that of the 
presupposed information. Presupposed information was restricted to Old and Inferrable 
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relations, while New information always appeared in head position. Reverse wh-clefts 
were exactly the opposite, having obligatory Old heads, which could also be contrastive, 
and New or Inferrable presupposed information. TVh-clefts and reverse wh-clefts can also 
be represented diagrammatically in the same way as the it-cleft, in figures 5.8 and 5.9 
respectively. 
compl. head 
(Old or Inferrable New 
Figure 5.8: Information structure predon-dnant in wh-clefts 
head compl. 
Old New or Inferrable 
head compl. 
Old New or Inferrable 
Figure 5.9: Information structure predominant in reverse wh-clefts 
Note that of all the combinations of Old, Inferrable, or New information with presup- 
posed or non-presupposed information, only one seems to be duplicated: the information 
structure shared between it-clefts and reverse wh-clefts with Old heads and New pre- 
suppositions. One distinction between the two was suggested above, however, in terms 
of the relationships between the anaphoric elements that each mi., lit have as head and 
their antecedents: those appearing in reverse wh-cleft heads would inevitably be closer. 
In addition, as we saw in chapter 3, syntactic distinctions exist between the two: how 
these might come into play in the choice between them in context will be discussed in 
chapter 6. 
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5.5 Information Structure and Presupposition: A Syn- 
thesis 
In the cliscussion above, we observed two apparently disparate systems at work, as 
follows: 
1. The syntactic marking of presupposition 
2. The distribution of Old and New information in the various parts of the cleft. 
In this section, we attempt to draw together the roles of these two systems in providing 
pragmatic markings for the messages conveyed by clefts. 
5.5.1 The Relative Roles of Presupposition and Information Structure 
The examination of presupposition and information structure above revealed that a 
wide variety of information types existed apparently independently of whether the part 
of the sentence in which they appeared was the part syntactically indicated to contain 
presupposed material. That is, information structure could not be shown to correlate 
reliably with what the syntactic structure of the sentence seems to signal: instead, the 
two systems seemed to have separate roles. These roles can be summarised as follows: 
The Role of Information Structure: to reflect the current state of the discourse 
context, a function also served by sentence accent. 
The Role of Presupposition: to mark the requirement in context for an antecedent: 
that is, to prescribe the state of the context required for the sentence as a whole 
to be interpreted. 
We can therefore see information structure and sentence accent as descriptive of the 
speaker's expectation with respect to the state of the discourse context, while presup- 
position acts as a statement of the speaker's ainis with respect to that context, i. e., to 
state what it should be like. 
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These two roles, however, are not independent. Taking sentence accent as an observ- 
able sign of information structure, we can demonstrate that, if the speaker's expecta- 
tions regarding the discourse context as signalled by accent appear to be incorrect, the 
syntactically-signalled presupposition cannot be accommodated. We can demonstrate 
this by means of an example in which the falling intonation and lack of accenting in the 
cleft complement seem to be indicating that the presupposed information conveyed is 
already available to the hearer. In a case such as (5-104), where the presupposition is 
not available in this way, the result is not accommodation of the presupposition, but an 
ill-formed discourse. For example, A might say to someone just back from an outing: 
(5-104) #Oh, you're back. It was JOHN who phoned a moment ago. 
It is as if sentence accent and information structure act as si"nals indicating how ac- 
commodation should take place, and in the absence of correct information of this kind 
prevents the hearer being able to isolate the correct strategy to adopt. When working 
correctly, sentence accent and information structure enable the hearer to detect the na- 
ture of the discrepancy between the actual state of the discourse, and the intended state 
as indicated by the presupposition, and to choose an appropriate strategy to rectify this 
discrepancy. 
5.5.2 Why Presuppose? 
While the respective roles of presupposition and information structure should now be 
clear, we have not answered the question of why speakers and writers would want to 
mark information as presupposed in the first place. We can suggest some answers to 
this question by looking at the special functions that clefts can serve in discourse. 
How Cleft Presuppositions are Used in Discourse 
Two particular functions we can point to depeii(l upon the use of Old and New presup- 
posed information respectively. Old presuppositions serve the purpose of reaching back 
into the existing context to locate a propositimi, for either of two reasons: 
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1. to fill in a missing value in an existing proposition; or 
2. to challenge an existing value in an existing proposition. 
Examples of both functions, which we can term VALUE-FIXING and CHALLENGING re- 
spectively, are as follows. An example of value-fixing occurs in (5-105): 
(5-105) A: Who made the beds? 
B: It was John 0. 
A cleft challenging a value appearing in a previous proposition is given in (5-106): 
(5-106) A: John made the beds. 
B: No, it was Mary ý. 
New presuppositions seem to serve the function simply of filling in background infor- 
mation about an element referred to by the cleft head. This information appears to 
be background not in the sense that it is less 'salient' than information appearing else- 
where in the cleft, but because it describes information away from the main stream of 
the narrative. An example from the written corpus illustrates this particularly well: 
(5-107) Mr. Butler, the Home Secretary, has decided to meet head-on the biggest 
challenge to Government authority yet presented by the Ban-the-Bomb 
demonstrators. Police leave has been cancelled and secret plans prepared 
to deal with the mass sit-down rally planned for Sunday in Parliament- 
square by the Committee of 100, the anti-nuclear arms group. It was 
Afr. Butler who authorised action which ended yesterday in 32 members 
of the Committee of 100 being imprisoned for inciting a breach of the 
peace. The committee's president 89-year-old Earl Russell and his 61- 
year-old wife were each jailed for a week. 
In this case, the presupposition provides hiformatioii about the main protagonist of the 
discourse that is relevant to the narrative, but does not constitute an event in that 
narrative. The observation that cleft presuppositions convey 'background' in this sense 
is clearly related to the constraint observed earlier on the presupposing of propositions 
rhetorically related to the previous discourse by simple narrative subsequence. It seems 
that this consideration of 'backgroundness' is bound up with issues of tense, discourse 
structure, and rhetorical structure, but further research is clearly necessary to estabfish 
its exact nature. 
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Inferrable presuppositions seem to serve -a dual function. Often, they can serve as an 
indirect challenge or value-fix, bringing the proposition to be challenged, or for which a 
value is to be supphed, into play by virtue of an inferrable relation with that proposition. 
An example of indirect value-fixing is as follows: 
(5-108) A: Who made the beds? 
B: Well, it was John who left last. 
Assuming that B is being co-operative, A is expected to infer the relation between her 
question and B's answer, in which it appears to be suggested that John made the beds. 
An indirect challenge appears in (5-109): 
(5-109) A: This coffee you made is really yukky. 
B: It was you who put the milk N. 
Here, B is challenging an implication of A's remark, namely that B, being responsible 
for making the coffee, was also responsible for adding the milk. 
Although a great deal of research has to be done before the true discourse function of 
deft presupposition emerges, the types of example isolated above suggest that presup- 
positions serve to manipulate context to achieve effects that are distinct from simple 
assertion. It is as if presuppositions are closer to meialinguistic devices than to ordinary 
assertions, - in that, like performative verbs in Speech Act Theory, they cause the state 
of the world-in this case, the discourse world-to change. 
While little is currently known about the discourse functions of presuppositions beyond 
the fact that it occurs, more is available in terms of how presuppositions are processed 
in discourse. In the following section, we examine a model of human sentence processing 
as an analogy for the model of presupposition and its relation with context suggested 
so far. In particular, the model provides some interesting parallels for the strategies 
suggested so far for incorporating cleft presuppositions into context. Of course, it is 
important to note that the analogy being drawn here is not intended to claim psycho- 
logical plausibility for the formal mechanisms used in this and the previous chapter for 
representing the relationships between clefts and context, such as DRss and the use of 
axioms for inference. 
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Presuppositions in a Psychological Model of Sentence Processing 
The psychological model of sentence processing referred to above is that described by 
Clark and Haviland [19771. We can summarise the model briefly as follows. 
On Clark and Haviland's account, one of the first tasks of a hearer or reader in processing 
a unit of language is to identify which part of the message is that which should, on the 
basis of the cues given by the speaker, have an antecedent in the hearer's memory. 
Clark and Haviland refer to this identification task as the application of the GIVEN- 
NEW STRATEGY, in whch hearers and readers identify Given information as that which 
has a unique antecedent, the location of which is the address or location in memory 
at which the incomina information is to be stored. Clark and Haviland's claim is that 
hearers or readers encountering a device such as a cleft are able from the form of the 
cleft to recognise information for which an antecedent should be present in memory, and 
go on to identify antecedents for that information. 
In their suggestion for clefts, Clark and Haviland appear to equate Given information 
with the cleft presupposition. Even though we have seen that this is incorrect on the 
Hallidayan notion of Given, it is still plausible to suggest that the information identified 
by hearers as requiring an antecedent is the presupposed information, analogous to the 
location or formation of antecedents for presuppositions in the Dra model discussed in 
chapter 4. 
As we have seen, however, the information in cleft presuppositions is in the majority 
of cases not information for which an antecedent is already available in context. Clark 
and Haviland's model, however, allows for this, in that it permits information to be 
presented as requiring an antecedent wlien no antecedent is in fact available. The cleft 
construction can be treated in Clark and Haviland's model as a construction that uses 
conventional syntactic signals to indicate that the presupposed information should be 
treated by the hearer or reader as if it had such an antecedent, by forming one for it at 
the time of processing-in formal terms, by accommodating the antecedent. 
Clark and Haviland's model suggests a psychological correlate to this process of accom- 
modation. On their account, if the hearer or reader can find no direct antecedent for 
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presupposed information at the time of processing, three compensatory strategies are 
available. The three strategies are, respectiWAY, BRIDGING, ADDITION and RESTRUC- 0 
TURING. The first two of these, we would suggest, constitute a specialisation of the 
process of accommodation in the ways already suggested in this chapter, being analo- 
gous with the treatment Of INFERRABLE and NEW presuppositions respectively. 
The following definitions of the three strategies are adapted from Clark and Haviland 
[1977: 6ff]: 
Bridging: When a listener or reader cannot find a direct antecedent for information 
marked as requiring one, lie or she may be able to form an INDIRECT ANTECEDENT 
by building an inferential BRIDGE from something lie or she already knows. 
Addition: Sometimes it is impossible to form an inferential bridge between the incom- 
ing information marked as requiring an antecedent and an actual antecedent in 
memory. In this case, the hearer Must ADD to memory something that will act as 
an antecedent, possibly newly constructed from the content of the message he or 
she is trying to process. 
Restructuring: Restructuring is used as a last resort, when the material that is marked 
as antecedent- requi ring does not seem to be the correct material to use as any 
kind of basis for a coherent relationship. In cases such as this, the hearer can re- 
interpret the markings of the incoming message until an interpretation is arrived 
at which enables either the location of an antecedent, or bridging or addition, to 
take place. 
While Bridging can be correlated witli the treatment of Inferrable presuppositions, and 0 
Addition with the treatment of New presuppositions, we can assume Restructuring to 
be simply an 'error condition'. 
If we adopt the assumption that the cleft presupposition is the processing cue for finding 
addresses in memory, which is consequently processed first, this would provide a general 
explanation for the observation made in section 5.4 that clefts whose heads appear 
prior to the presupposed information do not carry a large amount of information in 
head position. On the application of Clark and Haviland's model suggested here, the 
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information carried in the cleft head would have to be held in short-term memory until 
the presupposition had been processed. The processing overhead associated with this 
would increase in proportion to the amount of information that needed to be stored in 
this way: presumably, the longer the cleft head, the greater that processing load. 
Of course, without further experimentation on clefts of all three kinds, the analogy above 
cannot be considered to be more than a plausible suggestion. In particular, it needs to 
be established what effects a variety of information structures and accentual patterns 
has in the processing of clefts: whether, for example, a head would be processed first if 
it were anaphoric, and not the presupposition as suggested above. 0 
5.6 Pragmatic Aspects of Cleft Constructions: Summary 
In this chapter we have addressed several interdependent areas surrounding the use of 
clefts in context. In particular, we have been careful to point out factors that differenti- 
ate the three cleft types from one another, and, where possible, factors that differentiate 
clefts from non-cleft sentences. The main points of the chapter can be summarised as 
follows: 
Clefts have a wide range of accentual patterns, of a far greater variety than has 0 
generally been associated with them in the literature. 
* While the information-ordering principles based on 'Given before New' or on svo 
ordering cannot be uplield, the psychological notion Of REFERENTIAL CONTINUITY 0 
is relevant in the description of clefts, particularly the choice between them. 
9 Apparently, propositions standing in the rhetorical relationship Of SIMPLE NAR- 
RATIVE SUBSEQUENCE cannot appear as the presuppositions of clefts. 
9 The relationships of cleft presuppositions to discourse context can be captured in 
terms of three categories, OLD, INFERRABLE and NE%v. Differing constraints oper- 
ate on clefts of all three types in relation to which of these kinds of presupposition 
they can carry 
e Although the hypothesis that clefts serve to differentiate New information from 
Given could not be upheld, two generalisations could be made: one, that clefts 
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obligatorily communicate a novel connection between the set of elements specified 
by the deft head, and the existentially-quantified variable in the cleft presupposi- 
tion, and two; that no cleft can be composed entirely of New information. 
It is also possible to demonstrate distinct and typical information structures for 
each of the three cleft types. 
e The roles of presupposition and information structure, though distinct, are not 
independent. Presupposition serves to identify the required state of the context in 
order for the interpretation of the sentence to be completed; information structure 
relates to the current expected state of that context. Information structure enables 
the interpreter to detect the discrepancy between the required and current state 
and to select the appropriate strateory for closing the gap. 0 ZD 
Analogies were drawn between the formal model of cleft presupposition discussed 
in this and the previous chapter, and the model for human sentence procesing 
described by Clark and ll-, tviland [1977]. It was suggested in particular that the 0 
relationship between presuppositions and context were formed by accommodation, 
namely the Inferrable and New cases, were analogous to Clark and Haviland's 
processing strategies of Bridging and Addition. 
In the next (the final) chapter of this thesis, we suggest how the conclusions surnmarised 
above might be put to use in a decision procedure for syntactic choice. 
229 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Further 
Research 
So far in this thesis we have looked at three main aspects of cleft constructions: their 
syntax, their semantics, and the pragmatic factors surrounding their use in discourse. 
In this chapter, we summarise the main claims made in previous chapters with respect 
to each of these areas, and draw some general conclusions about how they interact. 
The factors that we have concentrated on in this research on clefts fall into two broad 
groups, as follows: 
e factors that differentiate clefts from other sentence- types; and 
9 factors that differentiate one type of cleft from another. 
Factors of the first type have been predominantly semantic in nature, and relate to the 
function of cleft sentences as a group. Factors of the second type have been pointed 
out mainly at the level of syntax and pragmatics, emphasising how the three types of 
cleft in English serve to provide a variety of options with respect to the content that 
can be conveyed, the pragmatic markings that can be communicated along with that 
content, and the way in which the message as a whole fits into context. In the summary 
of the claims of this thesis given in section 6.1 below, these two groups of factors will 
be brought out in particular. They are further emphasised in section 6.2, where the 
conclusions reached in the thesis are sYnthesised into an outline for a decision procedure 
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for choosing between a cleft and a pragmatically- u nmarked syntactic construction, such 
as a declarative, for the purposes of conveying a given message in a given context. 
Finally, as is common to all research, there are many questions that remain to be 
answered if a complete understanding of the form and function of cleft constructions 
is to be fully appreciated. Accordingly, in section 6.3, we point out some unsolved 
problems that have arisen during the course of the exposition, as well as suggesting 
some interesting related directions for future research. 
6.1 The Claims Made in this Thesis 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, we examined previous research on clefts in discourse, con- 
centrating on claims to the effect that clefts mark particular kinds of information status 
on the information they carry, such as GIVEN, FOCUS, and NEW. We found that most 
claims of this nature were inaccurate or insufficiently general due to a lack of attention 
to the variety of the data, and in particular due to the assumption that factors such as 
information structure could straightforwardly be associated with syntactic structure. It 
was demonstrated, for example, that syntactic structure did not reliably mirror either 
Given-New structure, or associate with particular accentual patterns. 
Apart from the variety inherent in the data, we were able to show in particular: 
a No definition Of FOCUS so far suggested in relation to clefts can reliably be as- 
sociated with clefts of all kinds, which casts considerable doubt on the popular 
assumption that clefts are 'focusing' constructions. 
* On a related topic, the assumption that cleft heads are a reliable source of an- 
tecedents for pronominal anaphora, built into some prominent computational the- 
ories for anaphora resolution, does not appear to be supported by the data. 
* Explanations of the existence of clefts couched in terms of the serial ordering of 
information or syntactic constituents were shown to be ill-founded, on the basis 
of a variety of counterexamples. 
Most striking about the research reviewed, however, was its uniform tendency to suggest 
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explanations for the existence of clefts in terms of a single layer of linguistic description. 
Examples of this are the theory that clefts serve to indicate information structure, or 
that they provide options for a particular serial ordering of information. Such theories, 
which tend to reside particularly at the level of pragmatics, neglect the fact that cleft 
constructions were additionally differentiated from other sentence types at other levels, 
notably at the levels of syntax and semantics. ror example, most of the pragmatics 
research reviewed entirely neglected the fact that clefts were presuppositional construc- 
tions, thereby losing themselves the often saving explanation that, even if a cleft was 
not the only syntactic construction that could offer, for example, a particular serial 
arrangement of information, it may still be the only presuppositional construction that 
could do so, and thereby still be an attractive option for the speaker. 
On the basis of this objection, it was argued that a multi-layer approach to the expla- 
nation of marked syntactic structures was required, in which it was possible to combine 
claims about the pragmatic functions of clefts with observations regarding their differen- 
tiation from other syntactic types at levels of description other than pragmatics. Using 
this as a starting point, the thesis set out to examine what distinctions between clefts 
and other sentence types, and between the three types of clefts themselves, resided at 
each level, and how these distinctions could be considered as part of a system of factors 
determining the unique role of each type of cleft in discourse. 
Accordingly, in chapter 3 we set out to look at how the three types of cleft could be 
characterised at the level of syntactic structure. GPSG rules were formulated for each 
type of cleft (or, in the case of the it-cleft, existing rules were available from within 
the GPSG framework). We showed how the various syntactic characteristics of the three 
cleft types could be captured by these rules, an(] how the clefts, or syntactic constituents 
within them, could be differentiated from other superficially similar constructions. In 
particular, we examined the types of constituent that could appear as head in each type 
of cleft, not only for the completeness of the analysis, but also because the distinctions 
in this direction were likely to be at the root of distinctions in the content it was possible 
to convey using each type of cleft. Apart froin observing distinctions in the possibility 
of anaphoric elements appearing as head of each type of cleft, the potential for other 
syntactic constructions to appear in that position was given as a table, repeated here 
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Figure 6.1: Possible Head Constituents by Cleft Type 
In chapter 3, we also exarnined the actual occurrence of the strings predicted by the 
grammar in the corpus of data. It was observed that only a subset of the possible strings 
appeared with any regularity, a fact that was attributed to pragmatic factors. 
In chapter 4, we turned to what was seen to be the core of the distinction between 
clefts and other sentence types: their semantics. We differentiated between clefts and 
other sentence types on the basis that clefts of all three types were PRESUPPOSITIONAL 
constructions, on a conventional definitioii of the notion, whose content could be rep- 
resented as a presupposition containing an existeiiti ally- quantified variable, and an as- 
sertion which served to link that variable with a value. On the basis of van der Sandt's 
[1988] suggestion that presuppositions could be treated as anaphors within the frame- 
work of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), we worked out the detail of such an 
account, concentrating in particular on how cases in which the presupposed informa- 
tion was not already present in the context (cases requiring ACCOMMODAMN, after 
Lewis [1970]) could be dealt with in the framework. The mechanism offered in DTLT for 
dealing with these cases, and with cleft presuppositions in general, was straightforward, 
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relying only on the introduction of an eventuality marker for each predicative vp in the 
sentence, and on a distinction, made primarily in the interests of clarity, between the 
PRECONDITIONS on the interpretation of a sentence and the POSTCONDITIONS of having 
interpreted it. 
In addition to the fact that clefts are presuppositional constructions, a second important 
aspect of the meaning of clefts that is not associated with the corresponding declarative 
sentences is that the element (or set of elements, on our formulation) specified by the 
cleft head was UNIQUE or. MAXIMAL with respect to the predicate in the presupposition. 
We captured this by a condition MAX in the DRT formalism, the derivation of which 
cond-ition was based on an analogy between the behaviour of the existentially-quantified 
variable concerned and ordinary definite referring expressions, as analysed by Hawkins 
[1978]. 
In chapter 5, we turned to the pragmatic level of describing clefts, examining some sepa- 
rate but related aspects of their use in context. We saw first of all the range of accentual 
patterns found in a corpus of 150 examples, the date serving to further substantiate 
claims made in chapter 2 regarding the variety in the data. Second, we went on to 
show how the psychological principle of the preservation Of REFERENTIAL CONTINUITY 
provided an information-ordering principle relevant for the choice between cleft types 
that was able to account for data that principles such as Given-New ordering (reviewed 
in chapter 2) failed to explain. We then went on to examine the range of relations that 
could exist between cleft presuppositions and preceding context, providing a detailed 
analysis to substantiate the claim made in chapter 4 to the effect that the information 
in cleft presuppositions did not always have to be present in the context. In fact, we 
defined and gave examples for three types of presuppositional, OLD, INFERRABLE and 
NEW, and showed the differences between the three types of cleft with respect to their 
capacity for exploiting the three kinds of relation. In particular, we saw that wh-clefts 
could not carry New presuppositions, while it-clefts could not convey presuppositions 
related to context by Subsumption, a subdivision of the Inferrable category. It was also 
demonstrated that a general constraint existed on cleft presupposition in that propo- 
sitions having a particular rhetorical relation to preceding discourse, which we termed 
SIMPLE NARRATIVE SUBSEQUENCE, could not be presupposed at all. It was suggested 
that this was one of a possible range of rhetorical and discourse'-structure constraints 0 
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on the acceptability of propositions as cleft presuppositions. 
Turning then to the relationship of clefts as a whole to the preceding context, we used 
our analysis of presuppositional types as part of a framework for analysing information 
structure in general, that study being based on a linearised DRT representation of the 
sentences involved. We saw further evidence against the claim, originally reviewed in 
chapter 2, that information structure correlates reliably with syntactic structure, and 
also observed two general features regarding the information structure of clefts. The first 00 
of these was that a cleft had at the very least to contribute an informative connection 
between the set of elements specified by the head constituent and the existentially- 
quantified variable in the presupposition conveyed by the complement-that is, that 
this connection must not already be entailed by the context. We termed this the -, IINI- 
MAL INFO RNIATIVENESS REQUIREMENT. We suggested that this requirement exposed a 
further aspect of the discourse function of clefts, namely that of drawing attention to 
the asserted content, that assertion being the connection between the cleft head element 
and the variable in the presupposition. Secondly, we observed that clefts also had to be 
at least MINIMALLY COHERENT with context, in that they had to contain at least one 
non-New element. 
Finally, we examined the information structure of all three cleft types, and observed 
the various distinctions between them. The most notable of these was that wh-clefts 
could not convey Old information in cleft head position, while reverse wh-clefts could 
not convey New information in this way. 
In the final section in the chapter on cleft pragmatics, we gave a synthesis of the relative 
roles of syntactically-signalled presupposition and information structure. It was claimed 
that presupposition indicated the required state of the context for the cleft content to 
be integrated, while information structure, and relatedly sentence accent, indicated the 
actual state of that context as the speaker assumed it to be. We then examined the 
residual question of why presupposition takes place at all, suggesting that speakers 
used it to reach back into the discourse context to locate available propositions for the 
purposes of challenging them or adding to them, or to provide background information 
about a current element in the discourse. 
In conclusion, we looked at a psychological model of sentence processing that offered 
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interesting analogies to the formal model of cleft interpretation developed in chapters 4 
and 5. We suggested that the relationships of presuppositions to context found in the 
corpus were reflected in the processing strategies Of BRIDGING and ADDITION suggested 
by Clark and Haviland [19771. On the basis of their model, it was suggested that cleft 
presuppositions were processed first, which accounted for features of the information 
structure of the data that were observed earlier-notably that clefts whose presupposed 
information was presented after the cleft head had significantly shorter head constituents 
than those in which this was not the case, presumably to avoid processing load on short- 
term memory. 
In section 6.2, we give a brief overview of how these various features might fit together 
in an outline procedure for syntactic choice. 
6.2 Choosing Clefts in Context 
In this section, we take a brief look at how the conclusions reached in the thesis might 
fit together in a decision procedure for the computer generation of appropriate clefts 
in context. For this purpose we can assume a state of affairs in which the discourse 
function and content of an utterance are planned, but how that content and function is 
to be given a surface realisation is not (cf. the 'what to say vs. how to say it' distinction, 
discussed in Thompson [19771. ) 
As suggested above, we might see the generation of clefts as essentially a two-stage 
process: the choice of whether or not to use a cleft at all, and the choice of which type 
of cleft to use. 
To Cleft or not to Cleft? 
Given the content of an utterance (which we can suppose to be represented as a propo- 
sition) and a context, the first decision that would plausibly be made is the decision 
regarding whether or not to use a cleft. We can imagine for the purposes of the first 
process that there exist two kinds of sentences in the world: clefts and declaratives. 
(Of course, many other sentence types exist, but complex constraints operate on their 
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use that are outside the scope of this thesis, and I do not therefore intend to"address 
them here. ) The first thing to decide is whether it is desirable to give the content of the 
message the particular characteristics that we claimed in this thesis to be the function 
of the cleft. 
We can briefly summarise these claims for the functions of clefts differentiating them 
from declarative sentences, as follows: 
e Clefts serve to draw attention to the asserted relationship between the (possi- 
bly singleton) set of elements specified by the cleft head and the existentially- 
quantified variable in the presupposition. 
9 Clefts are presuppositional constructions. 
e Clefts convey the fact that the set of elements specified by the cleft head are 
unique in the context with respect to their ability to provide an instantiation of 
that variable. 
* Clefts require at least one discourse object in the domain of things referred to 
by the cleft to be currently available in the context. On this basis, they serve to 
highlight cohesiveness explicitly. 
To decide whether these markings are required, the corresponding questions to ask 
might be those below: 
* Is it required to draw attention to the material that would be asserted? Does that 
assertion satisfy the minimal informativeness requirement, namely that it be New 
in the discourse? 
a Is it desirable to mark part of the message as presupposed, taking into account 0 
the function of presupposition as discussed in chapter 5? 
a Given that presuppositional marking oii part of the message, does the residue of 
the message-the part that would be arranged as cleft head-satisfy the NiAxi- 
NIALITY criterion with respect to the predicate in the presupposition? 
a Is the message to be conveyed such that an explicit cohesive link with the prior 
context can be maintained? 
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If the answer to all the above conditions is affirmative, it is likely that a cleft is a good 
candidate for conveying the message. The second stage of the procedure can then be 
invoked: deciding which cleft to use. 
Which Cleft? 
This part of the procedure is made up of a large number of interacting constraints, 
and it is not always easy to see the best means of prioritising them. The ordering 
suggested here is intended merely to be indicative of how they might interact. It is 
unlikely that they can be satisfied all at once, and given the eventuality of one or 
more being violated, it is up to the researc her to decide how serious a violation this is: 
can it be tolerated, or does it mean that the particular cleft type must be completely 
ruled out? Are there interactions between the constraints suggesting that particular 
combinations of violations aýre worse than others? In a fully-specified algorithm, it is 
likely that a system of weightings and penalties might be of use in deciding on the 
gravity of particular violations or combinations of such violations. 
On the basis on the first part of the procedure, we can expect the information to reach 
this second part to be a representation of the content of the cleft such as we discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5, namely a specification of which information is presupposed, and 
wMch asserted. This specification needs then to be mapped into a range of possible 
syntactic realisations. This might be achieved by concentrating in particular on the 
possible syntactic realisations of the semantic object that provides the value with which 
the variable in the presupposition is to be instantiated-that is, the content that is to be 
realised as the head of the cleft. This would be done taking into account the conclusions 
on acceptable head types reached in chapter 3. 
Of course, once the realisation of this is decided upon, other features of the syntax, in 
particular the dependencies described between elements in the structure (both gap-filler 
dependencies and those dependencies captured by feature co-occurrence restrictions) will 
serve to determine the syntactic structure of the remainder of the cleft. At this stage, 
therefore, we can expect to have a range of possible realisations of the content, perhaps 
more than one of each type of cleft. At t his stage, constraints at various levels can 
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be brought into play to decide between the sentences, successively narrowing down the 
possible alternatives. 
While no claims are made here regarding the priority of the various constraints, it is 
suggested on the basis of the conclusions reached in this thesis that the following factors 
are relevant in reducing the range of possible alternatives: 
* If the cleft head has to be anaphoric, some cleft types may be ruled out because 
of the unacceptability of these elements as head. 
0 Related to the above, some cleft types may be ruled out because the relationship 
between the content of the cleft and the preceding context, which can be described 
as the INFORMATION STRUCTURE of the cleft, is inappropriate for the particular 
cleft type in the manner described in chapter 5. This may apply to the presupposed 
information, the information borne by the cleft head, or the combination of the 
two. 
0 The space of alternatives can further be narrowed down by the observance of 
constraints on processing: the chosen cleft should be maximise the degree of refer- 
entially continuity between its content and the surrounding discourse, and should 
mininiise postponement of the presupposition. 
If there is more than one sentence remaining at the end of this process, assuming that 
the constraints and their interactio, n have been set up correctly, the resulting sentences 
should be interchangeable in the context with no loss of acceptability, in the manner 
described in chapter 1. If no sentences remain, this suggests that a declarative (or 
other sentence type, if similar decisioit procedures caii be formulated for them) is the 
appropriate choice. 
6.3 Directions for Further Research 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, maii), qiiestioiis remain to be answered con- 
cerning the structure and function of clefts in discourse. Some of these arise as unsolved 
problems in the current research, others are simply interesting avenues for future ex- 
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ploration. The issues will be treated under the various headings of the chapters in the 
thesis, as follows: 
o Syntactic Issues 
* Semantic Issues 
a Pragmatic and Processing Issues 
We will look at each one in turn. 
Syntactic Issues 
In the discussion of cleft syntax in chapter 3, we saw that cleft constructions of various 
kinds had partially distinct constraints on what constituents could appear as cleft heads. 
We did not, however, give rules for each different case, and could not suggest why the 
cleft types should be distinct in this way, nor why they should be distinct from other 
construction s--su ch as topicalisation--in which a similar kind of extraction seems to 
be taking place. Both rules and explanations remain to be formulated. 
Although we were able to differentiate some superficially-similar constructions from the 
clefts under examination, the analysis of one particular structure still remains a mystery: 
are sentences such as it's an ill wind that blows nobody any good actually clefts, it-relative 
constructions, or something different again? 
On a related note, how justified is the distinction we have made between clefts as they 
have been studied in this thesis and copular sentences such as the following? 
(6-1) a The one I am looking for is Liberty. 
b She's the one I want. 
c All I care about is greengages. 
d The thing she's wearing is a kaftan. 
e The girl in the corner is my amit's bridge partner. 
In other words, where do clefts stop, and other types of copular sentence begin? 
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Semantic Issues 
The DRT model for cleft presupposition presented in chapter 4 could well be extended, 
particularly to deal with clefts in which negation is involved. What, for example, is the 
treatment of clefts such as it was not only John who smiled? How do these not only 
and not just clefts interact with the criterion for maximality postulated? On a related 
issue, how can the fact that only it-clefts are completely acceptable with not only, not 
just and not until be accounted for? 
We worked out the details of presupposition for it-clefts in chapter 4, and suggested 
that the treatment can straightforwardly be generalised to deal with the other two 
cleft types. No semantic distinctions have been discovered between them during the 
course of the thesis except for the fact that wh-clefts alone can appear with quantified 
NPs and the complements of non-factive verbsI as head. This suggests that the head 
of the wh-cleft might not have the same kind of 'definiteness' that the it-cleft and the 
reverse wh-cleft have, indicating in turn that a different semantic treatment might be 
necessary for wh-clefts. Are these factors evidence for this, or can they be explained 
more superficially? 
Pragmatic and Processing Issues 
Some of the most interesting areas for further investigation concern what might be caRed 
pragmatic issues. Some suggestions are as follows. 0 
In the discussion of why presuppositions are used at all, we pointed out some discourse 
functions of clefts, for eXaMple VALUE-FIXING and CHALLENGING. What other discourse 
functions can be observed for clefts? 
On a related issue, we noted that one of the effects of cleft presuppositions that contained 
New information was to provide background information. We also related this to the fact 
that some rhetorical relations, such as simple narrative subsequence, did not seem to be 
good subjects for presupposition. Using these facts as clues, what are the relationships 
between clefts and the rhetorical structure of discourse? Do they, for example, signal 
certain kinds of subordination relations among the propositions in discourse? How 
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might their effects be represented, for example, in a formal model of discourse structure 
such as that of Grosz and Sidner [1985)? 
In the discussion of the information structure of clefts, we noted that the short head 
constituents of it-clefts and wh-clefts tended to result in a contrastive reading when New 
information was conveyed by those constituents. Taking a theory of the relationship 
between sentence accent, New information, and the phonological notion of 'Focus', (cf. 
Gussenhoven [19831, Selkirk [1980], inter alia) how can the fact be explained that the 
absolute length of an accented constituent seems to affect the interpretation of the focal 
scope of an accent? Might it be that clefts signal SYNTACTic areas over which accents 
have scope? 
We noted the acceptability or unacceptability of anaphoric items as head in the various 
cleft types as a simple fact. However, it is well known that the appropriateness of 
anaphoric elements is pragmatically determined. Can the constraints on anaphoric 
heads be formulated as a pragmatic constraint on clefts? Can distinctions in pragmatic D 
function of the three cleft types be formulated on the basis of their differing abilities to 
accept anaphoric heads? 
Similarly, we noted regularities in the information structure of clefts of all three types. 
However, what is the explanation behind these reg-ularities? Why are the cleft types 
different? Might the serial ordering of information internal to the cleft, coupled with the 
different positions available for presupposed information, be at the root of the different 
possibilities that exist in the three cleft types for the siting of information? Might 
phonological factors be involved? 
In chapter 5, we suggested some reasons as to why people presuppose. Is this the whole 
reason? Relatedly, why is presupposition routinely associated with particular syntactic 
structures? 
We also suggested a rhetorical relation that seemed to prevent presupposition taking 0 
place. Is this a side-effect of presupposed information having to be 'background', as 
described above, or are there other rhetorical constraints on presupposition? How can 
they be explained? 
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Finally, why are examples such as the follo%viiig unacceptable? 
(6-2) A: Is a yellow block on the table? 
a B: #No, it's the box that a yellow block is on. 
b B: #No, the box is what a yellow block is on. 
c B: -', 'No, what a yellow block is on is the box. Ir 
Is there a simple prohibition on presuppositions containing indefinites? If so, why? 
In the discussion of clefts and processing, we made several suggestions that can only be 
assessed on the basis of psychological experimentation. In particular: 
* What is presupposition for, in processing terms? 
is What is the status of the claim that presuppositions are processed first? Is this 
affected by the information structure of the presupposition, or the information 
structure of the rest of the cleft? What, in general, is the psychological effect of 
presupposing (taking care to distinguish this front the effects of particular kinds 
of information structure)? 
e We have claimed that one of the functions of clefts is to highlight the connection 
between the element specified by the cleft head and the predicate in the presup- 
position. Does this mean that the connection is being made 'salient' in some 
way? 
On a related note, it was argued in chapter 2 that clefts are not 'focusing' con- 
structions on any of the derinitimis of focus suggested so far. This was due to 
the fact that focus on those definitimis did not correlate reliably with syntactic 
structure. Are there any psychological grounds for saying that focus is relevant to 
clefts? Experiments to date (cf. Clark and Clark [1977], Yekovich ef al. [19851) 
do not separate out the facts about accentual pattern and information structure 
from the observation of the effect of cleft syntax on memory, with the result that 
it is not clear whether it is the cleft, or the information structure, that has the 
observed effect. Experiments on clefts with a controlled variety of information 
structures would enable us to separate out the relative roles of the two. 
As is often the case, the research reported herein has produced answers and questions 
in roughly equal proportion. In view of the fact that such questions remain, I do not 
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feel that the conclusions reached in this tliesis sliould be seen as a full stop, rather as a 
brief pause in the dialogue on cleft constructions. 
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Appendix: The Corpus 
The corpus consists of both spoken and written data. The spoken data is a combination 
of data taken from the Survey Of English Usage [Svartvik and Quirk 1980] and the 
author's own collection. The written data is extracted from the Lancaster- Oslo- Bergen 
(LOB) on-line corpus of British English texts. The total frequencies of examples are as 
foHows: 
Cleft Type Written Spoken Total Total 
(LOB) (SEU) own Spoken 
it-clefts 165 54 37 91 256 
wh-clefts 72 63 36 99 171 
reverse wh-clefts 38 106 16 122 160 
1 Data from Written English 
The LOB data are given below. Citations given with the examples indicate the location 
of the clefts themselves, not that of the surrounding context which is also included. The 
form of a citation is as follows: 
C35 898 
The first digit indicates the data file on the tape. Where the file reference C appears, for 
example, the appropriate file on the tape is c. dat. The material in each file is divided 
into numbered texts, indicated by the numerical field iii the first group of characters 
(35 in this case). Each text has its own line numbers, which appear as the second group 
of digits. The line number in each citation given below is the one at which the cleft 
construction begins, although examples (which may, incidentally, be embedded within 
another construction) generally extend beyond the line at which they begin. In each 
case, the cleft sentence appears in italics. 
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It-Clefts (165 examples) 
A01 200 They would provide an ambulance service for the completely wretched - but 
it would not be too comfortable nor too easy to get. Answering jeers that it was 
Labour which first put a ceiling on health spending and started charges, Mr. Brown 
reminded the hostile Government benches that was done in 1950 because of the 
financial strain of the Korean war. In fact, the Tories made it worse now for the 
sick and needy than Labour had to make it in 1950. 
A02 104 If the threatened count er- revol u tion was not enough to bring the President 
back from his travels it might have been thought that the muster from the 13 
States of the Commonwealth was an occasion worthy of his presence. After all it 
was Mr. Nkrumah who suggested that this year the Economic Consultative Council 
should meet in Accra. It has been left, however, to Mr. Coka, Ghana's Finance 
Minister, to do the lionours as host, in which capacity lie held a reception tonight 
in Accra's Ambassador Hotel. 
A02 220 Police leave has been cancelled and secret plans prepared to deal with the 
mass sit-down rally planned for Sunday in Parliament-square by the Committee 
of 100, the anti-nuclear arms group. It was Mr. Butler who authorised action 
which ended yesterday in 32 members of the Committee of 100 being imprisoned 
for inciting a breach ýf the peace. The committee's president 89-year-old Earl 
Russell and his 61-year-old wife were each jailed for a week. 
A08 48 Lewis converted with a fine kick. Oxford's best means of progress was by the 
boot and it was in this manner that they secured their only success. McPartlin 
and Stafford hacked the ball from halfway, Lewis fell and missed it and McPartlin 
went on to score, Willcox converting. 
A08 98 Having to concede weight forward proved too much for the seamen and they 
lost by two goals and two tries to a try. A lack of determined defence in midfield 
and casual defensive covering allowed Swansea to score tries, but it was the greater 0 
ezperience and vigour of Swansea, with five internationals, which carried the day. 
After their good display against Newport the Navy failed to reproduce the same 
form. 
A10 201 Arthur Willcox, spokesman for the firm which makes the plane told me : The 
plane has a built-in stereo tape-recorder which can play for the whole four hours it 
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will take to fly tolklajorca. We are recording hits from the London shows on it. Nve 
understand the Duke likes them. I understand it was Air Commodore Sir Edward 
Fielden, Captain of the Queen's Right, who recommended the aircraft to the Duke 
after seeing it at the Paris Air Show. This plane is purely a demonstration model, 
said Mr. Willcox. 
All 176 In his letter of resignation 'Mr. Singleton wrote to Mr. 'Murray : Rightly or 
wrongly I felt justified in correcting the impression in the statement issued to the 
press that the opinion of the council was unanimous .... 
It is with sincere regret 
that I sever my association with the council on which I have always thought it a 
great honour to serve. 
A16 138 They are Guinness, Courage, Barclay and Symonds, Mitchells and Butler and 
the Scottish and Newcastle Breweries. And it was Lord Boyd, vice-chairman of 
Guinness formerly Mr. Lennox Boyd who in his best front-bench manner yesterday 
launched a campaign at the Dorchester Ilotel to make us drink Ilarp on a national 
scale. Now nearly all the big brewers (Bass is a notable exception) are committed 
to the struggle for the new drinking market. 
A18 172 Germany has done terrible things to the soul of man. Perhaps it is sym- 
pathetic fear which prompts his friendliness to other people. He is at home with 
scene-shifters, As, -, is, and strangers who stop to ask about his high-powered sports 
car. 
A19 56 Above all, they would never, never know that the New Wave, and it is the one 
thing that Mr. Coward can no more forgive than lie can understand, is supremely 
successful, or that his own latest offering to Britain's ungrateful stage (Waiting in 
the Wings) is being withdrawn shortly, having failed, as they say in the profession, 
to attract an audience. Yet it is J11r. Coward, too old nearly 40 years ago, mark 
you, who offers himself as the man to lead the poor, stumbling audiences out of 
the theatrical dark- and into the bright, brave noonday where it is always perfect 
anyone-for-tennis weather, and where nothing as vulgar and squalid as a stove is 
ever mentioned, but where lots Of nice, jolly, fun-giving adultery to the immense, 
brittle amusement of The illaster is. I think it is time that the case for the British 
theatre of today was made, and made loud and clear. 
A20 209 The men are well trained and well deployed. But it is the role of the whole 
N. A. T. O. army that worries me and our role in that. While I am clear myself on 
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what that role is, I am not sure whether the politicians' statements are clear to 
the rr6litary generals and to Air Force chiefs. 
A28 26 At the airport, Mr. Kennedy praised his host as a captain in the field in the 
defence of the West for over 20 years, adding that his leadership and sense of 
history were needed more than ever today. It was ilfrs. Kennedy who drew the 
crowds, said police. The President stood bare-headed in his car to acknowledge 
the cheers, but Mrs. Kennedy, dressed in a pale blue coat and matching blue straw 
hat, was half-hidden from the crowds as she rode by in her enclosed car, waving 
and smiling. 
A39 19 Anything from C30 to CSO, he said. Oh, yes, for one performance. It is 
therefore on real hard cash that he bases his argument that if Manchester is ready 
to pay the top price of, say, 25 s. a seat, andfill the theatre, Manchester can expect 
more of the world-famous ones always provided that her claims do not unhappily 
conflict with those of La Scala, New York's Metropolitan Opera, Vienna, Venice, 
Paris, San Francisco, and the rest of the world's leading opera houses. The career 
of an international opera singer is not a particularly long one. 
A40 145 But, despite the painstaking research which occupies the leisure hours of 
the keener enthusiasts, this anniversary nearly slipped by unnoticed. It was 18- 
year-old Steyning Grammar School boy Michael Keeney, of Atherton, Jarvis-la ne, 
Steyning, who came upon the fact that the Shoreham to Henfield railway, via 
Steyning, opened on July 1,1861. Ile got to work immediately. 
B01 191 The same sort of good neighbour that lie proved to be to the Jews fleeing 
from Hitler in the thirties. It was Dr. Verwoerd who led a protest against admitting 
any of them because they would defile the national while stock. It is impossible 
to make contact with Dr. Verwoerd in his nightmare world. It is this that makes 
illusory any hopes that lie may be influenced to change course. The Archbishop of 
Capetown, Dr. Joost de Blank, has pleaded that South Africa should be allowed 
to stay in the Commonwealth. 
B04 31 Not so long ago older folk were reminding young wives, harass ed by shortages, 
of the good old days of abundance. Now it is mother who picks up recipes from her 
daughter. The dinner table is the best answer to the grumblers in Britain today! 
2.54 
B07 45 The objectives might be listed like this: that the system should be efficient; 
that it should be fair as between one taxpayer and another; that it should en- 
courage personal saving and the wider spread of ownership of assets and property, 
and that it should contain the minimum disincentive to, and where possible should 
actively encourage, risk-taking, enterprise, exports and investment in efficient pro- 
duction methods. It is the last of these four objectives about which we have heard 
most in the past year. It is, therefore, with direct taxes on income (income tax 
and surtax) and capital (death duties and stamp duty) that we will begin. 
BOT 95 The second source of concern is the widely-held suspicion that a number of 
professional dealers in property and shares pay no taxes since their income is 
mostly in the form of untaxed capital gains. It is from this suspicion that the 
main support for a capital gains tax comes. The trouble with a capital gains tax 
is that it hits so many other things as well, including small savings and the smooth 
working of the capital market, besides being of low and uncertain yield. 0 
B08 43 Then into the hmelight stepped Selwyn. It is not only AIr. Butler, the deserving 
candidate for Downing Street, who is in trouble. So are many other prominent 
contenders for the Premiership in the radical sector of the party. 
B08 59 And Viscount Hailsham, a radical Tory even if lie would dislike being labelled a 
Left-winger, is down in the dumps of the whimsically named Ministry for Science. 
Cast a glance along the Right Wing: it is there that success lies at the moment. 0 
Lord Home is wielding immense power at the Foreign Office. 
BýO 167 Sir, I presume that Mr. GAL Woolveridge's letter (August 23) is written in 
his official capacity, and it is for this reason that I do not think it should be allowed 
to pass without comment. Firstly, what does it cost a motor trader to assist in 
fill-ing up an H. P. form and posting it? 
B11 56 A junior clerk of 16 receives X230 per annum: does Mr. Kelf-Cohen expect 
him to work for him for X22 per annum , or a young man to return from the forces 
at the age of 20 and work for him for S162 per annum (. C370-X2O8)? It should 
be remembered that until the implementation of the Guillebaud Report, under 
which railway rates of pay were based on the principle of comparability with 
those of comparable employees in other employments, railwaymen had worked 
for considerably debased rates of pay, and it was they who had been providing 
the subsidy necessary for the running of the railways which are necessary to the 
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economy of the country. 
B16 17 During the summer of 1917 lie dispersed a Communist rebellion with a whiff 
of grapeshot now described by such progressive historians as A. i. p. Taylor as 
a massacre. It was a blundering general, with the active encouragement of the 
English and the French, who destroyed Russian democracy by attempting a right- 
wing putsch, which was suppressed without a shot but left the masses confused and 
distrustful of Kerensky. This turn of events enabled Lenin to mount a counter- 
attack which the vast majority of Socialists tantamount to a majority of the nation 
resisted only with talk. 
B17 45 Berlin could be an independent city and used as a home for the United Nations. 
It is true that, whatever happens, the Germans look like being left with a divided 
country, in itself a dangerous situation, but, as has been said many times before, it 
is the Germans themselves who are at the root of all these problems and they must 
be satisfied with whatever terms their conquerors feel are nccessary to maintain 
the peace of the world. 
B17 60 He submitted that in our society there was evidence that education was failing 
to keep up with the increasing tempo of materialism. It is, of course, this aspect 
of the matter that is disturbing the Home Secretary. One of the great tragedies 
of modern times is that our busy schools are kept at full stretch educating the 
young in the practical things which they will need to make their way in a highly 
competitive society. 
B17 75 It was a heavy, distasteful task that fell to IMr. Frank Foulkes yesterday. For 
Mr. Foulkes is, of course, the president of the Electrical Trades Union, and it 
was in that Union, and it was in that capacity that he announced the results of 
the elections for the membership of the union's general executive, in which the 
Communists have suffered an overwhelming defeat. Naturally Mr. Foulkes, who is 
himself a Communist, put as good a face on it as was possible in the circumstances, 
but it did not amount to much. 
B19 5 Lord Ainory is to head the Central Advisory Council for Education during its 
consideration of the 12 to 16 age group in our schools and further education 
institutes. It is within this age group that outlooks are formed and decisions are 
taken that lead to lamentable waste of young people who could make a valuable 
contribution to our national life and u, -ho do not, for the most part, make the best 
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of their own lives. Lord Amory's long-standing interest in youth particularly in 
the. young teenagers now to be considered will be of great value to the Council as 0 
will his personal experience in medium-sized industry in which large numbers of 
youngsters must find their first jobs. 
B22 48 Mr. de Freitas became INI. P. for Lincoln in February 1950 and his term will have 
extended to 13 years and eight months by October 1963. To return to Sir Walter 
Liddall: it was in July 1944 that he set tip his Parliamentary record by beating 
the term of office of Mr. Charles Roberts, who was Liberal Ni. p. for Lincoln from 
1906 to 1918. But the all-time record is one of 20 years, held by Colonel Charles 
Sibthorp, an early Victorian Member, and one of a number of gentlemen of that 
family who at one time or another represented Lincoln in the Commons. 
B26 164 The Labour Party is fundamentally inore united than before. It is not the 
withdrawal of the Whip that causes new disunity : but the deliberate defiance byfive 
members of decisions by the party. 
C01 91 It struck me that Mr. Bennett's ideas in this piece were not so much succinct 
as slender. Perhaps it was for this reason that the work- seemed somewhat pale in 
character, a criticism that certainly cannot be made of Berg's very rarely heard 
Three Orchestral Pieces, Op. 6 each bar of which, even the most derivative, is 
impregnated with the composer's personality. The cruel acoustics of the hall 
played havoc with textures which are unusually hectic and congested, but Mr. Del 
Mar's heroic labours conveyed a clear impression of the succession of catastrophes 
which seems to be the work's natural mode of expression. 
C01 190 Byron's marriage, the reasons (real enough though embroidered later) for 
Lady Byron's leaving him, the scandal of his love affair with his half-sister, Au- 
gusta Leigh, the question of the paternity of Medora Leigh her daughter, the 
long inquisitorial persecution of Augusta by Lady Byron (who seems to have been 
as neurotic as the most ghoulish novelist could wish), the patient ferreting for 
evidence to add homosexuality to incest as an extra nail in his coffin, the un- 
speakable treacheries of Lady Caroline Lamb, the scarcely less heinous treacheries 
of Augusta-it is the Lovelace Papers, surely, that deserve to be called a 'pest bag, 
not Byron's consumed Memoirs, which at least would have possessed the merit of 
being well and entertainingly written. Equally important have been the Hobhouse 
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Journals, a vast mass of material partly in tile British Museum, partly in the 
possession of the Hobhouse family in Somerset. 
C03 37 In Fanny the pregnant girl is befriended by an old man. Here it is a young 
homosexual, estrangedfrom women but yet moved by a strong maternal instinct 
to the unborn child as much as to the expectant mother, who acts as a protector 
and comforter to her in her hour of need. 
C06 142 Result: Mr. Hudson and lady love Lollo find themselves playing chaperon 
(Brenda de Banzie, the official one, has broken a lea) to the girls, who have just 
been joined by a Jeep-load of boys. It's hereabouts that the budgie takes to the 
bottle, but I don't think it was through boredom. The film is funny enough in 
places and has a line or two of painful home truths thrown in. 
C07 46 Lautrec's vision of his women is, I think, the outcome of some such ambivalence 
as this: on the one hand, celebration of their easy animal vigour and grace; on 
the other, celebration of the knowledge that they too would fall into decrepitude. 
For it is not a present state of decay that Lautrec presents as a rule, but only an 
intimation of decay. Ile isn't at all Swiftian about women: he doesn't, getting 
close, rejoice in recoiling from their enlarged pores. 
C07 88 Rodin's ghost will not be laid. It is that old master's energy and ruggedform, 
rather than his aspirations, which have influenced two of the three conspicuous 
sculptors this week: Ralph Brown (Leicester G'alleries) and the American Jack 
Zaja (Roland, Browse's). Ralph Brown began as a social realist sculptor infusing 
tenderness into a gawky mother fondling a child, an infant bowling a hoop. 
C10 151 Radha and Vasanti are graceful, too. It is how their brother Mr. Kumar 
got on stage that beats me-unless, of course, he is really Peter Sellers. From his 
performance, I guessed that, watching his kid sisters perfecting themselves in their 
art, he suddenly couldn't bear not to be in on it too, and finally forbade them to 
appear without him. 
C12 68 Of other Greek cities only Athens and Constantinople have equally powerful 
associations, and the worlds of Alexandria and Constantinople are, of course, 
utterly different from the world of fifth-century Athens. It was out of the world 
of the Greek dispersal that Cavafy creatcd his personal mythology-a world both of 
triumph and disaster, a world of courage, of humour and of irony. Cavafy was the 
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first modern Greek poet who contrived to be patriotic without being romantic, 
and his method was to stand at 'a slight angle' to what is assumed to be the 
universe of Mstory. 
C12 164 He reminds his French readers of Rimbaud's obscene parting rites in the 
home of an acquaintance and explains that Lawrence's own ungrateful mocking 
of those who had helped him was only to be expected in a great artist. Someone 
as courageous as Lawrence in following the promptings of his own intuition is 
b ound to inspire the jealousy or the envy of those who are more timorous and 
conventional and it is probably for this reason that so few of his critics, whether 
or not they have known him personally, have been capable of a truly disinterested 
assessment of his character and genius. N1. Temple's short study of the life and 
works is on the whole eulogistic and lie defends Lawrence vigorously against some 
of the charges that have been brought against him in the past: ... 0 
C12 1T4 ... that he was a precursor of Nazism, that lie sentimentalized the noble 
Mexican savage, that he suffered from the neuroses described in Murry's Son of 
Woman and that he earned money to which lie was not entitled by publishing 
Maurice Magnus's Memoirs. It is only occasionally that he gives the impression of 
not wanting to sound too impressed, as, for example, when he mentions in passing 
the numerous (unspecified) puerilites in Lawrence's daily life and in many of his 
books. M. Temple makes good use of the available biographical information. 0 
C12 181 He also quotes lengthily and well from Lawrence's letters. If one is forced to 
conclude that he seriously misrepresents both the life and the work of Lawrence 
it is not therefore because he is swayed by any deep prejudice or because of any 
particular inaccuracy (his worst inaccuracy is to describe Ursula in The Rainbow 
as Tom Brangwen's daughter). The principal defect of this book is that it is written 
in a style which will convey to the reader little or nothing of the resemblances 
between Lawrence's inner life and his own: 
C13 66 Criticism has been misguided and has u nderesti mated the book because it has 
'seized upon the superficial content of the novel and confused it with the story 
it is really telling'. But it was precisely because the 'primal mythic adventure' 0 
could not form the total substance of a novel that Lawrence was driven to invent 
the paraphernalia of a political anti rehyious movement led by Ramon which Mr. 
Kessler rightly regards as superficial. It is impossible to 'rescue' the myth from 
259 
the novel. 
C15 63 The action covers one day in the lives of the occupants of a pleasant country 
house who find they have a body on their hands shortly before the arrival of an 
important foreign diplomat. At all costs this must be covered up so that the im- 
portant conference with the v. i. p. can take place, and it is in this endeavour that 
the plot develops, drawing into it a number of mysterious suspects. Introducing 10 
years old Wendy Turner to the screen as the daughter of the household, the film 
also enables David Nixon to make a guest appearance. 
C17 164 That is why John Cassavetes came to England to find someone who would 
take a risk on something new. It was the directors of newly- constructed British 
Lion, who have got faith in fresh faces, talent, ideas and letting people try them 
out, who saw 'Shadows'one evening and immediately offered Cassavetes the money 
for world distribution rights. I feel sure they won't regret it, from the prestige or 
financial angles. 
E01 96 During the sixteenth century a considerable amount of crochet was produced 
in the convents of Europe. Without doubt it was the nuns who carried the craft to 
Ireland. There it was developed into quite an elaborate and distinctive form with 
rosettes, leaves and lace fillings. 
E01 104 One can remember with horror the pictures of the overcrowded and over- 
embelfished drawing-rooms complete with heavy crochet antimacassars, mantel- 
piece covers with a fringing of clumsy bobbles and numerous other crocheted 
pieces. It was some years after the Victorian period that designers realised the 
potentialities of the craft, and crochet was revived with designs suitable for con- 
temporary trends. Crochet today has a variety of uses, and has even stepped into 
the field of high fashion. 
E04 87 If you do not have a wooden floor on which to anchor the moulds, make a frame 
of rough lumber as shown in Fig. 2. The main idea is to have the moulds standing 10 
as rigid as possible, for it is on these you will be building and shaping your little 
craft, upside-down. For cheapness I recommend using Douglas Fir Plywood from 
British Columbia. 
E07 45 After extricating itself from the membrane, the young mantis has to dry itself. 
It is at this stage that the helpless insect is in great danger-especially from ants. 
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I found that neither sticky bands nor tanglefoot deterred Kentish ants. 
E07 114 Despite the steady influx of substitutes since the end of the war, clay pots 
are still in greatest demand. It is mostly in the smaller sizes that the substitutes 
have made headway, and although numerous small clay pots are used each year, 
they are fewer than they were 10 years ago. In the larger sizes there is still no real 
substitute for clay that can be obtained at a comparable price, except the bitu- 
minized paper pots which are used on commercial nurseries for growing tomatoes 
and chrysanthemums. 
E09 75 Miniature cedar trees are used to block out the original value. It was not until 
1947 that the Nahr el-Kelb scene again appeared on stamps. In that year four 
airmail stamps in offset lithography were printed in Beyrouth to commemorate 
the evacuation of all foreign forces from the Republic. 
E12 172 Much credit for this effort goes to the Secretary, Mr. Aubrey Pugh, who 
carried the bandsmen and instruments in relays in his own van to save the band's 
fund. It is due to his financial and untiring help that the band is continuing to 
function as they are not supported by any industrialfirm. Deiniolen and District 
(J. E. Williams) played carols in their district during the week before Christmas. 
E13 11 Recent articles of 'Steps to Success', have been for beginners in the Four Stan- 0 
dard English dances, and we have covered efficient to enable the non-dancer of 
a few months back to now dance around in the average ballroom without feeling 
self-conscious and with just enough figures to avoid the monotony of repetition. In 
the dancing school it is usually when this stage is reached that the pupil is asked to 
move on to a different class of instruction. either to an intermediate class, where 
an added variation is taught at each session, or to a Bronze and Silver Medallist 
Class, where time will be mainly spent in improving the style of dancing and the 
execution of the figures already learnt. 
E15 44 But apart from these domestic problems the question of the prolongation of the 
season depends on agriculture. roxhunting, after all, is a 'trespass by courtesy' 
and since the courtesy is on the part of the farmer, it is the latter's interests that 
finally decide the matter. Those counties that have a bit of hill or downland are 
often able to continue operations after the vale is closed. 
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E23 147 Another Spring flower, the iris, is sometimes called 'The poor man's orchid'. 
It is not the colour or the texture of iris petals that fascinate me, but the fine 
detail of their exquisite shape. I love them all, the Dutch and English varieties, 
and later on the Flag and Bearded types among which there are such exciting 
colour combinations. 
E24 108 'Written composition, ' it said, 'is generally begun too soon and practised too 0 
often. ' It is only tradition and obsession that demands a weekly piece of writing 
from each child in the class. If we look ahead a little to the work of the majority 
of our leavers, we must admit that few will need (nor will they wish perhaps) to 
have to write a formal letter. 
E26 17 Then, after you have ascertained whether it is to be tea or coffee and made sure 
of any other details, you can go to bed yourself, to sleep with an easy conscience. 
It is not everybody that likes to be given breakfast in bed; on the other hand, because 
it is so many people's idea of bliss, I would like to say someýhing more about it. 
The bhss can be considerably marred if the tray is overcrowded or ill-arranged so 
that in order to pour out it becomes necessary to move things, to play a sort of 
game of chess in bed. 
E26 87 A nice old-fashioned housemaid, labelled by cap and apron, is easy enough; 
when you leave you will give her your little present as you thank her for looking 
after you. It is the 'lady who obliges' that can confound you; on that point, the 
simplest way is to quietly consult your hostess. In the old days a young woman 
was not expected to tip men servants; nowadays if a chauffeur meets you and takes 
you to the station, you will want to show appreciation. 
E26 110 Young people of the present generation have conditioned themselves to what 0 
is sometimes called background noise, and can carr on conversations, read and t3 y 
play games against a radio programine-even against two from different stations, 
without apparent inconvenience. Nlkvbe it was the early training which expected 
a complete cessation of noise of any kind when music was being performed, that 
causes me and others like me to find it quite impossible to talk or listen when there 
is 'back-ground noiseý To be a little considerate about radios and gramophones 
and noise generally is rated highly among good manners. 0 43 
E28 19 'Rental Values'. It was not until 1836 that the basis of assessment was defined 
by statute. The Parochial Assessments Act of that year stated that all rates were 
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to be based on the rent at which rateable hereditaments rnight reasonably be 
expected to let from year to year. 
E29 9 To mark the event a dinner dance was held at the Scotch Corner Hotel and 
upwards of 200 farmers, friends, and staff were present. While it was a second- 
hand machýinery sale that was celebrated, the main feature in the ballroom was a 
new Massey- Ferguson tractor, which shone quite brilliantly under the spotlight. 
We understand that, while it excited much attention, it did not intrude in any 
way on the dancing. 
E30 72 Doubling the selling space to 700 sq. ft. by adding a new section of over 300 sq. 
ft. was not to be the greatest expense. It was the new fixtures and fittings to fill 
th isspace that would be costly. But Roy Beddis solved this problem by building all 
the new sectional shelving, eight dump bins, and the large gondola from materials 
he bought for a total of 50. 
E35 51 It is advisable to keep in reserve a sinall amount for advertising during March 
/ April to catch those people who do not decide where or what they are going to 
do until later in the year, or possibly are wanting to see what the Budget is going 
to do for them. It is at this time when the public are thinking of planning their 
forthcoming annual holiday. It would be extremely wasteful to spend money on 
promoting summer holidays in the middle of June or July. 
E35 124 However, nothing materialises, no positive action takes place, no orders are 
negotiated, until the prospective purchaser is in contact with a travel agency or 
a transport organisation. 'People taking charge'. It is now that people become 
involved ... 
E35 124 ... and it is people, with their idiosyncratic ways, patterns of behaviour and 
thought processes, who make or mar a sale. The human personality takes effect. 
E36 130 While this general picture of the way the farm was run will be of interest to the 0 
practical farmer, it is the economic aspect which the experiment was undertaken 
to test. This aspect is treated in detail in the next section of this report, but in 
considering it three points should be borne in mind. 
E37 92 This illustrates how wrong it is to attach too much importance to the price of 
a ration. It is the feeding value which counts. A food costing S30 a ton may be 
dearer to buy than one at 128 a ton but it can be cheaper to feed. 
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FOI 9 Both the item and the sketch can then go into the store. In the mind it is the 0 
stored items which constitute our memory ... 
F01 10 ... and it is the stored sketches which constitute our understanding. Thus read- 
ing for understanding means taking items of knowledge to pieces as we read them 
and seeing how the pieces are connected. 
F01 143 To begin with it is a pattern of brai n-processes, just as physical as the water- 
drops. But it is e. xperienced as a cloud, as a whale, as a camel and so on. We 
cannot dismiss these as 'illusions' for it is just the occurrence of such illusions that 
we seek to explain-besides why is it illusory to see the thing as a whale but not 
illusory to see it as a cloud? And how did Ilamlet know it was 'really' a cloud? 
F05 77 Then, as the United National Independence Party, Mr Kaunda's group promised 
independence by October 1960, which was rash. The potentialities for conflict 
existed in all three countries, but it was in JVyasaland that the nationalist orga- 
nization developed its greatest energy. The Nyasaland Congress had been formed 
in 1950; the institution of rederation three years later provided it with its ralson 
d'etre, and in 1958 it received at last the genuine leadership and stimulation it 
had awaited. 
F07 39 The peasant in those days, as ever, ate sparingly, but generously enough in 
his own fashion, save at feast times, when lie, too, let himself go; and it was 
from his simplerfood that the later renaissance of cooking was to come. Epicures 
and gourmands, sated by the unending procession of dishes from those mammoth 
kitchens of the 18th century-that amazing epoch of grossness and delicacy- 
sought inspiration at last from the dishes of the country, and, instead of gorging 
the eye with magnitude, began to understand the value of intelligent selection and 
comparative simplicity, though nowadays their simplified meals would seem quite 
monstrous. 
Flo 137 So deficate is the balance that it can be tipped by a slip of the tongue or by 
some development that shakes the confidence of the timid or uncertain. It is on 
this uncertain group that the choice of government rests. It's a grave thought. 
Flo 199 Film-strip talks play an important role in many schools all over the country, 
and they should play a much more important role in the N. C. L. C. than they do, 
because people learn through their eyes as well as through their ears. Besides, 
264 
if one looks at the papers that have the biggest working-class circulations it is 
they which have the most pictures. One of the latest history film strips available is 
'George and the Revolutionary Wars (1760-1815)', published by Common Ground, 
Ltd. 
F16 188 Nor will they eliminate the mounting frustration, boredom loneliness and 
tension, felt by an increasing number of people. Perhaps it is the knowledge of 
this fundamental truth-that real happiness and satisfaction is found in doing 
for others, that enables councillors to labour on year in and year out, unpaid, 
unrecognised, in what must appear to others to be a thankless and unrewarding 
task. Does this sound priggish, evangelistic, dull? 
F16 212 From his earliest years he was an active trade unionist and Labour Party 
worker. However, it was not until 1920 that I first knew of him. He was in 
Leeds and I in London. In that year his Union-the Tramwaymen's Union- 
amalgamated with others to form the United Vehicle Workers' Union (u. v. %v. ), 
and my Union, the London Carmen's Trade Union amalgamated with others to 
form the National Union of Vehicle Workers (NXNAV. ). 
F19 99 Prayer, psychic abandonment and the many kinds of devotional exercises in- 
duced in primitive man, accompanied, as it did in all his descendants, the condi- 
tion known as spiritual elevation and exhaltation, followed by the more advanced 
stages of inspiration and ecstasy. It was only in these later spiritual phases, that 
the human mind was able to step across the threshold of material thought into the 
sphere of the immaterial or supernatural world. In these phases only, could man 
leave his objective consciousness entirely behind him. 
F20 57 The farm which was the Company's first purchase, High Wallabarrow, Hes 
on the Cumberland bank of the Duddon, opposite to the hamlet of Seathwalte 
in Dunnerdale, and adjoins the National Trust property at Wallabarrow Crag. 
The farm and its fell land are within the area which the Forestry Commission 
had declined to preserve from commercial afforestation and it was to anticipate a 
purchase by the Forestry Commission that this farm was acquired by the Company. 
The landscape is a fine example of the beauty characteristic of the Duddon Valley, 
and the farm house, though in itself a small one, is delightfully situated. 
F21 144 On his death at eighty-four lie bequeathed his notes, comparative charts and 
unreturned library books to his son, dicii aged fifty-six, with the request that 
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he complete the task by knocking the book together. The son occupied twenty- 
two years very pleasantly in reading through, revising and annotating his father's 
notes, and it was a grandson, a very well-rounded personality of forty-eight with 
no leisure-time problems, from whom I heard the story. Here is wisdom indeed, 
when a man can cater not only for his own middle-age and old age relaxations but 
for those of his descendants as well. 
F25 13 The rank and file of the expedition were drawn from many. parts of the Em- 
peror's wide domains, and even from lands beyond. A particularly large and 
well-armed contingent came from Portugal, and it is to one of these Portuguese 
adventurers, known as the Gentleman of Elvas, that we owe the most circumstan- 
tial first-hand account of the expedition. Amongst volunteers of other nationality 
we find mention of a French priest from Paris, Biscayan carpenters, a Genoa 
master- craftsman who could construct anything from a bridge to a brigantine, a 
Spaniard reared in England, and even an unnamed Englishman whose skill with 
the long-bow matched that of the Indians. 
F25 43 Florida seemed a promised land indeed. It was not until some days later that 
the first Indians were encountered. Amongst them was a man, all but indistin- 
guishable from the natives, whom the Spaniards almost rode down. 
F2T 169 How the outlaw was rewarded is told in the Tale of Gamelyn: the knights of 
the county might conspire to cheat him, but his villeins were faithful even in the 
hour of extreme misfortune: 
Tho were his bonde-men sory and nothing glad When Gamelyn lier lord 
wolves heed was crved and maad. 
It was to protect them against the oppressions of their new master that Gamelyn 
came to the Afoot Hall, where he was arrested and bound by the sheriff. Whether 
he is like Gamelyn a knight or like Robin Hood a yeoman, the outlaw hero of 
the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century stories is the friend of the poor: he is not 
consistently the friend of the knight. 
F29 174 The last reigning monarch to attend the Assembly was actually James , be- 
fore he became the King of 'Great Brittany, ' and before the appearance of his 
Authorised Version of the Bible; and lie (lid so in order to discipline the members, 
not to praise or encourage them. It ivas he, too, who instituted the office of High 
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Commissioner, so that the Crown could keep a good eye on the proceedings; and 
ever since Jacobean times the Sovereign has been represented at the Assembly by 
a royally appointed representative. The office of Lord High Commissioner is now 
more ornamental than functional, at least in the sense that the holder is no longer 
a 'spy' in the pay of the Crown, which itself has changed beyond all recognition 
and is completely above politics or religious faction. 
F31 123 Just as there is no specific cure for eczema, so there is no one specific cause. 
Nevertheless, it is regarded as an allergic reaction, although it's only in rare cases 
that a particular substance can be detected to which t he child is allergic. Some 
believe that eczema is caused by emotional factors, even in the youngest baby. 
F33 102 He'd rushed to the surgery and was breathing heavily. But it wasn't that 
which disturbed me. ... 
F33 103 ... It was the time he took to recover. If you're under 30 you should get your 
breath back in one minute. 
F34 43 The Post-Impressionists felt that this impartiality was itself a fimiting thing. 
They held that it was the painter's feelings about a scene that should be ezpressed, 
not just the light that reflected from the scene. With this in view they permitted 
themselves to exaggerate any quality which they found exciting-they claimed the 
right to distort the facts according to their own feelings. 
F35 36 Ruin and destruction seemed inevitable. It was then that a beautiful young girl, 
named Lore, accompanied by a crowd of small children, offered to go out to meet 
the Colonel and to beg pity for the town. But before the plan could be realised the 
Swedish troops had entered the city, ready to destroy it. 
F37 13 22) Years later, after I had come across other versions of the song, I discovered 
why. Mr. Crouch, the blacksmith, as a child, had been in the party that gave the 
song to Sir Ernest Clarke at Ilinwick Hall in the first decade of the century, and 
it was Sir Ernest who had sent it to Lucy Broadwood. 
F37 15 ... It was the Church family of Biddenhanz who first brought home to me the 
fact that there were other versions of this carol still known, and sometimes still 
sung, in Bedfordshire. 
F40 41 The distant motor-cycle caused me to give a momentary reflection on the 
calamity of road accidents. The barking dog made me pause to find out if it 
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was one of my own dogs barking, and if so for what reason. By contrast with our 
continual alertness to noises and their meaning it is possible at times so to lose 
oneself in preoccupation as to be oblivious to outside sounds. 
F44 82 Russ Conway's injured hand has given him time to think-and the result may 
well be that a new field of entertainment will open up for him in 1961. It was 
towards the end of November you may recall, that Russ had to withdraw from the 
London Palladium revue 'Stars In Your Eyesý A fall in which he had suffered a 
severely bruised hand and wrist was the cause. 
1_ý 
G03 110 Alf Barton, who in was presented with a book on the life of Marx, and a gold 
purse in recognition of his work for the movement, was later known to say that 
it was not necessary to understand Marxism in order to understand socialism, 
though at this time he was a keen member of the B. s. p.. George, however, never 
deviated from his belief that it was the economic basis of society which needed to 
be changed, for the conditions of the people were appalling, there being only slight 
alleviations. 
G04 28 The work was growing pretty heavy, and we managed to get a stipendiary 
layman who could help among the children and young people. It was while I was 
at Tatsfield that Ifirst visited Oberammergau in Bavaria to witness the Passion 
Play. The place and its people were to play an important part in my life. 
G05 39 This time, mercifully, there had been little destruction but warlike atmosphere 
was not entirely lacking since, through the town, ran one of the 'Red Ball High- 
ways', those one-way highspeed supply routes along which by day and night thun- 
dered the endless convoys of giant American supply trucks carrying supplies from 
Normandy to the battle-fields. It was seemingly not only humans that derived com- 
fort from the roar of engines, for it seemed to have positively intoxicating effect 
upon the nightingales that appear to exist in Rheims in great profusion. 
GOT 38 The papers were reopened in the presence of leading Ni, Iissolonghi officials in 
order to make sure that no recent will was amongst them. It may have been then 
that Trelawny contrived to do his copying. Considering that Pietro was not above 
twenty-three years of age when lie undertook a load of heavy responsibilities, his 
conduct reveals him as one of the most intelligent as well as the most sympathetic 
of Byron's entourage in Greece. 
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G08 166 ... the Viceroy was Lord Ilardinge who lacked Lord Minto's enterprise, and 
was in every way a more conventional and less imaginative man', while the Secre- 
tary of State was Lord Crewe, much absent from the India Office on account of in 
health and other duties in the House of Lords. 11itchie was permanent head of the 
India Office during most of this time, and it is not surprising that Sir Mackenzie 
Chalmers considered that it was only through Ritchies great ability and devotion 
that the Government of India was enabled to pull through the serious difficulties 
of those years; that Sir Henry Dobbs wrote that Ritchie had very great influence 
on affairs in India and saved -the Government from many mistakes; that Sir i. rt. 
Dunlop Smith considered Ritchie's death a blow to India not easy to measure 
G12 18 Does 'Naval Officer' want our fleets to lie alongside the home ports, Gibraltar 
or Malta, for nine months in the year? It is not every naval officer who is afraid of 
battle exercises, or manning and arming ship, or of sea trips between nice places. 
If 'Naval Officer' chooses to present one side of the case to the British public, 
surely the views of the majority may have a hearing also. 
G12 25 It was about now that I took action against Their Lordships themselves in the 
matter of the yearly Examination in French of Junior Officers Afloat. My diary 
simply records: French exam. Had hoped to do well but they asked what were 
the pronouns which correspond to the adjectives 'ce, cette, ces, son, nos, leurs. ' 
G13 99 Mr. Wells considered himself to be very nearly an average man. If he was at all 
abnormal, he supposed that it was 'only by reason of a certain mental rapidity. ' 
Be this as it may, the outbreak of hostilities evoked much the same response in 
Mr. Wells as in many other Englishmen. 
G14 53 The confidence tricksters, it seems, consider it axiomatic that no wholly honest 
man can be regarded as a likely victim of the confidence trick. It is not the mere 
fools that the confidence men successfully delude. It is, in their pregnant phrase, 
the 'larceny in the blood' of the victim which results in his victimization. And 
that was how Hitler operated-exploiting and using as his leverage the 'larceny in 
the blood' of innumerable politicians in every country who wanted to believe that 
here was a man who really had found a way of making diamonds out of plastics; 
a way, that is to say, of making a quick profit out of an illicit sale of the Western 
soul. 
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G15 129 The massacre of the Jews in his beloved Ukraine, and the uncertainty as to 
what rrdglit be the fate of the yishuv, intensified his unhappiness; and his malaise 
adversely affected his physical health. Paradoxically, it was during this period of 
acute distress that he made for the first time a direct contribution to the shaping of 
the policy of the Zionist Organisation. Thanks to his intimacy with Dr. Weizmann, 
he was kept informed from the outset of the steps which were taken during the 
war to win the sympathy of the British Government and British public opinion 
for Zionism. 
G15 182 Now, at the age of 70, he felt that lie had- earned the right to retire on a 
pension which would enable him to live in reasonable comfort in the land of his 
dreams. For unknown reasons, over a year elapsed before the necessary arrange- 
ments could be made; and it was not till the end of that year that he was able to 
leave London for Palestine, accompanied by his wife and their son and daughter- 
in-law. He preferred to live in Tel-Aviv, which was a creation of the new spirit of 
Jewish nationalism, rather than in the Holy City of Jerusalem, to which the aura 
of medievalism still clung; and the Tel-Aviv Municipality built him a house next 
to the Gymnasia Herzlia, the first all-Hebrew secondary school of modern times. 
G18 15 At times the Rector was justifiably concerned at Wesley's indiscreet religious 
zeal, but realized his merits, and in June, made a donation to the work of the 
Castle, a gesture by which Wesley was obviously touched. Wesley had been re- 
called to act as tutor to the undergraduates, and it was as a teacher and preceptor 
that he had returned into residence in November. He was already well-read in the 
classics and in divinity. 
G18 43 Green's father lived at Shipton, where Wesley often took the service for his 
friend, the former Lincoln undergraduate, Joseph Goodwin. It was probably 
through Wesley's efforts that Green came to Lincoln. Ile was soon calling on 
Wesley, who lived in rooms just above him in College, at ten every morning, 
presumably for tuition. 
G20 2 The days grew shorter, but given fine weather, another crop could still be gath- 
ered. It was on- 21st October, as King of the Belgians, that he made a confession 
to the Archduke John: 'The Prince of Prussia has also written to tell me that you 
regret I have tied myself to Belgium. I too sometimes regret that my part in the 
East was taken from me. ' 
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G20 38 There is no difficulty which does not alarm him, no obstacle which does not 
stop him, no gesture which does not prove that he would have brought to Greece 
disgust, pusillanimity, and the perpetual regret of having abandoned his so-called 
chances of the eminent position of Regent of England. It is this Regency that he 
will never obtain, above all now that he has crowned his shame like this ... 
Such 
a sovereign would have done damage to royalty. ' And this scorn and anger were 
echoed by the correspondent, quoted in the Memoirs of Baron Stockmar ... 
G21 193 It was in fact a kind of literary 'class distinction', a superior quality which 
only the select were capable of appreciating. It was not the matter presented by 
the author so much as the manner that counted. The reader learnt to be sensitive 
to the shape of a sentence, to the use of 'master words' round which an author 
like Stevenson would build significant paragraphs; and to admire those splashes 
of colour that were almost purple. 
G22 60 1 remember how I would open it and read the first words: 'You know, my dear 
little Arthur' and then turn to the last page and read the last words: 'I hope it 
will help you to understand bigger and better histories bye and bye. 'I don't know 
if it was 'Little Arthur', but most certainly it was little Hiss Cray who helped me 
to that understanding, awaking in me, sublimely unconscious, interest and energy 
for tackling these 'bigger and better histories' in later years. One of our lessons 
was to read aloud. 
G22 139 My blacksmith too, had 'large and sinewy hands'-swiney' as one of my own 
children misread it-and often did I stand and watch him shoeing a horse, and 
was allowed to put my small hands on the beflows and help blow the fire. So it is 
of my Clovenfords blacksmith, dark-eyed and black-bearded, in his smithy among 
the hills, that Longfellow brings back the memory. At ten o'clock Miss de Dreux 
rang the big brass beH in the hall. 
G22 176 Before very long we were reading Un Philosophe sous les Toits-I cannot 
remember the author, but I know I had a sort of affection for that old philosopher 
and his meditations under his roofs. It was dear Miss Bogen who gave us ourfirst 
German lessons, only vocabulary, no books. She was a sweet, kind creature and 
we all loved her. 
G24 121 But it was a sad parting, and I always missed them through the years of 
a, ero-engine and car designing. It was, in fact, while I was working on locomotives 
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at Doncaster that I became a motor-bicycling enthusiast; and I certainly got more 
pure fun out of the motor bicycle than I ever got from any of my cars, although I 
will-ingly accept that sport on two wheels is essentially for the young, and for me 
it was only a sport, with no commercial purpose behind it. 
G25 110 There was the garrulous Bracey with the red face, monotonous voice, and stiff 
knee covered with wounds, who sat on the bed and told his story: he said that 
every anaesthetic took six months off a man's life; he had already had sixteen, 
so that meant he had lost eight years-and there were still more operations to 
come; yet that was better than being like Cain or Thompson who had each had a 
leg off, or better stiH than the little Canadian whom I often carried about in my 
arms because he had lost both his legs. But it was Max the tall Irish Guardsman 
with his thin waxen face and black hair who distressed me more than any of the 
others as he stooped and coughed as he walked about. He had a huge wound in 
his chest which the sisters washed out with long tubes and hissing fluid, and theff 
he coughed and spat as he tried to get his breath. 
G26 14 But I was too busily engaged on the process of rehabilitation to want her 
company, and she was a woman-suspect as such, and further suspect owing to 
her happy association with holy writ that linked her with my father. It was not till 
the middle of the week that I began to welcome her, caring for her until Saturxlay 
night. Then, with the sound of the first church bell on Sunday morning, all women 
were suspect again; and as the hour in the box-pew remorselessly approached-the 
hour of avoiding looking at Milly, at the same time trying to reconcile her with 
my visual world-I knew it would only lead to the hour of afternoon when the 
sunlight froze on the tops of the trees, immobilized as I by the bible. 
G27 146 And his 'pair of petticoats' for public inspection, though there miIt be 
another petticoat in the emotional back-round, were now Georgina and Mamie 
and what could be more outwardly respectable? It was they who went to the great 
farewell dinner held in London when he was invited to visit America for the second 
time. His visit was a tremendous success, and it was they who welcomed him back 
to Gad's Hill upon his return. Georgina was not in the company of Dickens when 
he met with his first railway accident at Staplehurst, as were Ellen Ternan and 
her mother. 
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G28 144 Never did lie refer to this letter to the Halle Society, demanding my excom- 
munication, at any of my subsequent meetings with him, not even during our day 
by day, night by night expressions of brotherly love in Australia. It was round 
about then that he told me he was about to form a new orchestra in London. 'But 
where, ' I asked, 'where do you hope to find the players-the B. B. C. Orchestra has 
taken the best? ' 
G29 64 The tremendous debt which Helen and blind people the world round owe to 
Anne Sullivan is beyond computation. For it was Anne who rescued Helen from 
her world of darkness and misery, and enabled her to bring deliverance to countless 
fellow sufferers. Anne was born in poverty, and her eyes were infected from birth. 
G29 69 Her mother died when Anne was eight years old, leaving three children who 
were placed in the workhouse. It was here that Anne spent the next four years 
of her life, being allowed no social contacts save that of fellow paupers. One of 
them told her that blindness entitled her to go to a special school, but no one 
was interested in the education of a blind pauper child until Anne literally threw 
herself at the feet of the chairman of the visiting committee and pleaded 'I want 
to go to school. ' 
G29 95 In complete self-effacement, sweeping all self-pity aside, she gave herself to 
Helen, working tirelessly to open lines of communications between the imprisoned 
child and the world of people and nature about her. It was the day after Anne 
Sullivan's arrival that Helen learned the finger language for the word 'don'. Anne 
spelt it into her hand very slowly and deliberately, and got Helen to imitate. 
31 157 So Mr. Baldwin took the front of the stage, which lie was to share with the 
King, others, in the background, till the play was done, for, as His Majesty phrased 
it, they were to settle the matter alone. It is the King who serves as ceremonial 
figure-head for his country. It falls to his Prime Minister to speak on behalf of 
England. 
G32 42 '1 was filled with questions', lie says, 'and I had to carry these questions about 
with me unanswered. It was thus that I reached my eighth yearý During this year 
the family moved to Neudorff in Hungary, and here they remained until Rudolf 
Steiner was seventeen. 
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G32 52 With them, he took part every year in the vintage and with their children he 
went to the village school. It was through the assistant master at this school that 
the first great event of his life took place-an event that, he believed, influenced 
the whole course of his development and of hisfuture work-, it was the discovery, in 
his teacher's room, of a text book on geometry. Ile was allowed to borrow it and 
through it he felt the deepest satisfaction he had yet known, for by this science 
he found justification for his own assumption that the reality of the unseen world 
is as certain a fact as the reality of the physical world. 
G36 90 The ability of a literary mode to expand into others is often taken as a sign 
of vitality, and it is true that between them fantasy and science fiction have 
gobbled up most of what was left of the horror story without much injury, but I 
cannot feel that the injection of these thriller ingredients is likely to lead to much 
beyond blurring and dilution. It is not by capturing more territory that science 
fiction will improve itself, but by consolidating what it already has. Such internal 
reconstruction would do well to start with an attempt to bring sexual matters into 
better focus. 
G38 47 You can, if you wish, class all science-fiction together; but it is about as per- 
ceptive as classin the works of Ballantyne, Conrad and%ý. %v. Jacobs together as 
'the sea-story' and then criticising that. But it is when we come to the second 
distinction, that made among the sheep or within the pale, that my system would 
differ most sharply from the established one. For the established system, the dif- 
ference between distinctions within the pale and that primary distinction which 
draws the pale itself, can only be one of degree. 
G40 21 The Indians were too few in the land to introduce Prakrit or any Dravidian 
tongue as the language of conversation, but the court Brahrnins brought religion 
and learning and furnished the primitive 'Malay with his first abstract terms, 
terms still used by the Muslim INIalay to denote religion, fasting, heaven, sin, 
life, language, time, name, prince, property, thing, a fine, work and so on. It is 
this back-ground that gave the illalay stories from the Jataka tales, Bidpai's fables 
and the Katha Sarit Sagara or Ocean of story, carried down the centuries per ora 
virum, until they were written down and published in modern times. Most of these 
stories are known throughout South East Asia and there is Buddhist influence in 
folktales. 
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G40 41 By then Malays were instructed by a famous theologian writer in Malay that 
the Ramayana might be condemned to the rubbish heap provided the name of 
Allah did not occur in the manuscript. In the Bodleian manuscript which goes back 
to the 12th century or earlier, it is NabiAdam who gives Ravana his kingdoms and 
Allah taala has been substituted for the Hindu Trinity (dcwata mulia raya). One 
other strong pre-. Muslim element in 'XIalay literature was a cycle of some forty tales 
enacted in the shadow-plays of Java, Bali, Malaya, Siam and Cambodia, whose 
hero is a Javanese prince Sri Panji and heroine Chandra Kirana, Moon-beam. 
G41 100 In both, however, this ambition was partially frustrated by a shared egocen- 
tricity, a neurotic self-absorption hitherto unparalleled among great writers. For 
Joyce as much as for Proust, it was the T, the moi, with which he was ultimately 
concerned: both were autobiographers for whom the objective world about them 
was largely subordinated to their own specialized and highly subjective mental 
attitudes. 
G43 91 When practicalwork has begun, a producer has above all to be able to give 
all the collaborating experts their heads when desirable, and to check them gently 
but firmly-that is, tactfully-when necessary. It is rather like driving a team of 
fine, Mgh-mettled horses: it is they who do the work, but, unless they are a team 
used to working together, they may have to be guided. How often does an excellent 
conductor wish to take a passage of music at an 'effective' pace that is unsuitable 
in the circumstances? 
G44 10 It reached the climax of its career in the year (date), with the not incon- 
siderable total of performances; soon after this triumph, however, the average 
number of performances per year dropped sharply from about (date) to about 
(date), and after 1890 it disappeared almost completely from the repertoire. It 
was not until (date) that the 'lost scenes' of the 'Amsterdam edition' were redis- 
covered and published by the grammarian, m. -j. Simonnin; not until (date) that 
the original Don Juan was restored to the stage at the Od6on; and even then, 
not until some six Years later that the Corneille version was finally ousted from 
the Com6die Franýaise. The date (date), therefore, is usually taken to mark the 
critical turning-point in the fortunes ofNloli6re's play. 
G44 58 The musical public of Paris in was unable to digest German opera in any form; 
any opera written'in Germany had of necessity to be 'arranged' in the French, or, 
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slightly later, in the Italian tradition, if it was to succeed at all; and it was in 
fact the eventual discovery that both Le Nozze di Figaro and Don Giovanni, de- 
spite their having been written by a German composer, were fundamentally Italian 
operas, and so might be thankfully handed over to the opera buffa, that finally es- 
tablished Afozart's operatic reputation in France. The one traceable attempt to 
produce a Mozart opera (Die Entfuhrung) in the German tradition was so dis- 
astrous and lamentable a failure that not an echo of it remains throughout the 
century. 
G44 155 Public taste in music was guided exclusively by men of letters, and, during the 
whole Napoleonic era, the major dramatic critics were wont to look upon opera as 
their exclusive prerogative. Above all, it was Julien-Louis Geoffroy, the feared and 
influential oracle of the Journal des Dibats, who could make or mar a composer's 
reputation with a single article, although-as lie thankfully admitted-music was 
an art which he understood no more than Morris-dancing. 
G45 178 In an earlier volume in this series, Mrs. Rice, who is Russian by birth, took 
as subject the Scythians. Despite chronological difficulties, it is they who have 
been suggested as the link between the arts of Central Asia and the Steppes, and 
so ultimately with certain traits in the Scandinavian and Celtic cultures. In his 
geographical history of the Vikings, Professor Arbman shows how the Rus, or the 
Swedes of Muscovy, traded in Black Sea ports and sent caravans into Baghdad. 
G48 48 For the true naive painter, on the other hand, there is no margin between his 
intention and his result: lie paints to the exact limit of his vision. It is exactly in 
his humble capacity to be satisfled with this that his naivete or lack of sophistication 
lies. It is exactly in this that his appeal lies. Rousseau once wrote to the mayor 
of his home town Laval, offerin to sell La Boli4mienne Endormie. 
G48 103 Whereupon Lautrec muttered something about middle-class stupidity, which 
wa, s always prepared to 'admire an absurd gesture or a sunset. ' Proust and Lautrec 
belonged to different worlds and it was precisely the difference in their worlds that 
made Proust what he was. Ile was the woman outside the window, able by the 
intensity of his desire and his curiosity to possess the ring. 
G49 104 Their tradition is carried on by directors like Kozintsev, Romm and Ileifetz. 
But it is the young men who are profoundly changing all our old ideas. The pattern 
began to emerge when Chuklirai made The Forty First, and it was consolidated 
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in his more recent film, Ballad of a Soldier. 
G51 30 For the most part, this pastime has no permanent effect on the language, but 
occasionally, so strong is the desire to make familiar that which is strange, that 
a word is changed-either in whole or in part-in accordance with the fancied 
etymology, and the changed form is henceforth accepted. It is a change of this 
kind which is often specifically intended by the use of the term 'folk- etymology. ' A 
good example is a plant, proverbial for its bitter taste, namely wormwood. 
G51 58 In fact, the word oecern is related to oecer 'a field' (modern acre, which has, 
however, become specialised in meaning), and originally referred to the produce 
of the fields in general. It is not the observation of likenesses which is at fault in 
popular etymology, it is the fact that conclusions about the relationships of words, 
drawn from comparisons, happen to be erroneous. It is not, however, necessary for 
a whole word to be transformed in order to satisfy the popular etymologist. 
G53 83 In Britain, on the other hand, it has been assumed that the welfare of society 
demands the unquestioning and habitual acceptance of the supremacy of Parlia- 
ment, a Parliament which cannot limit its own competence and cannot bind its 
successors. No doubt it was in the seventeenth century that the decisive steps in 
this direction were taken, but it would be a mistake to read into the constitutional 
debates of those days the modern conception of Parliamentary sovereignty which 
grew out of them. The truth is that all three participants in the constitutional 
conflicts of Stuart times in some degree accepted the notion of fundamental law 
and were largely ignorant of the notion of sovereignty as it was later formulated. 
G53 138 It may now be safely said, with certain qualifications regarding Question 
Time and Adjournment Debates, that the primary business of the Commons has 
ceased to be the rectification of private grievances and has become the enactment 
of public legislation. Large and highly disciplined Parties emerged with organised 
followings in the country, so that it is only on a niinority of issues that the House 
of Commons can formulate an independent view. Indeed, the best contemporary 
exponents of the constitution, like Sir Ivor Jennings, have no hesitation in holding 
that the real business of Parliament is to sustain government in office. 
G53 145 Public interest has largely shifted away from Westminster to the Party con- 
ferences and the private conclaves of Parliamentary Parties, each of which is sup- 
ported by a highly developed bureaucracy. It is at these places, after all, that 
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things really happen, that general plans of future legislation are formulated, subse- 
quently to be embodied in election programmes. A victorious Party at an election 
tends to assume, often with little justification, that it has been authorised to carry 
out in detail the measures listed in its programme, measures conceived by Party 
bureaucrats, born at Party conferences and designed less to reflect the will of 
Members of Parliament or even that of the country at large than to appease the CD 
Party zealots. 
G53 186 Now, in whatever way government may be theoretically conceived, it is in 
practice a matter of the adjustment of a multiplicity of private interests. If the 
function of an Act of Parliament is to establish general principles and rules, the 
details must be filled in by someone, and it is to the civil service that the task 
of filling in these gaps has fallen in modern tithes. Over the last half-century 
ParHament has perforce delegated to Ministers and to subordinate organs of the 
executive the task of devising the measures needed to achieve the objects of its 
legislation, and the measures thus devised, although they have lacked the direct 
consent of Parliament, have been endowed with all the force of statutes. 
G54 76 The Voce di Trastevere opened a nation-wide subscription fund. It was not un- 
til several weeks later that Tagliabue was detained by the Foggia police for simulat- 
ing an offence. He had been sweating up that snow-covered hillside, he explained, 
reflecting that he would not be pensioned for another fifteen years. 
G60 179 Yet there are recorded, in the famous code Hammurabi, Babylonian laws 
relating to medical practice. It is however from the Egyptian papyri, especially 
of Edwin Smith and Ebers found at Thebes and dating from about the sizteenth 
century B. C. that we find the first records of the practice of medicine. These 
papyri show that the Egyptians shared with the most primitive medical folklore 
the concept of anin-ism viz. that disease is caused by the evil influence of enemy, 
demon, god or even animd and that this evil spirit might be warded off by amulets, 
propitiated by sacrifice, and expelled by incantations. 
G61 31 There is another contrast. In England it is only Oxford and Cambridge which set 
standarTis of prestige for universities. Men come and go easily between Cabinets, 
Embassies, Chairmanships of Boards and the Oxford and Cambridge colleges. 
G61 102 The teachers in public schools and grammar schools will have a strong bias 
to Arts and pure science, a bias towards Oxbridge, which diminishes as one goes 
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down the long ladder of social status, which is not necessarily a ladder of ability or 
even of success. It is to these 'customers, the advisors of students, the creators of 
ambition, that we have to sell a new picture of the system, as it will be, a system 
in which Oxbridge will have a special but not predominant place. My last point 
is that to me, as a professor in a civic university, interested in the growth and 
government of cities, with a young family growing up in a city, the civic situation 
seems a peculiarly advantageous one. 
G64 25 It is admitted that the search for scientific truth may be a genuine aspect of 
culture, and the current fashion is to praise scientists for their broadn-lindedness 
rather than call them illiterate. Today it is the technologist who is the object of 
humorous deprecation. This shows that we have not really begun to solve the 
problem of 'the two cultures. 
G65 38 54) The following table gives some indication of percentage allocation of in- 
vestments ... 
It is in the field of external resources that the greatest difficulty arises 
in estimating the budget of the Thiid Plan. Considering foreign trade trends, the 
Draft Outline estimated ... the total export earnings over the Third Plan period 
G66 89 There was no intention, declared Professor 11romadka, Dean of the Comenius 
Theological Faculty in Prague, in his opening address to the Conference, 'to level 
the organisational differences, the diversity and riches of the heritage and legacy 0 rD 
possessed by the individual Churches and their members ... 
On the contrary, it is 
here, among us, that our multiformity assumes a deeper meaning ... 
We cannot 
labour for a new atmosphere in the world, in international relations, unless we 
form here among ourselves an internal partnership of trust and willingness to 
learn from one another. ' 
G66 167 Xforeover, in the world of today it is a problem confronting Jews no less 
than Christians. And if the difficulties at present seem greater in the East, where 
the apostles of the Marxist-Leninist form of dialectical materialism openly attack 
what they regard as religious or superstitious survivals, the situation is hardly 
less serious in the West where more practical forms of materialism are in danger 
of undermining the very foundations of the Judeo- Christian way of life. It is, 
I believe, the fact that Christians (and Jews) on both sides of 'the Curtain'face 
similar if not identical problems that gives special importance to this 'First All- 
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Christian Peace Assembly, ' arid to all that went to its making and that will, it is 
hoped, flow from it. 
G66 185 From the very earliest days infants are imbibing the implicit assumptions 
of the society in which they live. It is just because of this liability on the part 
of young people to pick up the prejudices of their environment that the Council 
of Christians and Jews has always regarded the broadening of their minds and 
sympathies through contacts with different religious, racial and cultural groups as 
an essential part of its educational programme. Here is a description of a most 
valuable piece of work on these lines carried out by the Leeds Branch of the Council 
as part of their programme and some of the reactions to which it gave rise. 
G68 158 On the announcement of the primary results Sir Ferdinand Cavendish- Bentinck 
could justifiably claim an outstanding triumph, but this was only the first stage of 
the election. The principle of Kenya's new Constitution established at Lancaster 
House was the common roll, so it would be the mass African vote that would prove 
decisive. Would Sir Ferdinand's be a Pyrrhic victory? 
G72 84 The National Certificate Courses at Ordinary and Higher levels have provided 
the training for many technicians and an avenue to full professional status for 
many students. It is in these courses that the high rate of failures has attracted. 
most attention. The White Paper proposes that the Ordinary National Certificate 
course, at present a three year course, should become a two year course i. e. 
the length required now of students who are exempt from the first year because 
they have the appropriate passes at Ordinary level in the General Certificate of 
Education. 
G74 181 Briefly, the answer is two-fold: political vigilance and military professional- 
ism. It is the imperfectly professional army and the careless statesmen or power 
vacuum which constitute the ingredients of military intervention. But the success- 
ful containment of military power within its proper sphere has never been achieved 
without difficulty. 
76 192 When General de Gaulle came back to power two and a half years ago, there 
was a general wave of optimism about his chances of bringing the tragic problem 
of Algeria to a settlement. Algeria was in the forefront of every Frenchman's mind 
at that time, because it was a crisis in 41giers that brought about the appeal to de 
Gaulle to return. 
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77 81 These digressions have seemed necessary because, despite the title of the Ob- 
scene Publications Bill, the connections between obscenity and pornography are 
both tenuous and intermittent. In Latin literature such writers as Juvenal and 
Martial used the complete obscene vocabulary without apparently being consid- 
ered pornographic; we do not know what vocabulary Elephantis and her colleagues 
employed, but for her contemporaries it was the subject matter, not the language, 
which made her books reprehensible. Conversely, to the best of my recollection, 
The Xlemoirs of Fanny Hill (one of the few masterpieces of English pornography) 
does not use a single obscene term. 
M-Clefts (72 examples) 
A04 142 He was afraid lest the decisions would mean the labelling of the party at 
a future General Election that it did not 'care about the defence and security 
of our country. ' After saying that Mr. Khrushchov believed Russian power to 
retaliate had stopped a u. s. attack upon the Soviet Union, Mr. Gaitskell said 
that what stopped the Russians in the last resort from aggressive nuclear war was 
the certainty that they would be annihilated. Mr. Gaitskell added that agreement 
with the unilateralists was not possible, though lie respected their views. 0 
A08 165 They are also the answer to those critics of Conroy who complained that 
he slowed up the attack. TVhat they meant, of course, was that Conroy did not 
belong to the school that bash on regardless and hope for the best. Smith, who 
played outside Conroy on both wings for England, always says that nobody else 0 
could place the ball so perfectly to create an opening. 
A12 98 Anyone who went into unskilled work, lie said, went in at the rate for the job, 
regardless of age. What many parents did not seem to realise was that a relatively 0 
high wage now might be a rather poor one in after years. Britain, said the Duke, 
could not hope to compete in foreign markets if industry went on using unskilled 
labour. 
A19 154 111 do no work for weeks and then write solidly for 12 hours. I think what I'm 
really seeking all the time is the source of Original Sin in myself. Lo, ue leaped to 
his feet at this heresy and shouted: Original Sin! What are you talking about? 
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A19 214 'But even Auden can't make a living just writing poetry, ' said Roethke. 'I 
doubt if anybody does, except maybe Robert Frost'. Let's face it, poems will 
never be as popular as football coupons, and what America offers is just bigger 
subsidies. As characters, poets range from rhyming layabouts to saintly travellers 
who have embarked on the greatest journey of all: the journey into the mind and 
spirit of man. 
A25 128 Here, a company is formed to exploit the actor's services over the next five 
years. In essence what happens is that the drop in value of the shares in this 
company (at the end of the five years they are worthless) is offset against the 
actor's earnings over the period. How many of our leading actors are anxiously 
waiting for April 17 to find out whether they will be able to continue their forward 
strip? 
A26 66 He shrugged: 'Might do one good thing-prove once and for all there's no God 
up there. ' IVhat is taken for granted, both in America and in Russia, is that there 
would be no sputniks if there were no military rockets. Which brings me to the 
gloomiest aspect of my journey: the spectacle of two great peoples getting ready 
to massacre each other. 
A26 82 1 switched to electronics, and it was the same. I sat down to figure out what 
they couldn't use for war, and what I came up with was birds. Add to this a still 
potent distrust of foreign entanglements. 
B01 64 Britain and the U. s. , which have problems with their balances, will gain some 
immediate help. What it means in practical terms is that our exports to Germany 
will now be a little cheaper for Germans to buy, while the goods which Germany 
exports will be made a little dearer. Booming Germany is deliberately encouraging 
more imports as a means to curb rising prices at home. 
B01 87 If, however, in addition to her new good-neighbour gesture, Germany takes a 
really big share in giving aid to underdeveloped nations, the world outlook will 
be brighter. What gives rise to optimism is the sign that Germany and the other 
leading Western nations are at long last moving towards a solution of currency 
problems by co-operation. 
B02 26 But that might give President de Gaulle a convenient excuse for keeping out of 0 
talks if he still thought this was not the time to start them. What seems certain 0 
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is that those who advocate putting off any approach until AIr Krushchev gives 
evidence of a change of heart (whatever that may mean) would have us run risks 
greater than the West ought to run and greater than President Kennedy's most 
influential advisers seem disposed to face. The real question is what we should 
put to the Soviet Government as a basis for talks : and that means working out 
what we know to be the essential interests of the West in Berlin and what we 
suppose that the Soviet Government may now be after. 
B03 42 But discussion on current points of east-west conflict could not go much farther 
than, for example, the truism that policies of menace and mutual disarmament 
cannot be followed together. What the council has done and it is an achievement 
is to make religious contact across the greatest political barrier in what is not yet 
a unitary world. In the words of one Russian delegate, older churches like his own 
have personally discovered younger churches for the first time. 
B05 67 They have developed a new system whereby completely untrained workers can 
be taught their trade by means of tape recordings and television. What happens is 
that the unskilled worker is processed, by high-speed listening to recorded instruc- 
tions on how to do the job coupled with explanatory TV pictures, into becoming a 
highly skilled, obedient craftsman in no time at all. Not only can the raw human 
rnind be technically equipped very quickly to do one set of skilled manufacturing 
processes in one trade but, by being given another of the new audio-TV training 
techniques, he can be switched to a different industry if he just gives in and listens 
and looks. 
B05 173 1 may well have felt that I was hell-bound under a strict Presbyterian up- 
bringing and a possible reprieve might come through the sugary sentiments of 
Abou Ben Adhem. What happened in the jingly-jungly jingle was this: Abou Ben 
Adhern (may his tribe increase! ) Awoke one night from a deep dream of peace 
And saw, within the moonlight in his room, IMaking it rich, and like a lily in 
bloom, An Angel writing in a book of gold. To cut a long story short the Angel 
got on well with Abou and wrote his name at the top of the book of gold.. 
B09 147 In spite of post-IMoss Side, post-Oswestry, and cosy Liberal optimism it will 
be some years yet before the Liberal Party can form a Government, while it is 
obvious that the unique event of a Labour majority in the Commons is unlikely 
to be repeated. But what we need is not a Lib. -Lab. Pact but a new party; not 
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coalition but coalescence. Is it too much to hope that the Radicals, now sprinkled 
in all three parties, may one day be united and that the Liberal Party may find 
itself the anchor of a new radical alliance? 
B09 173 1 am unable to find this reference in the report which is hardly surprising as 
it was published in 1959 and its latest reference to costs is in the financial year 
1957-58. What the Hinchliffe Report does say on page 27, paragraph 63, is : These 
figures do not support the general belief that the cost of the pharmaceutical service 
is increasing at a much faster rate than that of other branches of the National 
Health Service or that it is absorbing an increasing share in the total cost of the 
Service. 
B11 203 This was never my intention and such an interpretation is possible because 
my remarks were of necessity condensed. IVhat I intended to imply was that doc- 
tors often prefer not to be used solely in a consultative capacity in recommending 
treatment for patients to their general practitioners because they prefer to pre- 
scribe such treatment themselves, to know that it has been supplied and then to 
follow up their patients by seeing them again. This situation can be realized by 
the use of E. C. IO(H. P) forms written by hospital doctors and dispensed by retail 
pharmacists. 
B12 56 Nor is his undoubted success entirely accountable in terms of his personal 
charm, great though that is, nor of the presence of the Russian Trade Fair. What 
in fact Major Gagarin seems to have done is to have shown us how much we want 
to like the Russians, in a spirit of genuine neighbourliness. This, and the fact 
that British visitors to Russia usually find a reciprocal warmth of welcome there, 
is surely a portent worth noting by the political leaders on both sides. 
B15 106 There can be no real objection to these proposals, in principle. What should 
concern us is how this policy is to be administered, and whether in fact it can 
be administered without racial discrimination. Since the majority of immigrants 
to-day are coloured, it will be difficult to avoid the suspicion of discrimination. 
B16 32 The darlings of democracy today are the men who, long after the Commu- 
nists have shown their true colours, have handed country after country to them: 
Benes surrenderina Czechoslovakia, Roosevelt giving them half of Europe, Tru- 0 CD 
man and Attlee abandoning China to its mild agrarian reformers. Nlight I suggest 
that Nloscow knows that Kerensky has been one of its most unhesitating and de- 
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termined enemies for 44 years, and what it is really looking for in Persia is not 
Kerensky (nor Alikhailovich, nor Chiang) but a nice lVestern-style statesman with 
half-a-round-table-full of crypto- Communist advisers? 
B16 47 It reads : In so far as the United States has hitherto been, the protector of 
the regime, the people tend to be emotionally anti-Western ... TVhat I 
had written 
was : ... the opposition tend to 
be emotionally anti- Western. What proportion of 
the people belongs to the opposition is a matter of opinion. 
B20 190 The man who captures it will go down in history as one of the greatest of 
mortals. IVIzat the great masses of ordinary people in the world desire most of all 
is the certain prospect of peace for as long ahead as possible. No one can blame 
Harold Macmillan for trying to reach the elusive goal. 
B21 114 They can laugh at their own weaknesses, like the belief that it is impossible 
to cat in a restaurant without gipsy music, although the gipsies have disappeared 
long since. What I found depressing was the insistence that all the many good 
things in the country were due only to socialism and the Party and would not 
otherwise exist, together with fantastic ignorance of the western world or refusal 
to believe what did not suit the theory. To give a couple of instances that stuck in 
my mind ... 
B21 184 This was, of course, untrue, the negotiation was a flat demand for a Soviet 
officer to be brought to whom they would talk and with whom they would, no 
doubt, establish their identity. TVhat is at stake, in fact, is whether the West 
recognises Herr Ulbricht or AIr ICruschev as responsible for East Berlin. The 
West has no intention of recognising Herr Ulbricht, as it has made very clear to 0 
the Russians in public and private conversations. 
B25 125 It took place on a part of the A that has a dual carriageway which the people 
of Sidcup are still hoping will be extended into this urban district so the need for a 
road improvement of that nature cannot be argued in this case. What is alarming 
is not only that this sort of accident can still happen with dual carriageways, but 
that there could so easily have been otherfatal accidents within the urban district 
over the week-end. A number of brushes between traffic was reported to the police, 
several of them causing minor injury 
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C07 10 Lautrec's liking for whores and dancers and singers and acrobats as subjects 
was, of course, a perfectly commonplace taste among artists of his time. What is 
singular about his use of them is that no other artist, of his time or any other, 
has painted them so directly, intimately and pertinently. Ile doesn't, on the one 
hand, use them as symbols, pegs for a moral or aesthetic attitude, as the young 
Picasso does (to take one example among many); and on the other hand, he 
doesn't use them only for the way they look, like Degas, whose dancers are more 
or less interchangeable with his laundrywomen-the same breed with a different 
set of gestures. 
C08 142 The truth is that at least a dozen selections of equal size, equally good and 
equally representative, could have been made from the same source. What matters 
is that the editor has given us the essence of lVellington's genius-his clarity, his 
good sense, his powers of observation, his understanding of human nature, his dry 
irony, his wonderful balance and foresight. It is like offering the reader a small 
parcel of a superb cellar; it is all there for his buying if he wants more. 
C10 163 He never got up much speed, and made few turns. What he did do was to fix 
us with a basilisk stare, make odd pointing gestures and keep improvising for about 
twenty minutes. A polite attempt to drive him offstage with a burst of applause 
only spurred him to go on and on. 
C12 55 Nothing could be more remote from Cavafy than any of these. What is in 
fact the case is that he was concerned with a view of a Greek's place in history, a 
view which was peculiarly his own and which has been found by his contemporaries 
and successors in the Greek tradition peculiarly true and enlightening. It is a view 
taken from 'a slight angle to the universe', but is none the less accurate for that. 
C13 172 Phoenix is itself a miscellany, unplanned, yet unified as no other miscellany 
could be, by the personality of Lawrence himself. Some of the things it contains 
are of rare quality, some interesting for what they add to our understanding of 
Lawrence's 'philosophy', some are comparatively trivial pieces; but what matters 
even more than their individual merits is the cumulative effect which they achieve 
when brought together in this way. The sum even of the novels and poems is greater 
than the parts, but the existence of a collective meaning, subtly influenced by the 
presence of the author (which is always felt in Lawrence's work), can be more 
easily perceived in the sum of Phoenix. 
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E03 114 Almost certainly they are of carbon steel-good enough for a hand brace, 
maybe, but you would be lucky to use them more than once in a power tool. No, 
what you need are high-speed-stcel drills, more expensive in first cost but cheaper 
in the long run; these can tackle most jobbing work, but you will want et another 0y 
type of drill if there is glass, concrete or masonry to be drilled. A good high-speed 
drill will have the letters iis and the diameter stamped on the shank. 
E08 156 It becomes quite a problem to know how to keep everything in good condition 
and it is more important than ever to use the ventilators as much as possible 
whenever outdoor conditions are favourable. What is essential is to maintain a 
free circulation of air around the plants and to keep the atmosphere reasonably 
dry. Schizanthus and calceolarias need very careful watering at this time of the 
year. 
E18 126 Cooling water in vast quantities will be discharged into Southampton Water 
but except for being warmed it will be unchanged. What we can and do object to, 
however carefully 'landscaped' and however beautifully designed this power station 
may be, is the fact that we shall be able to see it from all parts of the Solent. This 
may seem a slight objection but it is a valid one. 
E38 36 Are their present services so inadequate that it is necessary for the N. F. U. to 
step in and improve matters? What triggered off the move was a report, published 
last year, on the marketing of herbage seed. The N. F. U. was rightly concerned 
with ensuring that British seeds had at least an equal share in their home market 
Nvith foreign seeds, and there is much, though not everything, to be said for a 
standardised product. 
FOI 148 For the moment we need not concern ourselves with these last questions. 
What we have to grasp is that there are patterns of brain-activity of different 
kinds. There are patterns which result directly from processes such as seeing, 
hearing, etc., and that which is experienced as the shape of the cloud (but not yet 0 
identified as such). 
F13 76 The responsibility of the advocate in court rests upon the importance of every 
witness's honest recollection being fully tested. When a man comes before a court 
charged with, say, driving dangerously, what it really means is that 'in the opinion 
of a number of witnesses, whom you will see and hear, he was driving dangerously. ' 
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F15 14 It is not a question to be decided on nationalistic or political party feeHngs, and 
no reasonably objective opinion, one way or the other, is likely to be arrived at 
without going through the process known to the writing world as bednning with 
Adam and Eve. What that means in this case is going back to the war years, when 
the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland were in exile in London 
and had every reason to be so concerned about the precariousness of their post-war 
prospects that they organised a careful experts' study of the subject. The outcome, 
based on the realisation that their chance of economic recovery and their ability 
to make themselves heard in international politics was desperately poor if taken 
singly, and decidedly better if they could act in unison, was the agreement to 
join their three countries in a union to be called Benelux-in which we can now 
recognise the beginning of all endeavours to unif Western Europe. 0y 
IF21 36 On the contrary it is a time for constantly taking up new pastimes, new in- 
terests. TVhat must be dropped is those physical leisure-time exercises taken up in 
youth and now inevitably being performed with diminishing success. A man, it has 
been well said, whose enjoyment consists of constant reminders that he is not as 
young as lie was should take medical advice immediately. 
F2T 24 Men of the period, both humble and gentle, accepted a stratified society: what 
they resented was the abtise of official or social position, and this is precisely the 
attitude which the ballads echo, with their detailed catalogue of the crimes of 
men like the sheriff of Nottingham and the Abbot of St. Mary's. One should not 
expect popular literature to concentrate its attack on the manorial system or the 
inconvenience of villein status, because the peasants themselves did not see their 
grievances in econon-Lic or systematic terms: they saw them rather in terms of the 
personal viciousness of individual lords. 
F31 41 There was no fracture and all that had been needed was the simplest treatment. 
TVhat they had done was to take a three-inch elastic adhesive bandage and apply 
it carefully but firmly from below upwards, so that it supported the torn outer 
ligament of her ankle. I encouraged her to try walking on it now that it was safely rD 
strapped up. 
F34 99 At that age people tend to become somewhat set in their ways. What is 
remarkable is not so much that the Royal Academy should have remained distinctly 
academic, but that it should have shown so much tolerance as it has to the younger 
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men. 
F35 57 The event is celebrated each Sunday in summer when the story is re-enacted 
by a piper and boys, the latter disguised as n-ke. Unfortunately, modern research 
tends to discredit the legend, claiming that what really happened was a visit from 0 
a labour agent who attracted many local young men away to Bohemia, with the 
promise of good wages. 
40 111 It is necessary, to avoid confusing the issue, to ignore some of the extreme 
examples of deleterious sounds, those that make telephone operators faint or the 
jingling of a bunch of keys that sends a mouse into something approaching hys- 
terics. IVhat is at least as interesting is the way inventors seem to have chosen, 
probably intuitively, a combination of explosive and aggressive sounds as warn- 
ing signals to be used on automobiles. Apart from the purely explosive sounds, 
those that stir most animals to rapid action are the snarls, growls, barks or long 
drawn-out roars of predators or rivals. 
G14 28 These call themselves democrats, but as they have never yet got full control 
of'the footplate, nobody knows what their large claims amount to. What arouses 
the indignation of the honest satirist is not, unless the man is a prig, the fact 
that people in positions of power or influence behave idiotically, or even that they 
behave wickedly. It is that they conspire successfully to impose upon the public a 
picture of themselves as so very, very deep-thinking, sagacious, honest and weU- 
intentioned. 
G15 51 The well-worn antithesis between Judaism as the religion of Justice and Chris- 
tianity as the religion of Love does not, in Ahad Ha-Am's opinion , go to the root 
of the matter. 'IFhat essentially distinguishes Judaism from other religions is its 
absolute determination to make the religious and moral consciousness independent 
of any definite human form, and to attach it without any mediating term to an 
abstract, incorporcal ideal. ' Hence the Christian idea of a divine-human being, 
who mediates between God and man, is one which Judaism can never accept ... 
G36 13 The aliens, then, are on the airfield all right, but their space-ship is sinking 
into a muddy heelprint or whatever. Apart from the effects of awe and amazement 
produced by the description of the pulpy monsters and so on, what we have here is 
a strong puzzle interest that is widespread in science fiction as a minor aspect and 
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not uncommonly central, as in this case. I have already mentioned the biological 
puzzle--problems of determining an alien life-cycle and the like-as an important 
sub-category; another involves the question of finding the weak point in some 
apparently invulnerable monster or hostile alien or badly behaved human artifact 
of the robot sort. 
G36 99 Going easy on the puritanism would be a commendable resolve, and so would 
a decision to drop sex altogether where it is not essential rather than to decorate 
a planetary survey or alien invasion with a perfunctory love interest presented in 
terms borrowed from the tough school or the novelette. What will certainly not 
do is any notion of turning out a science-fiction love story. In the as yet unlikely 
event of this being well done, the science fiction part would be blotted out, reduced 
to irritating background noise--a dozen Venusian swamp-lillies being delivered to 
the heroine's apartment, and so forth. 
G37 41 From his knowledge of war as it really is the poet may start again towards a 
wider vision of it and try to see it in a fuller perspective without reverting to the 
old abstractions and falsities. It is impossible to present its illimitable chaos, but 
what counts is the poet's selection from it of what really strikes or stirs hirn ... 
G38 122 We all know that certain passages in good fiction and good poetry are used 
by some readers, chiefly schoolboys, as porno-sraphy; and now that Lawrence is 
con-dng out in paperbacks, the pictures on their covers and the company they keep 
on the station bookstalls show very clearly what sort of sales, and therefore what 
sort of reading, the booksellers anticipate. We must, therefore, say that what 
damns a book is not the existence of bad readings but the absence of good ones. 
Ideally, we should like to define a good book as one which. 'permits, invites, or 
compels' good reading. 
G44 52 If Moliere's heroic seducer was unfortunate in the manner of his reception 
by the Parisian audience, his operatic counterpart was scarcely less so; and the 
trials and tribulations of Don Giovanni at the Grand Opera furnish an admirable 
illustration of the obdurate tenacity of French musical conventions, which, in 
the post-revolutionary period, were certainly as rigid as those of the Comedie 
Francaise, and even more fettering to would-be dramatists of the new generation. 
In this brief study, however, what interests us is not the direct significance of these 
musical conventions in themselves, but their indirect influence upon the fate of 
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Moliere's Don Juan. The musical public of Paris in was unable to digest German 
opera in any form; any opera written in Germany had of necessity to be 'arranged' 
in the French, or, slightly later, in the Italian tradition, if it was to succeed at all. 
G44 163 The story of the resplendent premiere, the gradual disintegration and even- 
tual catastrophic d4bficle of this first French production of Don Giovanni can be 
followed in detail through the reviews in the contemporary press. What appears 
evidentfrom the various comments which have survived is that Ifalk-brenner's ma- 
nipulations of the score had put all the critics except Geoffroy in a quandary. 
Geoffroy's position was simple and unassailable. 
G48 165 Then, in the small commercial galleries, a desultory collection, out of the 
tourist season, of Roman and other Italian artists fighting their battle against 
what is expected of them or giving themselves up to an illusory affair with some 
faded beauty-spot, and coming-out of it rather worse than such ill-advised lovers 
elsewhere. What is instructive is to see the three aspects of modern art-realist, 
abstract, and that curious cabalistic art of symbolism andfantasy mixed that has 
no tidy name-in a new setting and a new light. Certain things become very clear. 
G53 43 In being pragmatic about his priorities lie will rightly emphasise on the one en 
hand, for example, the political advance of Somalia, while arguing on the other 
that a more complex set of constitutional checks and balances is required in North- 
ern Rhodesia. The jibe of Mr. Mboya in attacking the Lancaster House Conference 
that what Somalia required were settlers was double-edged. Settlers might have 
retarded Somalia's political progress, but they would have given it a much better 
standard of living. 
G53 43 Here we should look to a judge or a retired and senior Treasury official, or to 
Parliament, to provide such services if they are required. What matters is that 
Denmark appears to have found a way of satisfying what is prima facie a legit- 
imate public demand for protection against administrative abuse without either 
paralysing administration or diminishing the dignity and independence of the ju- 
dicature. This, to say the least, is a constitutional example worthy of scrutiny 
in the context of other political and social circumstances which, however, include 
the tendency towards ever-increasing administration noted by the advocates of 
the Ombudsman in post-war Denmark. 
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G58 119 For we, in the universities, hope that they will see the problems of here-and- 
now- whether they are the problems of personal conduct, of public affairs, of art 
and literature, of science and its applications-illuminated by the studies of their 
university years. In other words, what the student needs from the university is 
not just a little (or even just a great deal) more competence in the subjects he has 
studied at school; not just to have a few rough edges knocked off his mind; not just 
to learn more elaborate intellectual skills; not what, in the modern idiom, is called 
'know-howý He is going to be a member for three or four years of a society which 
has its own characteristic way of life. 
G6 0 52 Edward Shils and Daniel Bell both write about the 'End of Ideology', but not 
very convincingly. What they really mean is the end of the appeal of communist 
ideas to the intellectuals. I believe that we can still see pervasive influences of 
certain kinds of ideology in American thinking. 
G62 109 Moreover, their use of manpower per beast or per acre is very high. What 
is impressive is the enthusiasm and thoroughness with which they carry out their 
systems: roorning of cows, attention to their feet, feeding of calves, detailed 
keeping of farm records ... I 
G62 112 ... But I should like to end by saying that what impressed us most was the 
warmth of our welcome. As far as we could learn, we were, in every case, the first 
English people to visit the farm. 
G63 31 So far I have been much concerned to rebut the strong suggestion that what 0 
might be described as the carrying out of an intention could be known without 
observation, but now I want to return to a weaker suggestion which was shelved 
at an earlier stage. This is the suggestion that what we know without observation 
are our intentions. One might perhaps concede that neither the driver in my 
example, nor the man writing on the blackboard in Miss Anscombe's, could know 
without observation that their respective intentions were actually being carried 
out, but one might also claim that in both cases the persons concerned would 
know what they intended to do and would know this without observation and 
quite independently of what actually happened. 
G64 99 Our error is not in training scientists who are unaware of the classical outlook: 0 
it is in training them in all sorts of assumptions which are still unconsciously 
derived from it. What we need, to produce scientists who are also human, is 
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something far more fundamental than a Departmental Committee on Syllabus Re- 
vision on which schoolmasters and industrialists as well as university dons are 
represented (although that would be a practical first step which is already long 
overdue). We need a radical revolution in our whole outlook. 
G64 161 Those who have absorbed the atmosphere of scientific culture find those out- 
side it alarming because they appear to be willing to attach more validity to 
their fundamental myths than to evidence. What the new men want-and will 
have, sooner or later-is a public system which bases authority always on declared 
evidence that the good of persons is demonstrably being served. 
G65 163 Poverty, unemployment and illiteracy have yet to be mastered completely; 
and the common man cannot, in general, feel relaxed under the umbrella of the 
welfare state. Nevertheless what is surprising is not that planning has achieved 
so little in its first ten years, but that it has achieved so much in so short a time 
in a country which inherited problems created by centuries of foreign rule. Before 
the war, India was almost completely dependent on foreign countries for the most 
elementary articles of consumption-from needles to locomotives, and from tooth 
paste to heavy chemicals. 
G67 104 The contending approaches I've just cited (I could add some more, extend- 
ing to scholastic disputes about which techniques ought to be applied in-entirely 
hypothetical-investigations) of course contend mainly in the minds of the dis- 
putants. What makes so many of these debates so sterile is that the participants 
either cannot or will not see that they occupy vantage points of a very restricted 
sort; they seem to think that, like so many intellectual collossues (sic), they strad- 
dle the globe. The more one looks at this, the more one feels that the thing which 
British sociologists need is to consider the implications of Weber's work for their 
own. 
G73 7 Nearly twenty years ago, when D. S. Senanayake asked me to prepare a Draft 
Constitution for consideration by the Ceylonese IMinisters, I asked him what sort 
of Constitution he wanted. Ile replied that lie was not very concerned with the 
details, because what he wanted was a transfer of power front British to Ceylonese 
Ministers. I have heard that sort of remark several times since. 
G73 12 First, nobody can transfer power, except in a purely legal sense. What is 
transferred is legal authority, and legal authority does not necessarily confer power. 
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If you have legal authority to knock a man down, you still have to knock him down; 
and lie may prefer to knock you down. 
GT3 42 Nationalists are nearly always impatient, and they often think that the British 
Government is being deliberately slow and evasive. But what the Colonial Office 
really tries to do is to glide so gently from colonial rule to independence that the 
machinery of government will go on licking over as if no fundamental change had 
taken place. Some of the Nigerian leaders came to London ... 
G73 109 That is a common experience; but a good deal of knowledge has been accu- 
mulated over the past twenty years. What I am sure about is that all the problems 
which can reasonably be foreseen ought to be solved-in so far as they ever can be 
solved-before the transfer of authority takes place. In other words, a detailed and 
permanent Constitution ought to be carefully worked out beforehand. 
Reverse 1, Vh-Clefts (38 examples) 
A04 128 It was far better for a weapon used for retaliatory purposes to be under the 
sea rather than on land. This was why the Labour Party did not think it right to 
oppose the Polaris depot ship. The party agreed that it was unwise to locate the 
base in the Holy Loch, only 30 miles from Glasgow, a city with two n-dllion people. 0 
A16 69 Ordinary shares of Sopers of Harrow, Middx, the store firm, are worth 10,0s. 
each. That is what Debenhams, which already owns most of those in issue, are 
offering for the remaining 4,135. 
A22 236 Cheque in Scotland! Excuse the play on words, but that's what it could 
amount to where Spurs and Chelsea are concerned. Bill Nicholson, Spurs boss, has 
money to spend to maintain Tottenham's Double Top League and Cup glamour. 
A3T 79 A photograph of this occupies pride of place on his desk in the Fleetwood 
office. 'Since she was very youn,,, ' says her proud father, 'she has always taken a 
great interest in the business, and that is why I chose her for the company's trade 
name. I have confidence in her ability. ' 
A39 84 Sometimes when you listen to a record, the backing, however unobtrusive it 
may be, attracts your attention more than the singer. I mean no slight on Mr. 
Gary Miller when I confess that this is what happened when I heard his record 
'Dream Harbour' (Pye, N. 15338). The accompaniment, a soft, oriental rhythm, 
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came through entrancingly. 
B01 181 Only a man wrapped in the impenetrable cocoon of what he regards as a 
divine mission could have spoken of apartheid as a policy of good neighbourliness. 
We may be sure that he is not being hypocritical. That is what he really believes. 
A good neighbour to those Africans who, under apartheid, will be forced back to 
their tribal reserves with no prospect but a cramped and primitive existence. 
B14 77 And if he needs spectacles, when in hospital, he gets them free. And yet 
a widow, whose pension, for which her husband paid, is wiped out because she 
works for a living wage, will now have to pay 12 s. 6 d. for each lens in her 
spectacles, and 17 s. 8 d. for the frames. This is what -the Minister proposes. 
The truth is that you can't make sense out of small private charges under a vastly 
expensive public scheme. 
B14 84 But, at least, it ought to be a Minister's duty to refrain from doing positive 0 
harm just to collect a token tribute to the total tally. And social harm, Ifear, is 
what two of the proposed changes are going to achieve. For example, from March 
1, each item on a National Ilealth Service prescription is to cost 2 s. 
B17 104 This was, of course, a reference to the directive by the TUC General Council 
before the actual expulsion of the union, asking that Mr. Foulkes should resign 
his office and submit himself acain to the members for re-election. There can 
be no doubt, however, that readmission is what the members, or at least the vast 
majority of members, of the ETU want. But apart from whether or not this actually 
comes about, a heavy blow has been struck against Communist influence, one that 
should, and could, have been struck long ago. 
C07 36 He must have suffered not only from knowing what a monster he was to look 
at, but also from the uselessness to himself of his distorted body. This perhaps 
is what gave hint a fascination with bodies that were agile, bodies that could do 
what was asked of thern, and bodies that others wanted to use. At ihe same time, 
he needed to reassure himself about his own deformity with his consciousness 
that these bodies also would in time become, as his had, useless and hideous and 
unwanted, and that to would become so through the very exploitation of their 
desirability. 
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C10 160 There can be no doubt that, like Romeo Coates, he believes utterly in his 
mission. 'Dance inspires him ceaselessly to strive higher and higher towards the 
shining pinnacle of perfection that is the goal of every Artiste. ' Kathak, with its 
swift spins, is what bedizened boys used to dance before Alogul Emperors. Mr. 
Kumar rashly did it stripped to the waist, his long hair arranged in an untidy 
bird's-nest. 
C17 161 It is strange that a Hollywood actor should get the idea for a film in a New 
York students' loft on January 14,1957, and a few months later, with money 
borrowed and money donated after a TV interview, make this film in the streets 
of that city and then fail to find anyone in the United States who would show it. 
That is why John Cassavetes came to England to find someone who would take 
a risk on something new. It was the directors of newly- constructed British Lion, 
who have got faith in fresh faces, talent, ideas and letting people try them out, 
who saw 'Shadows' one evening and immediately offered Cassavetes the money 
for world distribution rights. 
D16 55 It's for families to decide what kind of houses they want and what kind of edu- 
cation is best for their children. This is what the modern State usually forgets. The 
Catholic Church always remembers. Hence all the quarrels between the Church 
and State. 
D16 172 Christ, of course, did no such thing. What had Ile told them? 'Render to 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's. ' That's 
what He had said. 
D16 175 That's what he expects. 
D16 176 ... if that's what happened to Christ Himself the priest is not surprised it 
should also happen to him. 
E05 110 Stainless steel from Sweden and the English Lake District: this is what we 
found at Pearce's, jewellers of Market PI, Leicester. The coffee-jug, designed 
by Gense of Sweden, costs 7s 6d and the three-legged dish, hand-beaten by the 
Keswick School of Art, is 19s 6d. Lanterns outside the front door, we are told, 
are fast increasing in popularity. This we confirmed whilst visiting Jack English 
at his shop in London Rd, Leicester. 
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E05 127 Bohemian crystal chandeliers, magnificent and resplendent, to grace alike 
the baronial hall or 'semi-det', are hung in a superb exhibition at Morgan Squires 
in Market St, Leicester. Crown Theresian chandeliers are known throughout the 
world- Maria Theresia, Empress of Austria and the mother of Marie Antoinette, 
decorated her palace with their like and this is how the name originated. They are 
made in Czechoslovakia and distributed in this country by Homeshades of Baker 
St, London W1. 
E22 47 It was not easy for anyone to believe at the time-about a year ago-when 
the noted scholar A. J. P. Taylor returned from a visit to Hungary, and wrote an 
encouraging report, that he was not misled while there. This is what he wrote: 
'the solid unn-dstaRable fact is that Hungarians are now pretty well off. I have 
never seen a greater display of foodstuffs ... there are clothes in every quality, 
from multiple stores to elegant private shops- in the provinces too: the days of 
hardship are over'. 
E35 68 It should be apparent from these remarks that very careful thought and plan- 
ning should be undertaken before carrying out any type of advertising. Quality is 
what cou'nts. As has already been stated, it is not always the size of space which 
don-dnates but how the space which is bought, can be used to the best advantage. 
F01 173 Before going further we should try to face what is an almost inevitable dif- 
ficulty for anyone approaching the study of mind for the first time. It is the 
tendency to get things the wrong way round. As a psychologist I am constantly 
encountering this tendency in friends and acquaintances. They think there is 
something inevitably 'queer' about psychology and this feeling of queerness usu- 
ally boils down to a quite mistaken belief that the psychologist first looks into his 
own mind and then interprets other people's minds by what he has found in his 
own. This is what I mean by 'getting things the wrong way roun dý He is far more 
likely to find out about how his own mind works by looking at other people's. 
F13 85 If a witness can be persuaded by an advocate in cross-examination that his 
honest, preconceived opinion must have been wrong, then that witness's side of 
the case suffers a major blow. That is why the defending advocate is watching you 
at this moment with such intensity. Ile is trying to read your mind, to understand 
your prejudices, to assess your qualities of reason and of reasonableness. 
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P17 10 The mother's face was drawn with anxiety. 'It's my little girl, doctor, ' she said 
indicating, the fair-haired child sitting by her side. 'I'm desperately worried about 4: ) 
her. I think she's got cancer. ' The doctor showed no emotion. 'And what makes 
you think that? ' lie asked. 'Well, ' said the mother, 'she's developed a lump in her 
chest. It's getting bigger, too. That is how cancer starts, isn't it? ' 'How old is the C> 
cldld? ' asked the doctor. 
P27 94 And from what class were the sheriffs and justices othe ballads chosen, if not 
from among the knights? The fact is that the knights as a class are not treated 
consistently in the ballads, which in my submission is what we should expect. The 
commons had no animus against social rank as such: what they resented was the 
lordship of unjust men and their corrupt practices. 
F27 151 The outlaws were not always poor men, but the poor man did not demand 
that. He demanded kindness, good lordship to engage his fidelity, and this is what 
the outlaw gave. It is the theme of Robin Hood's famous advice: But loke ye do 
no husbonde harm, That tilleth with his ploughe. 
G07 71 She had dreaded still more that he might return to England, overshadowing C) 
her again wi th spiritual and social peril. But this kind of return was what she 
could never have foreseen ... that he should come back not voluble but silent, not 
beautiful but defaced, not in obloquy but with his praises ringing! 
G14 58 It is not the mere fools that the confidence men successfully delude. It is, 
in their pregnant phrase, the 'larceny in the blood' of the victim which results 
in his victimization. And that was how Hitler operated-exploiting and using as 
his leverage the larceny in the blood' of innumerable politicians in every country 
who wanted to believe that here was a man who really had found a way of making 
diamonds out of plastics; a way, that is to say, of making a quick profit out of an 
illicit sale of the Western soul. 
G15 153 Ile realised, however, as not all Zionists did in those days, that there was an 
important difference between 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people', which was what the British Government undertook to support, 
and 'the re-establishment of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people', 
which was the formula suggested on the Zionist side. 
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G21 155 Make your way along the Backs on a May morning to the Wilderness, pene- 
trate passages and archways, cross bridges and gaze again and again at the Great 
Court of Trinity: this, believe me, is what education means, real education, for 
through appreciating the beauty of things you come in time to appreciate the beauty 
of ideas. 
G34 89 Yet if, because of his broad generalizations and his imperviousness to tinsel 
compliments, we used to think him unworldly, we were at once overestimating 
and underestimating him. For he has shown-and it is why the Rede Lecture has 
such an authoritative ring-a fine grasp of the realities of power. It is one reason, 
too, why in his novels the pictures of closed societies, clubs or departments are so 
horribly accurate. 
G37 43 ... This is what Georg Trakl, who died on the eastern front in December 
does in 'Im Osten' ('On the Eastern Front). Ile applies to the whole shapeless 
panorama of battle his gift for images which form a centre for a host of associations 
and must be taken at their full value as each appears: 
G37 59 Yet it was not impossible for a fighting man to let his vision pierce beyond C) C) 
the actual carnage and to divine with an apocalyptic clairvoyance its meaning in 
the scheme of things. This was what Isaac Rosenberg did. In the British army he 
had little in common with his fellow poets. They were officers; he was a private 
soldier. 
G37 112 The soldier has to adjust his mind to death. He does so by treating it as 
nothing unusual, and in his topsy-turvy world he is not wrong. This note of 
superficial detachment is what Guillaume Apollinaire catches in 'Exerciceý 
G52 133 Now most experts are wiffing collaborators, but the danger with all experts 
is that they are often not content to give of their best but insist on valuing their 
own contribution higher than that of other experts: think of the brilliant designer 
Inigo Jones and Ben Jonson's not unreasonable attack on his conceit. That is 
where the Mahler or Diaghilev is invaluable. Cochran, who checked every bit of 
material used in his shows (like Bernard Delfont now), was always there to appeal 
to, and was always watching from the background ready to step tactfully in to 
prevent trouble. 
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G57 111 It would be disastrous if the law had no firmer basis than the emotions of the 
majority-if dispassionate reason, knowledge, and common-sense were not also 
allowed a voice in its determination. Yet this is precisely what has happened in 
the realm of private morality which is concerned with sexual relation. Homosexual 
practices between men in private are deemed to be criminal (but not lesbian- 
ism, fornication, or adultery) simply because such practices arouse in the 'reason- 
able man' feelings of reprobation so strong as to demand expression in repressive 
statutes. 
G57 135 He recognizes that a morality based upon the consensus of a majority, even 
if that consensus is one mainly of feeling, is essentially a democratic notion, and 
that democracy means the running of risks which are inseparable from majority 
rule. But he insists that loyalty to democratic principles does not require us 
to maximize these risks, 'yet this is what we shall do if we mount the man in 
the street on top of the Clapham omnibus and tell him that if only he feels sick 
enough. about what other people do in private to demand its suppression by law, 
no theoretical criticism can be made of his demandý And in this connection it is 
well to remember the'adventitious and irrelevant means by which such sickness 
can be induced-the propaganda and pressures of many dubious kinds which can 
build up artificial emotions of reprobation to the point where they have to find 
expression, and may do so through the law. 
G59 57 To his instinctive behaviour on that occasion we can, in part, attribute the 
development of the Labour Party within the Parliamentary system instead of 
outside it, at a time when Left-wing movements throughout Europe became emigre 
groups within their own countries. Holding the ring-for this is what such conduct 
i, -ý--is not confined to strict constitutional questions. In Sir Harold Nicolson's 
biography, there are many examples of George's anxiety that the dominant party 
or even interest should not, so far as it was within his power to influence decisions, 
ride roughshod over the rights of any of his people. 0 
G73 27 A host of public servants, civil and military, have to obey orders; even then, 
government will not be efficient unless the people as a whole accept leadership 
loyally and enthusiastically. That is why the transfer of legal authorityfrorn British 
to Asian or African hands has been done as slowly and as cautiously as political 
conditions make possible. Lon, before the example of the Congo, we learned in 
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India in that it is possible to move too quickly; and in India there was no question 
of the public services breaking down because of the failure to obey orders. 
2 The Spoken Data 
In this part of the appendix appear the examples taken from the Survey of English 
Usage (SEU) data, appearing as Svartvik and Quirk [1980], and examples collected by 
the author during the course of the study (1987-1989). A superset of the SEU data also 
appears as an appendix in Geluykens [1984]; since our study is narrower in scope than 
Geluyk-ens', ' we cite here a reduced version of his corpus. 
The syntax of the spu line-numbers is as follows. All numbers carry the prefix s; the first 
two numerical fields (e. g. 1.4) indicate subdivisions of the corpus. The final numerical 
field indicates the line number of the appropriate subdivision at which the cleft itself 
appears. Because our study is concerned with clefts in context, we also include a small 
quantity of preceding and subsequent material with each example. In the spoken data, 
the beginning of each cleft is indicated by V, and the end by A. 
In the second section, our own examples are given. Less context appears with these, 
because of the limitations of casual recording by means of pencil and paper. 
Throughout both sections containing spoken data or references to such data, the notes 
[A] and [B] may appear after a reference or example. These notes denote sub-corpus 
A and sub-corpus B respectively, sub-corpora of data used and described in chapter 5 
above. 
'GeIuykens [1984] discusses headed cleft constructions beginning All that ..., the thing that 
andthe one who .... The study here does not consider these, as explained in chapter 1. 
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Line Number Stib-corpora I Line Number Sub-corpora 
S. 1.1.80 [A) [B] S. 1.13.130 [A] [Wj- 
S-1-1.299 [A] [B] S. 1.13.568 [A] [B] 
S-1-1.1083 [A) [B] S. 1.13.958 [A] [B] 
S. 1.2.35 [A] [B] S. 1.13.974 [A] [B] 
S. 1.2.823 [A] [B] S. 1.14.165 [A] [B] 
S. 1.2.831 [A] [B] S. 2.2.749 [A] [B] 
S. 1.3.361 [A] [B] S. 2.2.935 [A] [B] 
S. 1.4.365 [A] [B] S. 2.2.1138 [A] 
S. 1.4.881 [A] [B] S. 2.2.1150 [A] [B] 
S. 1.5.10 [A] [B] S. 2.4.1131 [A] [B] 
S. 1.5.377 [A] [B] S. 2.5.210 [A] [B] 
S. 1.5.984 S. 2.5.431 [A] [B] 
S. 1.5.987 [A] [B] S. 2.5.620 [A] [B] 
S. 1.6.17 [A] [B] S. 2.5.657 
S. 1.6.107 [A] [B] S. 2.5.930 [A) [B] 
S. 1.6.341 S. 2.5.1106 [A] [B] 
S. 1.6.781 [A] [B] S. 2.5.1124 
S. 1.6.1131 [A] [B] S. 2.6.241 [A] [B] 
S. 1.7.26 [A] [B) S. 2.6.400 [A] [B] 
S. 1.7.464 [A] [B] S. 2.6.611 
S. 1.7.807 [A] S. 2.6.664 
S. 1.8.321 [A] [B] S. 2.7.359 
S. 1.8.768 [A] [B) S. 2.7.426 
S-1-8.790 S. 2.8.13 
S. 1.8.799 [A] [B] S. 2.8.17 
S. 1.9.560 [A] [B) S. 2.8.90 
S. 1.9.623 (A] [B] S. 2.8.283 
S. 1.9.651 (A] [B] S. 2.8.529 
S. 1.9.867 (A] [B] S. 2.9.748 
S. 1.9.1126 [A] [B] S. 2.9.874 
S. 1.9.1412 [A] [B] S. 2.10.14 
S. 1.10.447 [A] [B] S. 2.10.203 
S. 1.11.106 [A] [B] S. 2.10.382 
S. 1.11.1060 [A] [B] S. 2.10.950 
S. 1.12.57 [A] [B] S. 2.10.1180 







































Author's Own Collection of Casual Conversational Data 
It-Clefts (37 examples) 
(1) IIP: We could find someone who's into Unix 
SB: VIt's opentop that's the problem. A I haven't been getting too much 
into Unix. [B] 
(2) HP: I was actually going to write and specify to the regions, but I sent 
it off anyway, 'COS Vit Was FRiday I was doing RA [B] 
(3) RD: I thought you'd be upset about the cup. 
JD: No, Vit's the GLASS I'M worded about., L [B] 
(4) JD: I'm really boring. Oops, I have to stop telling Jeremy I'm boring. 
Actually, I'm an incredibly exciting person. 
RD: VIVS IME that's boring. A 
(5) Tlds has certainly been a farnily affair. Barbara Bush has been on all 
the TV networks, and Vit was his Mexican daughter who seconded the 
nomination for the vice PREsidency. A So for a man who stated that he 
didn't want his family involved, this has been a bit of a U-turn. 
(6) JMHO: Are you sure nothing got copied across? 
JD: (goes and looks) Yes, Jeremy, you're right. So Vit's just the GARBage 
that didn't get copied., L [B] 
(7) A: I want some cheese. 
B: Which one did you want? 
A: Vlt'S CHEDDar I'm wantingL 
(8) JD: I think your Mum phoned. It was a middle-aged woman, anyway. 
KK: (Rings up, talks for about 12 minutes) 0 
JD: VWas it your lklum? A 
(9) JD: And here was me thinking that Robert had brought me the croissant, 0 
while all the time Vit was You. A [B] 
(10) JD: Did the subject really make this error? 
PT: Sic? No, that's not sic. VIt's just me that can7t TYPE., L 
(11) JD: Well, we lost three surveys before we got our flat. 
PT: And Vit was on the FOURTH one you got itA 
JD: Yeah [B] 
(12) PT: I've killed myself running. I can't go downstairs. 
JD: (pointing to front of legs) VIt'S THESE muscles that hurtL, isn't it 
PT: Yeah, and my FEET for some reason 
C, 
(13) JD: Fascist. 
RD: VIt's You that7s the fascistA. 
(14) You see yesterday Vit wasn't just us who put up their interest rates. It 
was the FRENCH, it was the siviss, it was the GERxians& 
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(15) JD: These [oatcakes] always smell a bit rancid. Vlt's the OIL they useA, 
I think. 
(16) INIM: The door's always wide open all weekend when the place is empty, 
but when there's a full department it gets locked 
JD: From this we can conclude that Vit's the people who aren't in at 
weekends that CLOSE RA 
(17) KV: I don't like going to popmobility. It's too energetic. VIt's more the 
bendy, FLEXY Stuff I needA. [B] 
(18) JD: But have I started to write mine? Have V I've got four pages. VIt's 
not the starting, it's the carrying ON that's the problemL. 
(19) JD: Alia, THAT'S what it is. Robert's doing a dump of brouwer. 
AL: VIs it Robert that's making it go SLOIVA? 
(20) JD: (pointing to a picture on the wall) It's a little cartoon, isn't it? 
RD: Yes, VitS JON that did itA. 
(21) KK: The people realised that they needed a computer-Vit was an Apple 
they neededA-and 
(22) HP: It gives you wordwrap when typing things. VIt's as you say when 
you start insERTin., things that it gets to be a problem& 
(23) JD: And does the head know? 
HP: No. Oh, wait a rrLinute. Vlt was the head who arrANGED itA. 
(24) HP: Then she can decide which one of the rooms she wants, and I don't 
mind if Vit's F10 or F13 I GETA 
(25) RD: Are you sure instant decaff is OK for you? 
MC: Yes, Vit's just the CAFFeine that I can't take much ofA 
(26) JB: Isn't it locked? It's usually locked. 
JD: VIt's only the cupboard that's lockedA. 
(27) MM: So do you think they're going to wake up? 
EK: So it's them and us, is it? 
TMINI: Well, Vit's me versus everyone else. It's people who are still work- 
ing on their PhDS that we're talking about hereA. [B] 
(28) JD: All you have to do is go to Leicestershire 
KIM: Or even Lancashire. VIt was in Lancashire that I HEARD itA. 
(29) KK: In order that this doesn't get out of hand we have to be careful-keep 
it all in separate sections 
HP: Well we can do the lower level specifications of what's needed sep- 
arately. I mean Vit's basically PROTOCOIS you're specifyingA, that they 
should be able to follow 
(30) Telecom. VIt's You we answer toA. 
(31) Who else would choose one of the gurus of the film industry, Orson 
Welles, to expound the philosophies that form the major insights of the 
film? To be fair, though, Vit's Welles who expounds the most INteresting 
ideas& 
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(32) FH: I've ordered. 
Waiter: 1,2,3,4,5 - ah 
RD: VIt's NiE who hasn't orderedA [B] 
(33) A: We've found that the cabbage root fly comes in a wave motion. So 
by predicting when it's going to come, we can tell the farmer when to 
spray. 
B: But Vit's not only cabbages that are affECTed, is it? A 
A: No, the cabbage root fly affectS ALL the brassicas [B] 
(34) NUM: You could try Elsa. She's got Chomsky's complete works 
CR: I know ... VIt's cos of her that I NEED itA. Anyway, thanks 
(35) CM: When we set up the description space, Vit's these kinds of relation- 
ship that we're interested in COMPUTingA. In particular, this one here, 
the relationship between two concepts of animacy. 
(36) CM: So my conclusion said I needed a NEcessary condition. VIt's 
sufficient ones I needA. Yes, you're right. 
(37) C IN, I: ... but Vit's essentially a very suNiple part of an equation that's bein- added onA. 0 
Wh-Clefts (36 examples) 
(38) RD: Do you know what I'm doing? I'm testing my memory. VWhat 
it does is tests the whole of memory by %Vniting to it and reading back 
from it to see if what it wrote is Still THEREA. It does it over a thousand 
times. 
(39) RD: Come and have some Dairy Milk. VWhat you need is a wee bit of 
cHocolateZý. [131 
(40) RD: VWhat you could do is hit it with a IJA, \Irier& 
(41) RD: They're OK, and if they're not, it's not clear what's wrong with 
them. 
JD: VWliat's naff about them is that they'd normally be WH cleftsA. 
(42) RD: Is any of you guys shit-hot on DAGs and things of that sort? 
G M: No. 
RD: VWliat I want to FIND is a model of things I can use-a sort of formal 
description ... some formal thing I can use to follow the definitions of 
these feature structures I useA 
(43) MR: Do you want a recursive definition of a DAG, or something? 0 RD: No, Vwliat I want to say is that each STRUCTure has the following 
characterisficsA ... 
(44) VWhy we're unhappy about this scheme is that we don't believe it will 
WORKL. 
(45) They must have said to themselves, this man has gone crazy. He is mad. 
VWliat they didn't realise was that I was the one who was saneA. 
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(46) IIP: Well Vwhat you want is to have the word insERTed, so that it simply 
goes in between the twoA. 
JD: But is that what we WANT? 
(47) 1 want them to understand who's in charge. And Vwho's in charge is 
Neil K INNOCk-A. 
(48) HP: I mean there's already sometNng of that in the low-level proram- ZD 
min- documentation 0 
KK: VWhat we actually NEED is a specification of what these things 
actually Do-rather than just what they ought to doA. [B] 
(49) HP: VWhat we've been working on is the general framework for the 
evalUATionA. And what I'm going to talk about is just briefly a frame- 
work for the pilot phase. 
(50) HP: @ What we've been working on is the general framework for the eval- 
uation. And Vwhat I'm going to talk about is just briefly a framework 
for the Pilot phaseA. 
(51) HP: The fifth section is a pragmatic one-a sort of dustbin category. 
VWhat I haven't addressed is THIS& [points to chart] and what I haven't 
included in the framework is the question of how the project management 
is evaluated. 
(52) HP: The fifth section is a pragmatic one--a sort of dustbin category. 
What I haven't addressed is this [points to chart] and Vwhat I haven't 
included in the framework is the question of how the project NIANagement 
is evaluatedA. 
(53) JD: You seem to be able to do almost anything with them. VWhat you 
can't do is write CIIEQUESA. 
(54) LS: I've lost the application form, so Vwhat I'm trying to do is FIND 
itA. So what I'm doing now is going everywhere I've been, you know? 
(55) LS: I've lost the application form, so what I'm trying to do is find it. So 
Vwhat I'm doing now is going everywhere I've BEEN, you knowA? 
(56) A: So are you concerned about the allegations of safety on the rig? 
B: Yes, of course I'm concerned, but V%vhat I'm concerned about is to get 
to the BOTTOM of them ... to get to the hard facts of what happenedA. [B] 
(57) If you look at the figures, they are as I say: 101 accidents in 1986, but 0 
only 56 in 1987. VWhat I'm concerned about is that there's been an 
iMPROVEmentA. 
(58) CTNI: When I come to the last bit, Vwhat I'm trying to do is ... 
I'd just 
like to give a general flavour of what I'm trying to doA, but won't be 
going into very much detail. 
(59) CIM: VWhat I'm interested in doing is embodying general PRoperties 
like this one& 
(60) CIM: Well Vwhat you get is a description space, and we can think of a 
description space as being a latticeA. 
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(61) CM: VWhat my project is looking at is certain kinds of enco(fing that 
we might be able to ConSTRUCT for description systemu2s. 
(62) CNI: So Vwliat I want to do is just to tell you a resULT that applies to 
finite tree encodable descriptionsZý 
(63) CTM: I want to be able to talk about elements of the description being 
prime. And Vwhat prime means is that anything beLO%V this description 
has that primitive in it,, ̂ N. [B] 
(64) CM: So in effect, Vwhat this is saying is that any clash Of GRoUNDing 
has to be describable within primitivesA. [B] 
(65) VWhat I want to talk- about is basically a way of constructing BIG IS Out 
of smaller onesA. And I need to have a way of talking about the bigger 
elements of these lattices. 
(66) CM: People have been using trees before, but in an ad hoc way. Partly 
Vwhat I was trying to do was come upon a formal desCRIPtion of what 0 
these things meantA. 
(67) CM: 
... a conjunction of two addresses. 
And Vwhat it's pointing to 
... oops I missed aD out there ... is the thing pointed at 
by the FIRST 
addressA ... the conjunction of that and the thing pointed at 
by the 
SEcond address. [B] 
(68) CM: If you just want to say look, these two descriptions simply aren't 
rCATed to one another, Vwhat you would get would be TIIISL [pointing 
to diagram]. 
(69) CM: 
... an operation I call 
deepening. VWhat you do is you take a 
description space D, with one element, and you say that where I had this 
element here before, I can replace that element with a whole description 
spaceA. So the result of that would be this lattice here. 
(70) CM: And here we have a tree. VIlow I got to the tree was simply by 
adding one on each timeA. What that's doing is essentially adding on a 
dimension each time. [B] 
(71) CIM: How I got to the tree was simply by adding one on each time. 
VWhat that's doing is essentially adding on a diMENsion each timeA. 00 
(72) JD: I quite like documentaries. VWliat I loathe are those interminable 
heart transplantsA. [B] 
Reverse 11,1-Clefts (16 examples) 
(73) JD: Why don't you use a spanner to open it? Or do you need something 
else? 
RD: VA SPANNer's what I needA 
(74) MG: It must be Lawrence Erlbaum asking him to write a book, and he's 
got to say, 'I'm sorry, that's not the plan. I've got to write the article 
for the Manchester Guardian first. ' 
JD: VIs that what he %VANTedA? 
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(75) JD: Aha, VTHAT'S what it isA. Robert's doing a dump of brouwer. 
AL: Is it Robert that's making it go SLOW? [A] [B] 
(76) SB: If you drop it in here it puts it in here. 
HP: VTliat's obviously what YOU WANTed when you pointed thereA. 
(77) HP: Well what you want is to have the word inSERTed, so that it simply 
goes in between the two. 
JD: But Vis that what We WANTA? [B] 
(78) JD: VI didn't know THAT was where he livedA. 
(79) JD: That was my friend Mike. 
MM: GOS11, VTHAT'S what lie looks likeA. [A] [B] 
(80) MM: I thought you were going to Spain. 
JD: Yes, Vthat's what I told MimoA, but ... 
(81) MM: But it can't be true that they're simply to make intonation clearer, 
as then you don't have account for written language 
JD: Yes, VTHAT'S what you would think-A, but you can make a case for 
a model of reading that uses intonational cues. 
(82) RD: I'm phoning to complain ... sent me a 
letter that accuses me, be- 
cause Vthat's what it DOESA, of failing to either return the letter or 
specify enough information. 
(83) JD: How are you with things like cabbage and cauliflower? 00 
MC: VVegetables are what I should eat MOST ofA, so they're fine. 0 
(84) JD: They call it a 'Bain Marie', which means 'Mary's bath'. I don't 
know why. Maybe Vshe was who inVENTed itA. 
(85) JD: I've been given a really nice Habitat holepunch for Christmas. It's 
matt black 
KIM: Can't you go and exchange it for a stapler? Because VTHAT'S what 
I really needA 
(86) JD: We're not having a very good relationship at the moment, because 
he's on a diet. Ile's being a right pain. Robert practically threw him 
at the wall last night. [To eat) V 1"ou were what woke us up at four 
O'CLOCKA, weren't you? 
(87) A: So are you concerned about the allegations of safety on the rig? 
B: Yes, of course I'm concerned, but what I'm concerned about is to get 
to the bottom of them ... to get to the 
hard facts of what happened. 
And VTHAT'S what I'm determined to doA. 
(88) FII: 
... or are 
these just what you could think of at the TMIE? 
CM: VThey're what I could THINK OfA ... 
I'd like to think of MORE 
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